ORDER
1. This Writ Petition is directed against the impugned order of the Tahsildar, Dharwar, who is respondent-3 herein, dated 17-9-1988 resuming the land in question under Ss. 5(3) and 5(4) of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 and ordering restoration of the land under S. 7(3)(a) of the Act to respondents-1 and 2.
2. Arguments were advanced at length by both the learned counsel for the petitioner and respondents-1 and 2. The point which arises for consideration in this Writ Petition is whether the impugned order is justifiable in the facts and circumstances of the case, and whether respondent-3 has acted without jurisdiction.
3. The petitioner is a Company represented by its Managing Director by name Ramesh S. Subbaiah Bolar. The land in question measuring 4.06 acres situate in Sattur village in Sy. No. 94/1 was originally seth sanadi inam land and was with respondents-1 and 2as inamdars. After the Act came into force, the land stood resumed to the Slate Government. In the year 1974, it appears, an order of regrant was made in favour of responctents-1, and 2. Thereafter under a different enact-, ment, the land was permitted to be converted for non-agricultural purpose by an order dated 8-3-1984. Again under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 exemption was obtained in respect of the land in question under S. 20 of the Act on 6-7-1985. Ultimately the land was alienated by the original holders in favour of the petitioner-Company on 4-4-1986 preceded by two agreements of sale.
4. There was a controversy in this case about the date of regrant. It was contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the order of regrant was passed on 23-8-1966 whereas the learned counsel appearing for respondents-1 and 2 contended that the correct date of the grant is 26-7-1974. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, relied upon Annexure A. I have examined the contents of Annexure A.' But what Annexure A indicates is that the land stands in the name of the Government even though there is a passing reference to the proposed regrant. There is no communication that such an order was passed and the date of the order is also not mentioned. Annexure B is the one relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for respondents-1 and 2. There is an unequivocal reference in this document substantiating the contention of the learned counsel that the regrant order was passed on 23-8-1974. I accept the argument of the learned counsel appearing for respondents-1 and 2 that unmistakably the regrant order was passed on 23-8-1974 and not in 1966.
5. If the order of regrant was passed in the year 1974, it is necessary to refer to sub-sec. (3) of S. 5 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961, in order to ascertain whether the regretted is conferred with the power to alienate the regranted land.
6. Section 5(3) of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 reads as follows:
'The occupancy or the ryotwari patta of theland, as the case may be, re-granted under sub-sec. (1) shall not be transferable otherwise than by partition among members of Hindu Joint Family without the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner and such sanction shall the granted only on payment of an amount, equal to fifteen times the amount of full assessment of the land.'
Ordinarily there is no power to sell under this provision. But the exception that is made is that the regretted can alienate only with the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner and also that such a sanction can be granted only on payment of an amount equal to fifteen times the amount of full assessment of the land. There is no material on record to reach the conclusion that the petitioner who is stated to have purchased the land from respondents-1 and 2 had obtained the necessary previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner. This provision of law does not contemplate even subsequent verification and what is mandated is prior sanction of the Deputy Commissioner which was conditional upon payment of certain sums of money.
7. Assuming for a moment that the order of regrant was made in the year 1966, it has to be mentioned that such a restraint and subsequent alienation would not alter the legal position and the predicament in which the petitioner has landed himself. Whether the regrant order was made in 1966 or in 1974, the bar imposed under S. 5(3) of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 is attracted to the sale transaction. It is true that the alienation took place on 4-4-1986 which is subsequent to the amendment of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 by amending Act of 1978. It is to be seen that under the amended Act, under sub-sec. (3) of S. 5, occupancy or the ryotwari patta of the land, as the case may be, re-granted under sub-sec. (1) shall not be transferable otherwise than by partition among members of Hindu Joint Family for a period of 15 years from the date of commencement of sub-sec. (1) of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1978. Thus it would be seen that the amendment is more stringent than the unamendedAct inasmuch as it is not open to the original holder of land to alienate the land for a period of 15 years from the date of commencement of sub-sec. (1) of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1978. There is no provision for prior sanction of the Deputy Commissioner under the amended Section. Either way the position of the petitioner does not undergo any improvement.
8. However, it was vehemently contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that under the provisions of the Land Revenue Act, conversion of agricultural land into non-agricultural purpose was obtained on 8-3-1984 and, therefore, the provisions of the Village Offices Abolition Act would not be attracted. It was further argued that in view of the exemption granted under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 on 6-7-1985, the provisions of the Village Offices Abolition Act prohibiting alienation would not be applicable. In short, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is relying upon the order of conversion passed by the competent authority under the Land Revenue Act and the exemption granted in favour of the petitioner under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 in order to safeguard the right to continue his dominion over the land in question.
9. The learned counsel appearing for respondents-1 and 2 submitted that an order of conversion under the Land Revenue Act and an order of exemption granted under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 cannot take away the operation of law envisaged under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 by virtue of sub-sec. (3) of S. 5. It was contended that the said Act is a piece of beneficial legislation and the purpose of the Act would be defeated if the provisions of other statutes are utilised to destroy the effect of the provisions of the special enactment which regulate the sale transaction.
