V. Jagannathan, J.
1. All these appeals arise out of one and the same order passed by the IV Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bangalore City, and, hence, common judgment.
2. The appellant, M/s Eureka Forbes Ltd., a public limited company, is the plaintiff in O.S. No. 15302/2006 and the said suit was filed praying for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the respondent, M/s Pentair Water India Pvt. Ltd. the defendant, from publishing, placing of advertisement or in any manner circulating or distributing any material defaming or maligning the plaintiff's product 'Aquaguard' or 'UV Purifier' or from issuing disparaging statements about the said Aquaguard or UV Purifier, and also prayed for a decree of mandatory injunction directing the respondent-defendant to withdraw the advertisement, pamphlets or such other material containing the disparaging and false information relating to U.V. Purifier and also for a direction to the defendant to public in the newspapers and media a statement that insofar as U.V. Purifier is concerned, the assertion made by the defendant is not based on any scientific information. The appellant also filed applications as per I.A.Nos. 1 and II for temporary injunction against the defendant. An interim order was passed by the trial court on the said two I.As. in favour of the appellant and, after the appearance of the defendant and upon I.A.Nos. IV and V being filed by the defendant praying for vacating the ex-prate ad-interim order of temporary injunction, the learned trial judge heard the parties on all the four I.As. and passed the impugned order. I.A.Nos. I and II filed by the appellant came to be dismissed and ex-prate ad-interim order of temporary injunction was vacated thereby allowing I.A.Nos. IV and V filed by the defendant. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant-plaintiff is before this Court.
3. The facts in brief which led to the impugned order being passed by the trial court on the I.As. filed can be stated as under:
The appellant's case is that, it is a pioneer and leader in U.V. water purifiers sold under the brand name 'Aquaguard' and the appellant is a market leader in India and accounts for more than 70% of the market share in the U.V. purifier segment. It is its case that Aquaguard is India's first super brand water purifier enjoying the trust of over fifty million users and the appellant had an exclusive monopoly in the market over one and half decades. Later on, various other water purifiers in the U.V. segment and other segments were introduced into the market. But, still, the appellant continues to be the market leader enjoying a huge client base which includes some of the prestigious corporate houses, financial institutions, Government bodies, hospitals, etc. The appellant was also granted registration of trade mark 'Aquaguard' for the goods water purifiers.
4. It is the appellant's case that the water purification system developed by it and called as 'Aquaguard' employs U.V. (Ultra-Violet) technology and the five components of the purification process are - (a) The Pre-filter, (b) Solenoid Valve, (c) Activated Carbon Chamber, (d) Ultra Violet Chamber, and (e) The Electronic Monitoring System.
5. It is with this background, one will have to look at the advertisement given by the respondent and, according to the appellant, the advertisement issued by the respondent is not only false, but it disparages the product of the appellant's company. The advertisement issued by the respondent is as under:
'Water contains contaminants that are invisible to the naked eye and to your UV water purifier.' and
Pentair's Home RO system with PXP removes contaminants as small as 0.0001 micron....
6. It is this advertisement issued by the respondent-defendant that has led to the suit being filed and the relief sought as mentioned earlier. It is the specific case of the appellant that the above advertisement admittedly disparages UV technology and as the appellant has adopted UV technology, in effect, it would cause great damage to the marketability of the appellant's product viz., Aquaguard, which uses UV technology.
7. The stand of the respondent-defendant before the trial court was that, it is a wholly owned subsidiary of Pentair Inc, U.S.A., and Pentair is a multi-billion dollar company having its headquarters at Minnesota and operates from at least fifty different locations worldwide and further, Pentair Water Group is a global leader in providing innovative products and systems used worldwide in the movement, treatment, storage and enjoyment of water and that Pentair is the world's largest manufacturer of softener equipment, Reverse Osmosis (RO) membrane housings and commercial drinking water systems and boasts of a client list that includes Air Force One, Mitsubishi, Japan, GE, U.S.A., Violia France, Australia and Singapore, and Degremont Spain and France, to mention a few. In addition to the above, the respondent-defendant is a manufacturer and seller in India of inter alia Water Purification Systems including water purifiers using Reverse Osmosis (RO) technology and water purifiers using Ultra-Violet (UV) technology. It is its case that the UV technology is different from RO technology and besides these two, there are many other technologies available for water treatment. Even the advertisement taken out by the respondent is a statement of fact relating to RO technology and the appellant-plaintiff itself has carried a comparative chart in its website about the two technologies and, according to the said website, the RO technology is more effective than UV technology and further, the appellant had acknowledged in the suit before the Goa District Court that its Aquaguard Water Purifier, based on UV technology, uses a sediment filter that was only capable of removing the dissolved contaminants of upto 5 micron units. Therefore, referring to all these factors, the respondent denied that the advertisement carried out was in any manner disparaging and more specifically, the advertisement does not disclose the identity of the appellant's product viz., 'Aquaguard'. Hence, the appellant is not entitled for the relief sought in the suit.
