1. In view of the memo filed, the cases had been posted today for being spoken to. The order dated 25th November, 1987 allowing these petitions is recalled and full-fledged arguments of the learned Central Government Counsel and Sri Sastry for the accused are heard and the matter are thus finally disposed of.
2. These petitions raise a very substantial question of general importance as to whether the failure to file the returns as laid down by para 36(2)(a) and (2)(b) and para 38(2) of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Scheme'), would amount to continuing offence or an offence committed once and for all.
3. All the complaints, C.C. No. 826 of 1986 to C.C. Nos. 849 and 909 to 932 of 1986, have been filed by the Provident Fund Inspector alleging that the accused failed to submit the returns as laid down by para 36(2)(a) and (2)(b) and para 38(2) of the Scheme. Para 36(2)(a) and (2)(b) of the Scheme read :
'(2) Every employer shall send to the Commissioner within fifteen days of the close of each month a return -
(a) in Form 5, of the employees qualifying to become members of the fund for the first time during the preceding month together with the declaration in Form 2 furnished by such qualifying employees, and
(b) in such form as the Commissioner may specify, of the employees leaving service of the employer during the preceding month :
Provided that if there is no employee qualifying to become a member of the fund for the first time or there is no employee leaving service of the employer during the preceding month, the employer shall send a 'Nil' return.'
Therefore, the Scheme enjoins on the employer to send a return as laid down by para 36(2)(a) and (2)(b) within fifteen days of the close of each month. The word used is 'shall' and thus it means that it is mandatory. That the employer is bound to submit such returns as laid down by para 36(2)(a) and 2(b), cannot be disputed and is not disputed before me at all.
Para 38(2) of the Scheme reads :
'(2) The employer shall forward to the Commissioner, within twenty-five days of the close of the month, a monthly consolidated statement, in such form as the Commissioner may specify, showing recoveries made from the wages of each employee and the amount contributed by the employer in respect of each such employee :
Provided that an employer shall send a 'Nil' returen, if no such recoveries have been made from the employees :
Provided that in the case of any such employee who has become a member of the Family Pension Fund under the Employees' Family Pension Scheme, 1971, the aforesaid form shall also contain such particulars as are necessary to comply with the requirements of that Scheme.'
Therefore, para 38(2) is also a mandatory provision which enjoins on the employer to submit monthly a consolidated statement within 25 days of the close of the month. That the said mandatory provision enjoins on the employer to file a monthly consolidated statement within twenty-five days of the close of the month also cannot be disputed and is not disputed before me at all. The non-compliance with para 36(2)(a), 36(2)(b) and para 38(2) is made punishable under para 76(b) of the Scheme. The punishment prescribed under para 76(b) of the Scheme is imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
4. The complaints in all these cases have been filed by the Provident Fund Inspector alleging that the accused, who is an employer, had not submitted the returns as provided under para 36(2)(a) and (2)(b) within 15 days of the close of each month and also alleging that the accused employer had failed to forward to the Commissioner, within twenty-five days of the close of each month, a monthly consolidated statement in the form prescribed by the Commissioner. They all pertain to the period from 1972, that is, ending with 31st December, 1971 to 1975.
5. The accused, on being served with summons in all the cases, appeared in the court below and filed an application urging that all these complaints had been filed nearly after expiry of 11 to 12 years. According to the accused, the complaints were barred by limitation under Section 468(2), Criminal Procedure Code. Section 468, Criminal Procedure Code, reads as :
'Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation. - (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.
(2) The period of limitation shall be -
(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;
(b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;
(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.'
6. In this case, as already indicated, the punishment prescribed under para 76(b) may extend to six months imprisonment or a fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000 or both. Therefore, the accused contended that the limitation of one year prescribed by Section 468(2), Cr. P.C., would be applicable to the facts of this case. He also relied on Section 469, Cr. P.C. which reads thus :
'Commencement of the period of limitation. - (1) The period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence, -
(a) on the date of the offence; or
(b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police office, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police office, whichever is earlier; or
(c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police office making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier.
(2) In computing the said period, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded.'
