Judgment:
ORDER
1. The petitioner was working as a Selection Grade Lecturer in the Veerasaiva College at Bellary run by Veerasaiva Vidya Vardhaka Sangha, Bellary. On the basis of certain allegations of misconduct made against him, the employer - Institution terminated his services by an order dated July 22, 1993. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Educational Appellate Tribunal, Bellary, who came to the conclusion that the order of termination had been passed without framing proper charges against the petitioner. The Tribunal accordingly set aside the order of termination by its order dated April 17, 1995 and after framing the requisite charges against the petitioner, directed the respondent - Institution to lead evidence. The charges framed against the petitioner were as under :
'1. That on July 31, 1991 you picked up the quarrel with one Rajashekar Neeramanvi, who was working as a Reader and Head of the Department of Geology in Veerasaiva College at Bellary. You also threatened him stating that you will break his leg and you also abused him and defamed him. This act of yours is likely to seriously subvert discipline in the college in which you are working. Thus, your conduct is unbecoming of a Lecturer as per Rule 12(1)(b) of the Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Rules.
2. That you as a Lecturer and Examiner of University Examinations for II Year B.Sc., Geology for the year 1990-1991, tried to harm the students viz., Nagaraj, Shashidhar, Jeevappa, Srinath, Chinnaiah, Madhusudhana Reddy, Khaja Mohdin, Nagaraja Goud, Suryanarayana and Venkatarami Reddy who were the students of II year, B.Sc. in Geology, thereby their performance was affected in the said University examinations. Thus, your conduct is unbecoming of a Lecturer.
3. That you tried to seduce a girl student by name Bharathi Katwe of Geology Department when she had come to you to get her Geology records certified. Thus, your conduct is unbecoming of a lecturer'.
2. The petitioner felt aggrieved of the aforesaid order and came up to this Court by way of Civil Revision Petition No. 1622 of 1995, in which the only grievance made by him was that even though the petitioner had reported himself for duty, the management had not assigned any work to him nor paid his salary. Brother Narayana, J., before whom the Civil Revision Petition was argued, dismissed the same holding that the petitioner is not actually aggrieved of the order of the Tribunal and that his grievance about the non-payment of the salary, could be agitated elsewhere.
3. Consequent upon the dismissal of the revision petition and in pursuance of the directions given in the Tribunal's order a detailed enquiry into the charges framed against the petitioner was conducted by the Tribunal itself, in the course of which both documentary as well as oral evidence was recorded. On behalf of the respondents, apart from the documentary evidence, the statements of four witnesses were recorded. The petitioner, however, did not produce any evidence except getting his own statement recorded.
4. Upon consideration of the material so produced the Tribunal recorded its findings holding the petitioner guilty of charge Nos. 1 and 3. Charge No. 2 was, on the other hand, held not proved. The Tribunal then proceeded to impose a punishment of reversion of the petitioner to the post of Demonstrator with a further direction that the petitioner shall be treated to have been newly recruited against the said post from the date of his reinstatement. He was also held entitled to the payment of salary as Demonstrator from the date of reinstatement or from January 20, 1996, whichever was earlier. His seniority was directed to be fixed in the cadre of Demonstrator as per the rules treating the petitioner as a newly recruited candidate. His increments and promotion from the post of Demonstrator were also granted to him, but, his back wages from the date of termination i.e., July 22, 1993 till the date of his reinstatement as Demonstrator was denied. It is against the aforesaid findings and directions of the Tribunal dated December 20, 1995 that the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner.