8. The learned trial judge, after considering the contentions put forward by the respective sides and taking note of the rulings cited, came to the conclusion that the brand name of the appellant company's product viz., 'Aquaguard' is not forthcoming in the advertisement and no material was placed by the appellant to substantiate that 'Aquaguard Water Purifier' is synonymous with UV water purifier or for that matter, Aquaguard means UV water purifier and vice versa. The trial court also observed that it is admitted by the appellant itself that RO technology is superior to UV technology and, therefore, no case was made out by the appellant for grant of temporary injunction and as there was no prima facie case made out by the appellant, ultimately, the trial court found the balance of convenience on the side of the respondent and so also the irreparable loss and injury and accordingly dismissed I.A.Nos. I and II filed by the appellant and allowed I.A.Nos. IV and V filed by the respondent.
9. I have heard the arguments addressed by the learned senior counsel Sri Udaya Holla for the appellant and the learned senior counsel Sri Vijaya Shankar for the respondent. Both sides referred to a number of rulings of the Apex Court as well as to the views expressed by leading authors on the special trade marks, trade names, etc. I have gone through the rulings cited by both sides.
10. The learned senior counsel, Sri Udaya Holla for the appellant submitted that the appellant company accounts for more than 70% of the market share in UV water purifier segment and its brand name Aquaguard is virtually synonymous with 'UV' in the sense that Aquaguard in other words means 'UV Water Purifier' and, therefore, trial court was in error in observing that, in the absence of use of the word 'Aquaguard' in the advertisement, the appellant can have no grievance. It is submitted that as the appellant uses UV technology in marketing its water purifier through the brand name 'Aquaguard', the advertisement in question is disparaging even in a generic sense and, as such, actionable. It is further submitted that the very same contentions as are being advanced before this Court by the respondent were also the contentions taken in the case at the District Court, Goa, and the said District Court rejected the contentions of the respondent and granted injunction in favour of the appellant herein and, as such, the said decision operates as res judicata so far as the respondent is concerned. The very fact that the advertisement mentions that the contaminants are not visible even to UV water purifier itself is sufficient to damage the appellant's product and its business in marketing the Aquaguard water purifier using UV technology. Therefore, the advertisement in effect causes confusion in the minds of the consumers and would divert them from using UV water purifiers and persuade them to go after the water purifiers of the respondent. Considering the fact that the appellant's Aquaguard using UV technology covers a wide area of the market almost to the extent of 70%, the advertisement is not only damaging to the reputation of the appellant's product, but, at the same time, the appellant will also lose its business. Therefore, the right of the appellant to market its product Aquaguard is now being affected greatly and the advertisement has disparaged the appellant's product without any valid justification. The appellant could not have had any grievance if the respondent, by its advertisement, had only stated that the respondent's water purifier with RO technology is the best in the world, but speaking ill of the appellant's water purifier cannot be permitted and hence, the trial court was totally in error in appreciating the facts of this case in the proper perspective.
11. The learned senior counsel for the appellant, referring to the various decisions of the Apex Court, submitted that, in the light of the proposition of law laid down in the said cases, the advertisement in effect causes disparagement. The decisions on which reliance was placed by the learned senior counsel for the appellant are : AIR2005Delhi102 , : 63(1996)DLT29 , : [1989]2SCR979 : : AIR1998SC526 : : 1983(13)ELT1607(SC) : : AIR1985SC1644 : A.I.R. 1997 Kant. 255 : : AIR1999SC3105 : : AIR1996Kant202 . Therefore, relying on the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted that disparagement of rival product is not permissible even if it is a generic disparagement and irreparable damage that would be caused following the advertisement cannot be repaired. In addition to the above proposition of law, the learned senior counsel also contended that the trial court, while considering an application for grant of temporary injunction, ought to have satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried and, in the instant case, having regard to the facts and circumstances and in particular, the nature of the business carried on by the appellant and it being a market leader in water purifiers and also the District Court at Goa having passed an order of temporary injunction in favour of the appellant, the relief sought by way of temporary injunction could not have been refused and, as such, the impugned order of the trial court is liable to be set aside and the temporary injunction as prayed for by the appellant requires to be granted.
12. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel Sri Vijaya Shankar for the respondent submitted that there is nothing disparaging in the advertisement earned out by the respondent company and as there is no reference to 'Aquaguard' or to the plaintiff's name in the advertisement, the question of any disparagement being caused to the appellant will not arise. Further, it is not in dispute that both the appellant and the respondent companies use both UV and RO technologies. As such, the question of any disparagement muchless any irreparable injury being caused to the appellant-company will not. arise and, therefore, it is not necessary to go into other aspects of the matter. It is then submitted that courts are not the appropriate forums for resolving differences between the traders. As far as the additional grounds urged in the appeal are concerned, it is contended that the appellant is not a manufacturer, but is engaged only in the marketing of vacuum cleaners. As far as the order of injunction granted by the District Court at Goa is concerned, that was a case in which a picture of Aquaguard was put in the publication, but the publication was not in the nature of an advertisement. Therefore, the facts and circumstances here are different from the one involved in the case at Goa. Interference by this Court is called for in respect of an order granting or refusing injunction will arise only when the impugned order is perverse or capricious. In this connection, reference was made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Wander Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. 1990 Supp. (1) S.C.C. 727.
13. In support, of the above submissions, the learned senior counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the decisions reported in : AIR1988Kant255 : : [1990]2SCR719 : : [1985]3SCR580 : : 1973CriLJ52 : A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1963 : : [1960]3SCR590 : : AIR1991Pat235 , : 72(1998)DLT7 : : [1979]3SCR671 : : (1972)IILLJ9SC : : : [1997]1SCR840 : : AIR1995SC2438 : : AIR1996SC761 : : 86(2000)DLT31 .
14. In the light of the aforesaid contentions urged by the respective sides and rulings cited, the points that arise for consideration are the following:
(i) Whether the advertisement in question amounts to disparaging the product of the appellant company?
(ii) Whether the order of the trial court suffers from perversity or is capricious?
Point No. (i)
15. It is not in dispute that the appellant company is engaged in selling water purifiers having 'UV' technology under the brand name 'Aquaguard'. The advertisement, which has been reproduced above at paragraph-5, clearly mentions that water contaminants which are invisible to the naked eye are also invisible to UV water purifiers. Since the appellant's water purifier uses UV technology in its water purifier Aquaguard, certainly, the advertisement amounts to disparaging the produce that is sold by the appellant company. No doubt, as the trial court has observed that there is no specific mention of the name 'Aquaguard' in the advertisement, nevertheless, the very use of the words 'UV technology' in the advertisement certainly will have the effect of causing damage to the appellant's business. The disparagement though not specific in the sense that there is no mention of the word 'Aquaguard', yet, taken on the whole, the advertisement though appears to be generic in nature, still becomes actionable and, as such, the appellant is right in contending that the said advertisement has affected its product.
16. In this regard, the law laid down by the Apex Court will have to be pressed into service in support of the above conclusion. In the case of Dabur India Ltd. v. Emami Ltd. reported in 2004(29) PTC 1, dealing with the advertisement 'Garmion mein chyawanprash bhool jao, Himani sona chandi amritprash khao' (Forget Chyawanprash in summers, eat Amritprash instead), the Delhi High Court has observed thus:
The aforesaid effort on the part of the defendant would be definitely a disparagement of the product Chayawanprash and even in generic term the same would adversely affect the product of the plaintiff. The presence of the defendant in the market is only to the extent of 12% of the total market of Chayawanprash in India whereas the plaintiff has about 67% share/presence in the Indian Market and if sale of Chayawanprash is weeded out from the market during the summer months, the plaintiff's presence in the market for sale of Chayawanprash is adversely affected. Even if there be no direct reference to the produce of the plaintiff and only a reference is made to the entire class of Chayawanprash in its generic sense, even in those circumstances disparagement is possible. There is insinuation against use of Chayawanprash during the summer months, in the advertisement in question, for Dabur Chayawanprash is also a Chayawanprash as against which disparagement is made.