If the return is not filed by the date prescribed an offence is committed. Therefore, the date of commencement of limitation, according to counsel for the accused, would be the date of offence, that is, the date which falls immediately after the expiry of the period for which the return is required to be filed.
7. Sri C. Shivappa, learned counsel, referred me to Section 472, Cr. P.C., which reads as under :
'Continuing offence. - In the case of containing offence, a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues.'
8. According to learned counsel, Shri Sastry, for the accused, the period of limitation would be one year from the date of offence and, according to him, the offence is not a continuing one. According to him, it is an offence committed once and for all. According to him, the non-filing of returns as prescribed in para 36(2)(a) and (2)(b) and para 38 of the Scheme would be an offence committed once and for all. There are some offences which are exceptional in nature. They are just like kidnapping, abduction and non-contribution of the compulsory payments required to be made by law. If the statute imposes or enjoins on the employer to make certain contribution, then every moment he fails to pay contribution, till he pays contribution, it would continue to be an offence.
9. But, the question in this case is whether non-filing of the returns contemplated by para 36(2)(a) and (2)(b) and para 38(2) would be a continuing offence or would amount to an offence committed once and for all.
10. The question whether a particular offence is a continuing offence or non-continuing offence or an offence committed once and for all, necessarily depends on the language of the statute which creates that offence, the nature of the offence and, above all, the purpose which is intended to be achieved by constituting the particular act as an offence. The word 'continuing offence' is not defined anywhere in the Code. The phrase 'continuing offence' has been left to the wisdom of the Court for interpretation. The expression, 'continuing offence' though it appears to be a very vague expression has acquired a well recognised meaning in law. If the act committed by accused constitutes an offence and that continues from day to day and if that act covers a lapse on the part of the accused to comply with any fiscal contributions, a fresh offence is committed by the accused every day so long as the act continues. In the case of contribution required to be made compulsorily by the statute, non-contribution would amount to an offence every moment till the contribution is made. Such an offence ceases to be an offence only when the contribution required to be made by the statute, is made. Normally, and in the ordinary course, the offence is committed only once and for all. As already stated above, there might be some offences which continue to be committed day to day and such offences falling in the latter category are continuing offences. In every case of a continuing offence, it might be an omission or a positive act on the part of the defaulter. Therefore, so long as the employer fails to comply with the contributions compulsorily required to be made and so long as the employer fails to comply with the obligation of making contributions created by the statute, he continues to commit an offence and, therefore, failure to pay contributions made compulsory by law would amount to continuing offence. In all other cases, the offence is one committed once and for all.
11. The accusation in all these complaints against the accused is that he has not filed the return and he has failed to file the return within 15 days of the close of each month as required by para 36(2)(a) and (2)(b) of the Scheme and that he has failed to forward to the Commissioner within 25 days of the close of each month, a monthly consolidated statement in the form prescribed by the Commissioner as laid down by para 38(2) of the Scheme. The non-filing of the statement within 15 days of close of each month as required by para 36(2)(a) and (2)(b) and non-filing of a monthly consolidated statement in the form prescribed by the Commissioner, within 25 days of the close of each month as required by para 38(2) of the Scheme, are made punishable under para 76(b) of the Scheme read with Section 14(2) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
12. Sri C. Shivappa, learned counsel for the Provident Fund Inspector, submitted that considering the object and purpose of these provisions which are meant to ensure the welfare of the workers, the offence will have to be held as a continuous one. According to him, the non-compliance with these provisions would make it impossible for the Department to calculate the amounts collected by the employer from the employees towards the provident fund and also the amount which is liable to be contributed under the Scheme. According to him, the non-compliance with the provisions of the Scheme makes it difficult for the Department to find out whether he has maintained proper accounts or not.
13. Learned counsel, Sri Sastry, for the accused relied on State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi, : 1973CriLJ347 It was a case under the Mines Act, 1952. Section 66 of the Mines Act, 1952 provides that any person omitting, inter alia, to furnish any return, notice, etc., in the prescribed form or manner or at or within the prescribed time required by or under the Act to be made or furnished, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000. Section 79, however, lays down that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act unless a complaint thereof has been made within six months from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed or within six months from the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector, whichever is later. The Explanation to the section provides that if the offence in question is a continuing offence, the period of limitation shall be computed with reference to every point of time during which the said offence continues. In para 5 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has observed thus :
'Continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and recurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues and, therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all.'
