S.J. Vazifdar, J.
1. The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari to quash and set-aside the order dated May 29, 2002 passed by 6th Labour Court, Mumbai, dismissing the petitioner's application filed for the recovery of various amounts. The impugned order directed Respondent No. 1 to pay only Rs. 5000/-.
2. Respondent No. 2, Prakash Bafna, is the Director of Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 3, Western India Art Litho. The petitioner was employed by Respondent No. 1 in accordance with the General Terms of Employment of Respondent No. 1, Clauses 5 and 9 whereof read as under:
'5. On confirmation you will be entitled to the following perquisites.
(a) House Rent Allowance at the rate of 10 per cent of your total salary.
(b) Leave Travel Allowance at the rate of one month's salary in a calendar year provided that you go out of Bombay on privilege Leave of not less than 10 days.
(c) You will be eligible to 30 days privilege leave with full pay in a calendar year. You will be allowed to accumulate your privilege' leave upto a maximum of 90 days only.
(d) You will be eligible to 7 days casual leave with full pay in a calendar year. Unavailed casual leave shall be allowed to, be encashed at the end of the calendar year. Casual Leave shall be allowed to be either prefixed or suffixed to a holiday but not both. Not more than 2 days casual leave shall be allowed at a time and not more than 2 days casual leave shall be allowed in a quarter of the year.
(e) You will be eligible to 8 days Sick Leave with full pay in a calendar year. You shall be allowed to accumulate sick leave upto a maximum of 24 days. Sick leave is not encashable.
(f) Conveyance Allowance will be paid to you at the rate applicable.
(g) Medical expenses will be reimbursed to you, if applicable, in respect of actual expenses incurred for yourself, your wife and dependent children, on production of Original Bills/cash memos subject to a maximum of half month's salary in a calendar year.
(h) On confirmation of your appointment other benefits like provident fund, gratuity and bonus (as per statutory requirements) will be available to you.
9. You may be transferred to any other Sister Concern of Associate Concerns anywhere in India as may be thought fit by the Management. However, such transfer shall not affect the salary and benefits which you shall enjoy. In case your services are required for any other publication published by this Company, full support to make such publication successful.'
3. Respondent No. 1 was engaged essentially in the business of publishing, printing and marketing several magazines, journals and tabloids in the name and style of 'Cuisine' having a circulation of 10,000 copies a month, Indian Machinist and Flexible Manufacturing having a circulation of about 2000 copies a month, Financial Newsweek having a circulation of about 1500 copies a month and Indian Electrical Contractor and Trader having a circulation of 2000 copies a month.
4. By a letter dated August 12, 1995, Respondent No. 1 stated that the petitioner was confirmed in her appointment on January 1, 1990. Respondent No. 1 further stated that in view of the then prevailing negative atmosphere and financial situation, the only avenue left open was to discontinue the operations of the company as they were unviable. It was also stated that the publication and operation of the Company were being discontinued immediately. The petitioner was accordingly informed that her services would no longer be required after August 12, 1995. She was informed that her account could be settled subject to the General Terms of Employment. The petitioner's case is that she joined the services of Respondent No. 1 as an Associate Editor on July 1, 1989 and went on to become its Executive Editor on January 1, 1994.
5. The petitioner was paid only a part of her dues by Respondent No. 1 aggregating to about Rs. 57,271/- towards her salary, casual leave/privilege leave, leave travel allowance, medical and gratuity dues as well as ex-gratia payment. The petitioner therefore filed an application before the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, claiming an amount of Rs. 1,93,822/-with interest thereon. By the impugned order and judgment dated May 29, 2002, Respondent No. 1 was directed to pay the petitioner only Rs. 5000/- towards medical allowance. It was held that the provisions of the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (hereinafter the 'said Act') did not apply to the petitioner.