5. I have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, who made a two fold submission in support of the petition. Firstly, he argued that the Tribunal was in error in having framed the charges against the petitioner for according to the learned counsel, charges could be framed only the disciplinary authority and not by the Tribunal. In support of his submission, he placed reliance upon a Single Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Management of Sri Siddaganga Training Centre v. Shivanna, ILR 1986 Kant. 3817. Secondly, he urged that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner was excessive and disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct committed by the petitioner. It was argued that the petitioner had put in a service of 20 years or so and that the impugned order unfairly deprived him of the benefit of the said service.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made but find no substance in any one of them. In so far as the first ground of challenge is concerned, it is apparent that the order passed by the Tribunal dated April 17, 1995, by which the charges in question framed against him were never questioned by the petitioner on the ground that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to do so. As a matter of fact, in the revision petition, which the petitioner filed against the said order the only grievance made was that, the Management was not assigning any work to him nor paying his salary. This Court accordingly, while dismissing the revision petition and upholding the said order, observed that the petitioner had no real grievance to make against the order of the Tribunal and that the grievance actually made was unrelated to the said order and could be agitated else - where. This implies that even though the petitioner had an opportunity to question the validity of the order of the Tribunal, he deliberately did not do so and thereby accepted the same. The order passed by the Tribunal haven merged in the order passed by this Court in the civil revision petition filed by the petitioner it is not open to the petitioner to question the validity of the said order on the ground that the same was in excess of the jurisdiction vested in the Tribunal. That apart the petitioner is estopped from taking the plea now being urged after having taken a chance at the enquiry and participating in the same without demur. It is well settled that a party cannot sit back, take a chance in the proceedings held against him with a view to get a favourable order in his favour and turn round to assail the procedure and the jurisdiction of the authority conducting the enquiry when he finds that the result of the enquiry has gone against him. The Court in such cases is entitled to refuse relief to the petitioner not because the acquiescence of a party confers jurisdiction which does not in the authority concerned but because the Court need not come to the rescue of a party who has either deliberately or due to lack of diligence on his part failed to point out the error of procedure or lack of jurisdiction at the first available opportunity. Reference in this connection may be gainfully made to C. Y. Parthasarathy v. Syndicate of the Mysore University, Mysore and Anr. : ILR1994KAR2603 , wherein a Division Bench of this Court, dealing with a similar situation observed thus :
'19. It is true, that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the parties where it does not otherwise inhere in the authority concerned; but it is equally true that the High Court can while exercising its extraordinary and discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution decline to interfere with an order of a subordinate authority if it is satisfied that an objection relating to a defect of procedure or jurisdiction which would have been and ought to have been raised at the earliest opportunity was not so raised by the party complaining before it. The rule that acquiescence of the party belated making a grievance about the jurisdiction of the subordinate authority disentitles him to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, does not rest on the foundation that acquiescence, confers jurisdiction but on the rationale that the High Court will be justified in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a person who has either by reason of lack of diligence or by design remained on the fence, allowed the authority to pass an order and seeing that the same has gone against him turned round to challenge its competence, to have done so'.
7. In the above circumstances, therefore, the first ground of challenge urged on behalf of the petitioner must fail.
8. Coming then to the second limb of the petitioner's case. I see no substance even in the same. It is pertinent to mention that one of the charges held proved against the petitioner is that he tried to seduce a girl student by name Bharathi Katwe of his Department when she used to visit him to get her Geology record certified. I have been taken through the relevant portion of the order passed by the Tribunal in regard to charge No. 3 from which it is apparent that the student said to have been harassed had been driven to die brink of a suicide on account of the unbecoming and obnoxious conduct of the petitioner. The nature of the allegation made against the petitioner and the undue advantage which he tried to take because of his position reflect adversely upon him and the moral values he lives by. Far from being a paragon of virtue his conduct shows how even those who are supposed to be shaping the lives and careers of the impressionable young can fall prey to the base human or if I may say so, animal instincts. What however is unfortunate in the episode is that such instincts should have surfaced in the mind of a teacher qua his taught less than half his age without any moral compunction whatsoever. Moral depravity is a serious charge particularly when made against those who are supposed to build and strengthen the moral fibre of the nation's progeny. Seen in that light, the petitioner's charge that the punishment imposed upon him is excessive or disproportionate is without any substance. Interference with the quantum of punishment is warranted only in cases where the penalty imposed shocks the conscience of the Court. Far from being a case of that nature, the punishment imposed upon the petitioner appears to be over-indulgent to him and therefore calls for no interference.
9. It was then argued that the post to which the petitioner has now been reverted does not actually exist, making the order otiose, and unworkable. There is nothing on record before me as at present to support this submission except an assertion made to that effect in the writ petition. Even the Institution concerned, which has been directed to reinstate the petitioner as a Demonstrator has not come on record with the version that the post against which the petitioner is supposed to have been reinstated does not actually exist.
10. In the circumstances, I find it difficult to interfere with the order on the bald assertion made by the petitioner. It shall however be open to the petitioner to agitate the matter before the Tribunal in appropriate proceedings should the Institution decline to reinstate him to the post of Demonstrator as ordered by it.
11. In the result, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed in limine.