Judgment:
P.S. Patankar, J.
1. All the above-mentioned appeals, except First Appeal No. 876 of 1985, have been filed by the insurance company. The First Appeal No. 876 of 1985 is filed by the owner of the vehicle. All these appeals raise one common question, that is, what is nature of enquiry to be made by the Tribunal before fastening the responsibility upon the insurance company under Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereafter called 'the Act').
2. Strictly speaking, it will not be necessary to state the facts of each case considering the view that I am taking, however, some facts in nutshell are as follows:
First Appeal No. 142 of 1984
The accident took place on 9.5.1983 in which one Hajarat Kondibhai Mulla, aged about 35 years, who was working as a mechanic died. He was one of the passengers in tempo bearing No. MTL 5613 which met with an accident due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver. Hajarat Kondibhai was carrying certain luggage, i.e., material and instruments of his business in the tempo by paying fare. The insurance company resisted the claim made under Section 92-A, inter alia, on the ground that the insurer was not liable to indemnify the owner because there was breach of the terms of the policy. The owner was using the goods vehicle for conveyance of passengers for hire or reward which was prohibited by the terms of the policy produced at Exh. 40. The learned Judge rejected the contention of the insurance company, inter alia, observing that insurer should be liable to pay the compensation without considering the terms of the policy as otherwise the very object of Section 92-A was frustrated.
First Appeal Nos. 1135 and 1173 of 1984
3. The accident in both these appeals is the same as in First Appeal No. 142 of 1984. In these two appeals, 2 minors by name Rajendra and Rani were involved who succumbed to their injuries. They were travelling by paying fare. The same view was taken in these two appeals as in First Appeal No. 142 of 1984 by the learned member of the Tribunal while holding the insurance company liable to make the payment under Section 92-A.
First Appeal No. 423 of 1985
4. In this case accident took place on 21.5.1983. One Ramchandra Tippanan Khairavkar was the owner of motor cycle bearing No. BSF 661 and deceased Vilas was a pillion rider. The tractor bearing No. MXW 137 dashed against the motor cycle. The driver of the tractor was rash and negligent in driving the same and, therefore, the claim was made by the legal representative of the said Vilas. The insurance company, inter alia, contended that risk of pillion rider was not covered by the insurance policy. The deceased cannot be said to be a third party and, therefore, the insurance company cannot be liable. The learned member of the Tribunal held that the insurance company was liable to satisfy claim under Section 92-A of the Act and deceased can be said to be a third party and apparently covered by the policy. The learned advocate for the appellant has produced on record the judgment dated 3.9.1992 passed by the member, M.A.C.T., Sangli, in which it was, while considering the claim finally under Section 110-A, held that the insurance company was not liable.
First Appeal No. 664 of 1990
5. The accident involved is the same as in the First Appeal No. 423 of 1985. The
claimant was another pillion rider on the motor cycle. In this case also the learned member took the same view while considering the claim under Section 92-A. However, while deciding the same claim finally under Section 110-A by the judgment mentioned earlier it came to be held that insurance company was not liable.
First Appeal No. 343 of 1986
6. The accident took place on 6.1.1985. One Pandurang died. He was a pillion rider on the motor cycle bearing No. MJ 2469. The claim made under Section 92-A came to be resisted on behalf of the insurance company, first contending that the motor cycle was not at all insured with the insurance company. It was alternatively contended that the liability of the insurance company was subject to the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance. It was also contended that deceased was a pillion rider and in view of the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, the insurance company was not required to cover the risk of pillion rider and such a risk was not covered by the insurance policy, if the policy is proved. The learned member of the Tribunal held that the insurance policy is comprehensive and third party risk is covered and the insurance company is liable to make the payment. I may here state that the policy of insurance is produced. Section II-Liability to third parties-says as follows:
Subject to the limits of liability the company will indemnify the insured in the event of accident caused by or arising out of the use of the motor cycle against all sums including claimant's costs and expenses which the insured shall become legally liable to pay in respect of:(a) death of or bodily injury to any person but except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the company shall not be liable where such death or injury arises out of and in the course of employment of such person by the insured and excluding liability to any person being conveyed in or on the motor cycle unless such person is being conveyed by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. Suffice at this stage for me to say that prima facie this requires consideration of the pleadings and the evidence whether the exception is attracted or not, merely because the person with whom the deceased was employed is given in the application cannot exclude the liability.