In the said case decided by the Supreme Court, the complaint was not filed within the time statutorily fixed. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the complaint was barred by time. The offence in question was covered by the substantive part of Section 79 and it was not covered by the Explanation thereto. The Supreme Court thus held that non-filing of return contemplated by the Mines Act was an offence committed once and for all and it was not a continuing offence. The principle laid down in the said decision is that non-filing of the return is an offence committed only once and for all.
14. The Supreme Court decision cited next is Bhagirath Kanoria v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1986) 68 FJR 98.
The facts available in the said decision are mentioned in paras 2 and 3 of the said decision. They read as (at page. 100) :
'The facts of these appeals vary from case to case but such variation is inconsequential for our purpose. We will, therefore, state the facts of a representative group of these cases which comprises Criminal Appeals Nos. 407-418 of 1979.
On 22nd August, 1975, the Provident Fund Inspector, Indore, Madhya Pradesh, filed six complaints against the appellants and respondent No. 2, charging them with non-payment of employers' contribution under the Employees' Provident Fund and Family Pension Fund Act, 19 of 1952 (referred to herein as 'the Act'). Respondent No. 2 is a company called M/s. Burhanpur Tapti Mills Limited, of which appellants Nos. 1 to 3 were directors and appellant No. 4, the factory manager. Under Section 17 of the Act, the company was granted exemption from the operation of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952, which is framed under the Act. That exemption was granted on the condition that the company will transfer monthly collections of the provident fund of workers, inclusive of the employers, contribution to the Board of Trustees of the fund within 15 days of the close of each month. The allegation against the accused, about which there is no factual dispute, is that they did not pay the employers' contribution to the fund from February, 1970, to June, 1971.'
In the said case also, an application was filed that the complaint was barred by the period of limitation as laid down under Section 468, Criminal Procedure Code. The Magistrate held that they were all continuing offences and the question of limitation did not arise. The accused filed a petition in the Madhya Pradesh High Court. By the judgment dated 6th July, 1977, the learned Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh upheld the order of the trial court and dismissed the revision petitions. The directors of the company who, along with the company, were arraigned as the accused had filed those appeals for special leave against the judgment of the High Court and thus those matters came up before the Supreme Court. In paragraph 7 of the judgment it is stated (at p. 101) :
The allegation against the accused is that by not paying their contribution to the provident fund, they committed default in complying with the condition subject to which exemption was granted to them under Section 17 of the Act from complying with the provisions of the Act. Stated briefly, Section 17 confers upon the appropriate Government the power to exempt any establishment from the operation of all or any of the provisions of the Act, if such establishment has its own scheme of provident fund, of which the rules are not less favorable than the rules of the scheme framed under the Act. The company, in the instant case, was granted exemption under Section 17 on the condition that it shall pay the employer's contribution within fifteen days of the close of each month. This condition is the same as the one contained in para 38(1) of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952. Paragraph 38(1) reads as follows, in so far as is relevant :
38. Mode of payment of contribution. - (1) The employer shall before paying the member his wages in respect of any period or part of period for which contributions are payable, deduct the employee's contribution from his wages which together with his own contribution ... he shall, within fifteen days of the close of every month, pay ... to the fund.'
Therefore, the facts involved in that case are different from the facts involved in these cases. The facts involved in that case where that the employer did not deduct the contributions from the wages of the employees and along with those deductions he did not send his own contribution to the fund. The Supreme Court in the said Bhagirath Kanoria's case (supra) laid down as follows in paras 12 and 13 (at pages 103-104) :
'In Best v. Butler and Fitzgibbon (1932) 2 KB 108, the English Trade Unions Act, 1871, made it penal for an officer or a member of a trade union to wilfully withhold any money, books, etc., of the trade union. It was held in that case that the offence of withholding the money was a continuing offence, the basis of the decision evidently being that every day that the moneys were wilfully withheld, the offence was committed.
