Judgment:
R.J. Kochar, J.
1. The above three Petitions are being disposed of by the present common Judgment and Order as the Labour Court has disposed of the Applications of the Respondents-workmen by a common Order dated 27.3.1996.
2. The Petitioners, the Union of India, through the General Manager, 'Western Railway, are aggrieved by the Judgment and Order dated 27.3.1996 in Applications filed by the Respondents-workmen on 21.10.1992 under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 claiming overtime wages for the periods from January, 1980 to December, 1989. The names of the individual workmen and the period of overtime wages and the claim is given in the body of the Writ Petition. According to the Respondents-workmen they had worked on various trains for a number of days during the said period spread over from January, 1980 to December, 1989. They have claimed overtime wages by trying to compute the amounts in each of their cases.
3. The Petitioners filed their written statements in these 65 applications denying the entitlement of the claim of the overtime wages. The Respondents workmen examined only one witness in all the aforesaid applications. The Petitioners did not examine any witness before the Labour Court. On the basis of the pleadings and evidence the Labour Court by the impugned Order directed the Petitioners to calculate the overtime wages for the period from 1.1.1980 to 30.12.1989 treating the Applicants continuously on duty from signing on to signing off. The Labour Court further directed the Petitioners to make payment of the calculated overtime wages within three months with interest at the rate of 12% p. a. from the date of the application till its disbursement. The Labour Court however did not allow the overtime claim of the workmen for the resting period at Ratlam and Kota. The Petitioners have challenged the said Order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the above Petitions.
4. I have heard both the learned Advocates for their parties at length. Both of them have taken me through the pleadings and material on record in support of their respective contentions.
5. Before dealing with the merits of the case I may first record that at the time of admission of the Petition on 3.3.1999, one Shri C.M. Jha, who appeared for the Respondents had made a statement before the Court that he waived service (Writ Petition No. 585 of 1999). In this Petition itself on 9.9.1999 Shri Ramamurthy appears to have undertaken to file his Vakalatnama, and it was, therefore, taken by the Court and by the learned Advocate for the Petitioners that Shri Ramamurthy would be appearing for all the Respondents-workmen. Now at the time of hearing of the Petition Shri Ramamurthy points out that he could file Vakalatnama only on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1, 3 to 14, 17, 18, 19 and 22. According to the learned Advocate he could not get Vakalatnama on behalf of the remaining workmen, as those workmen had expired. As far as Writ Petition No. 583 of 1999 is concerned Shri Jha had appeared for the Respondents and had similarly waived service on behalf of the Respondents. On the next date i. e. 9.9.1999 Shri Ramamurthy appeared and undertook to file his Vakalatnama. Today at the time of hearing of the Writ Petition he points out that he has filed his Vakalatnama on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 1, 4 to 13, 15, 16 and 18. He states that he could not file Vakalatnama on behalf of the others as they had retired from employment and that their addresses were not known. In view of the statement made by Shri Ramamurthy that he would file Vakalatnama for the Respondents it appears that Rule Nisi was not served on those workmen on whose behalf Shri Ramamurthy has not filed Vakalatnama. As far as Writ Petition No. 669 of 1999 is concerned when Rule was granted in this Petition it was ordered to be heard along with Writ Petition No. 1922 of 1998. It appears that Shri Ramamurthy had represented the Respondents from time to time. Today Shri Ramamurthy points out that he could file Vakalatnama on behalf of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 only. He states that the others have either retired or expired, he did not know their addresses, and therefore, he could not file Vakalatnama on behalf of them.
6. Shri Suresh Kumar the learned Advocate for the Petitioner pointed out that the workmen had not given their full addresses in the Applications filed by them before the Labour Court. In some applications at the place of address the following letters appeared 'C/o SS/ BY'. Shri Suresh Kumar is right when he points out that as in the title of the applications no address of the Applicant workman was given it was impossible for him to serve Rule Mst individually on the Respondents-workmen. He, however, submitted that one Shri M.B. Anchan, the learned Advocate who appeared for the workmen before the Labour Court was served with the copies of all the three Petitions and he accepted them on behalf of them.