6. The main question that arises for consideration, therefore, is whether the said Act applies to the petitioner. Sections 2(b), 2(d), 2(f), 2(g) and 3 of the said Act read as under:
'2(b). 'newspaper' means any printed periodical work containing public news or comments on public news and includes such other class of printed periodical work as may, from time to time, be notified in this behalf by the Central Government in the Official Gazette;
2(d). 'newspaper establishment' means an establishment under, the control of any' person or body of persons, whether incorporated or not, for the production or publication of one or more newspaper or for conducting any news agency or syndicate; -and includes newspaper establishments specified as one establishment under the Schedule.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause,-
(a) different departments, branches and centres of newspaper establishments shall be treated as parts thereof;
(b) a printing press shall be deemed to be a newspaper establishment if the principal business thereof is to print newspaper.
2(f). 'working journalist' means a person whose principal avocation is that of a journalist and who is employed as such, either whole-time or part-time, in, or in relation to, one or more newspaper establishment, and includes an editor, a leader-writer, news editor, sub-editor, feature-writer, copy-tester, reporter, correspondent, cartoonist, news-photographer and proof-reader, but does not includes any such person who-
(i) is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
(ii) being employed in a supervisory capacity, performs, either by the nature of the duties attached to his office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature;
2(g) all words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act.'
3. Act XIV of 1947 to apply to working journalists. -
(1) The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), as in force for the time being, shall, subject to the modification specified in Sub-section (2), apply to, or in relation to, working journalists as they apply to, or in relation to, workmen within the meaning of the Act.
(2) Section 25-F of the aforesaid Act, in its application to working journalist, shall be construed as if in Clause (a) thereof, for the period of notice referred to therein in relation to the retrenchment of a workman, the following periods of notice in relation to the retrenchment of a working journalist had been substituted, namely. -
(a) six months, in the case of an editor, and
(b) three months, in the case of any other working journalist.'
7. Under Section 3 of the Act the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are applicable only in relation to working journalists. The first question therefore is whether the petitioner is a working journalist. Working journalists are defined in Section 2(p) of the said Act. Analysing Section 2(f), it is clear that the following three ingredients require to be satisfied:
(a) The principal avocation of the petitioner must be that of a journalist.
(b) Respondent No. 1 must be a newspaper establishment as defined in Section 2(d) of the said Act, and
(c) The petitioner ought not to have been employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, or being employed in a supervisory capacity performed either by way of the nature of the duties attached to her, office or by reason of any powers vested in her, functions mainly of a managerial nature.
8. That the petitioner was an editor or proof reader is clear from paragraph 1 of her examination-in-chief. She deposed that she joined Respondent No. 1 on July 1, 1989 as an Associate Editor and thereafter became an executive editor in June, 1994. In paragraph 7 of her examination-in-chief, she stated that the nature of her duties included editing material to be published, proofreading and other journalist duties. In his cross- examination, Respondent No. 2 admitted that the petitioner was an editor in the first respondent. Thus the first ingredient is satisfied.
9(a) The next question, viz., whether Respondent No. 1 is a newspaper establishment, requires first for determination whether the publication is a newspaper as defined under Section 2(d) of the said Act. Respondent No. 1 published various periodicals. It is true that the petitioner was concerned mainly with one of them viz. 'Hobby, World Cuisine' which was published monthly. Her employment was not restricted to a particular publication though she may have spent most of her time working on the same. Even if she did, it would make little difference in determining whether the first respondent is a newspaper establishment and whether even that particular periodical is a newspaper, as I will presently demonstrate. I think that question is answered by the first respondent's following admission and conduct.
(b)(i) Section 1 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Press Act') defines the term 'newspaper' as under:
''Newspaper' means any printed periodical work containing public news or comments on public news.'(ii) It is important to note that Section 1 also defines the term 'book' to include every volume, part of division of a volume, and pamphlet, in any language, and every sheet of music, map, chart or plan separately printed. Section 5 of the Press Act provides that no newspaper shall be published in India except in conformity with the rules and the Section itself contains various rules. Section 20A of the Press Act empowers the Central Government to make rules by notification in the Official Gazette inter alia for prescribing the particulars which a declaration made and subscribed under Section 5 may contain.
(iii) Pursuant to Section 20A of the Press Act, the Government of India framed The Registration of Newspapers (Central) Rules, 1956. Rule 8 thereof reads as under:
'Particulars to be published in every newspaper.-(1) The publisher shall publish in every issue of his newspaper the retail selling price of each copy, or, when there is no such selling price, shall publish in an appropriate place that it is for free distribution. The publisher shall also publish in the first issue after the last day of February of each year the particulars specified in Form IV.'(iv) Form IV requires a statement about the ownership and other particulars of the newspaper to be published in the first issue every year after the last day of February.
