ORDER
1. This civil revision petition by the petitioners, the Divisional Controller and the Managing Director, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter called the Corporation), is directed against the judgment and order dated 23-2-1987 made by the Civil Judge, Haveri, in Misc. Appeal No. 23 of 1985 by which he reversed the order dated 13-8-1985 made by the Munsiff, Haveri, in O.S. No. 42 of 1985, rejecting the application (I. A. No. I) for temporary injunction.
2. A few facts that are necessary for the disposal of this petition are as follows :--
It is not in dispute that the immovable property adjoining the K.S.R.T.C., bus stand at Haveri constructed for the purpose ofrunning a canteen intending to cater to the needs of the travelling public is the property belonging to the Corporation. It is also not in dispute that by virtue of an agreement entered into between the petitioners and the respondent, a licence came to be issued in favour of the respondent to run catering business (refreshment room) at the premises in question. That agreement is dated 1-9-1981, with conditions 1 to 28 incorporated therein. One of the conditions is that the licensee, respondent herein, shall pay certain sum of money per mensem, apart from security deposit, as long as the licence is in force, which is for a period of four years from 1-9-1981. It is stated that even earlier to this, the respondent was running the canteen in the said premises from 1972 onwards on the strength of the licence which came to be renewed under the fresh agreement entered into in 1981 as aforesaid. It is stated that in 1972, the monthly rent of the premises was Rs. 1,885/-, besides the security deposit being Rs. 5,655/-. That came to be enhanced to Rs. 2,102/- being the rent and Rs.25,225/-being deposit. In 1981 the rental value of the premises was fixed at Rs. 3,083/- and the deposit at Rs.37,000/-.
It is stated that after the expiry of the period of licence, the Corporation issued a notice on 28-5-1985 to the respondent asking him to vacate the premises by 31-8-1985, the date on which the period of licence expired, failing which all the belongings of the respondent would be removed from the premises in which even the Corporation would not be liable for any loss or damage arising therefrom.
Aggrieved by the said notice, the respondent filed a suit in O.S. No. 42 of 1985 on the file of the Munsiff at Haveri for a declaration that he was the tenant of the premises in question and for consequential relief of injunction restraining the Corporation from evicting him from the suit premises. Along with the suit, he also filed an application (I. A. No. I) under 0.39, Rr. 1 and 2, C.P.C., for an ad interim order of temporary injunction against the Corporation, pending disposal of the suit. The learned Munsiff having heard learned counsel onboth sides on the application (I.A. No. I), by his order dated 13-8-1985, dismissed the application. The respondent having been aggrieved by the said order, filed an appeal in Misc. Appeal No. 23 of 1985 on the file of the Civil Judge, Haveri, who, having heard learned counsel on both sides, allowed the appeal, reversed the order made by the learned Munsiff and granted relief as prayed for in I.A. No. I. Hence this petition by the Corporation.
3. I heard learned counsel on both sides and perused the orders made by the Courts below.
4. Sri Jayaprakash, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation, petitioners herein, mainly argued that the order of the Appellate Authority was illegal and was unsustainable, inasmuch as, according to him, the learned Civil Judge failed to appreciate the contention urged before him that the suit premises being governed by the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974 (Karnataka Act No. 32 of 1974) (the Act for short), the suit as brought was not maintainable. He argued that the learned Munsiff was right in dismissing I. A. No. I holding that the respondent-plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case in his favour. In other words, the legal contention urged by Sri Jayaprakash is that the suit premises being public premises as defined under S. 2(e) of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises is ousted by S. 16 of the Act. However, the learned Civil Judge, without applying his mind to the said provisions, has allowed the appeal and reversed the order made by the learned Munsiff, which cannot be sustained in law.
5. Sri G. K. Shevgoor, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, argued supporting the order under revision. He submitted that the lower Appellate Court having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and following the decision of this Court, rightly reached the conclusion that it was a fit case for granting interim order of injunction pendingdisposal of the suit and that conclusion could not be interfered with by this Court or else, the very purpose of filing the suit would be defeated.
6. Now, the only question that arises for my consideration in this revision petition is whether the order under revision could be sustained in law.
7. My answer is in the negative for the reasons hereinafter stated.
8. According to the agreement dated 1st of September, 1981, a zerox copy of which has been produced in the trial Court, what is granted under it is a licence to run catering business (refreshment room) at the Haveri bus stand in the suit premises belonging to the petitioners-Corporation. There is no doubt about it. So, if the agreement is to grant a licence to run a canteen subject to the conditions incorporated therein and accordingly a licence is granted, then the question of dealing with the rights of a lessee would not arise, inasmuch as a licence is governed under the provisions of the Easements Act while a lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. Therefore, the rights that may be available to a lessee would not be available to a licensee. Further, if, as contended by Sri Jayaprakash, the property in question is governed by the Act, then the question is whether the suit in O.S. No. 42 of 1985 as brought by the licensee, respondent herein, is maintainable.
