ORDER
1. This petition under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code is made by the petitioner M/s. Shrei International Finance Limited, Madras with its branch office at Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the 'financier company') praying to quash the criminal proceedings in PCR 165 of 1997 pending on the file of the Court of IV Additional C.M.M., Bangalore and also challenging the order dated 9-9-1997 of the learned Magistrate referring the private complaint of respondent 1-M.G. Narayana ('complainant' for short) under Section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code to the Police Sub-Inspector (PSI) of Byatrayanpura, Bangalore City for investigation and report.
2. Respondent 2-Baruva is shown as the General Manager and respondent 3-Mr. Surendra as the Field Officer of A1 Finance Company. They are accused 2 and 3 in the said complaint. Therefore, they are hereinafter referred to as 'A2' and 'A3'. Respondent 4 is impleaded in the petition since the vehicle in question was purchased by him.
3. The undisputed facts giving rise to this petition are as stated under:
On 8-9-1997 the complainant presented his complaint under Section 200, Criminal Procedure Code before the learned Magistrate against Al to A3 and another alleging commission of offences under Sections 406, 420 and 506 of Indian Penal Code with a prayer that the complaint may be referred to the S.H.O. of the said police station under Section 156(3) for investigation and report. The subject matter of the alleged offences is the Hydraulic Excavator bearing No. G. 10520. It was manufactured by the industrial concern BEML, Bangalore. The complainant's case stated in the complaint is that he is the owner of the said Excavator. It was purchased by him from BEML for Rs. 37,02,600/- with the financial assistance from Al company. He availed the financial assistance for whole of the said price of the said Excavator from the latter (accused) by giving collateral security of 3 persons and depositing cash Rs. 9,00,000/- as security. In this regard he has stated at para 3 of the complaint that:
'The accused company had financed to the tune of Rs. 37,00,260/- which is repayable by the complainant in equal 30 monthly instalments of Rs. 1,61,875/-, amounting to Rs. 48.56,250/-. The finance advanced by the accused company in the month of January, 1996. The xerox copy of the invoice issued by the BEML, Bangalore, dated 24-1-1996 is herewith produced at Annexure-A for kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court'.
At para 4 of the complaint it is further stated:
'The complainant further submits that he has deposited a sum of Rs. 9,00,000/- on 18-1-1996 with the accused, apart from the collateral securities. The xerox copy of the letter of terms and conditions issued by the accused dated 18-1-1996 is herewith produced at Annexure-B for kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court'.
The complainant took delivery of possession of the said machinery on 18-1-1996 and he went on paying monthly instalments to Al upto 12-1-1997, totalling the sum of Rs. 12,88,000/-. He admittedly failed to pay subsequent monthly instalments to Al towards the discharge of the said loan amount. Therefore, the demand notice dated 25-3-1997 at Annexure-C was issued to him by the accused company demanding payment of admitted balance of Rs. 11,84,842/-. No further payment was made by the complainant to the accused in response to the said notice.
4. The complaint allegations against accused are that on 11-5-1997 one person approached the complainant and introduced himself as Surendra (A3) the Field Officer of A1 company and induced him to bring the said Excavator and leave it with M/s. Narendra Company on Mysore Road, Bangalore misrepresenting that after getting its condition checked there it would be returned to him. Thereafter the said Excavator was never returned to complainant by the accused though he was requesting them to give it back to him assuring that he would pay up the outstanding amount by instalments. A letter Annexure-A dated 13-5-1997 was also written by the complainant to the accused to this effect.
5. Subsequently, complainant came to know that the said Excavator was sold away by the accused to M/s. Eagle Earth Movers, No. 381, 'Paradise', I Block, Third Main, R.T. Nagar, Bangalore-32, which is arrayed as A-4 in the complaint, without the complainant's knowledge and consent and the sale proceeds thereof was misappropriated by A1 to A4. It is further alleged that certain blank papers with complainant's signatures were obtained and misused by Al to A4 and misappropriated the said sale proceeds and thereby wrong full loss was caused to the complainant and wrongful gain to themselves. Hence commission of offences under Sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code by them.
