S.R. Rangaiah Vs. the Regional Transport Authority, Chitradurga and anr. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:

.....to or in immovable property. the amendment is retrospective and is only clarificatory. concept of tenant co-partnership housing society is alien to act and hence act does not provided for such societies. when the society has not been registered, its bye-laws cannot be altered to bring it under that category, which is not provided for in the act. -- karnataka stamp act, 1957.[k.a. no. 34/1957]. section 33, 67 & 67-b: impounding of document held, in proceedings under sections 67 and 67-b, the authorities are competent to impound such documents, even copies of them, whether certified or not, for enforcing payment of stamp duty/penalty. -- section 39(1)(b): demand for payment of stamp duty held, the date of transaction is the basis for charging the duty i.e., on the market value of the property at relevant point of time. manner of computation should be indicated in the demand notice. demand not satisfying to the requirement is to bad in law. -- section 46-a: limitation for recovering stamp duty held, question of limitation would arise for consideration only when the demand is made and recovery is enforced and not till them. - section 58 (3) clearly means that if the application..........no. 871 (n) of 1974, dated 10-9-1976: : [1977]1scr563 . the relevant portion of the decision of the supreme court is as follows:............. sub-section (3) of section 58 confers a discretion on the regional transport authority to entertain an application for renewal when it is made beyond the time limit specified in the proviso to sub-section (2), but not more than 15 days late and the discretion is to be exercised in favour of entertaining the application for renewal when it is shown that there was sufficient cause for not making it in time. section 58 (3) clearly means that if the application for renewal is beyond time by more than 15 5 days the rta has no power to condone the delay. this express provision excludes the applicability of section 5, limitation act, in the cases where the application is delayed by more than 15 days.' (underlining is mine)2. from the above it is clear, that the regional transport authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of the writ petitioner for renewal of his permit, if it had been made beyond the periods mentioned in s. 58 (2) and (3) of the act.3. shri p. r. brirangaiah, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner,.....

Judgment:

ORDER

1. In this writ petition, the petitioner who was a permit holder bearing No. BP. 2/71-72 on the route Upperigenahally to Davanagere as a stage carriage operator held that permit up to 27-3-1977. He has admitted in his statement of the case that he could not apply for renewal of the permit from the aforementioned date within the time prescribed by Section 58 (2) and (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). His belated application was considered by the Ist respondent R. T. A. Chitradurga, in its Subject No. 56/1977 on 30-5-1977 and rejected the same on the sole ground that it was not filed within the time stipulated under Section 58 (2) and (3) of the Act. Aggrieved by the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority, the writ petitioner preferred an appeal to the 2nd respondent the Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) in appeal No. 559/1977. After hearing the appellant, the Presiding officer of the Tribunal dismissed the appeal relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Ashifaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, U. P. in Civil Appeal No. 871 (N) of 1974, dated 10-9-1976: : [1977]1SCR563 . The relevant portion of the decision of the Supreme Court is as follows:............. Sub-section (3) of Section 58 confers a discretion on the Regional Transport Authority to entertain an application for renewal when it is made beyond the time limit specified in the proviso to sub-section (2), but not more than 15 days late and the discretion is to be exercised in favour of entertaining the application for renewal when it is shown that there was sufficient cause for not making it in time. Section 58 (3) clearly means that if the application for renewal is beyond time by more than 15 5 days the RTA has no power to condone the delay. This express provision excludes the applicability of Section 5, Limitation Act, in the cases where the application is delayed by more than 15 days.' (Underlining is mine)

2. From the above it is clear, that the Regional Transport Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of the writ petitioner for renewal of his permit, if it had been made beyond the periods mentioned in S. 58 (2) and (3) of the Act.

3. Shri P. R. Brirangaiah, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that had the petitioner been given an opportunity to have his application published, then he would have had the advantage of being heard fully and there would have been no objection for the renewal of his permit. This may be so if the application was validly made and could be construed as one made in accordance with law. Since that is not the position, this argument of the learned counsel is of no avail.

4. There is no apparent error of law in the order of the Tribunal or the Resolution of the 1st respondent R. T. A. and on the other hand is in conformity with the law declared by the Supreme Court. Therefore, this writ petition is dismissed without issuing- Rule.

5. Petition dismissed.