Judgment:
P.D. Kode, J.
1. By present application in revision, applicant-accused in Crime No. 49/2007 registered with Koradi Police Station for commission of offence punishable under Sections 325, 506 of Indian Penal Code upon complaint of his brother non-applicant No. 2 has thrown challenge to order dated 8.5.2007 passed by learned 1st Ad-hoc District Judge and Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur allowing application in Revision No. 258/2007 preferred by non- applicant No. 2 and setting aside order dated 27.4.2007 passed by learned JMFC Court No. 6, Nagpur and holding non-applicant No. 2 being entitled for the custody of Auto-Rickshaw bearing No. MH-31AP/ 5846 seized by Koradi Police Station in connection with said Crime No. 49/2007 on furnishing suprutnama bond to investigating officer in sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-with usual terms and conditions. The applicant-accused has prayed for setting aside order impugned and directing non-applicant No. 2 for handing over custody of auto- rickshaw to applicant-accused.
The facts, in brief, giving rise to filing of present petition can be set out as under:
2. The Auto-Rickshaw in question was seized by Koradi Police Station on 27.3.2006 from the applicant-accused during the course of investigation of said crime registered upon complaint lodged by non-applicant No. 2 to the effect that on 26.3.2006 at about 6.00 AM while he was taking morning walk, on the count of old rivalry, the applicant-accused had intentionally dashed and injured him by means of causing him fracture at the left wrist.
2.1 On 28.3.2007 non-applicant No. 2 had preferred Misc. Criminal Application No. 540/2007 under Sections 457 r/w 451 of Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as Code) for releasing the said Auto-rickshaw on suprutnama to him on contention of himself being registered owner of said auto-rickshaw and using same for personal use and said rickshaw being not directly and indirectly involved in said crime, no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining same in custody of investigating officer;
3. The said application was opposed by applicant-accused by filing say on 28.3.2007 contending that since beginning auto- rickshaw in question was in his possession and he has been paying monthly instalments for the same to financer and since beginning non-applicant No. 2 had executed T.T.O. forms in his favour for submitting same to the R.T.O. for transferring said auto-rickshaw in his name but the same could not be transferred as in the meanwhile State Government had stopped issuing new permit but he is possessing all the original papers of said auto-rickshaw which was seized by police from his possession;
3.1 In the said say he had further contended that non- applicant No. 2 on 14.1.2006 had sold said auto-rickshaw to him and had executed receipt to such effect and further on 16.9.2006 had also executed a power of attorney authorising applicant-accused to do all necessary acts in respect of said auto-rickshaw and also had executed a compromise deed before panchas in respect of said auto-rickshaw.
It was his further contention that non-applicant No. 2 has mischievously lodged the complaint with ulterior motive for any how taking possession of auto-rickshaw from him and hence application made by non-applicant No. 2 deserve to be dismissed and on the contrary auto-rickshaw deserve to be released in his favour on his executing bond on suprutnama and himself being ready and willing to abide the condition which would be imposed for the same.
4. Investigating Officer vide his say dated 2.4.2007 has requested that offence in question being registered for user of auto- rickshaw in question by applicant-accused for causing injury and fracture to left wrist of non-applicant No. 2 on count of old rivalry there was possibility of commission of cognizable offence due to ensuing of quarrel in between the said brothers in event of release of auto-rickshaw, appropriate order be passed after verifying the papers and ownership of the said auto-rickshaw.
5. In addition to filing of such say, additionally applicant- accused on 19.4.2007 also filed a separate application in the same proceeding i.e. MCA No. 540/2007 under Section 457 of the Code for releasing seized auto-rickshaw on suprutnama for the reasons stated by him in a reply filed for opposing such a prayer made by non-applicant No. 2 and showing contending himself being entitled for custody of auto-rickshaw on suprutnama.