In Verney v. Mark Fletcher & Sons Ltd., (1909) 1 KB 444, Section 10(1) of the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901, provided that every fly-wheel directly connected with steam, water or other mechanical power must be securely fenced. Section 135 provided the penalty for non-compliance, with Section 10(1), while Section 146 provided that information of the offence shall be laid within three months after the date on which the offence comes to the knowledge of the Inspector. It was held that the breach of Section 10(1) was a continuing breach and, therefore, the information was in time. Every day that the fly-wheel remained unfenced, the factory was run otherwise than in conformity with the Act of 1901 and, therefore, the offence defined in Section 10 was continuing offence.'
In para 14 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed (at page 104) :
'The third English case referred to is London Country Council v. Worley, (1894) 2 QB 826, in which Section 85 of the Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1852 prohibited the erection of a building on the side of a new street in certain circumstance, without the consent of the London County Council. The Court construed Section 85 as creating two offences : building to a prohibited height and continuing such a structure already built after receiving a notice from the County Council. The Court held that the latter offence was a continuing offence.'
In para 15, the Supreme Court has stated (at page 104) :
'In Emperor v. Karsandas, (AIR) 1942 Bom 326, Section 390(1) of the Bombay City Municipal Act, 1888 provided that no person shall newly establish in any premises any factory of a certain description without the previous permission of the Commissioner nor shall any person work or allow to be worked any such factory without such permission. It was held by the High Court that establishing a new factory was an offence committed once and for all but, working it without permission, was a continuing offence.'
In para 16, the Supreme Court has stated (at page 104);
'In State of Bombay v. Bhiwandiwala (1956-II-LLJ-153), it was held that the offence of using the premises as a factory without a licence is a continuing offence.'
In para 17, the Supreme Court has stated (at page 104);
'In State of Bihar v. J. P. Singh, (1963) BLJR 782, the High Court of Patna held that conducting a restaurant without having it registered and without maintaining proper registers were continuing offences.'
Therefore, all the said cases referred to by the Supreme Court involved either the question of contribution or the question of making statutory payment or running some restaurant or some business without obtaining licence. Therefore, it was under those circumstances that a principle was laid down in the said case that non-payment of statutory contributions and running of business in the premises without obtaining permission amounted to continuing offences. In para 18 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has made it absolutely clear and has laid down in unequivocal terms (at page 104) :
'The decision of this Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi, : 1973CriLJ347 , to the effect that failure to furnish returns before the due date is not a continuing offence must be confined to cases of failure to furnish returns.'
Therefore, the Supreme Court in the said case did not leave the matters in doubt. It laid down in absolutely clear and unambiguous terms that the failure to furnish return before the due date under the various laws did not amount to continuing offence. The Supreme Court in the same paragraph 18 further states :
'It cannot be extended to cases like those before us in which the contravention is not of a procedural or formal nature and goes against the very grain of the statute under consideration. What is of closer resemblance to the cases before us are the three English cases, the two Bombay cases and the Patna case referred to by this Court as illustrative of cases in which the offences were held to be of a continuing nature. We adopt the reasoning in those cases as applicable to the circumstances of the instant prosecutions.'
The Supreme Court held, looking to the facts involved in the said case, that non-contribution of the amount to the statutorily created provident fund was a continuing offence because it was a statutory obligation and it was meant to alleviate the pitiable conditions of workers and also on the principle that non-contribution would amount to non-compliance every moment till contributions were made. Taking this view, the Supreme Court has stated in paragraph 20 of the judgment as follows (at page 105) :
'Our attention has been drawn to a judgment of the Bombay High Court in S. V. Lachwani v. K. C. Parikh; Criminal Revenue Applications Nos. 337 and 338 of 1976, which were decided by a learned single Judge on 7th November, 1977 : (1978) Lab. I.C. 868. It was held in that judgment that the failure to pay the employer's share of contribution to the provident fund is not a continuing offence. For reasons which we have mentioned above, we dissent from that judgment. With respect, we are unable to appreciate the reasoning of that judgment that if the failure to pay the employer's contribution is regarded as a continuing offence, it would be open to the employer to pay the contribution even after the due date has expired, in order to escape punishment. The concept of continuing offence does not wipe out the original guilt. It keeps the contravention alive, day by day.'