6. As regards alleged offence under Section 506, Indian Penal Code the only allegation made in the complaint is that the accused 2 and 3 have also threatened the complainant with dire consequences to break his limbs and bones if the complainant informed the police or any other person.
7. On the same complaint under Section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code on a reference of the learned Magistrate in the said Byatrayanpura P.S. Crime No. 416 of 1997 under Sections 406, 420 and 506, Indian Penal Code against A1 to A3 was registered by the SHO on 12-9-1997 and the FIR was despatched to the Magistrate Court.
8. The petitioner-accused has contended in the petition that the complaint allegations do not disclose commission of the alleged offences and, therefore, the criminal prosecution against accused may be quashed to meet the ends of justice. It is further stated therein that the said excavator machinery (vehicle) was supplied to the complainant by Al company on hire-purchase basis providing him necessary financial assistance for its said price subject to the terms and conditions of hire purchase agreement dated 18-1-1996 entered into between the parties. On complainant's failure to make the payment of the said subsequent monthly instalment towards discharge of the said loan facility, the said machinery was seized by A1's officials on 11-5-1997 in exercise of the power reserved for Al owner under Articles 3(b) and 19 of the said hire purchase agreement, after giving sufficient opportunity to the former to clear the amount due and that on 5-6-1997 the said machinery was sold to A4-M/S. Eagle Earth Movers represented by its proprietor U.R. Subramanian in exercise of the power so reserved to Al Company under Article 19(c) read with Article 42 of the said agreement.
9. Mr. M.V. Kini, learned Counsel for petitioner, reiterating the contentions taken in the petition argued that the criminal proceedings initiated by complainant against accused is ill-motivated and it amounts to sheer abuse of process of the Court. Therefore, he maintained that the same is liable to be quashed. He further contended that the criminal proceedings against an accused launched on the basis of a private complaint or investigation undertaken by the police on the basis of the FIR could be quashed by High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code at the initial stage itself and even before learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the alleged offence and directing issue of process against accused. To support this contention reliance had been placed by him on the following decisions:--
(i) State of West Bengal and Others v Swapan Kumar Guha and Others;
(ii) Madhava Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia and Others v Sambhaji Rao Chandroji Rao Angre and Others;
(iii) M/s. Silk Import and Export Inc. v M/s. Exim Aides Silk Exporter and Another.
His further argument was that, on complainant's default in payment of instalment amount, under the said articles in the said hire purchase agreement dated 18-1-1996, the accused company was legally empowered to take possession of the said vehicle belonging to it from the complainant and sell the same to any third party and, therefore, the said acts of the accused do not amount to any criminal acts attracting the alleged offences under Sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code. In support of this submission he relied on a decision of Supreme Court reported in K.A. Mathai v Kara Bibbikutty, and on a Division Bench decision of this Court in M/s. Sriram Transport Finance Company Limited, Bangalore and Another v R. Khaishiulla Khan and Another.
10. Mr. C.V. Nagesh, learned Counsel for complainantvehemently argued otherwise opposing the petition. Hecontended firstly, that the accused had no locus standi toapproach this Court invoking Section 482, CriminalProcedure Code seeking quashing of the said criminalproceedings or investigation by the police against accusedin the said Crime No. 416 of 1997 of Byatrayanpura P.S.Nextly, the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed at theinitial stage by the High Court in exercise of its powerunder Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. Thirdly, theHigh Court under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Codecannot enter into evaluation of the allegations made in theFIR or complaint to find out if the alleged offences weremade out or not. In support of respective contentions hecited the decisions in V.S. Narayanan v B.C. Sridhar and Another, State of Uttar Pradesh v O.P. Skarma, M/s. Asian Wire Ropes Limited, Hyderabad v Delhi Special Police Establishment, Bangalore Branch, Bangalore, State of Tamil Nadu v Thirukkural Perumal, Union of India v B.R. Bajaj and Others and M/s. Jayant Vitamins Limited v Chaitanya kumar and Another.
11. Therefore, the material points that call for determination are:
(1) Whether the High Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code can quash the criminal proceedings at the initial stage viz. when the learned Magistrate directs a private complaint to the police under Section 156(3), Criminal Procedure Code for investigation and report, or at the FIR stage?
