Judgment:
M.F. Saldanha, J.
1. This C.R.P. was disposed of by me on July 23, 1996, when the petitioner's learned advocate was not present. The court had heard the respondent's learned advocate and prima facie, since the order passed by the Small Causes Court appeared to be sustainable, the C.R.P. was dismissed. Thereafter, an application was made for re-consideration of that order which was granted by me principally because, the petitioner's learned advocate stated that there are certain other aspects of the case which required to be seriously considered by the court and obviously, the matter had gone by default. It was only fair that the court should take these into consideration. The C.R.P. was therefore, re-listed and has been heard by me once again today.
2. This is a case in which, respondent No. 1 alleges that she had deposited a sum of Rs. 6,000 in a high interest scheme with Deccan Finance Industrial Investment Company who are the second respondents to this C.R.P. The not unfamiliar situation occurred whereby the amount in question became irrecoverable and, therefore, a suit was filed by the first respondent praying for a decree not only against the company and the third respondent who is supposed to have been the person running it, but also against the present petitioner inter alia on the ground that the deposit receipt in question was signed by him. The suit came to be decreed and it is only the present petitioner who has challenged the validity of the decree passed against him. The petitioner's learned advocate has submitted that there was no ground on which the liability in respect of the deposit amount and the interest could be fastened on him. His contention is that the petitioner was a Professor of Economics, a person of some status and merit and that he had responded to an advertisement for the post of branch manager of the company which styled itself as a reputed finance and investment company. He has also relied on the letter of appointment whereby his designation was set out as accountant and he has also submitted that irrespective of whether he was treated as the accountant or the branch manager, he had resigned in the year 1987, when the company confirmed that he was in no way liable for the financial business. The learned advocate submits that the signing of the deposit receipt was on behalf of the company and having regard to the office held by the petitioner, but there is nothing to indicate that his status was in any way different to that of an employee and more importantly, no material has been advanced to justify the petitioner being held liable by the court for any repayment. The learned advocate submits that in so far as the petitioner was a mere employee, the plaintiff herself realised that there was no case against him and a belated attempt was made to amend the plaint on the date of judgment which application was rejected. It is, therefore, submitted that the decree in question must be set aside vis-a-vis the petitioner. On behalf of the respondent, the usual argument is canvassed that she has acted in good faith and was clearly induced by the advertisement and more importantly by the persons who manned the office. These aspects of the matter may be relevant in a criminal court, but as far as a civil court is concerned, it will be necessary to demonstrate that the amount deposited was in fact received or entrusted to the person against whom the decree is sought. If the defendant was either a director, proprietor or partner of the concern, it would be impossible to argue that no such liability can accrue but if the person is a mere employee, then the position would be exactly the reverse. I do concede that having regard to the malpractices prevalent in the market, there are occasions when persons of some repute are deliberately used to inspire confidence or to attract gullible investors and if this can be demonstrated, then the person concerned will not be immune from the liability for the reason that there is clear abetment in the transaction. On the state of the present record however, it is very clear that the present petitioner was only an officer/employee of the company and even if he has signed the deposit receipt on behalf of the company, that could not be sufficient to make him liable under the decree as the transaction was between the depositor and the company.
3. The petitioner's learned advocate has drawn my attention to a decision in Ganapathi Rao v. Puttamma [1983] 1 KLJ 318 wherein this court had occasion to examine the ambit and scope of section 18 of the Small Causes Courts Act because, the point had arisen as to whether a total re-examination of a proceeding that had come up from that court was permissible within the limited scope of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code since, this court was exercising revisional powers. Since section 18 uses the words, 'satisfying itself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes is according to law ....', it is very clear that since no other appeal is provided for against such orders, the scope in such instances is much wider than that under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. This court while considering this aspect of the matter, had occasion to refer to the well-known decision of the Supreme Court in Hari Shankar v. Rao Giridhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698. As far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, since the law recognises the scope of one appeal or review in almost all proceedings, section 18 does give the High Court the general power to do a total review of the order and under these circumstances, all points that would come within the scope of this definition are certainly open to be canvassed. It was, therefore, within the scope of this proceeding, for the petitioner's learned advocate to have referred to various parts of the record and the evidence.
4. Another point that was sought to be raised was with regard to the aspect of limitation, where the petitioner's learned advocate submitted that the suit is time barred. Even though this point was never taken up before the trial court, learned advocate referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, : [1964]3SCR495 , as also to an earlier decision of this court reported in Mahaboob Saheb v. V. Anjaneyulu [1973] 2 MLJ 91 wherein the courts had occasion to observe that even if the point of limitation is not specifically raised or pleaded, it is the basic duty of the court to apply its mind to the facts of the case carefully and to consider all aspects of the matter including points of limitation. The learned advocate submitted that the suit was time barred and that the trial court ought to have dismissed it on this ground. It is true that this point was never brought to the notice of the trial court and in this regard, I need to observe that there can be no two opinions about the fact that it is the basic duty of the court office to examine the limitation point apart from which the learned judge cannot lose sight of this aspect of the matter even if the parties do not highlight it. What has not been highlighted in the earlier decisions is the fact that there are situations in which limitation gets extended for a variety of reasons including acknowledgments, etc., and under these circumstances, there exists a corresponding duty on the part of the litigants and the learned advocates to bring to the notice of the court and particularly the presiding judge, any such serious or basic infirmities which the litigation may suffer from. This is all the more so because, there is every possibility particularly as far as the aspect of limitation is concerned, that if the office has, while scrutinising the plaint, not pointed out this fact, a court may very safely proceed on the footing that there is no such bar. I do need to emphasise therefore, that before blaming the presiding officer of a court, it is more necessary to ascertain as to whether the litigants and their learned advocates have done their duty. In the present case, I do not propose to examine that aspect of the matter because, it is not very clear as to whether there were acknowledgments of the date at subsequent points of time which is quite possible and more so because, the petitioner is entitled to succeed on the first point.
5. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner was no more than a mere employee of the company, he would not be liable for the financial transactions of the company in a civil court and on the state of the present record. The decree passed against him only is, therefore, set aside.
6. The C.R.P. succeeds to this extent. No order as to costs.