First Appeal No. 626 of 1986
7. The accident took place on 28.4.1984 and one Babasaheb Anna Mali suffered serious injuries. He was the pillion rider on motor cycle bearing No. MZG 964. The claimants contended that the truck bearing No. MRT 4049 was driven rashly and negligently and dashed against the motor cycle causing injuries. The said truck was insured. The claim for Rs. 7,500/- under Section 92-A came to be made. The insurance company contended that it was not liable since the claimant was pillion rider and his risk was not covered by the policy. It was also contended that there was no liability since the person driving the motor cycle was not having valid licence. The learned member of the Tribunal rejected this contention of the insurance company and held that the insurance company was liable. It is also held that prima facie the truck owner and insurance company were liable to make the payment of 50 per cent each, i.e., Rs. 3,7507-. The nature of the policy and terms are the same as mentioned in First Appeal No. 343 of 1986.
First Appeal No. 876 of 1985
8. This appeal has been filed by the owner of the vehicle. In this, one Bhagwan Rajaram Bhosale met with an accident on 23.3.1984. The deceased was travelling in truck No. MHL 3784 belonging to the opponent. It was alleged that the same was driven rashly and negligently. It was insured with the respondent No. 3. Claim made under Section 92-A came to be resisted on behalf of the insurance company, inter alia, contending that deceased was travelling unauthorisedly in the said truck and, therefore, the insurance company was not liable. This contention of the insurance company came to be accepted by the learned member of the M.A.C.T., inter alia, observing that prima facie the insurance company was not liable to make the payment. It was necessary to consider the provisions of Chapter VII-A to be read along with the provisions of Sections 95 and 96 of Motor Vehicles Act. He held that only the owner was liable to make the payment. This appeal has been filed by the owner contending that the insurance company ought to have been held liable to make the said payment of Rs. 15,0007-.
9. In my opinion the point raised in this appeal is no more res integra in view of the recent decision of the Apex Court reported in Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More 1991 ACJ 777 (SC). In the said case a petrol tanker lying turtle as a result of the collision was lying idle at a short distance away from the road. After some time an explosion took place in the said petrol tanker resulting in fire. A number of persons who had assembled near the petrol tanker sustained burn injuries and few of them succumbed. The representative of one of those who died filed claim petition. Section 92-A claim came to be considered. It was mainly contended that the motor vehicle ceased to be in use. It was held that 'use of vehicle' does not cease on account of vehicle being rendered immobile on account of breakdown or mechanical defect or accident. Point regarding procedure to be followed by the Tribunal while considering the claim under Section 92-A was also raised. The Apex Court considered that aspect and, therefore, extensively quoting from the said judgment, observed:
(38) Mr. Sanghi has also raised a question as to the procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal while adjudicating claims under Section 92-A of the Act and has submitted that such claims have to be adjudicated upon like other claims under Section 110-A of the Act and that claimant must first adduce evidence to establish his/her case and that the owner as well as the insurer of the vehicle in question must have a right to adduce evidence to rebut the same. In this context, it may be mentioned that procedure for adjudication of a claim petition under Section 110-A of the Act by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is contained in Rules 291 to 311 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). The said Rules prescribe a form for filing a claim petition and the documents to be filed along with it (rule 291), examination of the applicant (rule 293), issue of notice to the opposite gaily (rule 297), filing of written statement by the opposite party (rule 298), framing of issues (rule 299), recording of evidence (rules 300 and 301), local inspection (rule 302) and judgment and award of compensation (rule 306).
(39) After the enactment of Section 92-A, amendments have been made in the Rules in 1984.