(2) If so, whether in the instant case, the investigation by the police in the said Crime No. 416 of 1997 of Byatrayanpura P.S. into the alleged offences against accused should be stopped?
Point No. 1
12. In Sharma's case, supra, the accused industrial unit was engaged in dealing in linseed oil and other edible oils and it had been storing the same utilising it for the manufacture of paints and varnish. An FIR was issued by the concerned police against accused for an offence punishable under Section 3 read with Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 on the allegation of the accused industry being found storing a large quantity of the said oil in violation of certain clauses of Pulses, Edible Oilseeds and Edible Oil (Storage Control) Order, 1977. The criminal action so initiated by the police was challenged by the accused by his petition under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code in the High Court of Allahabad and the said FIR was sought to be quashed. His petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge of High Court. The state took up the matter before Supreme Court. While setting aside that order of the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court, the Supreme Court observed at para 10 of its judgment:
'It is seen that the complaint is self-explanatory and has specifically mentioned about the storage of oil and oil seeds without licence under the respective orders. It is not in dispute that the FIR did mention that he purchased and kept in store the above quantity. Thus the ingredients have been specified'.
The material observations made by Supreme Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v Prithi Chand and Another, were also reproduced by it. The relevant statement or law contained therein which is material for our purpose is as excerpted below:
'But only in exceptional cases, i.e., in rarest of rare cases of mala fide initiation of the proceedings to wreak private vengeance criminal process is availed of in laying a complaint or FIR which itself does not disclose at all any cognizable offence, the Court may embark upon the consideration thereof and exercise the power'.
In the context of facts of that case in O.P. Sharma's case, supra, Supreme Court further observed:
'The High Court should be loath to interfere at the threshold to thwart the prosecution exercising its inherent power under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code or under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, as the case may be, and allow the law to take its own course'.
In Thirukkural Perumal's case, supra, the same principle is reiterated by Supreme Court in following terms:
'The power of quashing an FIR and criminal proceedings should be exercised sparingly by the Courts. Indeed, the High Court has the extraordinary or inherent power to reach out injustice and quash the first information report and criminal proceedings, keeping in view the guidelines laid down by this Court in various judgments (reference in this connection may be made with advantage to State of Haryana v Bhajanlal), but the same has to be done with circumspection'.
Further adverting to the guidelines enunciated in the earlier decision in State of Haryana v Bhajanlal, at para 102 of its judgment it has listed out seven circumstances by way of illustration wherein power under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code could be exercised to quash the investigation at the FIR stage or the criminal proceedings before the Court at the preliminary stage itself to secure the ends of justice. For our purpose circumstances 1 and 5 that are so listed therein are material and they are:
'1. Whether the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute an offence or make out a case against the accused.
2, 3 and 4 xx xx xx.
5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can even reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6 and 7 xx xx xx.
A note of caution is also made in the judgment that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of cases; that the Court will not be justified upon an enquiry as to reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice'.
In Swapan Kumar's case, supra, the Supreme Court has laid down the following guiding principle in this regard:
'On consideration of all the relevant materials the Court has to come to a conclusion whether an offence is disclosed or not. If on consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, the Court will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation into the offence to be completed for collecting material for proving the offence. If, on the other hand, the Court on consideration of the relevant material is satisfied that no offence is disclosed, it would be the duty of the Court to interfere with any investigation and to stop the same to prevent any kind of uncalled for and unnecessary harassment to an individual'.
(emphasis supplied)
The same principle is reiterated by Supreme Court in its latter decision in Madhava Rao's case, supra, at para 7 of its judgment as follows:
'The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are black and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage'.
13. In the case of Asian Wire Ropes Limited, supra, an FIR issued against the accused for offences under Section 120B, Indian Penal Code read with Sections 420 and 421, Indian Penal Code and Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act was sought to be quashed by the accused under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. This Court on examination of the allegations in the complaint observed:
'When an action was initiated in respect of commission of offence by any person, statutory right to investigate cannot be interfered with under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioner can wait till the investigation is over and there is a specific provision in the Code to establish that there is no prima facie case against him after filing of the charge sheet. When the matter is covered by an express letter of law, the Court cannot give a go-by to statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction'.
