Judgment:
ORDER
Venkatachala, J.
1. In these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution, quashing, by means of an appropriate writ, of the judgment dated 22-2-1980 rendered in Appeal No. 249 of 1979 by the Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal (for short 'the Appellate Tribunal'), is sought.
2. Antecedent material facts are briefly these: Respondent-3, by his application dated 8-2-1978 under Section 46 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short 'the Act'), sought from the Regional Transport Authority, Dakshina Kannada (for short 'the R.T.A.') grant of a pucca stage carriage permit for running a stage carriage service of one round trip a day on the route - Thirthahally to Mangalore via Hulikal, Haladi, Coondapur, Kota, Brahmavar, Udupi and Mulki, according to the time-schedule proposed therein. That application's substance was published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 23-3-1978, inviting filing of representations thereto, if any, and announcing the date fixed by the R.T.A. for hearing on the application and representations to be filed respecting it as 20-5-1978. Petitioners herein, whose stage carriages passed on the route for which respondent-3 had sought for grant of a stage carriage permit or on portions of that route, filed their representations objecting to the grant. There were others who had filed representations supporting such grant. Motor Vehicles Inspector, who, at the instance of the R.T.A., had conducted the traffic survey as to the need of introducing the stage carriage service on the route for which grant of permit was sought, gave his report recording therein, inter alia, his opinion that there existed such need. The Regional Transport Authority, Shimoga, within whose region a portion of the route for which grant of permit was sought, intimated to the R.T.A., of its concurrence for the grant. However, on 17-3-1979, the adjourned date of hearing, the R.T.A. passed a resolution refusing to grant the permit sought for by respondent-3 herein on its view that the existing services passing through Thirthahally were sufficient to cater to the needs of the travelling public of Thirthahalli. That resolution was impugned by respondent-3 herein in an appeal, Appeal No. 249 of 1979, preferred before the Appellate Tribunal. In that appeal, each of the petitioners in the present five writ petitions, had been impleaded as respondents among others. By its judgment dated 22-2-1979, the Appellate Tribunal allowed that appeal, set aside the impugned resolution of the R.T.A. and granted the pucca stage carriage permit to respondent-3 herein (appellant therein) as had been sought for by him. It is the validity of that judgment which has become the subject matter of these petitions, as stated at the outset.
3. Of the two contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners at the hearing against the validity of the impugned judgment of the Appellate Tribunal, one related to the finding recorded by the Appellate Tribunal as to the existing need for introduction of a stage carriage service on the route respecting which grant of permit had been sought and the other related to the schedule of timings, on which the stage carriage service of respondent-3 herein had to run on that route.
4. According to the first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, when a finding of fact as to the non-existence of the need for introducing a stage carriage service on the route for which respondent-3 had sought grant of permit, was recorded by the R.T.A. on an appraisal of material on record and having regard to its familiarity of local conditions, the Appellate Tribunal had committed an error of law apparent on the face of record in re-appraising the material on record for recording a contrary finding of its own and hence the contrary finding so recorded by the Appellate Tribunal is liable to be quashed by issue of a writ of certiorari.
5. This contention of learned Counsel for the petitioners proceeds on the assumption that the Regional Transport Authority, which could be credited with awareness of existing local conditions, when records a finding of fact as to the need or otherwise of introduction of a stage carriage service on a route lying within its region, such finding of fact binds the Appellate Tribunal. No provision in the Act or the Rules made thereunder lends support to such assumption. The highest that could be said in favour of sanctity of a finding of fact recorded by a Regional Transport Authority functioning under the Act is that such finding since could be equated to a finding of fact recorded by a trial Court on the civil side on an appraisal of oral evidence, it should not be lightly interfered with by the Appellate Tribunal which could be equated to the Appellate Court on the Civil Side. But, it should not be overlooked that when an appeal in a matter decided upon by the Regional Transport Authority lies to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 64 of the Act, the Appellate Tribunal can, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, review a finding of fact recorded on such matter by the R.T.A. in exercise of its original jurisdiction, on a re-appraisal of the entire material on record relating thereto inasmuch as the appellate power exercisable by the Appellate Tribunal under the Section is in no way circumscribed. Indeed, when a finding of fact recorded by a R.T.A. in a proceeding, is challenged in appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, the latter has a responsibility of independently examining the material on record and expressing its own view on a matter in controversy. It would be so for the reason that power exercisable by an appellate authority and the power exercisable by the original authority on a matter in dispute, are always regarded as coextensive. If this is how an Appellate Tribunal has to exercise its appellate jurisdiction, a finding of fact recorded by it as to the existing need of introduction of a stage carriage service on a route on a proper re-appraisal of all material on record, can never be regarded as an error of law apparent on the face of the record, even if such a finding displaces a contrary finding recorded by the R.T.A., the original authority. In this view of the matter, the question of quashing the finding of fact relating to the need recorded by the Appellate Tribunal by issue of a Writ of Certiorari in exercise of this Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot arise. Hence, the first contention of the learned Counsel does not merit acceptance.