6. The said application was opposed by the non-applicant No. 2 by filing say on 23.4.2007 denying contentions taken by applicant- accused including rickshaw being allegedly seized from custody of applicant-accused and/or original papers of auto-rickshaw being in custody of the applicant-accused and further contending that after purchasing the said rickshaw from Narendra Finance Institution and after paying entire instalments, non-applicant No. 2 had demanded original documents of auto-rickshaw several times from said financer but said financer under the pressure and/or the advice of applicant had not returned the same to him and the same were in possession of financer and applicant-accused in collusion with the said financer may be having the said documents, to which in fact only non-applicant No. 2 is entitled. Hence, applicant-accused was not entitled for having custody of auto-rickshaw on the said basis.
6.1 By the said say non-applicant No. 2 had further contended that after purchasing said auto-rickshaw he was using same for earning his bread-butter. The applicant-accused also had been Nagpur for similar purpose and is also owning another auto- rickshaw. Since non-applicant No. 2 was also carrying business as Labour Contractor, he had executed power of attorney in favour of applicant-accused for looking after affairs of auto-rickshaw owned by non-applicant No. 2 and for doing necessary work with RTO and Police if required.
6.2 By the said say non-applicant No. 2 had further contended that due to wrongful attitude and misuse of said power of attorney by applicant-accused, non-applicant No. 2 had cancelled the same. Applicant-accused got enraged due to same and intentionally dashed auto-rickshaw on non-applicant No. 2 and hence non- applicant No. 2 lodged complaint against applicant-accused, upon which crime in question was registered by Koradi Police Station.
6.3 By the said say non-applicant No. 2 had further contended that due to seizure of said auto-rickshaw he is suffering hardship and loss in earning livelihood for himself and his family. He had also asked non-applicant No. 1 for handing over custody of auto-rickshaw to him but themselves having told him to bring suprutnama from the court he was required to make an application accordingly. Thus he contended for allowing his application and dismissing the application made by his brother applicant-accused.
7. The learned JMFC 6th Court, Nagpur after considering the rival submissions and the decisions relied for the reasons recorded in paragraph Nos. 9 to 11 in order dated 27.4.2007 and particularly by relying upon decision in the case of T. Narayan Swami v. State and Ors. reported in 1993 Cri.L.J. 3139 came to the conclusion of applicant-accused being entitled for interim custody of seized auto-rickshaw. Accordingly by said order he rejected application made by non-applicant No. 2 and allowed application made by applicant-accused and amongst other ordered releasing and handing over of seized auto-rickshaw to applicant- accused on suprutnama.
8. Non-applicant No. 2 being aggrieved with said decision preferred an application in Revision No. 258/2007 to the Court of Sessions at Nagpur which was allowed by learned Ad-hoc District Judge-1 and ASJ, Nagpur by order impugned in the present petition by coming to conclusion of non-applicant No. 2 being entitled for possession of said auto-rickshaw and view taken by learned JMFC being improper and unjust and having resulted into miscarriage of justice and hence order passed by learned JMFC being required to be quashed and set aside. The learned Ad-hoc District Judge No. 1 and ASJ, Nagpur hence quashed and set aside order dated 27.4.2007 and holding that non-applicant No. 2 was entitled for custody of seized auto-rickshaw on furnishing bond and conditions ordered accordingly. As narrated earlier, applicant-accused has preferred present application in revision against the said order.
9. The learned Counsel for applicant-accused in consonance with stand taken by applicant-accused in his say opposing the application made by non-applicant No. 2 urged that the revisional court manifestly erred in:
(i) interfering with and setting aside order passed by learned JMFC Court No. 6, Nagpur for releasing and handing over seized auto- rickshaw to accused-applicant and further setting aside order of rejection of application made by non-applicant No. 2 and allowing the same by ordering handing over custody of seized auto-rickshaw to non-applicant No. 2;
(ii) coming to conclusion of non-applicant No. 2 being entitled for possession of said auto-rickshaw and view taken by learned JMFC being improper and unjust and the same having resulted into miscarriage of justice;
(iii) giving undue importance to the fact of non-applicant No. 2 being registered owner of said auto-rickshaw and further ignoring the fact of auto-rickshaw being seized from possession of applicant- accused and the documentary evidence produced by non-applicant No. 2 showing himself being in possession of the auto-rickshaw prior to the seizure due to himself being then entitled to have possession of the same, in view of transaction entered in between himself and non-applicant No. 2;
(iv) misinterpreting decisions relies by the parties and coming to conclusion of registered owner being entitled to have possession of the auto-rickshaw;
(v) discarding sound detail reasoning given by learned JMFC while ordering handing over custody of auto-rickshaw on suprutnama to applicant-accused in spite of there being no error much less error occasioning to injustice having occurred by passing the said order;
9.1 The learned Counsel for the applicant-accused thus contended that interference made by the revisional court being unwarranted and unjustified in law requires quashing and setting aside the order impugned and consequently dismissing the application made by non-applicant No. 2 and allowing the application made by the applicant-accused by ordering handing over custody of the auto-rickshaw to applicant-accused upon the bond in terms of order passed by learned JMFC by restoring the same.