9. Before applying the provisions of the Act, let us consider whether the premises in question is governed by the said Act.
10. Section 2(e) of the Act defines 'public premises' as follows :--
'2. Definitions.-- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,--
(e) 'public premises' means any premisesbelonging to or allotted to State Governmentor taken on lease or requisitioned by Or onbehalf of the State Government and includesany premises belonging to or taken on leaseby or on behalf of -
(i) a local authority;
(ii) any company as defined in S. 3 of theCompanies Act, 1955 (Central Act 1 of 1956) in which not less than fifty one per cent of thepaid up share capital is held by the StateGovernment;
(iii) any Corporation (not being a company as defined in S. 3 of the Companies Act, 1956) established by or under a Central Act or a State Act and owned or controlled by the State Government; and' xx xx
Now we will have to see whether, in fact, as defined in S. 2(e), the premises could be brought within the purview of the Act. The Corporation has been established under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 (Central Act 64 of 1950) by Notification No.HD3(1) RTC 57 dated Bangalore 25th July, 1961. Therefore, it is a Corporation coming within the definition of sub-clause (iii) of clause (e) of S. 2 of the Act. Though it is a company as defined in S. 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (Central Act 1 of 1956), since the State Government is having not less than 51 per cent of paid up share capital in it, it also comes within the definition' of the 'public premises' defined in S. 2(e) of the Act. Further, by virtue of the provisions of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India, the I Corporation has been declared as a State. Thus, it is clear that the suit premises is a 'public premises' as defined in the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974 in which case the said Act is attracted to this case. A specific pleading was taken in the written statement filed in Original Suit No. 42 of 1985 by the Corporation that the suit as brought was not maintainable in view of the Act barring the Civil Courts to entertain suits relating to public premises. The learned Munsiff accepting the defence taken rejected the application(I. A. No. I) for the interim relief of temporary injunction. However, it is very unfortunate that the learned Civil Judge, Appellate Authority, has failed to apply his mind to the facts of the case before proceeding to consider the merits of the case, though on merits there is no substance in the arguments advanced for the respondent-plaintiff (appellant before the Appellate Authority).
10(a). Be that as it may, first, we will have to find whether the approach of, the learned Munsiff in upholding the action taken by the Corporation in 1982 was correct. In paragraph-47 of his order, the learned Munsiff held as follows :--
'It is not in dispute that the KSRTC is a Corporate Body established under the Karnataka Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 and therefore, the premises belonging to the KSRTC, comes within the purview of public premises as defined under Section 2(e)(iii) of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974 and that any person who remains in occupation of the property in question after expiry of the contract period etc., will be an unauthorised occupant of it as defined under Section 2(g) of the said Act of 1974 and its competent officer appointed by the State Government under Section 3 of the Act, 1974 is competent to deal with such matters under the Act, after following the procedure prescribed therein.'
Referring to Section 16 of the Act, the learned Munsiff held in paragraph-48 as under :--
'Further, Section 16 of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974 bars jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupant of any public premises etc., as contended by the learned counsel for the defendants.'
In paragraph-50, he held that under those circumstances, he felt that it was not a fit case to grant temporary injunction pending disposal of the suit at that stage and accordingly he rejected the application-IA.I, without expressing anything about merits of the case.
11. Turning to the conclusion reached by the learned Civil Judge to reverse the order made by the trial Court, in paragraph-15 he considered the contention taken with regard to maintainability of the suit in view of Section 16 of the Act and rejected it following the rulings of this Court in M/s. Patil Exhibitors (P) Ltd. v. Corporation of the City of Bangalore, : AIR1986Kant194 and the Supreme Court in Bishan Das v. State of Punjab, : [1962]2SCR69 . While doing so, on merits, he took into consideration the improvements effected to the property in question by the respondent-plaintiff by putting up a construction of a water tank, by taking 3 phase electricity etc., which are, according to him, outside the purview of the agreement. Ultimately, he allowed the appeal, set aside the order made by the learned Munsiff and allowed I.A. No. I restraining the Corporation from dispossessing the respondent-plaintiff from the suit premises, without recourse to law, holding that the respondent-plaintiff made out a prima facie case in his favour, that balance of convenience was in his favour and that if injunction as prayed for was not granted, he would be forcibly evicted from the suit premises as threatened in the defendants' letter dated 25-8-1985.
12. Section 16 of the Act provides:
'16. Bar of Jurisdiction.-- No Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises or the recovery of the arrears of rent payable under sub-sec. (1) of S. 7 or the damages payable under sub-sec. (2) of that section or the costs awarded to the State Government or the local authority or the corporate authority under sub-sec. (5) of S. 10 or any portion of such rent, damages or costs.'