7. This is not a very happy state of affairs before the Labour Court. The Labour Court should not receive or accept the Applications from any party and from the workmen where their full addresses are not given. The Labour Court should insist from the Advocate who gives the address of the workman under his care (C/o...Advocate) to give an undertaking to the Labour Court that all notices and process would be received by him on behalf of the Applicants and that such service would be deemed to be a good service. Unless such undertaking is given by the Advocate who takes care of the Applicants the office of the Labour Court must insist to get addresses of the Applicants in the Applications and Applications without such full addresses should not be accepted by the office of the Labour Court/Tribunal. Even before this Court the Advocates who appear and who do not file their Vakalatnama should be held liable for disciplinary action for appearing and for committing breach of the undertaking or a statement made by them that they would be appearing in the matter and to waive service of the Rule Nisi.
8. In any case Shri Ramamurthy has ably assisted me in the cause which is common in all the three Petitions. He is representing the common case of the workmen, and therefore, it was possible for me to decide these Petitions.
9. I may further note here that the observation made by the learned Judge in paragraph 18 that Shri Anchan the learned Advocate for the Applicants (present Respondents} had insisted that the payment of overtime wages should be made to him. Fortunately, the learned Judge has not acceded to the said request of the learned Advocate for the obvious reasons which need not be spelled out by me. It appears that in the past the said practice was followed, sometimes with the consent of the Railway Officers attending the matters. In the present case the learned Advocate for the Railways had not given consent to hand over the amount of overtime wages to the said learned Advocate Shri Anchan. I seriously deprecate this practice on the part of the Advocates to demand the decretal amount directly from the parties without bringing the parties to receive the said awarded amount. Let the Labour Court or any other Court be not a party to such practice. The money due must go to the Applicant and not to his Advocate directly. The Railways must insist on the presence of the recipient Applicant and must also insist that the recipient was properly identified and he passed a proper receipt for the money received. I have my own hunch that this practice was going on and was followed by the learned Advocates for the Applicants who filed such cases claiming overtime wages which became stale by decades with the active co-operation and connivance of the Railway Officers or the Railway Advocates attending such matters. I may further mention here that fortunately Shri Ramamurthy who appears before me for the Respondents-workmen is no way concerned with such past practice.
10. It further appears that a kind of overtime scam is going on in the Railways. A number of applications are filed under Section 33C(2) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 claiming overtime wages for the period which had past many many years or decades of years before such applications are filed merely because there is no limitation prescribed under Section 33C{2) of the said Act for entertaining such Applications. Even in the present three Petitions the Applicants have demanded overtime wages for the period between 1980 to 1989 as set out on page 20 of the Petition (W.P. No. 585/99) a summary of the claims. Such summary is given in all the above three Petitions. It certainly shocks my conscious that the claim of overtime for the period from 1980 to 1989 as filed by the workmen on 21.10.1992. I wonder why the workmen who are genuinely entitled to get their dues from the Railways have waited for more than 12 years to claim overtime wages. The very fact that such claims are filed after lapse of number of years gives rise to suspicion about the genuineness of the claim. Ordinarily no workman would wait for such a long period to claim his legitimate dues to which he is entitled. It further appears from the record that in almost all these cases of overtime wages the applicants or the workmen are not brought before the Court and are not examined in the witness box to prove their signatures on the applications and on the Vakalatnama and to prove on oath the period during which the claim of overtime was made and the number of hours of overtime put in by them. In the present case one witness was examined on behalf of 65 applicants. The Labour Court has awarded the entire claim of overtime wages of all the workmen on the basis of evidence of one witness. Henceforward the Labour Court is hereby directed to insist on presence of each and every applicant before the Court and to prove his claim on oath and not to wholly rely on one or two witnesses on behalf of large number of claims. These matters require individual evidence and individual number of overtime work done by them. It is just impossible in the huge and large organisation like the Railways for one person to swear on oath what the other person at a distant place had done. In case any such evidence is given on behalf of others for whom there is no reason to remain away from the proceedings such evidence has to be very strictly scrutinized and put to very strict test of reliance and credibility. In the present case one witness swears on oath how 64 applicants had done overtime work at far off places in Railways and in a distant past, 10 years and 15 years back. Such a witness would be available at one place at one point of time and it is not possible for him to swear on oath how his colleagues., known or unknown at Ratlam and Kota or anywhere else had performed or were performing overtime work. In the present case the witness on behalf of the Applicants had made this herculean effort to show that the applicants who were spread all over India in the large net of the Railways were doing overtime work at a particular period each of them and that they were entitled to get overtime wages, as set out in the applications. Such testimony has to be discarded as a total falsehood and worth not even the paper on which it was typed.
