Saldanha, J.
1. The allegation in this case once again is of matrimonial cruelty and dowry death. Deceased Kusuma was married to A-1 on 16-3-1986 and it is alleged that certain demands were made by A-1 and his family members at the time of the marriage particularly in relation to jewellery and certain items of property. These demands were met except for the fact that two items viz., a gold chain and a pair of bangles were not gifted to Kusuma by her parents at the time when the marriage took place. It is alleged by the prosecution that A-1 and his family members, his mother, his father, as also his brother, used to ill-treat and torture Kusuma on the ground that her parents had not given these items of gold jewellery. The situation got rather bad and the girl kept complaining to her parents and finally the dispute was referred to the panchayath. The decision taken was that the girl's parents would provide these two items of jewellery as soon as they could raise necessary funds for the same. According to the prosecution, the harassment and torture did not cease but it only increased, which was why the parents of Kusuma managed to sell some property and make up the gold chain which was handed over a few days prior to the incident. The prosecution alleges that on 26-12-1988, Kusuma disappeared from the husband's house. A day or two prior to this, her mother and her aunty had visited her and she had complained about the recurrence of unbearable levels of torture to which she was being subjected and the usual repeated threats that had earlier been made to her viz., that she would not be permitted to continue residing there unless the remaining items of jewellery were provided by her parents. The mother and the aunty decided to take Kusuma to their house, but their in-laws refused to permit this. On hearing that the girl had disappeared, P.W. 1, the father lodged a complaint with the police to the effect that she was missing. He continued to search for the daughter but to no avail until on 30-12-1988, four days later, he was informed that the body of Kusuma was seen floating in a well. The body was in a highly decomposed condition and P.W. 1 lodged a complaint with the police alleging that the unnatural death of his daughter was attributable to the acts of the accused. It was specifically alleged that the accused had made demands for dowry at the time of the marriage which could not be met and that had resulted in the unfulfilled portion of the dowry remaining outstanding since the girl's parents were not in a position to fulfill those obligations; that the daughter was being harassed, tortured and threatened because of this, and that it was this background that forced her to commit suicide. The police arrested the four accused viz., the husband, his father, his mother and his brother and charged them with the offence punishable under S. 304-B, I.P.C. as also Ss. 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The learned trial Judge at the conclusion of the trial, held that the evidence falls short of the requirement of establishing the offence beyond reasonable doubt and therefore acquitted the accused. The State of Karnataka has challenged the order of acquittal through the present appeal.
2. Mr. Patil, the learned Additional S.P.P., has stated that unfortunately some of the witnesses in this case have turned hostile. He however pointed out that even if one were to totally discard that evidence, that there was sufficient amount of perfectly reliable and good material on which this Court could place reliance in bringing home the charges against the accused. Towards this end, Mr. Patil has demonstrated that the evidence of the father who is P.W. 1, the mother P.W. 2, the aunt P.W. 3 and the independent witness Nagegowda who is P.W. 11, if taken cumulatively is more than sufficient to establish the charges in question. The learned counsel has demonstrated that one aspect of the matter is significant viz., that the evidence of these witnesses has hardly been challenged in the cross-examination. Undoubtedly they have been cross-examined, but a perusal of the record indicates that the evidence has withstood the cross-examination and that nothing has been established to indicate that the witnesses are either unreliable or for that matter that there are serious blemishes with regard to what has been deposed to by them. We do not propose to elaborately reproduce the evidence of these witnesses which in substance establishes the fact that at the time of the marriage, A-1 and his family had demanded various items of jewellery and that the girl's side had agreed to this. Secondly, what is pointed out by them is that these demands had been met with the exception of the gold chain and the gold bangles, which had not been given by them because the girl's parents could not afford them. They are quite consistent with regard to their version that Kusuma was facing a lot of hostile treatment, that she was being ill-treated to the extent of categorising it as torture and that she was being threatened by the husband and his family solely because they were insisting on the items of the jewellery being provided by her parents. They have also indicated that Kusuma conveyed these problems to her parents and that she was visibly disturbed because of this state of affairs. P.W. 11, who is an elderly person and one who is known to both the families, has stated that he had taken part in the compromise talks before the panchayat and that it was at his instance that the matter had been referred to the panchayat. He has also indicated that the girl's parents had agreed as soon as they could afford to raise the money to abide by the earlier assurance and to make available the two items of jewellery. The evidence of these witnesses also indicates that despite the decision of the panchayath that the situation did not improve and that even when one of the two items of jewellery was provided by them hardly two days before the date of the incident, that the situation did not subside. It is in this background that these witnesses have alleged that the accused are squarely responsible for the death of Kusuma. Mr. Patil has submitted that this material fully and completely establishes the three charges, the first of them being an offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act has been committed in so far as there is clear and unimpeachable evidence of the fact that illegal and unlawful demands were made at the time of the marriage and that these demands were enforced. Secondly, he has submitted that the evidence also indicates that in spite of the items of the dowry that remained to be given that the cruelty and torture inflicted upon the deceased girl consistently over a period of time was very clearly and specifically directed towards securing the dowry amounts and that therefore the offence clearly came within the ambit of S. 498-A, I.P.C. Mr. Patil has strongly relied on the presumptions that arise under Ss. 113-A and 113-B of the Evidence Act and he has submitted that if in this background the girl was forced to commit suicide, that the case would have to be categorised as one of dowry death and that the accused responsible for the suicide would be punishable under S. 304-B, I.P.C.