Therefore, in the said case, the Supreme Court has made it absolutely clear that if complaints relate to non-payment of contributions statutorily made compulsory, then it would continue to be a continuing offence every moment till contributions are made. The Supreme Court has made it clear that non-contribution only would amount to a continuing offence. It is made clear that the non-filing of returns prescribed under the Provident Funds Scheme would not amount to a continuing offence at all. The Supreme Court, in paragraph 18 of the judgment, upheld its previous decision in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi, (supra).
15. The principle laid down by this Court in Provident Fund Inspector v. N. S. Dayananda, (1979) 1 Kar LLJ 324, that non-payment of contribution did not amount to continuing offence, cannot be considered to be good law in view of the said Bhagirath's case (supra). But the principle laid down by this Court in the said case that non-submission of the returns as laid down in paragraph 36(2)(a) and (2)(b) and paragraph 38 of the Scheme was not a continuing offence, remains good law in view of the observation of the Supreme Court in paragraph 18 of the judgment in the said Bhagirath's case (supra).
16. Learned counsel, Sri Shivappa, referred me to Premier Studs and Chaplets Co. v. State, (1980) 56 FJR 611, decided by the Madras High Court. This decision has also been relied upon by the lower court. The Madras High Court held that non-submission of report prescribed by the Provident Funds Scheme amounted to a continuing offence. But, in view of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in paragraph 18 of Bhagirath's case (supra), the said decision rendered by the Madras High Court, with respect, cannot be considered to be a good law at all.
17. Sri Shivappa then referred me to a cyclostyled copy of an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court delivered on 17th September, 1984, in the case of Provident Fund Inspector v. Delhi Faridabad Textile Mills. It reads :
'Heard counsel for the parties. We are clearly of the opinion that Section 468, Criminal Procedure Code, can have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case in as much as refusal to pay provident fund and to submit returns is a continuous offence and every day the breach continues a fresh cause of action arises. We are but-tressed by a decision of this Court (Bhagirath Kanoria v. State of M.P., Criminal Appeal Nos. 407-418 of 1979 and allied matters) rendered on 24th August, 1984. The appeal is, therefore, allowed; the order of the trial court as confirmed by the High Court is set aside, and the case is sent back to the trial court for proceeding further in accordance with law with expedition.'
According to Mr. Shivappa, it is a case filed under the Provident Funds Scheme and the Act itself. The Supreme Court has stated in the said case that the view they have taken is but tressed by the decision in Bhagirath Kanoria's case, which is reported (1986) 68 FJR 98. As already stated, in Bhagirath Kanoria's case (supra), the Supreme Court laid down the principle that the offence arising on account of non-payment of contribution towards the fund was a continuous offence. At the risk of repetition, I would like to again quote paragraph 18 of the said Bhagirath's case (supra), which lays down (at page 104) :
'The decision of this Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi, : 1973CriLJ347 , to the effect that failure to furnish returns before the due date is not a continuing offence must be confined to cases of failure to furnish returns. It cannot be extended to cases like those before us in which the contravention is not of a procedural or formal nature and goes against the very grain of the statute under consideration. What is of closer resemblance to the cases before us are the three English cases, the two Bombay cases and the Patna case referred to by this Court as illustrative of cases in which the offences were held to be of a continuing nature. We adopt the reasoning in those cases as applicable to circumstances of the instant prosecutions.'
18. The principle laid down in para 18 of Bhagirath Kanoria's case (supra) has not been overruled or dissented from in the latter judgment of the Supreme Court itself.
19. Learned counsel, Sri Shivappa, again submitted that though the accused might have paid some money towards the fund later on, it is not possible for the Provident Fund Department to find out as to what was the exact amount required to be contributed by the employer and the employees and it is not possible to work out the entire contributions to be made or made.