Therefore, in view of the specific provisions of S. 16, it is seen that any dispute arising out of the action taken by the competent authority seeking to evict a licensee from the public premises, or to recover arrears of rent payable under sub-sec. (1) of S. 7, or damages payable under sub-sec. (2) of that section or the costs awarded to the State Government or the local authority or the corporate authority under sub-sec. (5) of S. 10 or any portion of such rent, damages or costs, cannot be entertained by any Civil Court.
13. The order under revision is based mainly on the ground that the respondent-plaintiff effected some improvements to the premises in question by investing a lot of money viz., construction of a water tank and getting supply of 3 phase electricity, which are, according to the learned Civil Judge, outside the purview of the agreement; but with the permission of the Corporation, that the respondent-plaintiff took a contention that he was a tenant of the premises, which was denied by the other side and that therefore the respondent-plaintiff cannot be thrown out from the suit premises. The submission of Sri Jayaprakash, in this behalf, is that it is true that the Corporation permitted the respondent to effect the said improvements in order to cater to the needs of the public and to gain benefit in day-to-day catering business of the respondent himself. Therefore, that should not come in the way of the Corporation to take action for eviction of the respondent immediately after the expiry of the period of licence.
14. Referring to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in a matter arising out of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (Central Act No. 40 of 1971), which is more or less similar to the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974, this Court in Bombay Swadeshi Stores v. State Bank of Mysore, ILR 1989 Kant 2506, held as follows :--
'(iii) The provisions of the Act are meant for taking action against a person in unauthorised occupation of a public premises after the expiry of the lease period. Taking action against unauthorised occupant cannot be termed as unreasonable or arbitrary.
(iv) The question whether a tenancy should be continued or not is a matter for the Bank to decide. It depends upon the requirement of the Bank and other relevant considerations.
(v)This is, therefore, a matter for considerationby the State Bank of Mysore and does notconstitute a ground for interfering with theorder made by the Original and AppellateAuthorities.
(vi)There is no substance in the contention that the petitioner is deprived of his right to carry on business and therefore the eviction is violative of Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The State Bank of Mysore by asking the petitioner to vacate the premises has not prevented the petitioner from carrying on its business. It has asked the petitioner to vacate the premises as the petitioner had become an unauthorised occupant.
(vii) Right to property by way of lease which the petitioner had secured was only for a period of 15 years and that right had come to an end by efflux of time and he is being evicted only in accordance with law. Therefore, there is no violation of Art. 300A.
(viii) The only two grounds which are required to be considered by the Original Authority as well as by the Appellate Authority are (i) whether the premises in question is a public premises, and (ii) the person in occupation had become an unauthorised occupant. If these two questions are answered in the affirmative, no further question arises for consideration by those authorities.
(ix) In respect of a premises belonging to a Corporation, the tenancy could be continued only by an express decision of the Corporation to continue the tenancy ..... In the present case, even without issue of any notice the lease in favour of the petitioner stood terminated with effect from I-7-I985. Since the Bank had decided not to continue the tenancy, the petitioner became an unauthorised occupant on the termination of the lease.'
While ruling as above, this Court followed the earlier rulings of this Court in Shamaiah Gowda v. Shimoga City Municipality, ILR 1986 Kant 3943 and Indian Bank v. M/s. Blaze and Central (P) Ltd., : AIR1986Kant258 .
15. I In the instant case, the premises in question is a public premises and the respondent-plaintiff was a licensee for a period of four years from 1-9-1981 to 31-8-1985. The Corporation did not want to continue him thereafter; therefore it issued him a notice to vacate the premises by 31-8-1985. That notice is the subject matter of the suit before the learned Munsiff. So, on fact, he is an unauthorised occupant from 1-9-1985 and has to be evicted under the Act.
16. It is very unfortunate that, despite the provisions of Section 16 of the Act referred to in the course of the order of the learned Munsiff, the learned Civil Judge failed to apply his mind to the relevancy of the questions while considering the contentions raised by the learned counsel on both sides. If Section 16 bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, how can the Civil Court entertain a dispute of this type even though there is a prima facie case made out seeking, inter alia, relief of injunction? The Appellate Authority, instead of confining himself to the relevant question, proceeded to consider that the action of the Corporation in issuing notice of eviction would affect the right of the licensee by referring to the rights of a tenant or lessee. As a matter of fact, as I have already observed, the rights of a licensee cannot be traceable to the rights of a lessee and the licensee is confined within the conditions incorporated in the licence under the agreement. The Appellate Authority ought to have seen that the licensee in the instant case cannot be put on par with a lessee enjoying the immovable property under the Transfer of Property Act. The approach of the Appellate Authority is wrong and erroneous. Therefore, considering these factors and the question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court arising under Section 16 of the Act, the suit as brought by the respondent licensee itself is not maintainable. The Appellate Authority has committed a serious error in allowing the appeal, reversing the order made by the learned Munsiff and granting the interim relief as prayed for.
17. In view of what is discussed above, I make the following :