10. On the other land, it was contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that on account of conversion and subsequent exemption obtained from the competent authorities, the land in question has lost its original character and on accountof the transformation it has gone through, the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of S. 5 and subsequent application of the provisions of S. 7(3)(a) of the Act cannot be availed againstthe petitioner.
11. The Act does not define the meaning of the word land. However, the definition that could be found of the word 'land' in the Land Revenue Act, 1964 under sub-sec. (14) of S. 2 reads thus:---
' 'land' includes benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth, and also shares in, or charges on, the revenue or rent of villages or other defined areas;'
Obviously the land referred to in the definition does not particularise only an agricultural land. The definition is so comprehensive that it does not make any discrimination between agricultural and non-agricultural land. It is almost all-pervasive. It is difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that by obtaining a conversion of the land and also by securing an order of exemption, the petitioner could defeat the purpose of the statute. It is a well settled principle of law that the provision of one statute ought not to be permitted to be used for the purpose of defeating the legislative mandate of another statute. Another argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the exemption was granted under the Central statute viz., the Urban Land ceiling legislation and therefore, it prevails over the effect of the State legislation. It may be made clear that the purpose of the Urban Land ceiling legislation is totally different from the object sought to be achieved under the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961. It is possible for the petitioner to seek shelter under the Urban Land ceiling legislation but for the fact that the land in question is regranted land under the provisions of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961. The purpose of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 which undoubtedly is a Central enactment is to provide for the imposition of aceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good. The Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 is an Act which was brought into force in public interest to abolish the village offices which were held hereditarily before the commencement of the Constitution and the emoluments appertaining thereto in the State of Mysore and further to provide for matters consequential and incidental thereto. Thus it could be seen that the purpose of the legislation under the two enactments is totally unconnected with one another. What we are concerned with in the instant case is whether the petitioner is liable to be evicted under S. 7(3)(a) of the Act after it is found that the alienation in favour of the petitioner by the original holder of land was in spite of prohibition imposed by sub-sec. (3) of S. 5. We are to be guided strictly by the provisions of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 in so far as the facts and circumstances of this case are concerned.
12. According to S. 7 of the Act where any land resumed under Cl. (3) of S. 4 is in the possession of an unauthorised holder, such unauthorised holder shall be summarily evicted therefrom by the Deputy Commissioner, in accordance with the provisions of the Code, provided that where in the case of any unauthorised holder, the Deputy Commissioner after enquiry is of opinion that in view of the investment made by such holder in the development of the land or in the non-agricultural use of the land or for any other reason, the eviction of such holder from the land will involve undue hardship on him, he shall re-grant the land to such holder on payment of such amount and, subject to sub-sec. (3) of S. 5, on such terms and conditions as the State Government may determine. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 7 stipulates that a land which is not regranted under sub-section (1)shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the rules and orders made thereunder applicable to the disposal of unoccupied unalienated land.
13. Undisputedly respondents-1 and 2 are the original holders of land and there is an order of re-grant in their favour passed in 1974. Though the said respondents have alienated the land on 4-4-1986 in favour of the petitioner, their possession is safeguarded by the provisions of the Act since the alienation was made without prior sanction of the Deputy Commissioner. At this stage, it would be of interest to point out that the registered sale deed dated 4-4-1986 under which the land in question came to be alienated by respon-dents-1 and 2 in favour of the petitioner shows that the Power of Attorney holder by name Ramesh S. Subbaiah Bolar representing respondents-1 and 2 has executed the sale deed in favour of the petitioner which is also represented by the same Ramesh S. Subbaiah Bolar acting in the capacity of the Managing Director. Similarly, according to repondents-1 and 2, the application for conversion was also filed by the same Power of Attorney holder and so also the application for exemption under the Urban Land ceiling legislation. It is not disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that in so far as the application for conversion is concerned, it was made by the original holders of land who are the vendors. What is sought to be made out by the nature of this transaction is that the petitioner went all out to defeat the provisions of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 in order to extricate the petitioner from the statutory mandate contained therein.
14. I am of opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of S. 5 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 are strictly and rigidly applicable and in the absence of prior sanction from the Deputy Commissioner, the alienation which took place on 4-4-1986 is void. I do not see any illegality in the order passed by the Tahsildar in this regard.
15. ' It was, however, pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the portion of the impugned order underAnnexure R directing the transfer of the land to respondents-1 and 2 is beyond the jurisdiction of the Tahsildar and what is contemplated under the Act is only resumption of land by the State Government and nothing else. I am unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. S. 7 of the Act provides for eviction and since the alienation took place on 4-4-1986, the Tahsildar has resorted to the provisions of Cl. (a) sub-sec. (3) of S. 7 of the amended Act wherein it is provided that the land from which an unauthorised holder is evicted under sub-sec. (1) shall, if it was granted or continued in respect of or annexed to an inferior village office be regranted to the holder of such village office. The enforcement of eviction is under S. 7 and the transfer of the land to the original holder is under S. 7(3)(a) of the Act and both these measures are contemplated where there is alienation prohibited under sub-sec. (3) of S. 5 of the unamended Act. Reference herein is made to the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 for the simple reason that the order of regrant was made prior to the amendment of 1978. The application of S. 7A of the amended Act does not arise in the circumstances of this case.
16. For the above reasons, I am of the opinion that there is no substance in the Writ Petition and the same is hereby dismissed.
17. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
18. Petition dismissed.