3. As against this position, the learned Advocate who represents the accused-respondents has submitted that the substratum of the evidence relied upon by the prosecution consists of the evidence of the father, mother and aunt and he submits that significantly enough, the independent witnesses have not supported the prosecution. Again, he points out that whereas these family members strongly contend that Kusuma was being harassed, tortured and treated cruelly, that there is directly contradictory evidence available through P.W. 4 who has deposed to the effect that the relationships between the husband and wife were good. Again, the learned Counsel points out that if this was the background and if in such circumstances the girl had disappeared from the husband's house and was not traceable and her father was required to lodge a police complaint, that it is very significant that in the complaint he does not mention anything about the so called demands and the alleged acts of cruelty. It is the submissions of the learned counsel that if the situation had reached such a grave point, that the girl was virtually being driven to suicide, and if the version that she had been repeatedly complaining to her parents is correct, when she disappeared, the very first aspect of the matter which her father would have reported to the police would necessarily have been the fact that the girl was beings severely threatened and tortured by the accused. He submits therefore that the non-mention of this very crucial and significant aspect of the case is not merely exceptional but that it is a tell-tale circumstance which in fact indicates that there was something seriously wrong and that it was only after her body was discovered that her people decided to frame the accused.
4. As regards the evidence of P.W. 11, the learned counsel has submitted that P.W. 11 has proceeded on the basis of whatever P.Ws. 1 and 2 had told him and that if essentially the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 does not inspire total confidence in the mind of this Court, that no amount of support from P.W. 11 can cure that defect. The learned Counsel also submitted that this is a case in which the High Court is dealing with an appeal against acquittal and he reiterated the position in law that the trial Court has carefully assessed all the evidence before it, that the learned trial Judge has had the benefit of watching the demeanour of the witnesses and that in the course of a well considered judgment, the trial Court has come to the conclusion that the offences are not conclusively established, that unless very strong and cogent grounds are made out, that it is well settled law that the decision of the trial Court should not be interfered with in an appeal against acquittal merely because some other view may be possible. We need to record here that Mr. Patil was quick to point out that he does not dispute the well settled canons of law, but it is his case that if it can be demonstrated that the learned trial Judge has sought to record doubts which were non-existent and where as a result of valid assessment of evidence, the trial Court has acquitted the accused when in fact they should be convicted, that it is not only within the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere but that in the interest of justice this must be done.
5. Between these two rival contentions, the real question that arises is as to whether what is left in the prosecution evidence viz., the depositions of P.Ws. 1, 2, 11 and the deposition of P.W. 3 individually and collectively inspire the degree of confidence which a criminal court would look to for purposes of establishing the charges which are of considerable seriousness. We need to record at the very outset that the allegations are generalised and at no stage has the prosecution taken the trouble to indicate as to whether all the accused at all times were alleged to have been acting in furtherance of their common intention or abetting each other or whether the overt acts that are alleged are against individual accused. This aspect of the matter is of considerable significance particularly in a situation where four accused are facing serious charges. The highest that can be said is that there is a general allegation that the accused who were the in-laws of the girl are responsible for what has happened. This, in our considered view, may not be sufficient to establish either the charges of common intention or abetment. It is necessary, within the ambit of criminal jurisprudence, to specifically allege an aspect of meeting of minds or abetment or assistance of each other in the commission of the offence. The learned Counsel who represents the appellants contended that in the absence of specific allegations which limit the acts to one or another accused, that it must be taken that the evidence makes out a case against all the accused. This unfortunately is an over simplification of the law and something which is not permissible in a criminal trial. On the basis of the evidence it is clear to us that it would be impossible to sustain an even remotest allegation against A-4 who was the brother-in-law. The evidence against him is so completely non-existent that it would be difficult to understand as to why at all he had been put on trial. As far as A-2 and A-3 are concerned, again there is very little that can be narrowed down against these two accused except one allegation that the mother-in-law had forcibly snatched all the ear-rings and nose-rings as also the mangalasuthra from Kusuma and this had been done so violently as to cause bleeding injuries and the suggestion was also that the severance of the mangalasuthra was almost indicative of the total destruction of the marital tie. There is virtually nothing that is alleged against the father. As the evidence stands, it is extremely difficult to find out from the generalised nature of the depositions as to which of the accused had made the demands for dowry and which of them was insisting on the fulfilment of those demands. The learned Additional S.P.P. submitted that the Court will have to assume that the demands were made by A-1 husband and that this was supported by by A-2 and A-3, his parents. This again is something that is not permissible because there are situations in which negotiations are carried out exclusively by the parents and there are reverse situations in which all sorts of demands come only from the prospective husband and in the absence of definite pointers in the evidence, it would be hazardous for a Court to record a conclusion merely on the basis of generalised allegations.