17. In the case of Dabur India Ltd. v. Colgate Palmolive India Ltd. reported in A.I.R. 2005 Delhi 102, the Delhi High Court has observed thus:. Generic disparagement of a rival product without specifically identifying or pinpointing the rival product is equally objectionable. Clever advertising can indeed hit a rival product without specifically referring to it. No one can disparage a class or genre of a product within which a complaining plaintiff falls and raise a defence that the plaintiff has not been specifically identified.
18. In the case of Dabur India Ltd. v. Wipro Limited, Bangalore, reported in 2006(32) PTC 677 (Del.), the Delhi High Court, referring to the law on the subject as stated in Reckitt and Colman of India Ltd. v. M.P. Ramachandran 1999 PTC (19) 741, after quoting the law on this aspect, has observed thus:
11. Learned Counsel for the parties referred to several judgments on the subjects, the first of them being a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Reckitt and Colman of India Ltd. v. M.P. Ramachandran and Anr. 1999 PTC(19) 741. In that decision, the law on the subject is stated as follows:
(a) A tradesman is entitled to declare his goods to be best in the world, even though the declaration is untrue.
(b) He can also say that his goods are better than his competitors', even though such statement is untrue.
(c) For the purpose of saying that his goods are the best in the world or his goods are better than his competitors' he can even compare the advantages of his goods over the goods of others.
(d) He, however, cannot, while saying that his goods are better than his competitors', say that his competitors' goods are bad. If he says so, he really slanders the goods of his competitors. In other words, he defames his competitors and their goods, which is not permissible.
(e) If there is no defamation to the goods or to the manufacture of such goods no action lies, but if there is such defamation an action lies and if an action lies for recovery of damages for defamation, then the Court is also competent to grant an order of injunction restraining repetition of such defamation.
12. What is really relevant for the present purposes are conclusions (d) and (e) mentioned above, which effectively mean that an advertiser can say that his goods are better than his competitors but he cannot say that his competitor's goods are bad because that would amount to slandering or defaming the competitor and its goods, which is not permissible. But if there is no derogatory reference at all to the goods or to the manufacture, no action lies against that advertiser. In that case, the High Court concluded that in the advertisement, the competitor's product was stated to be of an inferior quality.
19. Therefore, having regard to the aforesaid position in law, in the instant case, the advertisement will have to be held to be a disparaging one, even in a generic sense and hence is actionable.
20. As far as the contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondent that the appellant is not a manufacturer but is only a trader and, therefore, the question of disparaging the goods of the manufacturer does not arise, is concerned, it is to be said that in the case of Karamchand Appliances Pvt. Ltd. v. Sh. Adhikari Brothers reported in 2005(31) PTC 1, at paragraph-31, the High Court of Delhi, referring to the aspect of manufacturer vis-a-vis trader, has observed thus:
30. There is merit even in the second limb of Mr. Jaitley's contention that what the advertisement denigrates and rubbishes is the very concept of a pluggy device like the one manufactured and marketed by the plaintiff. A disparagement even if generic would remain a disparagement and can be restrained at the instance of a party, who manufactures or trades in that class of goods regardless whether the technology used is modem or obsolete. The defendant is indeed entitled to boast that its product is the latest in the market and even the best but it cannot describe either the technology or the concept used by any other manufacturer or trader in the manufacture or sale of his products as obsolete or worthless. Comparative advertisement is permissible, so long as such comparison does not disparage or denigrate the trademark or the products of a competitor. Comparison of different features of two products showing the advantages, which one product enjoy over the other is also permissible provided such comparison stops short of discrediting or denigrating the other product. Viewed thus the defendant's commercial, which shows the model in the same taking out the pluggy device by describing it as 15 years old and obsolete method is a clear case of disparagement of devices like that of the plaintiffs that are based on that concept or technology and would therefore, be impermissible.
(emphasis supplied)
21. Keeping the above observations in view, if we look to the documents produced by the parties and in particular document No. 17 in Volume IV produced by the respondent herein, there is a categorical statement to the following effect:
The big operators in this segment are market leader Eureka Forbes, .... As much as 75 per cent of the market is accounted for by Eureka Forbes with its brand Aqua Guard....
Document No. 18 of the same volume mentions thus:
Eureka Forbes' Aquaguard, virtually synonymous with UV, has priced its Reviva (an RO product)....