(v) It is important to note that in fact Respondent No. 1 has complied with the provisions of the Press Act including filing a statement of ownership and other particulars concerning the publication 'Hobby, World Cuisine', in Form IV, containing the following particulars:
'Statement of Ownership and other particulars concerning The Hobby World Cuisine:
FORM IV (See Rule 8)
1. Place of Publication: Calcutta2. Periodicity of its publication: Monthly3. Printer's Name: Prakash Mal BafnaWhether citizen of India: YesAddress: 23, Ganesh Chandra Avenue,Calcutta - 700 013.4. Publisher's Name: Prakash Mal BafnaWhether citizen of India: YesAddress: 23, Ganesh Chandra Avenue,Calcutta - 700 013.5. Editor's Name: Prakash Mal BafnaWhether citizen of India: YesAddress: 23, Ganesh Chandra Avenue,Calcutta - 700 0136. Name and address of Individuals who Prakash Mal Bafnaown the newspaper and partners and 23, Ganesh Chandra Avenue,shareholders holding more than one per Calcutta - 700 013.cent of the total capital: I, Prakash M. Bafna, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
(Sd/-)P.M. Bafna
Signature of Publisher
Dated : March 1, 1991'
_____________________________________________________________________________________
(c) It is thus clear that the respondents themselves treated even that particular publication as a newspaper. It is not open therefore for them to contend otherwise. It is further pertinent to note that from the record there appears to be no explanation contrary to the representation. It is not the respondent's case that the aforesaid formalities were complied with under a mistaken impression about the nature of the publication.
(d) The definitions of 'newspaper' in the Press Act and in the said Act, in so far as it is material, are similar.
10. There remains then for consideration the question whether the petitioner was employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity or being employed in a supervisory capacity performed functions mainly of a managerial nature. The question must be answered in negative. The evidence establishes the contrary.
11. The petitioner deposed that she had no authority to appoint or terminate anyone from service, sanction leave or payments or take any action which bound the company and that she was not a constituted attorney of the company. What is even more important is the fact that Respondent No. 2 in his cross-examination admitted that he sanctioned the petitioner's leave. He further admitted that he sanctioned the leave of other staff members. He further admitted that he made payments to the staff. He also admitted that the termination orders were signed by him. Respondent No. 2 nowhere stated that the petitioner had any authority to sanction the leave, to make payments, or to terminate the services of any of the employees.
12. Realising the effect of the cross-examination, he volunteered three statements. He stated that the leave was sanctioned, payments were made and termination orders were signed on the recommendation of the petitioner. Even assuming his statements are correct, it is pertinent to note that it is not his case even here that she had any authority to do so. The recommendations could be made by anyone, even by persons who are not employees of the respondents. That the petitioner allegedly made recommendations would not imply that she had any managerial functions.
13. The impugned order, wrongly and without any cogent evidence, comes to the conclusion that the duties of the petitioner were of a supervisory nature and that she had administrative control over the subordinates. There is no evidence whatsoever to support the finding. The only evidence was that the petitioner had sanctioned the leave of certain staff members during the absence of Respondent No. 2, as it was urgently required to do so. The learned Presiding Officer has disbelieved the reasons given by the petitioner for sanctioning the leave. It is difficult to understand why he did so. It is the case of the respondents themselves that the leave was sanctioned only by Respondent No. 2 albeit on the recommendation of the petitioner. In view of this testimony, the petitioner's explanation is obviously correct. In any event in view of the admission by Respondent No. 2, it is clear that it was Respondent No. 2 and not the petitioner who was responsible for and authorised to sanction leave, make payments and terminate the services of the employees. The respondents have not led any other evidence to indicate that the petitioner had any managerial or supervisory functions in the company.
14. In the Circumstances, the Industrial Disputes Act is applicable to the petitioner in view of Section 3 of the said Act.
