ORDER
Murlidher Rao, J.
1. Those petitions are directed against a common order passed by She District Judge, Kolar, in HRC. RP, No. 31 of 1984.
2. Facts giving rise to these proceedings are as follows :
Shop building situated at Gestha Road, Robertsonpet, KGF is the suit schedule property. Dr. P.G. Raghupathi is its owner ; Dr. R. G. Lavi who is in possession, is the tenant. Owner is a Pediatrician, working as Lecturer in Child Health C.M.C. Hospital, Vellore (Tamil Nadu). His wife, a Gyneacologist, is working as Assistant Surgeon in Government Head Quarters Hospital, Vellore.
Tenant is an Ophthalmologist, who has an 'eye clinic' is the schedule promises. Originally he had taken two rooms, as his surrendered one of them He has been paying rent of Rs. 200/- per month.
The owners having decided to resign their respective jobs at Vellora (Tamil Nadu) and start private practice in their home town, initiated proceedings for eviction. The tenant contested on several grounds. The Learned Munsiff framed the following points for determination :-
'(1) Whether petitioner proves that he requires the schedule premises for his bona fide use and occupation ?
(2) Whether greater hardship would be caused to the petitioner by refusing to pats a decree for eviction ?
(3) Whether petitioner proves that he intends to renovate the petition schedule premises after eviction of the Respondent ?'
3. Appreciating evidence the Court granted eviction decree under Section 21(1)(h) and granted six months time ; the order was pronounced on 30-6-1984. Against this decree tenant filed revision in HRC RP 34 of 1984. The Court below dismissed the revision but granted three years time to vacate vide order dated 19th April 1986.
4. As against this order, two revision petitions are filed; one by the tenant is C.R.P. 3850 of 1986 and the other by the landlord in C.R.P. 3147 of 1986. While the tenant challenged the eviction decree, concurrently granted by Courts below, the landlord has challenged the grant of three years' time, by the District Judge. Both the C.R.Ps. are filed under Section 115 C P.C.
5. Limited as the scope of Section 115 is, the tenant's Petition must fail. Both the Courts have appreciated the evidence and have come to the correct conclusions. There is no merit in this C.R.P. ; accordingly C.R P. 3850 of 1986 is dismissed.
6. This takes me to C.R.P. 3147 of 1986, filed by the landlord. His challenge is regarding the grant of three years time. Mr. H.R. Venkataramanaiah contended that proceedings are initiated in early part of 1979; the trial Court took five and half years to decide the matter ; it granted six months time ; thus from 1979 to the end of 1984, the landlord could not get the house. Thereafter Revision Petition was pending from 1984 to 19th April 1986, and on 19th April 1986, the Court has granted three years' time i.e. till 18th April 1989. In other words, he contended, that though the landlord has established his case he can get the possession only after one decade. On the face of it, it is shocking. Ten years is too long a period for the culmination of rightful cause. The tenant stands to gain, though with the hanging sword. The landlords, husband and wife who had the energy, zeal and enthusiasm to start a new enterprise become frustratad. With the passage of such a long time, they may feel the result is a denial of justice. As ago advances, man grows old with that his capacity to take risk declines, he loses the dashing spirit, the enthusiasm, vigour and the spirit of enterprise. That apart, the financial aspect has a serious implication on such enterprise Postponement of starting as avocation or enterprise may make it impossible of performance. The inflationary tendency would affect his venture. What could have been done in 1979, in a permissible budget may become impossible in 1989. These are hard truths and stark realities. We cannot close our eyes to these aspects. That apart in every private profession, there is an element of luck and gambling. Initial period has to be spent in preparing ground developing contact and establish goodwill. These facts must be dome in mind, in balancing the interests of landlord and tenant.
7. It was pointed out that granting of one or two years is a routine practice. Accepting this to be true what is the justification and who is the sufferer?. The tenant no doubt stands to gain, but the legislation is not meant for him alone. It is a social welfare legislation to control the rents and evictions. It has to be interpreted keeping in view the interests of landlord and tenant. The Act does not provide for granting of time. It stops at the passing of eviction decree Granting of time is a Judge made practice. It is done under the inherent powers of the Court to meet the ands of justice. The absence of provision makes it manifest that legislature never intended to give time, after the eviction decree is passed.
8. Patil, J : in Prabhakar v. Venkatswamy, 1982(2) KLT 446 pointed that
'A practice has been developed and hardened into law to give reasonable time to the tenant to give vacant posterior'.
Hakeem, J : has agreed with this view in P. Shahabuddin Sab v. S. Hiralal. Chandrakantaraj Urs, J: : ILR1987KAR159 made the following observations in Thimmappa v. Kousalya, : ILR1985KAR2664 :-
'Sri M. Shivappa, Learned Counsel for the tenant requested time far vacating the premise. The litigation up to date has lasted for 4 years. He has even cited an authority to support the proposition that this Court has power to grant extension of time. However that may be, assuming that this Court has power to grant time beyond what has been given by the District Judge, this Court has to exercise that power with due caution, due regard to all the circumstances of the case. In the Court the tenant has taken every possible defence not only to resist eviction but also to deny title of the landlord and the need of her first son to establish his own business. Such conduct does not deserve sympathy from this Court or the landlord. However, I am of the view that the landlord who has acquired a legal right under the orders of the Court below cannot be put at disadvantage without giving an opportunity of being heard over the matter of extension of time. As this case has been dismissed without notice to the other side, it is not a fit case where this Court should lean in favour of the tenant'.
9. To me it appears that discretionary powers must be exercised keeping in view the circumstances of the case and in conformity with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. It should not defeat the object. I must add that to-day the landlord belongs to a middle class. The word 'lord' may create an air of aristocracy, but in reality it is not so. The activity of house buildings has vastly increased. Under several schemes like HUDCO, Housing Co-operative societies, House buildings loans, allotment of houses by Housing Boards, etc, a citizen is able to build a house. In having such a building there is no profit motive. He builds the house for his own necessity. His day-to-day life is no better than his tenant's. School going children, aged parents, marriageable daughters or sisters etc., is common to all. These cannot be valid considerations, in granting time. While it is not possible to lay down exhaustively the considerations, yet, the long pendency of the case should weigh with the Court in granting time. This is because from the day the proceedings are initiated, the tenant is kept on notice; therefore when a decree is passed, he cannot be heard to say that he is taken by surprise. It may be that nonavailability of alternative suitable accommodation, is a valid consideration for granting time. Except in few cases, the alternative accommodation may not suit many. The tenant is required to adjust himself to the new situation. It is no doubt true that there is a housing shortage. But that circumstance is very much applicable to landlord. While it may be a relevant consideration along with other factors, that cannot be a sole consideration. Hence the Courts are required to examine all the relevant circumstances including the say of the owners before exercising the discretion. It cannot be done in a casual way. The conclusion must be supported by reasons. Granting of long extension may 'lull' the tenant and he may not venture to secure alternate accommodation. This can be avoided by granting short extension so that he can accelerate and activise his search for accommodation.
10. On the facts of this case, the case is pending since 1979, and the landlord wants it for his profession, six months from to-day, will be most reasonable- The tenant who was 54 years when the proceedings were initiated, has completed sixty-two years. By any test he is ripe for retirement. Hence this C.R.P. is allowed Impugned order granting three years time is set aside. Time is granted till the end of July 1987. No coats.