(40) In Rule 291-A which has been inserted by such amendments, it has been provided that:
'Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 291, every application for a claim under Section 92-A shall be filed before the Claims Tribunal in triplicate and shall be signed by the applicant and the following documents be appended to every such application, namely.
(i) Panchanama of the accident; (ii) First information report;
(iii) Injury certificate or in case of death, post-mortem report or death certificate; and
(iv) Certificate regarding ownership and insurance particulars of vehicle involved in the accident from the Regional Transport Officer or the Police.'
(41) Rule 297 was substituted by the following provision:
'297. Notice to opposite party.-(1) If the application is not dismissed under Rule 296, the Claims Tribunal shall, on an application in writing made to it by the applicant, send to the owner or the driver of the vehicle or both from whom the applicant claims relief (hereinafter referred to as 'the opposite party') and the insurer, a copy of the application, together with a notice of the date on which it will dispose of the application, and may call upon the parties to produce on that date any evidence which they may wish to tender.
(2) Where the applicant makes a claim for compensation under Section 92-A, the Claims Tribunal shall give notice to the owner and insurer, if any, of the vehicle involved in the accident directing them to appear on a date not later than ten days from the date of issue of such notice. The date so fixed for such appearance shall also be not later than fifteen days from the receipt of the claim application filed by the claimant. The Claims Tribunal shall state in such notice that in case they fail to appear on such appointed date the Tribunal will proceed ex parte on the presumption that they have no contention to make against the award of compensation.'
(42) Rule 306-A empowers the Claims Tribunal to obtain whatever supplementary information and documents which may be found necessary from the police, medical and other authorities and proceed to award the claim whether the parties who were given notice to. appear (Sic. do appear) or not on the appointed date.
(43) Rule 306-B lays down:
(1) The Claims Tribunal shall proceed to award the claim of compensation under Section 92-A on the basis of-
(i) registration certificate of the motor vehicle involved in the accident;
(ii) insurance certificate or policy relating to the insurance of the vehicle against third party risks;
(iii) panchanama and first information report;
(iv) post-mortem certificate or death certificate, or certificate of injury from the medical officer; and
(v) the nature of the treatment given by the medical officer who has examined the victim.
(2) The Claims Tribunal in passing orders shall make an award of compensation of fifteen thousand rupees in respect of the death and of seven thousand five hundred rupees in respect of the permanent disablement to be paid by the insurer or owner of the vehicle involved in the accident.
(3) Where compensation is awarded to two or more persons, the Claims Tribunal shall also specify the amount payable to each of them.
(4) The Claims Tribunal in passing order under sub-rule (2) shall direct the insurer or owner of the vehicle involved in the accident to pay the amount of compensation to the claimant within two weeks from the date of the said order.
(5) The Claims Tribunal shall as far as possible dispose of the application for compensation within forty-five days from the date of receipt of such application.
(44) Rule 306-C prescribes the procedure of disbursement of compensation under Section 92-A to the legal heirs in case of death. The submission of Mr. Sanghi is that in spite of the aforesaid amendments which have been introduced in the Rules after the enactment of Section 92-A, the Claims Tribunal is required to follow the procedure contained in the other rules before awarding compensation under Section 92-A of the Act. In other words, it must proceed to adjudicate the claim after the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to file the written submission under Rule 298, by framing issues under Rule 299 and after recording evidence in accordance with Rules 300 and 301 and that it is not permissible for the Claims Tribunal to make an order purely on the basis of the documents referred to in Rules 291-A, 306-A and 306-B. In our opinion, the said submission of Mr. Sanghi cannot be accepted. The object underlying the enactment of Section 92-A is to make available to the claimant compensation amount to the extent of Rs. 15,000/- in case of death and Rs. 7,500/- in case of permanent disablement as expeditiously as possible and the said award has to be made before adjudication of the claim under Section 110-A of the Act. This would be apparent from the provisions of Section 92-B of the Act. Section 92-B (2) of the Act provides that a claim for compensation under Section 92-A in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent disablement under Section 92-A and also in pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim for compensation under Section 92-A shall be disposed of as aforesaid in the first place. With a view to give effect to the said directive contained in Section 92-B of the Act, the Maharashtra Government has amended the Rules and has inserted special provisions in respect of claims under Section 92-A in Rules 291-A, 291-B, 297(2), 306-A, 306-B, 306-C and 306-D of the Rules. The object underlying the said provisions is to enable expeditious disposal of a claim petition under Section 92-A of the Act. The said object would be defeated if the Claims Tribunal is required to hold a regular trial in the same manner as for adjudicating claim petition under Section 110-A of the Act. Moreover, for awarding compensation under Section 92-A of the Act, the Claims Tribunal is required to satisfy itself in respect of the following matters:
(i) an accident has arisen out of the use of a motor vehicle;
(ii) the said accident has resulted in permanent disablement of the person who is making the claim or death of the person whose legal representative is making the claim;
(iii) the claim has been made against the owner and the insurer of the motor vehicle involved in the accident.