15. The status of the petitioner as a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act does not really fall for consideration at all. Under Section 3 of the said Act the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are made applicable to working journalist as they apply in relation to workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act apply to the petitioner not by virtue of the petitioner being a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act, but by virtue of the petitioner being a working journalist as defined in the said Act and the said Act incorporating in the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. I am supported in this view by the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in Bennett Coleman v. Mumbai Mazdoor Sabha : (1995)ILLJ225Bom . D.R. DHANUKA, J. (as he then was), after setting out the history of the enactment of the said Act and referring to the provisions of Section 3 thereof, held as under at p. 229:
'11............ It is clear that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as in force for the time being are applicable to working journalists save and except the modifications specified in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act. The Industrial Disputes Act in its application to working journalists must be read not in isolation but together with the provisions contained in the Working Journalists and Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955. The said Act 45 of 1955 incorporates the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as if with pen and ink except in respect of the specific modifications set out in Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act.'
16. This leaves for consideration the various claims made by the petitioner:
1. Notice Pay:
(a) The learned Presiding Officer has observed that under the terms and conditions of the services, the petitioner is entitled only to one month notice pay in the event of closure. However, the evidence indicates that there was in fact no closure as alleged by the respondents.
There was no closure of the newspaper establishment or company business. Two of the publications were discontinued. Moreover, Respondent No. 2 admitted that certain publications were restarted. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that there was any closure of Respondent No. 1 or of the establishment where the petitioner worked.
(b) Section 3(2) of the Act amends Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act by providing a notice period of six months in the case of an editor and three months in the case of any other working journalist. Admittedly, as seen above, the petitioner was an editor. Admittedly, again, the termination of the petitioner's employment by the said letter dated August 12, 1995 did not give any notice period before terminating the service of the petitioner forthwith. The petitioner is therefore, entitled to notice pay in the sum of Rs. 30,000/- as computed in Exhibit 'C' to the petition.
II. Retrenchment Compensation:
I have held above that there was no closure. In the circumstances, it follows that under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, the petitioner is entitled to retrenchment compensation as claimed in Exhibit 'C' to the petition in the sum of Rs. 20,769/-.
III. Provident Fund:
(a) The learned Presiding Officer has rejected the petitioner's various claims for leave travel allowance, bonus, ex-gratia, house -rent allowance, retrenchment compensation and notice pay on the grounds that the petitioner does not come under the category of workman and that the establishment is not a newspaper industry. I have already dealt with the question regarding the first respondent being a newspaper establishment. The learned Presiding Officer has also rejected the claim for provident fund on the ground that the petitioner cannot raise a claim under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as the Provident Fund Authority is a separate and independent authority, entitled to look into the grievance of the petitioner for provident fund. He held therefore that he has no jurisdiction to decide the claim for provident fund.
(b) The finding is contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd., Bararee Colliery, Dhanbad v. Rameshwar and Ors. : (1968)ILLJ6SC . The appeal before the Supreme Court arose out of the applications filed by the workmen of the Appellant company claiming bonus under the scheme framed by the Central Government under the Coal Mines Provident Funds and Bonus Schemes Act, 1948 and railway fares and leave under the award of the Industrial Tribunal (Colliery Disputes) which came into effect as from February 22, 1954. The Labour Court allowed the claim under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to try these applications under Section 33-C(2) because Section 33-C(2) contemplates recovery of money payable under an award, settlement, or under the provisions of Chapter V- A of the Industrial Disputes Act, and not under any other statute or scheme framed thereunder. It was further contended that under Section 33-C(2), the benefit capable of being computed in terms of money is a non-monetary benefit and not a claim for money itself and that the proceedings under Section 33-C(2) being in the nature of execution proceedings, substantial questions between the employer and his employee cannot be agitated by the Labour Court under that scheme. After noting the earlier decisions of the Apex Court itself, it was held as follows:
'The following propositions on the question as to the scope of Section 33-C(2) are deducible from these three directions:
(1).........
(2).........
(3).........
(4).........
(5).........
(6) The fact that the words of limitation used in Section 20(2) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 are omitted in Section 33-C(2) shows that the scope of Section 33-C(2) is wider than that of Section 33-C(1). Therefore, whereas Sub-section (1) is confined to claims arising under an award or settlement or Chapter V-A, claims which can be entertained under Sub-section (2) are not so confined to those under an award, settlement or Chapter V-A.'