6. I shall now proceed to consider the second contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners relating to the acceptance of the timings on which respondent-3 has proposed to operate his stage carriage permit. According to the learned Counsel, such acceptance by the Appellate Tribunal of the proposed timings of the operation of respondent-3's stage carriage service since would result in respondent-3's stage carriage overtaking the petitioner's stage carriages passing on the same route at some stages, this Court should set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal is so far as it relates to the acceptance of the proposed timings, on which respondent-3's stage carriage service has to be operated, and remit the case in this regard to the Secretary, R.T.A., for fresh disposal maintaining the priority of timings of the petitioner's stage carriage services. It is true, as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, that there arises some type of clash in the running of the service of each of the petitioners with the running of the service of respondent-3 at one or two places along the route. But, further probe into the matter shows that such clash may not adversely affect the interest of the services of the petitioners in their operation. It is so for the reason that the petitioner's services are passing-services on certain portions of the route for which respondent-3 is granted permit. Besides, the travelling public must have got accustomed to the timings of the petitioner's services as also the timings of respondent-3's service, in that, all of them together have been operating their services on the respective routes for over a period of seven years. However, even if the case is remitted to the Secretary, R.T.A., for re-assignment of timings for respondent-3's stage carriage service, it would not be possible for the Secretary to re-assign the timings so as to allow priority for the operation of the service of each of the petitioners on the concerned route at every stage point. It would be so for the reason that the stage carriage permits of the petitioners being those granted to them decades earlier to the grant of stage carriage permit in favour of respondent-3, the journey-time of the services of each of them would be unduly long, the same having been fixed according to the standards then prevailing as to the running-time of stage carriages and their halting time at each stage point enroute.
7. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, who conceded to this position with his usual fairness, submitted that there would not have been any problem for the petitioners in this regard if their requests for acceleration of the timings of their services could be granted by the concerned Transport authorities if approached, but such requests will not generally be accepted by them. The submission of learned Counsel appears to be well founded. Yet, a direction to the Transport authorities concerned to accelerate the timings of the stage carriage services of the petitioners cannot be given while deciding these writ petitions. It would be so for the reason that the carrying out of such direction by the Transport authorities may result in affecting the timings of the other stage carriages operating on the route, which result even if is in the interests of travelling public, cannot be brought about without such operators being afforded an opportunity of being heard. Be that as it may, when the petitioners have, in a way, acquiesced in respondent-3 running his stage carriage services on the route according to the timings assigned to it for as many as seven years, it may not be either just or proper to concede to the request made on their behalf at this distance of time for setting aside the impugned judgment of the Appellate Tribunal in so far as it relates to giving of approval of time-table on which respondent-3 has to run his stage carriage service, and for remitting the case in this regard to the Secretary, R.T.A., for re-assignment of such timings when no error of law apparent on the face of the record is shown to have been committed in this regard by the Appellate Tribunal. Hence, the second contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners also fails.
8. Though I have held while dealing with the second contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that having regard to the circumstances obtaining in the case, it is not desirable to remit the case to the Secretary, R.T.A., for deciding upon the question of acceleration of timings of the petitioner's stage carriage services operating on old stage carriage permits, my views on the problem of acceleration of timings in the time-tables of the old stage carriage permits, need mention in the interests of travelling public. The Common complaint of a holder of an old stage carriage permit on a route respecting which a new stage carriage permit is granted, concerns invariably to overtaking of his service by the new service at one or the other stage of the travel. Such situation arises due to the fact that the journey - time of a service under the old permit will be longer as compared to the shorter journey-time of a service under a new permit. Journey-time in old permit will be longer as compared to the short journey-time in the new permit despite the route for both being common. The reason for such variation in journey-time of an old stage carriage permit and a new stage carriage permit is not far to see. Journey-time of old stage carriage permits will have been fixed on ant equated standards of safe speed of a stage carriage and adequate halting time needed for a stage carriage at stage points on a route while journey-time of new stage carriage permits will have been fixed on modern standards of safe-speed of a stage carriage and the unavoidable halting time needed for a stage carriage at the stage points on that route. It is this situation which warrants reduction in journey-time of stage carriage services covered by old stage carriage permits or what is generally regarded as acceleration of timings in old stage carriage permits. Such reduction in journey-time of old stage carriages, it can be said without contradiction, would be a welcome change from the point of view of travelling public who mostly utilise the stage carriage services to attend to their work and not for joy rides. It should not be forgotten that time consciousness is growing in our people and they regard time wasted on their travel as a national loss. When the dominant object sought to be achieved by grant of stage carriage permits under the Act is the good of the travelling public, the transport authorities, who are, under the Act, entrusted with the duty of administering its provisions, cannot remain silent spectators of the loss of time caused to the travelling public using the stage carriage services operated under old permits. On the contrary, such authorities owe a responsibility to the travelling public to save their journey-time, as far as possible, whenever they (travelling public) utilise the stage carriage services of old time permits. This can be done when the operators of old time stage carriage operators apply therefor and even otherwise by the concerned Transport authority taking suo moto action in this behalf, of course, in either event the Transport authority necessarily complying with the procedural requirement relating to service of prior notice on the operators likely to be affected by such action [See: Section 48 (3) (xxi) of the Act]. If traffic survey is got conducted in the matter, either by State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority, on routes, particularly on those where operation of stage carriage services have increased several fold in the recent past, the need for suo moto initiation of rationalisation of timings of all stage carriage services operating on such routes, becomes exigent. However, it is obvious that the Transport authority's action in the matter shall be in the interest of travelling public and conform to the requirements of law.
9. As I have found no merits in the contentions urged against the validity of the impugned judgment of the Appellate Tribunal, these writ petitions are liable to be dismissed.
10. Hence, I dismiss these writ petitions and discharge the rule issued in them. No costs.