(45) The documents referred to in Rules 291-A and 306-B will enable the Claims Tribunal to ascertain the necessary facts in regard to these matters. The panchanama and the first information report will show whether the accident had arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle in question. The injury certificate or the post-mortem report will show the nature of injuries and the cause of death. The registration certificate and the insurance certificate of the motor vehicle will indicate who is the owner and insurer of the vehicle. In the event of the Claims Tribunal feeling doubtful about the correctness or genuineness of any of these documents or if it considers it necessary to obtain supplementary information or documents, Rule 306-A empowers the Claims Tribunal to obtain such supplementary information or documents from the police, medical or other authorities. This would show that Rules 291-A, 306-A and 306-B contain adequate provisions which would enable the Claims Tribunal to satisfy itself in respect of the matters necessary for awarding compensation under Section 92-A of the Act and in view of these special provisions which were introduced in the Rules by the amendments in 1984, the Claims Tribunal is not required to follow the normal procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rule with regard to adjudication of a claim under Section 110-A of the Act for the purpose of making an order on a claim petition under Section 92-A of the Act.
10. Thus, the Apex Court has in detail given the guidance as to what procedure is required to be adopted while adjudicating the claims under Section 92-A. It has been clearly pointed out that the Tribunal is only required to satisfy with 3 aspects mentioned in para 44. Para 45 clearly points out the documents which are required to be seen. The documents mentioned in Rules 291-A and 306-B are practically the same and their objects are also the same. It has been pointed out that the panchanama and first information report are to be seen for considering whether the accident had arisen out of use of motor vehicle in question. Injury certificate or in the case of death, post-mortem report would show the nature of injury or cause of death. The registration certificate and insurance certificate of motor vehicle will indicate who is the owner and insurer of the vehicle. The Tribunal is required to consider whether particular insurance cover is available or not on the date of the accident.
11. Section 92-A which falls in Chapter VII-A of the Motor Vehicles Act was inserted by Act No. 47 of 1982, with effect from 1.10.1982. This piece of beneficial and ameliorative legislation provides for immediate help to the victims of a motor accident. The provisions are attracted no sooner it is either admitted or apparently shown that the owner's vehicle was involved in the accident. This right of compensation under Section 92-A in respect of death or permanent disablement is in addition to any right to claim compensation in respect thereof under any provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act or of any other law for the time being in force. Section 92-B makes this clear. A combined reading of Section s 92-A and 92-B would indicate that after determination of no fault liability under Section 92-A, the Tribunal has to proceed to consider the fault liability and make an award under Section 110-B determining the compensation. Sub- Section (2) of Section 92-B lays down that claim under Section 92-A shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and shall be disposed of in the first place. How the amount awarded is to be adjusted is provided in Sub-section (3) of Section 92-B. The nature of enquiry under Section 92-A is, therefore, very limited to scrutinise the documents as produced, under Rules 291 and 306-B. They are to be scrutinized with a view to ascertain whether the vehicle was involved in the accident and was insured and the injuries suffered and on satisfaction thereof the award under Section 92-A has to be made in favour of the claimant requiring the insurance company to pay the amount forthwith. It is not contemplated that the terms of the insurance policy should be scanned and considered in conjunction with other provisions of Motor Vehicles Act. It is also not contemplated that the defences available under Section 96(2) to the insurance company should be gone into since this would invariably involve detailed consideration of the pleadings and also evidence to support the same. This can only be done at the time of trial under Section 110-A. In my opinion this construction can only subserve the object of the enactment effectively.