It was further held in paragraph 5 as under:
'It is clear that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer. Since, the scope of Sub-section (2) is wider than that of Sub-section (1) and the sub-section is not confined to cases arising under an award, settlement or under the provisions of Chapter V-A, there is no reason to hold that a benefit provided by a statute or a Scheme made thereunder, without there being anything contrary under such statute or Section 33-C(2), cannot fall within Sub-section (2). Consequently, the benefit provided in the bonus scheme made under the Coal Mines Provident Funds and Bonus Schemes Act, 1948 which remains to be computed must fall under Sub-section (2) and the Labour Court therefore had jurisdiction to entertain and try such a claim, it being a claim in respect of an existing right arising from the relationship of an industrial workman and his employer. The contention that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction because the claim arose under the said scheme or because the benefit was monetary or because it involved any substantial question between the Company and the workmen must, in view of the said decisions, fail.'(c) In the circumstances, it is clear that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain and try the petitioner's claim for provident fund.
(d) The claim for provident fund is also rejected on the ground that less than twenty employees were engaged by Respondent No. 1 and therefore, the provisions of the Provident Fund Act would not be applicable to Respondent No. 1. That the finding is incorrect is apparent on the face of the record itself. In his cross- examination, Respondent No. 1 admitted that the documents filed at Exhibit U-49 are the leave records, wage sheets and muster sheets of Respondent No. 1 and the dates mentioned of the joining and of the confirmation of the employees in the sheets were reflected therein. These sheets are annexed at Exhibit 'J' to the petition. A mere perusal of the sheets establishes beyond any doubt that there were more than twenty persons employed by Respondent No. 1 from the year 1991 onwards. It was only prior thereto that there were less than twenty employees. It is, however, important to note that another table was also filed on behalf of the petitioner indicating the names of 18 persons employed by Respondent No. 1, whose names were missing from the leave record, but were to be on the muster sheet. The entire record is in the possession of Respondent No. 1. The respondents have chosen not to lead any evidence or even furnish particulars of the dates of joining of these eighteen employees. An adverse inference against the respondents to the effect that had they produced the necessary documents, it would have disclosed that prior to 1991, there were more than twenty employees employed by Respondent No. 1, is justified.
(e) In the circumstances, the petitioner's claim for Provident Fund in the sum of Rs. 25,024/- as specified in Exhibit-C is allowed.
IV. Leave Travel Allowance:
The petitioner however is not entitled to leave travel allowance as she has failed to prove that she went out of Bombay which is a condition precedent for obtaining the leave travel allowance. Even in her evidence, the petitioner has not made a categorical statement that she availed of privilege leave of not less than ten days to go out of Bombay. Further there are no bills or other documents in support of the claim. For this reason, the petitioner is not entitled to leave travel allowance of Rs. 117,500/-, as claimed.
V. Bonus/Ex-gratia:
The petitioner is not entitled to bonus and ex-gratia. There is no contract or statutory provision under which she is entitled to the same. The mere fact that some employees and not all had been granted ex-gratia payment does not establish any contract between the petitioner and the respondents.
There is no evidence to the effect that there was any direction of any payment of ex-gratia and bonus. There is not even an assertion that there was any representation or understanding to this effect on the basis of which the petitioner acted.
VI. Medical Allowance:
Curiously, the Presiding Officer has granted a sum of Rs. 5000/- towards medical allowance despite having come to the conclusion that the petitioner's application was not maintainable. The petitioner's claim for medical allowance falls under Clause 5(g) of the General Terms of Employment. The petitioner has in her evidence expressly stated that she submitted the bills in respect of all payments for the relevant years claimed by her. In his cross-examination, Respondent No. 2 stated that he was unaware whether the petitioner had submitted the medical bills. He did not deny the petitioner's assertion that the bills were submitted. The learned Presiding Officer has not even adverted to the General Terms of Employment. He has accordingly stated that the Opponent did not give benefit to the employees till April, 1994. Even assuming that the assertion is correct, it is irrelevant. The termination letter itself stated that the petitioner's employment is governed by the General Terms of Employment. The respondent did not state that any part of the General Terms of Employment become applicable only from 1994. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to recover the balance amount towards the medical allowance in the sum of Rs. 8566.90 ps.