Yet the settled position of law is reiterated in the learned Judge stating:
'Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code has to be used for quashing a proceeding in the rarest of rare cases'.
14. The afore-quoted authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court have consistently laid down the law to the effect that where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint when taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute the alleged offence or make out a case against the accused for the same, it will be the duty of the High Court under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code to quash the criminal proceedings against accused at the preliminary stage of the proceedings itself to prevent abuse of the process of Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Therefore, it logically follows that the accused in such a case is entitled to challenge the criminal action initiated either by FIR or by a private complaint against him at the initial stage of such criminal proceeding and for this purpose he need not wait till the Magistrate takes cognizance of the alleged offence and/or issuance of process against him. In that view of the law laid down by Supreme Court, the afore-quoted observations of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Asian Wire Ropes Limited's case, supra, will operate merely as obiter dicta and cannot be taken as laying down the ratio. Similarly, the view taken by another learned Single Judge of this Court in a recent decision of V.S. Narayan's case, supra, that 'the accused will have no locus standi to question the order passed by the Magistrate which is prelude to taking cognizance of the offence' and that 'the accused gets right to approach the Court to participate in the proceedings or to question the order only after the concerned Court takes cognizance and directs to issue process to the accused persons. . . .', is per contra to the law consistently laid down by Supreme Court. Since such a view appears to have been taken per incuriam as the aforementioned relevant decisions of the Supreme Court were not brought to the notice of the learned Judge, the exposition of the law made in the case of V.S. Narayanan, supra, cannot be taken as a precedent and the same will have to be treated as confined to that case in its operation. If, on consideration of the allegations in the FIR or in the complaint if the Court is of opinion they do not make out the essential ingredients of the alleged offence, I find that under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code the High Court has the power and it will be its duty to quash the FIR or the complaint proceedings at the initial stage itself in order to prevent the abuse of process of law or to secure the ends of justice. Hence, Point No. 1 is answered in the affirmative.
Point No. 2
15. As indicated, the offences alleged in the complaint as committed by the accused are the offences under Sections 406, 420 and 506, Indian Penal Code. The complainant's case is that he was the owner of the said vehicle having purchased the same for Rs. 37,02,600/- from BEML under its invoice dated 24-1-1996 by availing loan from A1-Finance Company. After paying thetotal amount of Rs. 12,88,000/- upto 12-1-1997, which roughlyworks out to 8 months instalments, he failed to pay thesubsequent monthly instalments in spite of A1's demand letterdated 25-3-1997 at Annexure-C and that it was thereafter on11-5-1997 the said vehicle was taken away from him by A-1's people and the same was subsequently sold by A1 to M/s. Eagle Earthmovers who is admittedly represented by its Proprietor U.R. Subramaniam.
16. It is an admitted fact that the said vehicle was manufactured and sold by BEML under its invoice dated 24-1-1996 which is shown as Annexure-A in the complaint. The complaint allegation is that the complainant was the owner of the said vehicle having purchased it from BEML under its said invoice. He does not expressly state in the complaint that the said financial assistance was provided to him by Al and he got the said vehicle on the basis of hire purchase agreement between him and Al. But, in fact, this transaction was the Hire Purchase transaction between them is made crystal clear from the admitted contents of Al's said letter dated 18-1-1996 at Annexure-B written to the complainant prior to the date of purchase of the said vehicle from BEML on 24-1-1996. Its preamble portion is very material for the purpose and it is extracted below:
'Sirs,
Sub: Your proposal for an HP transaction
with us.
With reference to your application dated 12-1-1996, we are pleased to offer you on hire purchase transaction the following equipments to be used by you on broad terms and conditions mentioned herein below:'
The terms and conditions of the transaction are broadly spelt out therein giving particulars of the description of the said vehicle, its cost, Al's charges for financial service, rate of interest on the said loan, service charges and number of monthly instalments by which the loan was repayable, the security deposit to be made with A1 and other collateral security required to be furnished. It is further stated in Sl. No. 15 that the documentation that is required to be done between the parties is the hire purchase documentation, under the head 'Other terms and conditions'. The further conditions set out therein are as quoted below:
'Other terms and conditions:
'1. Payment will be made on completion of all documentation and complying with all terms and conditions of sanction and agreement.