12. The learned advocate for the insurance company relied upon the Full Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court reported in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Immam Aminasab Nadaf 1990 ACJ 757 (Kar). It has been observed that whether the compensation is claimed under 'no fault liability' from the owner of the vehicle under Section 92-A or on the ground of fault under Section 110-A, as far as the insurer is concerned his liability, in view of Section 95(5), is to indemnify the insured only to the extent such liability is undertaken or covered by the policy and not beyond that. Therefore, it was held that the Tribunal has also to decide as to whether prima facie the risk was covered by the insurance policy or not. If the risk was not prima facie covered, then it was not necessary to compel the insurance company to make the payment merely because the insurance existed and compel the insurance company to collect later from the owner which would throw the insurance company to innumerable litigations. With great respect, in my opinion it was not correct to proceed on the footing with the procedure required to be adopted for determining the claim under Section 92-A and Section 110-B was the same. Even the Full Bench was cautious and has made guarded observations. In para 20 it came to be observed that the case is to be considered prima facie in summary inquiry. If elaborate enquiry is required then Tribunal can direct the insurance company to pay the amount subject to the directions regarding reimbursement in case finally insurance company is found not liable. I find that the Rules were not considered. Overriding effect which was given to Chapter VII-A by Section 92-E was also not taken into consideration and in any case two Judges of this court have clearly taken contrary view and I am in respectful agreement with the same.
13. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Minguel Lourenco Correia 1986 ACJ 646 (Bom), the learned Judge considered Goa, Daman and Diu Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1986, which are more or less similar to the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules. It was held that the enquiry contemplated is very limited in its nature and scope. The material point accident occurred, second, the motor vehicle was involved in the accident and third, that the said vehicle was duly insured and fourth, that the death or permanent disability took place as a result of the accident. The learned Judge also relied upon the judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court and considered the object of new enactment, in detail. It was held that whether the defence is available to the insurance company under the Act or particularly under the terms and conditions of the insurance policy can be dealt with in the course of proceedings for compensation under Section 110-B of the Act and not at the stage of the consideration of the application under Section 92-A. Similar is the view taken in Oriental Fire and Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Aleixo Femandes 1986 ACJ 1137 (Bom). The same rules, i.e., Goa, Daman and Diu Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1986, particularly Rule 18 was considered. The rules were similar in nature as those of Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules. It came to be held that nature of the enquiry contemplated would be restricted to the terms or documents 1 to 5 mentioned in the rules. The defence which can be raised while defending the main petition cannot be taken into consideration at this stage. The contention raised on behalf of the insurance company was that Chapter VII-A does not mention anything about the liability of the insurance company and, therefore, insurance company cannot be held liable for claim under Section 92-A. This point was specifically raised before this court in Oriental Fire & Genl. Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Aleixo Femandes 1986 ACJ 1137 (Bom). It came to be observed as follows:
(8) So on a combined reading of Section 92-A, Sub- section (5) of Section 95 and Section 96 of the Act it is clear that the insurer has to indemnify a person who is covered under a policy and if it is required to satisfy a judgment made against such person it can even pay directly to the third party (claimant). I am, therefore, unable to accept that the insurer is or can be excluded from the liability to pay under Section 92-A. What emerges from the above-cited provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act is that it is really speaking not a question of insurer being omitted from Section 92-A. Likewise reading the word 'insurer' in Section 92-A is not necessary. Section 92-A casts liability on the owner of the vehicle. By virtue of the cover of insurance the insurer is bound to pay the awarded amount. It is, therefore, clear that the mention of the word 'insurer' in that Section is really not necessary and the argument of the appellant should, therefore, fail. This interpretation lends support in as much as Section 93 has been amended by the incorporation of another Sub-clause (ba) where the word 'liability' has been explained. This Sub-clause states liability wherever used in relation to the death or bodily injury to any person includes liability under Section 92-A. Coming back to Sub-section (5) of Section 95 it speaks of insurer indemnifying the person or classes of persons specified in the policy in respect of any liability. Mere omission of the word 'insurer' in Section 92-A cannot exclude insurer from the liability as long as the vehicle involved in the accident is duly covered by a certificate of insurance granted by the insurer.