VII. House Rent Allowance
House Rent allowance is provided under Clause 5(a) of the General Terms of Employment at the rate of 10% of the salary. Once again, the learned Presiding Officer has rejected the claim on the ground that none of the other employees had been paid the house rent allowance. However, the letter of termination did not state that any of the general terms and conditions did not apply to the petitioner or were applicable from any particular date. It is difficult in these circumstances to accept the bare word of the respondent in this regard. The petitioner's claim for balance house rent allowance in the sum of Rs. 1980/- is allowed.
VIII. Balance Wages:
The petitioner's wages for the period August 1, 1995 to August 12, 1995 in the sum of Rs. 1053.46 ps. remains to be paid and is payable.
17. By an order dated August 14, 2000 in Writ Petition No. 1515 of 2000, Dr. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, J. inter alia directed as follows:
'Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner- employee contended that the only assets which the company has, are virtually without any significant value since they consist of items such as Fans, Plastic Chairs and Computer cartridges. It is, therefore, submitted that the claim of the petitioner which is in the amount of Rs. 1.69 lacs together with interest is in a much higher amount and even if the petitioner succeeds before the Labour Court, the Company may not be in a position to meet the claim. In order to meet this grievance, it is stated on behalf of the respondent-Employer that the respondent shall, through its Director, file an undertaking within one week from today to the effect that any order passed by the Labour Court in pursuance of the application under Section 33-C(2) shall be personally satisfied by the concerned Director subject of course, to his right to challenge the correctness of any such order. The statement is accepted and the undertaking as aforesaid shall be filed within a period of one week from today. Apart from the aforesaid, in pursuance of the impugned order dated May 20, 2000 passed by the Labour Court, the 1st and 2nd respondents shall file an affidavit before the Labour Court disclosing the assets of the Company and the value thereof. Should the value of the assets be lower than the claim of the petitioner, the respondents shall furnish solvent security to the satisfaction of the Labour Court. Nothing further remains to be adjudicated upon in these writ petitions. The writ petitions are disposed of on the aforesaid terms.'
18. Respondent No. 2 herein was also Respondent No. 2 in Writ Petition No. 1515 of 2000 having been impleaded as a Director of Respondent No. 1. Despite the said order, an undertaking has not been filed. Nor have Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein who were Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 therein, filed an affidavit before the Labour Court disclosing the assets of the Company and the value thereof. It appears that proceedings were adopted by the petitioner in this regard. By an order dated December 22, 2000, the Labour Court rejected the security sought to be tendered and observed that the respondents had wasted time in furnishing the documents. It was therefore ordered that the solvent security should be furnished and if the respondents did not want to furnish the solvent security they should furnish a bank guarantee within two weeks. It appears that nothing has been done thereafter.
19. In any event the fact remains that the statement of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 atleast to the effect that Respondent No. 2 shall personally satisfy any order that may be passed i by the Labour Court was accepted by this I Court. Respondent No. 2 is, therefore, personally liable for the amounts payable by Respondent No. 1 to the petitioner.
20. As far as Respondent No. 3 is concerned, it is a separate legal entity. There is insufficient evidence to suggest foisting any liability of Respondent No. 1 on Respondent No. 3.
21. In the circumstances, the impugned order dated May 29, 2002 is quashed and set aside to the extent indicated above. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are ordered and directed to pay to the petitioner an amount of Rs. 87,393.45 ps. together with interest thereon at the rate of 18% p.a. from the date of the application i.e. March 26, 1997 amounting to Rs. 15,730.82 ps. till payment and/or realization. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 shall also pay to the petitioner interest on Rs. 87,393.45 ps. at the rate of 12% p.a. from the date hereof till payment and/or realisation. The payment shall be made within four weeks from today.
22. Office to issue notice to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to show cause why contempt proceedings ought not to be adopted against them for violation of the order dated August 14, 2000, returnable after eight weeks.
23. Parties to act on an ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Associate/Court Stenographer of this Court.