11. The claim of overtime wages requires minute particulars and it cannot be granted on the basis of loose and vague statements made by the applicants in their applications as has been done in the present case. All the applications are more or less identical and are cyclostyled copies with the change in the names of the applicants. In these applications only the names of the Trains and their destinations are given. The numbers of Trains and hours of working of overtime are very vaguely stated without any particulars to know the exact place and time of the overtime done by the claimants. There is no period or date on which the alleged overtime was done by each of the claimants. Two types of the claims of overtime are given i. e, the period from 1.7.1984 to 15.10.1989 or so, in each case. In another table which is annexed with the applications some calculations are made on the basis of some hours. There is absolutely no relation or connection with these calculations. The Applicants having not stepped in the witness box it is impossible for any one to decide such claims of overtime wages of the distant past. All these applications have the same pattern. None of the applicants, except one, stepped in the witness box to verify and to swear on oath that the contents of the said applications were proved and that he had performed overtime work at the place and time given in the said application. The applicants have merely given some figures and the period in the applications without giving any good particulars to claim over time wages. Assuming that the figures and the time and place given in the applications are legible, there is nothing on record to support the said claim as there is no material and there is no evidence before the Labour Court at all. It was the primary duty of each of the applicants to have examined themselves before the Labour Court to prove their case of overtime wages. I fail to understand how and on what basis the Labour Court has determined and computed the amounts of overtime wages and has awarded the same in a very mechanical manner looking into the applications filed by the Applicants. He has failed to appreciate that there was absolutely no evidence on record in support of the vague claims of overtime allegedly done by them in the distant past. It can thereafter only be expected from the Railways that they should have produced evidence in rebuttal. How can it be expected that the Railways should have preserved the documents pertaining to the period of decades back? It is further expected that the documentary evidence in respect of some Ticket Checkers who were working at a particular station in the year, 1980 or 1981 should have been produced by the Railways before the Labour Court as it was the best record available with the Railways and that they should have produced it to show that the claimants or the applicants had done or not done the overtime wages which are scattered loosely in the body of the applications! The law of the land has been as laid down by the Supreme Court that no stale industrial disputes should be encouraged. The Supreme Court time and again observed that the Industrial Disputes raised by the workmen after inordinate delay should not be entertained. If that is the law in respect of the industrial disputes for adjudication, in my opinion the same principle should be made applicable to test the legality and genuineness of the claim made under Section 33C(2) of the Act though there is no period of limitation prescribed in the said Section. It appears that the said provision is being abused by the workmen in cases like the present one. The Legislature never expected and anticipated that stale claims of 20 years back could be filed under the said section. I am aware of some of the judgments wherein the Courts have taken a view that there is no limitation prescribed under Section 33C(2) of the Act. Still 1 am of the opinion that the claim pertaining to the distant past must be examined very carefully and more strictly and should not be awarded lightly or mechanically merely because there is no period of limitation. As soon as the Railway attendants or Railway servants performed their overtime work they must get the same certified from their Head of the Department and thereafter they must lodge their vouchers of overtime done by them with the Accounts or the concerned Section. In the present case there is no evidence adduced by the workmen that they had got certified the overtime work done by them and that they had lodged such vouchers. It is impossible to believe that a Railway servant who had lodged his claim in 1980 for overtime will wait for 12 years to claim the overtime wages without making any grievance that he did not get his overtime dues. Further it is not expected from the Railways to have preserved the documentary evidence such as certificates issued by the concerned Head of the Department and the vouchers lodged by such Railway servants for a period of 10 years or 20 years. Ordinarily no workman would wait for such a long period if his due is just and legitimate. Ordinarily further even the Railway Administration will not deprive the Railway servants of their legitimate claim of overtime if the Railway Administration had received the required claim in accordance with the rules. If the Railway servants did not receive their overtime wages within a reasonable period of three months or six months in that case it was their duty to have brought to the notice of the higher authorities that they were denied their legitimate claim. There is not even an iota of such evidence adduced by the workmen.