6. There is another aspect to this case which is of some significance. The marriage had taken place about two years earlier which is relatively a long period of time and it is contended on behalf of the prosecution that merely because of the fact that the gold chain and the gold bangles had not been provided by the girl's parents that she was consistently and continuously tortured and threatened with the sole purpose of intimidating the parents and forcing them to provide those items. Undoubtedly, the evidence of P.W. 11 does tend to lend some support to this version, but unfortunately, the panchayathdars who would have been the best witnesses to depose about this state of affairs have turned hostile. Their evidence is therefore useless. In this background, when a very serious situation arose viz., that Kusuma disappeared from the house, when she was not found in any of the usual places and her father had to take the extreme step of reporting the matter to the police, a simple complaint of a missing person is lodged in which no indication is given with regard to the possible cause of her disappearance. It is not as though this case was devoid of any background, but if the charges levelled subsequently by the girl's parents were in fact absolutely true, we find it difficult to comprehend as to why her father would not have disclosed to the police as to what she was being subjected to as there could have been no other reason for her disappearance. The non-disclosure of this very important information leaves a serious void or lacuna in the prosecution case. The learned Counsel who represents the accused has vehemently submitted that this situation is fatal to the prosecution. Mr. Patil, on the other hand, has contended with equal vigour that it is not so and he points out that when the complaint was lodged with the police by P.W. 1 that it was a simple complaint of a missing person, that her father did not for a moment suspect that something serious had happened to her and that he possibly felt that out of despair she might have left the house and gone away which was why the police were asked to for her. Mr. Patil was quick to point out that immediately after the body being discovered, P.W. 1 has in his complaint disclosed the background of the case and he submits therefore that this second complaint which has been treated as the F.I.R. is the one on which the Court must place reliance and the non-disclosure in the earlier complaint four days prior to that is of no significance. The learned Additional S.P.P. submits that the disclosure of all material facts in the subsequent complaint is more than curative and that the infirmity or lacuna that has been alleged is more than adequately redressed. We find it impossible to accept this position, because in our considered view, the disclosure of all material information in the F.I.R. does not improve the position as contended by the learned Additional S.P.P. but worsens it. If what is stated in the F.I.R. was the correct position, then there is no explanation for these facts not having been disclosed earlier. On the other hand, we find that there is some substance in the defence version that after the death of Kusuma was discovered, that her people possibly decided to hit back at the husband's family for what had happened.
7. While assessing the evidence of witnesses, it is necessary to scrutinise the depositions with a degree of care and caution if the witnesses are interested witnesses. It is also necessary to be more circumspect in cases where the allegation is that the witnesses are motivated, that they are biased or that they harbour animus against the accused. Dealing with this class of cases however we need to categorise P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 and possibly P.W. 11 into an entirely different category of witnesses viz., the category of aggrieved witnesses. It is rather unusual in criminal law to deal with this class of witneses, but having regard to the number of cases nowadays relating to matrimonial discord and consequent family disputes and feuds, the Courts will have to carve out possibly a new category of witnesses, who would have to be categorised as aggrieved witnesses. One understands the psychology of the family members, particularly of a deceased girl who feel very strongly about what has happened and who could therefore be motivated to exaggerate or even fabricate to some extent with the sole purpose of either settling scores or with the down right intention of wreaking vengeance. In referring to this class of witnesses, we need to sound a note of caution in so far as there could always be a genuine situation where a girl has been harassed, treated cruelly and tortured and in this background where the family members very rightly and justifiably feel that in the interest of justice the persons responsible for what has happened had to be really punished. It is a subtle distinction that is required to be made and a virtual rule of caution which the Courts would have to bear at the back of their mind while assessing the evidence of aggrieved witnesses, but it does not mean that this class of evidence should be discarded, but it only means that it will have to be scrutinised with a high degree of circumspection.
8. This is precisely the ultimate test we have applied to the evidence before us and we do find that the learned trial Judge was justified in holding that the evidence though not discard able still falls slightly short of the requirement of proving the offences alleged against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. We are also conscious of the fact that in cases where the trial Court has recorded an order of acquittal that an appellate Court is required to take cognizance of one important factor viz., that the presumption of innocence with which an accused began at the start of the trial gets doubly reinforced by virtue of the order of acquittal and in such a situation barring very valid and cogent grounds, an appellate Court would not be justified in disturbing the order of acquittal merely because another view is possible. Here again we are guided by the age old principle of criminal jurisprudence that where two conclusions are permissible, the Court is obliged to accept the one which is in favour of the accused.
9. It is on a careful consideration of all these factors that we are of the view that the finding of the learned trial Judge that the evidence taken in its totality is not free from doubt is required to be confirmed. In view of this position, the appeal fails and stands dismissed. The bail bonds of the respondents are cancelled.
10. Appeal dismissed.