R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.
1. The substantial questions of the law which arise for consideration in this appeal are:
(b) Whether a lease deed compulsorily registerable and not registered can be looked into for the purpose of deciding as to the existence of relationship between the parties to the deed.
(c) Whether the Trial Court was justified in decreeing the suit of the respondents by invoking the provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act after coming to a finding that the respondents had failed to establish that he was a lessee of the suit plot.
2. The facts in brief relevant for the decision are that the. respondent herein filed a suit for injunction and in the alternative for possession of the suit property on the ground that the appellant had granted lease of the eastern half of plot bearing Survey No. 28/2 situated at Dicarpale, Davorlim-Goa admeasuring an area of 483 sq. metres for annual rent of Rs. 3250/- on execution of a lease deed for initial period of 11 months. Prior to the grant of lease by a document of sale dated 3rd March, 1987 the appellant had sold to the respondent a crusher installed in the suit plot and hypothecated to the Karnataka Bank and Dena Bank and the respondent had cleared the loan dues as well as paid all other dues except the amount of Rs. 10,000/- outstanding with the Karnataka Bank. The respondent has thereafter constructed a platform in the suit plot for efficient performance of the crusher. The respondent also paid Rs. 3250/- for the first year as rent and subsequent rent was due by the end of July, 1988. Till June, 1988 the respondent carried on business without any intervention by the appellant. However, since June, 1988 the appellant started obstructing the employees from operating the crusher. By notices dated 6th October, 1988 and 31st October, 1988 addressed on behalf of the appellant, the respondent was called upon to pay rent of Rs. 3250/- from the year starting from August, 1988 and also to pay the Bank dues. In January, 1989 the compressor which was out of order was repaired and the respondent was about to commence the operation of the crusher when the appellant obstructed the employees of the respondent from entering the premises and thereby did not permit the respondent to operate the crusher, hence the suit. It is the case of the appellant that no lease in respect of the suit plot was created in favour of the respondent and there was only an understanding to the effect that as long as hypothecation of the crusher with the Bank continues, the respondent would operate the crusher and thereafter would remove and dismantle the crusher and would take it away. The amount of Rs. 3250/- which was paid by the respondent was as compensation and not the rent for one year. On account of failure on the part of the respondent to pay the bank dues, the crusher was attached in execution of decree by the Court. It was only on account of pressure from the Bank for repayment of the entire loan against the crusher that the appellant had approached the respondent various times to help him and to operate the crusher till the end of 1988 and the same was agreed orally and there was no written agreement.
3. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed:
1. Whether the plaintiff proves that he is the lessee of the suit plot?
2. Whether the plaintiff proves that he is entitled for the damages in the sum of Rs. 4000/- on account of loss of income?
3. Whether the plaintiff proves that in the alternative that he is entitled for possession of the suit plot?
4. Whether the defendant proves that the plaintiff has fraudulently obtained his signature on the said Lease Agreement by misleading as mentioned by him in para 1 of the written statement?
4. The Trial Court held that all the facts brought on record show that the lease was for a period of one year initially and admittedly the lease deed was required to be registered and, therefore, the same having not been registered could not be looked into. However, the appellant has admitted that the respondent was allowed to use the suit plot only for a period of 6 months initially and thereafter the period was extended till the month of December, 1988 so that the respondent could repay the loan amount of the crusher. However, the possession of the suit plot with the respondent was admitted by the appellant. As regards the issue of lease the Trial Court held that the respondent had failed to establish that he is the lessee in respect of the suit plot since the document of lease could not be proved on account of want of registration. The Trial Court, however, held that considering the fact that the respondent was admittedly in possession of the suit plot and he was forcibly dispossessed by the appellant, the respondent was entitled for restoration of possession.
5. The lower Appellate Court by the impugned order held that the agreement of lease was for 11 months and therefore no registration was required and the same can be looked into for all purposes and in view of the said agreement the respondent has proved to be the lessee of the suit plot and/therefore/he was lawfully entitled for restoration of possession in view of the fact that the lease was not lawfully terminated.
6. Upon hearing the learned Advocates for the parties and on perusal of the records, it is seen that undisputedly the respondent, was put in possession of the suit plot on receipt of an amount of Rs. 3250/-. The contention of the appellant that the same amount was received as compensation for one year i.e. till the payment of loan by the respondent to the Bank whereas the contention of the respondent was that the same was yearly rent being for the first year starting from August, 1987. Prom the pleadings of the parties and the findings arrived at by both the Courts below it is apparent that the lease was in respect of the property for the purpose of running of crusher installed therein. Both the Courts below have arrived at concurrent findings as regards the relationship of lessor and lessee between the parties. The Trial Court has clearly held that 'all these facts go to show that the lease was for a period of one year initially,' however, has refused to hold that the respondent is the lessee in respect of the suit plot only because the agreement of the lease was not registered inspite of being for a period of one year. Moreover the fact remains that the Trial Court has come to a clear finding that there was a lease in respect of the suit plot. As already observed above this finding is coupled with the finding of the fact that the respondent had paid to the appellant a sum of Rs. 3250/- for a period of one year. Possession of the suit plot admittedly was with the respondent during the said period. This clearly shows the intention of the parties was to create leasehold rights in favour of the respondent in the suit plot. It is true that the lower Appellate Court has held that the document of lease deed was for a period of 11 months and therefore was not required to be registered. However on the face of the document itself it is clear that the same was for a period of one year. The rent disclosed therein is also for a period of one year. The clause for renewal therein is also for a period of one year and therefore the document ex facie discloses that the lease therein is for one year. Considering the provisions of Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act 1908, the deed was required to be registered. Therefore, no fault can be found with the finding of the Trial Court with regard to the fact that the document cannot be relied upon for want of registration. Nevertheless the document can certainly be relied upon for collateral purpose such as the proof of the possession of the suit plot in capacity of that of a tenant. This has been well explained by the learned Single Judge of Mysore High Court in the matter of Abdul Razack Sab v. H.K. Gopal Setty AIR 1947 Mys. 7 : (1973) 1 My. L.J. 541 : 1973 Ren C.J. 571 : ILR (1973) Mys. 641. Similar is the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Shri Janki Devi Bhagat Trust, Agra v. Ram Swarup Jain (Dead) by LR. : AIR1995SC2482 , wherein it has been clearly held that though the unregistered lease could not be looked at but the factum of lease can be and for that purpose the lease deed can be safely referred to. Therefore, it is clear that both the Courts below have arrived at the concurrent finding regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.
7. It is not in dispute that the appellant has not terminated the leasehold rights of the respondent. Undoubtedly the lease was in respect of the landed property in Goa. This Court in the matter of Gangadhar Narsingdas Agrawal v. Alina D' Costa e Pinto and ors. Goa L.T. 1989 (2) 118, has held that the Rent Act is not applicable to the premises which are not buildings and in respect of those premises the provisions of the Portuguese Decree No. 43525 shall continue to apply. It has been further held in the said decision that the said Decree No. 43525 prescribes for regulating the relationship between landlord and tenant and the rights are not governed by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. It has been further held therein that the said Decree No. 43525 confers protection to the tenant against eviction except on the grounds as set out in the said Decree. Admittedly no such suit on the allegation of any breach entitling eviction of the tenant under the said Decree has been instituted by the appellant against the respondent. Once it is clear that neither the lease had been terminated in terms of law in force nor there being any decree for eviction against the respondent, it was not permissible to the appellant to dispossess the respondent by taking law in his hand. In this view of the matter no fault can be found with the impugned decree as well as the order of the Trial Court for the restoration of the suit property to the respondent.