It is, therefore, clear from the above material that Eureka Forbes is synonymous with the word 'Aquaguard' and, in turn Aquaguard is synonymous with 'UV'. As such, the advertisement in question does affect the product of the appellant company since the said Aquaguard uses UV technology. In the light of the aforesaid observations in Karamchand Appliances Pvt. Ltd. case, a disparagement can be restrained even at the instance of a party who manufactures or trades in that class of goods. Hence, the argument of the learned senior counsel for the respondent that the appellant is not a manufacturer of UV purifiers, therefore, does not make much difference inasmuch as both the manufacturer as well as a trader can approach the court if there is disparagement of the product with which they deal. As the appellant is said to be a pioneer and leader in UV water purifiers and claiming to be Asia's largest direct selling organization accounting for more than 70% market share of UV water purifier segment, certainly the advertisement put up by the respondent causes irreparable damage to the appellant's product, Aquaguard.
22. As far as the contention of the learned senior counsel for the respondent that both the appellant as well as the respondent use both UV and RO technology and, therefore, the question of disparagement does not arise, is concerned, merely because both the technologies - UV and RO, are used, that itself is no ground to cause disparagement of the product of the appellant company, Aquaguard, which uses UV technology.
23. As far as the decisions relied on by the learned senior counsel for the respondent, are concerned, though by referring to those decisions, it was sought to be contended that the advertisement in question is not in the nature of a defamation and that it is not impermissible for a company to boast of its technology as superior over others, the said decisions will have to be read in the light of the facts and circumstances of those decisions.
24. What is pertinent, is to examine the advertisement in question in the context of the business of the appellant herein. Viewed from the said angle, though the respondent has every right to market its product by claiming that its product is superior in quality, yet, at the same time, the freedom of expression i.e., the right to advertise, does not permit one to go to that extent as to cause damage or irreparable injury to the product of others. Merely because the respondent has every right to market its product by stating that it's products are of superior quality over others, yet, it cannot go to the extent of stating that the contaminants are invisible even to UV water purifier. In other words, had the advertisement in question stopped with the words 'water contains contaminants that are invisible to the naked eye', certainly, the appellant would not have had any reason to complain. But, having said so as above, the advertisement goes on to say that 'it is invisible even to the UV water purifier'. The mention of 'UV' has further given rise to disparaging the water purifier of the appellant company. As such, in my considered opinion, the rulings referred to by the learned senior counsel for the respondent cannot come to its aid so as to contend that the advertisement in question is not one causing disparagement to the appellant company.
25. Consequent to the conclusion thus reached in the light of the decisions referred to above, I answer point No. (i) in the affirmative.
Point No. (ii)
26. The point that now requires to be answered is whether this Court can interfere with the discretionary order passed by the trial court in the matter of injunction. It is well settled that for grant of temporary injunction, the court has to be satisfied that the case is not frivolous or vexations one and that there is a serious question to be tried and further, as has been observed by the Apex Court in Colgate Palm Olive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. reported in : AIR1999SC3105 , the court has to consider whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss and injury keeping in view the strength of the parties' case. Although both sides have relied on a number of decisions as regards the scope of the appellate court with regard to interference against the order passed by the trial court under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the C.P.C., and as the proposition of law laid down in the cases referred to by the learned Counsel for the parties are no longer res integra, I would like to refer to two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which, in my opinion, would be of great relevance to answer the point under consideration in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case on hand.
27. In Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd. reported in 1990 (Supp) S.C.C. 727, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the following proposition of law:
14. ... the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion....
(emphasis supplied)
28. In a very recent decision in the case of M. Gurudas v. Rasaranjan, reported in 2006 AIR SCW 4773, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to earlier decisions, has observed thus:
22. While considering the question of granting an order of injunction one way or the other, evidently, the court, apart from finding out a prima facie case, would consider the question in regard to the balance of convenience of the parties as also irreparable injury which might be suffered by the plaintiffs if the prayer for injunction is to be refused. The contention of the plaintiffs must be bona fide. The question sought to be tried must be a serious question and not only on a mere triable issue....
29. Tested in the light of the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case on hand, the question that is raised by the appellant herein is a very serious question and not only a mere triable issue because, it is the specific stand of the appellant that it is a market leader across India having a share of approximately 82% in UV water purifier segment and the appellant's Aquaguard water purifier is synonymous with UV technology and in the light of the said backdrop, if we view the advertisement in question, it cannot be said that no serious question is involved nor can it be said that no triable issue is involved in the case on hand. Therefore, the trial court totally erred in not noticing these facts in the light of the documents produced by the appellant and also in not following the above proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court as regards grant of injunction. Therefore, in my considered opinion, when the trial court has ignored the well-settled principles of law as laid down by the Apex Court, the conclusion reached cannot, but, will have to be held as perverse and capricious. Merely because there was no mention of the word 'Aquaguard' in the advertisement, the said omission will not take away the disparaging effect of the advertisement insofar as the appellant's product is concerned, which product uses UV technology.