12. In the present case the overtime claim is granted to the Applicants merely because in the past also their applications were granted. I do not know on what basis the past claims of other railway servants were granted. But that cannot be a reason or a ground to determine and grant the overtime wages to the present claimants. The nature of the claim of overtime is of individual nature. It is possible that in the past applications the applicants might have adduced some material or evidence in support of their claims. That however does not mean that the claim should be granted in the all coming applications. The Labour Court has mentioned the aforesaid fact in paragraph 12 of his judgment that his predecessor in applications numbered therein had granted overtime wages for the period from 7.1.1973 to 31.12.1979 and thereafter application Nos. 21 to 29 of 89 were also granted. This can't be a ground for granting the overtime wages to the present applicants. The Labour Court has however, rightly observed that there was no record to show at which destination station other employees had taken charge from them and they were allowed to go as per their choice. This factual statement ought to have been proved by the applicants. As the applicants have not entered in witness box these facts have not been proved at all. The Labour Court has erroneously presumed that they were on duty as there was no material to show that who had taken charge from the Applicants at particular stations. I fail to understand on what basis such presumption can be made. There is absolutely no foundation in the form of evidence on oath before the Labour Court to presume that certain events had taken place in the past. The Labour Court has also observed that no duty roaster from 1980 to 1989 and no booking register for them was produced. The Labour Court has also found fault with the Railways that they have failed to produce the duty chart etc. It is just physically impossible for the largest organisation like the Railways to have preserved the documents of the distant past of 1980 onwards. If the claimants have not produced even a single piece of paper in support of their claim and nor have they said anything on oath it cannot be expected from the Railways to have preserved such old record and the Railway Administration could not have dreamt that after 20 years they will have to produce this record to face the claim of overtime wages that would be made by some of the Railway servants. The learned Judge has again repeated that the management had paid overtime to the applicants in the past as prayed in those applications, and therefore, he was allowing the present applications. To say the least the learned Judge was wholly wrong in granting the claim on the basis of slender evidence of one witness examined to prove the overtime work done by 64 others at different places in the distant past.
13. Shri Ramamurthy has relied on the following judgments :
1. Bombay Gas Company Ltd. v. Coral Bhiva and Ors. : (1963)IILLJ608SC ;
2. Central Bank of India Ltd. and Ors, v. Rajagopalan (P.S.) and Ors. : (1963)IILLJ89SC ;
3. Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishna and Ors. : [1964]5SCR64 ;
4. Special Civil Application No. 413 of 1976 with Civil Application No. 392 of 1978 dated 31st March, 1978, 11th April, 1978 (Deshmukh & Pendse, JJ.);
5. Writ Petition Nos. 581 of 1999, W. P. No. 573 of 1999 and W. P. No. ' 1375 of 2000 dtd. November 28, 2001 (Smt. Nishita Mhatre, J.);
6. Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-op. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Socy. Ltd. : (1999)ILLJ1260SC ;
7. Writ Petition No. 1628 of 1998 dated 14th January, 2000 (R. M. Lodha, J.).
In the case of Bombay Gas Company (supra) the question raised was in respect of the period of limitation under Section 33C(2) of the Act. There is no dispute that the claim petition under Section 33C(2) of the Act cannot be rejected solely on the ground of long delay and laches. I am not disallowing the claim on the ground of delay and laches, though the claim of 1980 was filed after a period of 12 years or so. The law is very well established on the question of limitation period under Section 33C(2) of the Act.
In the case of Central Bank of India (supra) the Supreme Court has considered the provisions of Sections 10(1), 33C(1), 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunals under those provisions. The Supreme Court has held that the Applicant must have an existing right to receive the benefit and such right will have to be determined by the Labour Court before computing the money due and the benefits claimed by the applicant-workman.
In the case of Syed Yakoob (supra) the Supreme Court was considering the scope and ambit of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court has held that the jurisdiction of High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This jurisdiction can be exercised only where there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record but not to correct an error of fact however grave it may appear to be. The Supreme Court has further held that if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. These observations squarely apply to the present case, which is the case of no evidence at all in support of the claim of the overtime wages.
