N.K. Sodhi, C.J.
1. The appellant before us is engaged in the manufacture of oil hydraulic equipments at its factory at White field and claims to be employing more than 200 workmen including officers, supervisors, etc. It is an industrial establishment covered by the provisions of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (for short 'the Act') and has its own standing orders which were certified in the year 1979. The workmen through their union applied to the Certifying Officer for some modifications in the standing orders and accordingly filed an application under Sub-section (2) of Section 10 of the Act. Amongst others, they sought amendment to the clauses defining 'probationer' and 'casual employee' and also sought enhancement in the age of retirement. Clauses 4 (1) and 4(2) of the standing orders provide for 9 months of probationary period subject to a further extension of 3 months to the satisfaction of the company. The workmen wanted this period to be reduced to 6 months subject to a further extension of 3 months. The age of retirement, which according to Clause 16 of the standing orders was 55 years, was sought to be enhanced to 58 years. The application filed by the labour union was opposed by the management and it pleaded that 9 months period of probation was quite reasonable and necessary. The management claimed to be engaged in a high-tech activity and it pleaded that it required this much time to assess a newcomer. As regards the age of retirement, it was pleaded that retirement at the age of 55 years was quite in order since physical labour was involved and it was not desirable to enhance the age. Some other clauses in the standing orders including the definition of casual employee were also sought to be amended but those issues were not raised before us and therefore it is not necessary to make a reference to them. On a consideration of the matter, the Certifying Officer was of the view that it was reasonable to reduce the period of probation from 9 months to 6 months subject to a further extension of 3 months to the satisfaction of the company as, according to him, this was the period prescribed in the model standing orders and therefore it was reasonable. Similarly, Clause 16 of the standing orders was modified and the age of retirement was enhanced to 58 years. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Certifying Officer modifying the standing orders, the management filed an appeal before the appellate authority which was dismissed on March 30, 2002. The management challenged the order of the Certifying Officer and also that of the appellate authority in W.P.No. 26265/2002 out of which the present appeal has arisen. The learned Single Judge examined the matter and did not find any illegality or arbitrariness in the orders impugned in the Writ Petition. Accordingly, the Writ Petition was dismissed. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed.
2. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. It was strenuously urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that the standing orders of the management had been framed in the year 1979 and were successfully operating between the parties for the last two decades and therefore there had to be good reasons before those could be modified. He also contended that the standing orders could not be modified only on the asking of the workmen. Another submission made by Shri S.N. Murthy, Senior Counsel, appearing for the appellant was that a settlement arrived at under the Industrial Disputes Act was operative between the parties and that there was a clause therein that during its operation no demand shall be raised which could impose a financial burden on the employer and therefore Clause 16 of the standing orders which enhanced the age of retirement could not be modified as that would impose an additional financial burden on the management. He referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in BARAUNI REFINERY PRAGATISHEEL SHRAMIK PARISHAD v. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. AND ORS., 1990 Lab.I.C. 1481 in support of his contention. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and have not been able to persuade ourselves to accept the same.
3. The Certifying Officer while certifying the standing orders is required to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions thereof while reducing the period of probation from 9 months to 6 months, he observed that this reduction was not only the demand of the workmen but also in consonance with the provisions of the model standing orders which are applicable to an industrial establishment from the date when the Act becomes applicable to it till such time its own standing orders come into operation. Surely, the provisions of the model standing orders cannot be said to be unfair or unreasonable. They are in fact a model for the industrial establishments to follow subject, of course, to the alterations that may be necessary keeping in view the peculiar requirements of each industrial establishment. The standing orders of the management were certified way back in the year 1979 and more than two decades have passed since then. In these circumstances, request of the workmen for the modification and its consideration by the Certifying Officer cannot be said to be improper. To say that the standing orders were operating satisfactorily for two decades and therefore they should have been allowed to continue as such cannot be accepted because parties have been given a right to seek their modification after the expiry of 6 months from the date when they came into operation or were last modified and if the Certifying Officer finds that the amendment sought is fair or reasonable, he could allow the same. The appellate authority confirmed the finding of the Certifying Officer observing that the reduction of the period of probation to 6 months does not in any way prejudice the interest of the management. The employees contended before the authorities below that such was the period of probation in some other industries as well though the management had pleaded that in some of the industries the period of probation was even one year. On a consideration of these factors, the Certifying Officer in his wisdom came to the conclusion that the reduction of the probationary period from 9 months to 6 months subject to a further extension of 3 months to the satisfaction of the company was reasonable. This was affirmed by the appellate authority and also by the learned Single Judge. There is no reason for us to take a different view. Similarly, the appellate authority having regard to factors like improvement in the standards of living and health care and increase in life span and considering the fact that the age of retirement had been fixed at 55 years in the year 1979 upheld the order of the Certifying Officer enhancing the same to 58 years. The appellate authority also looked into the certified standing orders of other companies in the region to uphold the enhancement in the age of retirement. We do not think that as on today the age of 58 years to retire is that unfair and unreasonable so as to warrant our interference. What was contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant is that there was a settlement dated 9.3.2000 operating at the relevant time between the parties and in terms of a clause contained therein, the employees could not raise during its operation any demand which would throw an additional financial burden on the management and since enhancement in the age of retirement will increase the of financial liability of the management, it is in violation of the settlement. Reference was made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation's case (supra). We cannot accept this contention for more than one reason. No such plea was raised before the Certifying Officer either in the written objections or even at the time of arguments. Again, in the memorandum of appeal filed before the appellate authority this plea was not taken though at the time of arguments it was urged before the appellate authority that there was a settlement between the parties and that in terms thereof the workmen could not raise a plea which would enhance the financial burden of the employer and therefore increasing the age of retirement was contrary to the settlement as it had the effect of throwing an additional financial burden on the management. The appellate authority dealt with this contention and rejected the same observing that on a careful perusal of the decision of the Supreme Court and the terms of the settlement it was clear that there was no specific mention about the age of retirement in the settlement dated 9.3.2000 so as to bind the employees to such terms therein. The appellate authority found that the judgment of the Supreme Court was of no help to the management in this regard. Thereafter when the Writ Petition was filed in this Court no specific plea in regard to the settlement was taken therein nor was a copy of the settlement produced along with the Writ Petition. The order of the learned Single Judge does not indicate that any such plea was raised and even in the memorandum of appeal now filed before us no such plea has been taken. The appellant cannot be allowed to raise this plea in the absence of the settlement.
4. No other point was raised.
5. In the result, we find no merit in the writ appeal and the same stands dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.