30. Although it is neither proper nor warranted for this Court, at this juncture, to go into the merits of either of the two technologies viz., UV and RO technologies, yet, the very fact that the UV technology is being used by the appellant in its water purifier, Aquaguard, the trial court ought to have held that this is a matter involving a serious question to be tried and, therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained in the light of the well settled proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court and further the trial court also erred in not taking note of number of documents produced by the appellant in proof of the fact that the appellant is a market leader insofar as the water purifier Aquaguard using UV technology is concerned.
31. Therefore, in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, I am of the view that the trial court has not exercised its discretion reasonable and in a judicious manner. Furthermore, having regard to the nature of the advertisement and the technology that is being used by the appellant in its water purifier Aquaguard, the view taken by the trial court cannot be termed as a reasonable or a possible view of the matter. The trial court, in fact, has virtually come to the conclusion that had the advertisement used the name 'Aquaguard', then, it would have been a case of disparaging the product of the appellant. Mere non-mention of the name 'Aquaguard' will not take away the effect of the damage that the advertisement causes to the appellant's product. As such, this is a case where interference is called for with the order passed by the trial court.
32. As far as the plea of res judicata raised by the appellant's counsel is concerned, it is submitted by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the District Court at Goa has passed an order in Civil Suit No. 27/2005/A restraining the respondent herein from disparaging the product of the appellant and, therefore, the said find operates as res judicata. The said contention urged was sought to be refuted by the learned senior counsel for the respondent by contending that the question of res judicata will not arise as the facts and circumstances of the case at Goa are not the same with which we are concerned in this appeal and in this regard, the learned Counsel also placed reliance on a number of decisions. In one such decision viz., in the case of Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar reported in : [1964]5SCR946 , it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court thus:
Interlocutory orders are of various kinds; some like orders of stay, injunction or receiver are designed to preserve the status quo pending the litigation and to ensure that the parties might not be prejudiced by the normal delay which the proceedings before the court usually take. They do not, in that sense, decide in any manner the merits of the controversy in issue in the suit and do not, of course, put an end to it even in part. Such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, though normally only on proof of new facts or new situations which subsequently emerge. As they do not impinge upon the legal rights of parties to the litigation the principle of res judicata does not apply to the findings on which these orders are based, ....
33. Bearing the above observations in mind, I have confined the discussion only in respect of the suit that is filed before the court at Bangalore and the order which is impugned in these appeals and irrespective of the order passed by the District Court at Goa. Even viewed independently, in the instant case, the facts and circumstances referred to above and the nature of the advertisement that is carried are themselves sufficient to come to the conclusion that prima facie, the advertisement in question amounts to disparaging the product of the appellant. I, therefore, deem it unnecessary to go deep into the question of res judicata, neither have I drawn any sustenance from the order passed by the District Court at Goa to arrive at my conclusion as above.
34. For the aforesaid reasons, I answer point No. (ii) also in the affirmative.
35. In the result, all the appeals are allowed and the order passed by the trial court on I.A.Nos. I, II, IV and V is set aside. An order of injunction as prayed for by the appellant is granted and the respondent, its Directors, Executives, Distributors, Marketers, Franchisers, Dealers, Agents, Stockists, Representatives, Advertisers, Officers, Successors-in-business, Assigns or anyone claiming through or under them are restrained from publishing, placing advertisement, or in any manner, circulating or distributing any material defaming or maligning the plaintiff's product 'Aquaguard' or 'UV Purifiers' or from issuing disparaging statements about the said 'Aquaguard' or 'UV Purifiers', during the pendency of the suit.
Regard being had to the magnitude of the controversy between the parties, the issue involved being a serious one, and the perceivable irreparable injury or damage to be caused to the parties concerned, it is Impressed upon the trial court to endeavour to dispose of the main suit, preferably within six months from the date of communication of this order.
One last word. The observations made herein being at an interlocutory stage of the suit, they shall not affect the case of either of the parties on merits, nor shall the trial court be influenced by the same, in any manner