2. If any advance/part payment are made by us on behalf of the hirer, finance charge @ 30% p.a. will be levied from the date of disbursement to the actual date of delivery.
OR
The Hirer can pay the advance/part payment which will be refunded by us at the time of signing the agreement which will be the date of delivery.
This offer is subject to credit appraisal, completion of documentation and approval of credit committee.
In case above terms are acceptable to you, kindly accord your acceptance in duplicate copy of this letter'.
17. Thus the admitted contents of the said letter dated 18-1-1996 stated in the complaint make it clear that the facility of said financial assistance by A1-Finance Company was to be granted to the complainant on the basis of hire purchase transaction with respect to the said vehicle and subject to execution of the hire purchase agreement between the parties. It being the complainant's case that he did avail of the said financial assistance by A1 company, undoubtedly, makes the position clear that the same was availed of by him from Al on execution of the hire purchase agreement on the terms and conditions stated in A1's said letter dated 18-1-1996. The contents of BEML's invoice shown in the complaint at Annexure-A dated 24-1-1996 discloses that the said vehicle was supplied to Al in execution of its supply order No. 2954/311 of 1995-96, dated 22-1-1996. So the fact of complainant taking possession of the said vehicle from Al on the basis of H.P. transaction which is clearly borne out from the contents of Al's said letter dated 18-1-1996 and the BEML's invoice dated 24-1-1996, which documents are relied on by the complainant himself in support of the complaint allegations, appears to have been deliberately not stated expressly by the complainant in his complaint. But the fact remains established from his own material on record that the financial assistance provided to him by A1 in respect of the said vehicle was on the basis of hire purchase agreement and, therefore, in the eye of law he was not the 'owner' thereof but he was its mere 'hirer' of the vehicle from Al who was its owner till the last monthly installment of the loan facility was paid over to Al by him. It is in this particular context the hire purchase agreement dated 18-1-1996 entered into between the parties, which has been produced for the accused in this revision per Annexure-A, calls for consideration to undo the mischief which the complainant intends to play against accused by attempting in vain to suppress this material fact from his complaint.
18. On going through the said hire purchase agreement I find, as rightly submitted by learned Counsel for accused, that the relevant clauses at Articles 3(b), 19(b), 19(c) and 42(d) reserve sufficient power for Al, owner, under the agreement to seize and sell the said vehicle in case of complainant committing default in regular payment of the said monthly instalments to the former. Therefore, on repeated default by the complainant in payment of the said monthly instalments Al was entitled to seize the said vehicle from him and sell the same to any third party. So, the important question which requires consideration is whether these acts of the accused could be held as constituting the alleged offences under Sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code against them. This question finds its answer in a recent decision of Supreme Court in the case of K.A. Mathai, supra and of this Court in its decisions M/s. Sriram Transport Finance Limited. In a similar case of K.A. Mathai, supra, under an hire purchase agreement with his financiers, complainant had taken delivery of a bus. On default in payment of monthly instalments by him the financier had taken possession of the bus from him. On a complaint of theft filed by him against the financier, the Supreme Court, in appeal by the financier, observed:
'The assertion of rights and obligations accruing to the appellants under the aforesaid two agreements, wiped out any dishonest pretence in that regard from which it could be inferred that they had done so with a guilty intention'.
So holding, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court which was passed setting aside the sessions Court order discharging the financier accused and acquitting the latter of the charge of theft.
19. The Division Bench of this Court in M/s. Sriram Transport Finance Company Limited's case, supra, dwelt at length on the legal aspect of the alleged criminal liability of the financier arising from hire purchase transaction in case when the vehicle which is the subject of such transaction was seized and taken possession by the financier from the hirer. At para 7 of its judgment the High Court has ruled:
'The absolute ownership of the vehicle does not pass to him until all the conditions in the agreement are fulfilled or he opts to purchase the vehicle. It would be a fallacy to equate the hirer with an absolute owner having proprietary rights in the vehicle'.
Relying on the case law laid down by Supreme Court in its decisions in Sundaram Finance Limited v State of Kerala and Another and K.L. Johar and Company v The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Coimbatore III, the High Court has further observed: 'Therefore, the intending purchaser is known as the hirer so long as the option to purchase is not exercised, and the essence of the hire purchase agreement properly so-called is that the property in the goods does not pass at the time of the agreement but remains in the intending seller and only passes on later when the option is exercised by the intending purchaser'.
