ORDER
R. Gururajan, J.
1. The petitioner, Vijayakumar is challenging an order at Annexure-E, dated 25-5-1998 passed by the Court-Martial, Secunderabad in the case on hand. The petitioner was a Gunner in 7 field Regiment (Gazzala), Secunderabad. He was posted as Mess Waiter. The petitioner according to the respondent struck with a meat chopping knife on the head of Captain Rajesh Masurkar. A charge-sheet was issued to him. He was charged for using criminal force to his superior in terms of Section 40(a) of the Army Act.
1.1 He was punished with the sentence of RI for 28 days with effect from 21-4-1998 to 18-5-1998. On 25-5-1998. The petitioner states that he was not in a position to defend himself on account of his conviction in the matter. On 25-5-1998, statement was taken from the petitioner and the petitioner pleaded guilty in the matter. He was just released from the prison on 18-5-1998. He did not know on what charges he had been convicted. He appointed his friend and that friend did not participate in the proceedings. In addition to sentence he was dismissed from service. Annexure-E is the order. The petitioner is challenging Annexure-E in the case on hand.
2. Respondents have entered appearance and they have filed a statement and they support their action in the matter.
3. Sri Visweshwara, learned Senior Counsel at the time of arguments, confined his argument with regard to double jeopardy and also with regard to the order being contrary to Section 71 of the Army Act. Learned Counsel says that in terms of Section 40-A a punishment of imprisonment of 14 years can be granted in the event of proof of use of criminal force to or assaults his superior officer. Learned Counsel refers to Section 71 with regard to punishment awarded by Court-Martial. He further refers to Section 73. He says that in the given circumstances and in terms of Section 71, petitioner cannot be granted imprisonment in addition to dismissal in terms of the law governing this matter. He wants the impugned order to be set aside on that ground.
4. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel says that there is no conflict as such in the case on hand. She supports the order. She however questions the jurisdiction of the Court in the matter.
5. In reply, Sri Visweshwara, learned Senior Counsel relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court in ( 2001 ) 9 SCC 525, ( 2001 ) 2 UPLBEC 1275, with regard to jurisdiction of this Court.
6. After hearing, I have carefully perused the material on record.
7. Insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court is concerned, the said issue has to be answered against the respondent in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in ( 2001 ) 9 SCC 525, ( 2001 ) 2 UPLBEC 1275. In the said petition, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Chief of Army Staff may be sued anywhere in the country. In that case, a writ petition was filed before the Allahabad High Court. Summary Court-Martial proceedings were held in Punjab. Writ petition was filed and the Allahabad High Court has ruled that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. On appeal, the Supreme Court restored the writ petition to the file of the High Court. In these circumstances and in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent that this Court lacks jurisdiction is rejected.
8. Coming to the legal issue in terms of the argument advanced by Mr. Visweshwara, learned Senior Counsel, let me see as to whether the order requires my interference in the given circumstances.
9. Army Act of 1950 is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the Government of the regular Army. Section 40 provides for punishment of imprisonment of a term which my extend to 14 years in the event of a person committing an offence of using criminal force to or assaults a superior officer, in the case on hand petitioner is charged under Section 40(a) and he was awarded the punishment of rigorous imprisonment.
9.1 Section 71 provides for punishments awardable by Courts-Martial. It says that punishment may be inflicted in respect of offences committed by persons subject to this Act and convicted by Courts-Martial, according to the scale following, that is to say, a death, transportation for life, imprisonment, cashiering, in case of officers, dismissal from service.
9.2 Section 73 provides for combination of punishments. It says that a sentence of a Court-Martial may award in addition to, or without any one other punishment, the punishment specified in Clause (d) or Clause (e) of Section 71 and any one or more of the punishments specified in Clauses (f) to (1) of that section.
9.3 A reading of Section 73 in the light of Section 71 makes it clear that apart from the punishment of Court-Martial, the punishment specified in Clause (d) or Clause (e) of Section 71 is permissible by way combination. Clause (e) of Section 71 is dismissal from service. Therefor, there is no impediment for the respondent to combine the punishment of dismissal in the light of Section 73 of the Act.
9.4 A reasonable combined reading of Sections 40(a), 71 and 73 would show that respondents have not committed any error whatsoever in granting the present punishment of rigorous imprisonment in addition to dismissal in terms of the material available on record. In this view of the matter, I find no grounds to accept the argument of the petitioner.
10. Before concluding, I deem it proper to observe that the defence personnel stand on a different footing compared to civilian employees. Discipline has to be maintained in the larger interest of the Army itself. In the case on hand, the present petitioner has chosen to behave disorderly against his superiors. Such conduct requires serious view by this Court in maintaining army discipline and for better working of the army.
11. No grounds. Petition is rejected.