9.2 The learned Counsel for the applicant-accused placed reliance upon the decisions of (i) the High Court of Orissa in a case of Pravakar Behera v. State of Orissa and Anr. reported in : 1999 Cri.L.J. Page 3108, (ii) the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in a case of Krishan Lal v. State of H.P. and Anr. reported in : 1994 Cri.L.J. 2539, (iii) the Apex Court in a case of State of Orissa v. Nakula Sahu and Ors. reported in : AIR 1979 SC 663 and (iv) the Apex Court in a case of State of A.P. v. Pituhuk Sreeinvanasa Rao reported in : 2000 Cr.L.J. 4021.
10. On the contrary to the same, learned Counsel for non- applicant No. 2 in consonance with stand taken by non-applicant No. 2 in application and say filed opposing application made by applicant- accused supported order passed by revisional court by urging that:
(i) since the learned JMFC had illegally ordered handing over custody of auto-rickshaw to a person who was not registered owner of said auto-rickshaw, the said order deserved to be set aside and was rightly set aside by the revisional court;
(ii) since non-applicant No. 2 is admittedly registered owner of the said rickshaw he was having definitely right to have custody of the same but in spite of upholding said right the learned JMFC having ordered handing over auto-rickshaw to accused-applicant who had no right or who had failed to establish any right much less any better right to have custody of said rickshaw warranted setting aside said illegal order for serving the ends of justice;
(iii) the fact of non-applicant No. 2 being a registered owner apart from being not disputed by applicant-accused and being also supported by documentary evidence and being further fortified by conduct of non-applicant No. 2 in immediately applying for return of the said rickshaw warranted allowing of his application and handing over custody of auto-rickshaw to him upon suprutnama. However, in stead of the same learned JMFC having passed contrary order the same was unsustainable in law requiring an interference from revisional court and accordingly said illegal order was rightly set aside by the revisional court;
11. The learned Counsel, therefore, urged of there being absolutely no merit in the petition preferred by the applicant- accused, the same deserves to be dismissed. The learned Counsel, in his turn, placed reliance upon the decision in a case of : (i) Hardayal Singh Harcharan Singh and Ors. v. Superintendent of State Excise and Anr. reported in 2003 All MR (Cri) 554, (ii) Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar and Anr. reported in : (2001) 10 SCC 88 and (iii) Smt. Shantabai Vishwasrao Mane v. Vishwasrao V. Gaikwad and Ors. reported in 1997(1) Bom Cri Cas 131.
12. After carefully examining record and proceeding called and after giving thoughtful consideration to submissions advanced, the only point whether revisional Court was justified in interfering with the order passed by the lower Court and, if yes, then what order arises for consideration.
13. Having regard to the point for consideration arisen and same having arisen in an application in revision preferred by applicant-accused, it will be necessary to observe that legal position regarding exercising powers in criminal revision has been settled by plethora of the decision to the effect of such a powers being required to be exercised for the purposes within the parameters of Section 397 of the Code by this Court as well as the Sessions Judge and/or Additional Sessions Judge i.e. to say for satisfying as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding to which challenge is thrown by preferring such an application. Needless to add that question of exercising of further powers as conferred by Section 401(1) of the Code by this Court or by the Sessions Judge under Section 399(1) of the Code or Additional Sessions Judge under Section 399 r/w Section 400 of the Code would arise only in the event of either order or finding under the challenge is found to be incorrect, illegal or improper. Having regard to the same, it will be necessary to determine whether the order passed by the learned JMFC and set aside by the learned ASJ was suffering from any defect on the count of either incorrectness, illegality or impropriety warranting an interference by learned ASJ as made by order impugned in present application. In event of the said order being found not suffering from any such defect would not have warranted interference as made by learned ASJ and then same would definitely warrant interference by this Court in present petition. Needless to add that while examining such question of interference, the same would be required to be examined from the angle to ascertain whether the same warranted to exercise powers in revision within the parameters of Section 397 of the Code.