In the case of Ajaib Singh (supra) the Supreme Court has once again reiterated the law that there was no period of limitation prescribed under Section 33C(2) as well as under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. There is no quarrel and there can't be any quarrel with the law laid down by the Supreme Court. There is no period of limitation prescribed in these provisions and the claims cannot be rejected on the ground of delay/laches.
In the case of the Divisional Superintendent, Central Railway (supra) the Division Bench of our High Court was considering the overtime claims of the railway employees under Section 33C(2) of the Act, The Division Bench considered various circulars applicable to the concerned claims. The Division Bench also did not accept the contention of the railways that the claims should not be considered on account of delay and laches. It is significant to note that though principally it held in favour of the employees that they were entitled to get overtime wages but the Division Bench refused to accept the charts claiming amounts of overtime wages as those charts required further scrutiny by the Labour Court. The Division Bench remanded the matter back to the Labour Court by making the following observations which are squarely applicable to the present case.
Unless the charts presented by the Railways are examined by the employees and accepted or otherwise held proved by the Central Government Labour Court, final award cannot be passed. In these circumstances, it is agreed that the award in Judgment Part II and Part III should be set aside and all the original applications should be sent back to the Central Government Labour Court for determining the amount due to each of the employees in the light of the judgment made by us in this Writ Petition.
(emphasis is given by me)
The Division Bench observed that the charts containing the claims of the overtime wages involved every minute calculations after their scrutiny of the actual work put in by each of the employee. The Division Bench further observed that the work of determining the claim involved detailed calculations and careful scrutiny. All the aforesaid cautions are totally absent in the present case. There is absolutely no close and correct scrutiny of the actual work put in by each of the employees. There is absolutely no detailed calculations and careful scrutiny as suggested by the Division Bench in the present case. It is further very significant to note that the Division Bench further observed in the last paragraph as under :
Each of the party will be at liberty to justify its own calculations and figures by leading evidence if need be, as may be found relevant by the Central Government Labour Court.
The Division Bench had not merely accepted the calculations put in the applications and the charts prepared by both the parties as there was good amount of difference between both the parties in their calculations. The Division Bench found that there was lack of evidence, and therefore, remanded the matter back to the Labour Court.
I am not following that course of remand as in the present case the Applicants have not attempted in any manner to justify their claim by leading individual evidence. Their claim is ex facie untenable.
In the case of Union of India through the General Manager, Western Railway (supra) my learned brother Lodha, J. has considered the. overtime claim made by the railway employees before the Labour Court. He has also set out the contents of the circulars. He however felt that the matter needed to be reconsidered by the concerned Labour Court in the light of the Railway Board's Circular dated 27.6.1985. There is no law laid down by my brother in the said decision, and therefore, this judgment does not help the Respondents-railway servants.
In the Judgment of Union of India v. Ram Pal Singh K. and Ors. (supra) my learned sister Nishita Mhatre, J. has considered the scope of Section 33C(2) once again and held after following the Supreme Court Judgments that there was no period of limitation prescribed in Section 33C of the Act. Since the Labour Court had rejected the claims before the learned Judge on the ground of delay she set aside the Order of the Labour Court and remanded the matter back to the Labour Court for computation of the amount payable to the workmen. It appears that she was also not satisfied with the material before -the Labour Court produced by the parties she, therefore, allowed both the parties to produce such further material as may be required for computation of overtime wages. There is not ratio laid down by the learned Judge which could bind me while deciding the present case on my hand. I have considered the case in its entirety on the question of law as well as the facts, and therefore, I do not wish to follow the same course of remand of all these matters before the Labour Court. An individual perception of a matter cannot be called a ratio as a binding precedent. Had it been so, there would have been complete and absolute stagnation in the live process of growth of the law and the law would have lost its life and the Judges their dynamism in their thinking and their judicial personality. I cannot allow the overtime wages in the present petitions only on the ground that my learned sister granted the claim in the applications before her. Even this Judgment therefore, has no assistance to the Railway employees in the present case.