20. The non-filing of the returns as and when required to be filed, if not filed, would amount to an offence committed once and for all. The argument now advanced that it is not possible to find out as to whether the entire contributions as required by law have been made or not unless returns are filed, does not appeal to me. If the department is so desirous to find out as to whether full contributions have been made or not by the accused, it can call for the accounts and find out the same. According to Sri Shivappa, the account books have been returned to the accused. When it possessed the account books, it ought to have found out whether payments are made in full or not. It is now too late for the department to turn back and say that it is not possible for it to find out in the absence of account books whether full payment is made or not. Therefore, this argument is rejected.
21. According to Shri Shivappa, in the absence of the returns, it is not possible for the department to find out as to how many employees are working at present and as to how many employees are out-going members and as to whether any contribution is really required to be made or not. According to him, the question of quantum of contribution to be made can only be made out on the basis of the returns. But, the returns that the accused will have to submit to the department would be dependent only on the documents maintained by the office. It is not the case of the complainant or the provident fund office that they have been denied access to the accounts. Therefore, in the circumstances, non-filing of the returns under the Scheme by the particular dates cannot be made a ground by the complainant to complain that it is not possible to find out whether full contribution has been made or not.
22. Learned counsel, Sri Shivappa, vehemently argued that the accused had questioned the notice issued by the department to him to make contributions. According to him, the accused filed an application to the department itself contending that he was not liable. It is undisputed that the said application filed by the accused was overruled by the department. It is also undisputed that the accused approached the Central Government under Section 19-A of the Act questioning the decision of the Provident Fund Department. It is also undisputed that the Central Government also rejected his application. It is also undisputed that the accused being aggrieved by the rejection of his application by the Central Government approached this Court in Writ Petition No. 7321 of 1981 questioning the demand made by the department to contribute contending that he was not liable to make contributions. That writ petition was dismissed on 13th August, 1981. The accused being not satisfied by the dismissal of the writ petition filed Writ Appeal No. 226 of 1983 and it was dismissed on 23rd September, 1986. It can be said to the credit of the accused that he appears to be a seasoned litigant. According to learned counsel, Sri Shivappa, Writ Appeal No. 226 of 1983 was dismissed on 23rd September, 1986, and the present complaint has been filed on 26th September, 1986, that is, within hardly three days after the dismissal of the writ appeal. But, the question involved in the objections raised by the accused and in the petition submitted to the Central Government by the accused and the subject-matter of the writ petition and the writ appeal filed were on the ground that he was not liable to pay the contributions and the provisions of the Scheme and the Act were not applicable to him. If the department thought that the Scheme and the Act applied to him, it did not prohibit the department from filing complaint in time for non-compliance with para 36(2)(a) and (2)(b) and para 38(2) of the Scheme. These reasons cannot be considered to be sufficient to treat the offences as continuing offences.
23. According to Sri Shivappa, as the applicability of the Act was itself in dispute, the question of the department filing any complaint for non-compliance did not arise under the Act. It is too far-fetched an argument. There was no stay restraining the department from filing complaint for non-compliance. Therefore, this cannot be considered to be sufficient ground also.
24. Therefore, in the result, in the view I have taken and in the light of the discussion above, I hold that these are not continuing offences and that they are offences committed once and for all. In view of the fact that the complaints have been filed after the expiry of 11 to 12 years, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. Therefore, the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offences and to continue with the cases, is set aside. Hence, these petitions are allowed. All the complaints are dismissed as time-barred.
25. Sri Shivappa submitted that the accused should be at least directed to furnish returns for the said periods. It is hoped and trusted that the accused would not stand on the question of prestige and that he would help the department by furnishing the information to the department in order to find out whether the contribution already made would amount to full contribution or not within the meaning of the Act.
26. Whenever such contumacious defaults in submitting the returns occur, it would be difficult for the department to work the Scheme as these are all social schemes to alleviate the condition of the workers. It is hoped that the Government brings out an amendment to the Act or the Scheme that if any such contumacious defaults by not filing returns are made, the industrial licence granted or any other licence or permission granted would stand cancelled. Unless such serious steps are taken, the very object of the Scheme and the Act would be frustrated. It is for the authorities concerned to think of such an amendment.