14. Apart from the aforesaid sole question involved in the present petition or in a proceeding before the Court of Sessions or before the learned JMFC being related to the right of either of parties to seek interim custody of an auto-rickshaw seized during the course of investigation of offence would warrant determining the said aspect qua provisions of Section 457 of the Code meant for such a matter. Even in the said respect, it is settled legal position that while passing an order under the said section the criminal court is entitled to deliver of property to the person entitled for the possession of the same on such condition as thought fit by said Court.
15. Now considering the facts and circumstances involved in the present matter it can be safely said that the proceeding from which the orders passed are challenged before this Court was involving question of passing an order under Section 457 of the Code. The same is apparent as the offence in question had occurred on 26.3.2006 and auto-rickshaw was seized on 27.3.2006 during the investigation of the same and non-applicant No. 2 had preferred an application immediately on 28.3.2006 for handing over custody of said auto-rickshaw. Having regard to the same it can be safely said that for passing a proper order in the said matter it was necessary for the learned JMFC to determine as to who was then entitled to have possession of the said auto-rickshaw, while it was necessary for learned ASJ to determine whether while determining the said question any error, illegality or impropriety warranting an interference under Section 397 of the Code was committed by the learned JMFC.
16. Now considering claim of entitlement of custody of auto- rickshaw staked by rival parties before the learned JMFC and record produced in support of the same it is difficult to accept that any cogent material was produced by applicant-accused for accepting his case of himself being entitled for possession/custody of said auto-rickshaw. Though applicant-accused has claimed of non- applicant No. 2 having sold him the said auto-rickshaw on 14.1.2006 and having executed receipt to the said effect and having executed TTO forms in his favour for transferring auto-rickshaw or on 16.9.2006 non-applicant No. 2 having executed power of attorney or having executed compromise-deed; the documents produced by him does not fully support his relevant contentions and particularly the contention of the same having conferred any superior right upon him for having custody/possession of the auto-rickshaw in spite of undisputedly non-applicant No. 2 being a registered owner of the said auto-rickshaw.
17. Such a conclusion is apparent as apart from non-applicant No. 2 having disputed the purported receipt bearing his signature, even the said document read as a whole, clearly shorts fall of indicating the transaction of sale having taken place between applicant-accused and non-applicant No. 2. Needless to add that said receipt of purported sale does not transcend beyond agreement of sale of auto-rickshaw on certain terms having taken place between them. Even the said purported receipt fails to reveal any payment towards advance or part of price or price for the sale being made for transaction of sale alleged by applicant-accused. Furthermore the same is also wholly silent regarding the date of delivery of auto-rickshaw sold or the delivery of the same being already effected. Similarly non-applicant No. 2 having disputed about the TTO forms bearing his signature, it is difficult to accept of the same being of any assistance to the applicant-accused for advancing his case.
18. Now even the reference to power of attorney produced by the applicant-accused also do not reveal the same supporting his contention of auto-rickshaw being allegedly sold to him though the same to some extent may indicate of possession of auto-rickshaw then being given by non-applicant No. 2 to applicant-accused for the reasons and the purposes mentioned in the same. Apart from the same even for such limited purpose the said document cannot be said to be of any significant assistance to applicant-accused, in view of the same being cancelled by non-applicant No. 2 as seen from the deed of revocation of power of attorney dated 15th March, 2007 produced by him before the lower Court.
19. Thus, on the aforesaid backdrop and except the bare fact of rickshaw being seized from the possession of the applicant- accused, hardly any convincing material seen to have been placed by him before learned JMFC establishing his any right showing entitlement to possession of auto-rickshaw i.e. establishing his right prevailing over the right of registered owner to possess or to have custody of auto-rickshaw.