Further, referring to the legal proposition enunciated in Tumkur Town Veereshaiva Co-operative Bank Limited v H.C. Shamala and to the said decisions of Supreme Court, the High Court held:
'These decisions of Supreme Court and of this Court affirm the contractual obligations having been recognised should be honoured and cannot be ignored and in fact under Section 176 of the Contract Act by agreement of the parties rights stipulated have been recognised. It also emerges that the property in goods does not pass to the hirer until all the conditions imposed on him under the hire purchase agreement are fulfilled, including the payment of the entire amount advanced under the agreement'.
So holding the High Court then proceeded to consider the right of the financier to seize the property for acquisition of which amount was advanced by it. Referring to its earlier decisions laying down the relevant propositions, the learned judges concluded at Para 10 of the judgment:
'If the hirer in possession of the vehicle has agreed that the financier or the owner would be at liberty to seize the vehicle whenever defaults are committed by him it becomes the obligation of the hirer to honour his commitment and pay the instalments as stipulated without committing any defaults. Having come in actual possession of the vehicle in pursuance of such agreement and the financier reposes confidence in him and entrusts the vehicle to his possession to run it and make earning and the hirer taking advantage of the position in which he is placed by virtue of the agreement makes out a case of financier committing theft when he seizes the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement in fact commits betrayal of the trust reposed in him by the financier or the real owner. It has become the modus operandi of hirers, as we come across such instances frequently, to commit defaults either wilfully or otherwise, scuttle the rights of the financier to seize the vehicle under the agreement by filing complaints of theft, take possession of the vehicle through Court relying on registration certificates and drive the financiers or absolute owners to Civil Courts to recover the money advanced to hirers. Such a course of open breach of solemn agreements cannot be encouraged by Courts by the Courts on the contrary should give effect to such agreements voluntarily entered into'.
20. Thus, in the light of the aforestated relevant legal propositions of the Supreme Court and of this Court it becomes manifest that when the complaint allegations and the material documents on which complainant relies are taken for granted at their face value, they do not prima facie make out a case of commission of the alleged offences under Sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code by the accused since the vehicle in question was seized from complainant's possession and sold out to the third party by the accused Financier in exercise of its powers reserved for it under the said hire purchase agreement dated 18-1-1996 entered into between the parties and, as such, there is complete absence of dishonest intention or metis rea on the part of the financier or his men in doing so which is an essential ingredient of the said offences.
21. Coming to another offence Section 506, Indian Penal Code alleged against accused this Court in Asian Wire Ropes Limited's case, supra, which was relied on by Mr. C.V. Nagesh for complainant, said:
'Whenever averments are vague and devoid of particulars, such averments need not be considered. ...'.
22. The complaint herein was filed on 8-9-1997 in respect of the incident which allegedly took place on 11-5-1997 i.e., about 4 months after the incident. The only allegation made in regard to alleged offence under Section 506, Indian Penal Code in the complaint is that 'A-2 and A-3 threatened the complainant with dire consequences to break his limbs and bones if the complainant informed the police or any other person'. The material particulars such as date, time and place, the specific acts or the threatening words and about the manner in which the alleged offence was committed by them are not mentioned in this highly belated complaint. Therefore, a mere casual and evasive allegation of this nature is certainly not worthy of consideration.
23. It, therefore, becomes clear from the above discussion, that the allegations in the complaint made against accused do not prima facie make out a case of commission of alleged offences by them. As such the police does not get authority in law to proceed with investigation into the alleged offences against accused on the basis of the said PIR. Therefore, the investigation by the police and the complaint proceeding on the file of the learned Magistrate are liable to be quashed. Hence, Point No. 2 is answered in the affirmative.
24. In the result, the petition is allowed. The investigation proceeding by the police against all the accused in Crime No. 416 of 1997 of Byatrayanpura P.S. is directed to be stopped and the said investigation as also the complaint proceeding on the file of the learned Magistrate in P.C.R. No. 165 of 1997 are quashed.