ORDER
Tirath S. Thakur, J.
1. Assessment proceedings for asst. yrs. 1977-78, 1978-79, 1979-80 and 1980-81 were completed by the Agrl. ITO, Chickmagalur by four different orders passed by him. Suo motu revisional proceedings against the said orders were then initiated by the Dy. Commr. of Commercial Taxes (A), Mysore culminating in orders that came under challenge in four different appeals filed before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore. The challenge inter alia was founded on the plea that the Dy. Commr. had no power or authority to revise the assessment orders, in the light of the provisions of the Karnataka Agrl. IT (Amendment) Act, 1983, which conferred such powers only in respect of assessments made upto the year ending 31st of March, 1982. The Tribunal found favour with this argument and by a common order dt. 7th June, 1985 set aside the orders passed by the Dy. Commr., holding the same to be without jurisdiction. While the position stood thus Karnataka Agrl. IT (Amendment) Act, 1985, (Karnataka Act 23 of 1985) amended s. 35 in the Principal Act and inter alia introduced with retrospective effect an explanation which reads as follows :
'Explanation : For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that subject to the provisions of sub-s. (2), the revisional power conferred on the Dy. Commr. by sub-s. (1) shall be exercisable in respect of an order passed under this Act by any authority subordinate to him before or after the conferment of revisional power on him.'
2. Consequent upon the above addition, the respondent by his communication dt. 14th of October, 1985, informed the petitioner about the effect of the Explanation and called upon the petitioner to deposit the amount of tax payable for the assessment years in question as determined by the Dy. Commr. in the orders, passed by him in suo moto revisional proceedings. The communication pointed out that on account of the addition of the Explanation, the decision delivered by the Tribunal as to the validity of the orders passed by the Dy. Commr. had been rendered ineffective and unenforceable. A similar communication was sent by the respondent to the Coffee Board asking the latter to hold back the amounts payable to the petitioner for purposes of utilisation of the outstanding tax dues. Aggrieved, the petitioner has come up with the present writ petitions questioning the communications and the demand raised by the respondent.
3. Mr. Sarangan, learned senior counsel for the petitioner argued that the orders passed by the Dy. Commr. of Commercial Taxes having been set aside by the Tribunal, it was not open to the respondent to ignore the said orders or treat the same to have been rendered inoperative or ineffective, amendment to s. 35 and the introduction of the Explanation to the same notwithstanding. He contended that if the order passed by the Tribunal had on account of the Explanation introduced by the legislature been rendered ineffective, the only course open to the respondent was to have the said order recalled by the Tribunal or set aside in appropriate proceedings. So long as the said order held the field, contended Mr. Sarangan, it was not open to the respondent on its own, to ignore the same on his appreciation of how the Explanation affected its validity. The argument sounds attractive, but I am afraid is not equally sound. It is no doubt true that an order passed by a competent Court or an authority cannot except in exceptional circumstances where the same may be deemed to be a nullity be ignored or treated non est in law, for it is only when such an order is either set aside by a competent Court or otherwise rendered ineffective or void by an appropriate legislative measure that its legal effect can be avoided. The question however, is whether in the instant case, in the absence of any order from a competent Court setting aside the view taken by the Tribunal, the said order could be deemed to be ineffective for any other reason. My answer would be in the affirmative. I say so, in the light of the provisions contained in s. 13 of the Amending Act (Karnataka Act No. 23 of 1985) which validates notices/orders or proceedings held for levy of assessment, reassessment, revision of assessments, etc., under the Principal Act before the date of commencement of the Amending Act, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court or Tribunal to the contrary. The provision to the extent the same is relevant reads thus :
'13. Validation (1) : Anything done or any action taken or purported to be done or taken (including any notices or orders issued, and of all proceedings held for the levy, assessment, reassessment, revision of assessment and collection of tax) under the Principal Act before the date of commencement of this Act, shall, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, Tribunal, or other authority, be deemed to have been validly done, taken, issued, made or held and shall have effect for all purposes as if it had been done, taken, issued, made or held under the Principal Act as amended by sub-cl. (d) of s. 2, s. 6, s. 7 and s. 8 of this Act and accordingly :
(a) no suit or other proceedings shall be entertained or continued in any Court for the refund of any tax paid under the principal Act;
(b) no Court shall enforce any decree or order directing the refund of any tax paid under the principal Act.'
4. A plain reading of the above would show that any action taken or purported to have been taken including one by way of reassessment or revision of assessment under the principal Act shall be deemed to have been validly done as if such action or proceedings had been taken or held under the principal Act, as amended by the provisions of the Amending Act. The net effect of the above provision therefore, is that the judgment of the Tribunal holding the orders passed by the Dy. Commr. to be without jurisdiction notwithstanding the orders passed by the Dy. Commr. in suo moto revisional proceedings shall be deemed to have been passed under the Principal Act, as it stood amended by the amending Act. If that be so, the error of jurisdiction which the orders passed by the Dy. Commr. suffered from would stand removed by the provisions of Explanation added to s. 35. Having done so the legislature was well within its power to render ineffective the order passed by the Tribunal. It is fairly well settled that the legislature can by an appropriate legislation, render inoperative, a judgment or order from a contempt (sic - competent) Court provided it removes the basis on which the same is delivered. Addition of the Explanation to s. 35 did precisely that in the instant case. Sec. 13 r/w the Explanation to s. 35, therefore, effectively (rendered) the order passed by the Tribunal inoperative. In the circumstances the respondent was justified in treating the orders passed by the Dy. Commr. to be valid and enforceable in law and raising a demand against the petitioner on that premise.
5. Mr. Sarangan, however, argued that apart from the question of jurisdiction, the petitioner had raised certain other points, in the appeals filed by him against the S.M.R. orders of the Dy. Commr. These points he urged had not been touched by the Tribunal as it had considered it unnecessary to do so keeping in view the fact that the appeals were succeeding on the question of jurisdiction alone. He submitted that in case the order passed by the Tribunal was to be deemed to have been rendered ineffective on the question of jurisdiction, the petitioner would be deprived of an opportunity to canvass other grounds of challenge against the orders of the Dy. Commr. unless such an opportunity is reserved to him by this Court. There is merit in this submission. The Tribunal had, while disposing of the appeals, specifically declined to go into the other questions raised by the petitioner, in the appeals filed by him. This was even otherwise understandable for any such exercise would have been unnecessary keeping in view the fact that the appeals were being allowed on the question of jurisdiction alone. Now that the question of jurisdiction stands settled, on account of the legislative intervention and amendment of the Principal Act, the petitioner would be entitled to canvas other points raised by him against the orders under challenge. This can be done by the petitioner by filing a suitable application before the Tribunal for a rehearing on the appeals and fresh orders on points other than those touching upon the jurisdiction of the Dy. Commr.
6. In the result, these petitions succeed but only in part and to the extent that the petitioner may, if so advised, file an appropriate application before the Karnataka Tribunal, Bangalore, seeking restoration of AIP Nos. 105 to 108 of 1983 for a fresh consideration of the points that remained uncovered by its earlier decision. In case the petitioner does file such an application within two months from today, the Tribunal shall restore the appeals to their original Numbers and pass fresh orders on the same on the point that had been left open by it in its previous order.
7. For a period of two months, the interim order granted by this Court shall continue to remain operative.
8. No costs.