20. On the aforesaid backdrop now carefully examining the order passed by the learned ASJ after examining order passed by learned JMFC of handing over custody of auto-rickshaw on suprutnama to applicant-accused and particularly the reasoning recorded in paragraph No. 5 by the learned ASJ makes it extremely difficult to find any fault with the observation made by him, accused-applicant having failed to give satisfactory explanation for not getting the rickshaw transferred in his favour in spite of alleging of the same being sold to him in January 2006 or the further observation that merely because vehicle came to be seized form the accused-applicant itself cannot be a reason or a circumstance entitling him to have possession of the same. Having regard to the same, it is difficult to find any fault with finding arrived of non applicant No. 2 being registered owner being entitled to possess the auto-rickshaw in absence of any reliable material pointing out any title or the interest of the applicant-accused. Similarly the reasoning given by the learned ASJ regarding non-applicability of the decision relied by the counsel for the applicant-accused also cannot be said to be improper.
21. Having regard to the same it is difficult to find any fault with the finding arrived by learned ASJ that the finding arrived by the learned JMFC being improper and unjust deserving to be quashed and set aside. Needless to add that the finding arrived by learned JMFC being not based upon any of the established right of the applicant-accused prevailing over right of registered owner to have the custody of the auto-rickshaw and merely based upon the auto-rickshaw being seized from the applicant-accused obviously alleged to have committed the offence by using the same cannot be said to be legal or sustainable.
22. Having regard to the same, it is difficult to find any merit in the submission canvassed by the learned Counsel for the applicant of any error illegality or impropriety committed by ASJ in setting aside the order passed by the learned JMFC releasing and handing over auto-rickshaw to applicant-accused or further ordering the same to be handed over on suprutnama to the applicant- accused. Needless to add that the order passed by learned ASJ being not passed merely upon the circumstance of the non-applicant No. 2 being registered owner and the same being passed after duly taking into consideration the fact of the same being seized from accused-applicant and after considering the documentary evidence produced by him also makes it difficult to accept submissions to contrary effect canvassed by the learned Counsel for the applicant- accused. The same is the case about the other submission canvassed by learned Counsel for the applicant regarding the learned ASJ having misinterpreted the decisions relied by the parties or having erroneously concluded of registered owner being entitled for possession of rickshaw or that the reasoning given by learned JMFC was discarded without any reason and order passed by JMFC was unnecessarily interfered. Needless to add that in light of the reasoning recorded aforesaid, the submissions to the contrary canvassed by learned Counsel for non-applicant No. 2 clearly appears to be convincing and credit worthy.
23. Having regard to the parameters of Section 457 of the Code recited earlier regarding the relevant aspect of person entitle for custody and since careful perusal of the decisions of the High Court of Orissa and Himachal Pradesh relied by learned Counsel for the applicant-accused referred hereinabove does not reveal that the same can be regarded as a precedent laying a law that custody of property is always to be handed over to the person from whose possession the same is seized as in the said cases the custody of seized vehicle was given to the concerned person in view of themselves being in possession of the relevant vehicle in pursuance of lawful agreement entered by them and on the contrary the decisions relied by learned Counsel for non-applicant No. 2 of this Court and apex court having reveal that preference is to be given to the registered owner while deciding the aspect of interim custody of seized vehicle also makes difficult to accept that the said decisions relied the learned Counsel for the applicant-accused would be of any assistance for advancing the case of the applicant-accused. Since hardly any quarrel can be entertained about the law pronounced by the Apex Court regarding the scope of criminal revision in the other two decisions relied by the learned Counsel for the applicant- accused, it would be wholly unnecessary to make any dilation about the same except stating that the said decisions also cannot be said to be useful to the applicant-accused for advancing his case.
24. As a net result of the aforesaid since it is difficult to accept that any illegality, error or impropriety was committed by interfering and setting aside the order passed by the learned JMFC and on the contrary such a interference being warranted for setting aside the illegality, error and impropriety committed by learned JMFC the present application sans merits deserve to be and hence same stands dismissed accordingly.