14. The claim of overtime wages needs no law and I do not need any precedent to grant or award overtime wages if there is any evidence on record to prove the fact of overtime done by the claimants. The claim of overtime depends on facts of each and every case. It is the claimant who has to prove on what date and for what hours he had put in the overtime wages and nothing further is required. The rate of overtime wages is statutorily determined. The claimant has to merely prove the particulars of the date, time and place of his overtime hours. Merely because this High Court or the Supreme Court had granted overtime in some other matters that cannot be the precedent for me to award overtime wages in these applications also. Facts of every case differ and the ratio of every case emerges from the proved facts in a case. There cannot be any precedent on the questions of facts. The foundations of the law of precedent is the judicial discipline, which however, does not mean judicial serfdom. It does not mean that if the High Court or the Supreme Court had granted over time wages in some other matters the said decision became a precedent for the future also regardless of the facts in such cases. There is no quarrel with the proposition that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 33C(2) of the Act. I am not deciding the question that the Applicants are not entitled to overtime wages because of their claim being stale or because there is an inordinate delay in lodging the claim. Though certainly the claims are stinking for their being stale. I am refusing to grant the claims as there is absolutely no evidence before the Labour Court in support of the overtime claim made by the Applicants. The decision of the Labour Court is totally baseless and cannot be sustained. The Labour Court has failed to appreciate that the Applicants had to prove their claims for overtime by adducing sufficient material and by entering in the witness box to swear on oath as to when and where they had done the overtime work and whether they got the same properly certified by the concerned Appropriate Authority and whether they had lodged their claim vouchers and how they had followed the claim and why they kept quiet for such a long period. It is more probable that they might have actually received the overtime wages from the Pay section soon after the vouchers accompanied by the authentication. The possibility cannot be ruled out that they or some one else is trying to earn a lottery in the litigation and therefore none of the claimants are brought before the Court. There is no system of verifying the signature of the Applicant in the Labour Court and nor has he physically appeared before the Court to verify his signature and the contents of the application. It is also possible that some clever railway employees are trying to take undue advantage of the flaws in the law and the lacuna in the procedure and system. The Labour Court, therefore, must always insist for the personal physical presence of the claimants in the Court before deciding the claims. I further fail to understand how the existing right to get overtime wages can be said to have been proved in the absence of any documentary evidence and/or oral evidence on oath. Even if there is no period of limitation under Section 33C{2) of the Act there is no escape for the Applicant to prove his existing right to claim money due and thereafter only the Labour Court can determine and compute the money due from the employer.
15. The present is an extra ordinarily unusual case where the applicants are missing; their signatures on the applications have not been attested and identified; they have not appeared in the Court to prove their claims; there is total absence of evidence to establish their existing right'; the final fruits of the decree are tried to be taken away by their Advocate! The claims are based on only the fact that in the past the Railways had made payment of overtime wages to their employees. They have sought support from some judgments/orders of the Courts granting overtime wages! There is neither anarchy in the law nor chaos in the Courts as yet to allow the Railway servants to loot the public money in the coffers of the Railways.
16. Shri Ramamurthy, the learned Advocate for the Respondents-employees in the above Petitions has stressed a point of delay and laches on the part of the Petitioners-Railways in filing the present Petitions after a period of two years and 10 months, he therefore, prayed that the Petitions should be rejected on that ground. It would be totally unjust for this Court to reject the Petitions at the stage of final hearing on the ground of delay and laches particularly when the Petitions were admitted and stay of the operation of the Tribunal's Order was granted after hearing the learned Advocate for the Respondents-employees. In any' case since I have considered the matter in minute detail on the question of law and I have also held that the present case is a case of total absence of evidence in support of the overtime claims of the employees, the Petitions cannot be rejected only on the ground of delay and laches. If the employees can file their claims after decades and if they can pray that there is no period of limitation prescribed to file their overtime claims the same logic can be extended while considering the Petitions of the Petitioners which are the largest organisation in the country functioning through various layers and ladders for taking decisions. We have to consider this fact and allow some leeway for some delay which is certainly in-built in the State administration. The stately elephant is said always to move slowly.
17. In my opinion the overtime claim made by the Applicants was a bogus claim without support of any material and evidence. There is not even a statement on oath by the Applicants in support of their own claim of overtime wages. The Labour Court ought to have rejected the said Applications. In these circumstances the Petitions succeed. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clauses (a), (ta) and (c). The Applications, are dismissed with no orders as to cost.