The Division Bench of this court in 1989 ML 488, relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court, has observed that so far as compensation payable under Section 92-A of the Act is concerned insurance company will be liable. Even the Division Bench recorded concession in that respect. Hence, I reject this contention.
14. The learned advocate for the insurance company contended that prima facie at least the court should come to the conclusion that risk was covered by the insurance policy so as to fasten the liability under Section 92-A. In other words, this would require scrutinising the various terms and conditions of the insurance policy. One cannot say merely from the pleadings or the terms and conditions of the insurance policy that the liability of the insurance company was excluded. Some evidence will have to be led for the insurance company to make out the case, since the terms and conditions involve many 'ifs' and 'buts'. In other words, whether the defence under statute or under the policy is really available or not will have to be gone into. In my opinion this is the position involved in all these appeals. This is not possible and cannot take place while considering the application under Section 92-A.
15. Learned advocate for the insurance company pointed out the definition of 'liability' as given in Section 93(ba). The phrase 'liability' includes liability in respect thereof under Section 92-A whenever that phrase is used in Chapter VIII. The said phrase has been used in different Section s under the said Chapter, such a.s Sections 95, 96. Section 95 deals with requirements of policies and limits of liability and Section 96 with the duty of insurers to satisfy judgments against persons insured in respect of third party risks. The learned advocate, therefore, contends that prima facie at least it will have to be seen and gone into by the Tribunal whether there was a liability to satisfy the claim of the third party. I have already given the reasons why this cannot be accepted. The phrase 'liability' is defined in that manner to show that the insurer is liable not only under Chapter VIII but also while considering the claim under Chapter VII-A, as the phrase 'insurer' is not used in Chapter VII-A. It is not for the purpose of considering nature of the policy or terms thereof or liability of the insurance company or the defences available to it. This is also clear from the fact that Section 92-E gives overriding effect to the provisions of Chapter VII-A and says that they shall effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force. Distinction will have to be made regarding the procedure followed and aspects to be taken into consideration while considering the liability of the insurance company under Section 92-A (Chapter VII-A) and under Section 110 (Chapter VIII). Therefore, I hold that summary and limited enquiry is contemplated under Section 92-A, but it is in order to ascertain the facts as mentioned in para 44 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patil's case, : [1991]3SCR26a and no more.
16. The learned advocates for the claimants, Mr. Nitin M. Jamdar and Mr. Tejpal S. Ingale, also placed reliance on the provisions of Section 92-A (4). It provides that a claim for the compensation under sub Section (I) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made. If Section 92-A (4) is read with Section 92-E, it would show that the claim made under Section 92-A shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the victim. In all these cases one can see that some wrongful act or default has been alleged on the part of victim, i.e., either he has committed some breach of term of policy or some wrongful act. In my opinion this should not and cannot defeat the claim made under Section 92-A. Hence, I accept the submission made on behalf of the claimants.
17. It was next contended that Motor Vehicles Act makes no provision to reimburse the insurance company in case it is finally found that the insurance company is not liable and, therefore, it is necessary to find out whether risk was covered or not. It is not possible to accept this contention. In fact, answer is provided by the judgment of this court reported in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Minguel Lourenco Correia 1986 ACJ 646, it was observed 'in the event of the Tribunal holding that the insurance company has proved such objections and under law avoided its responsibility to indemnify the owner of the offending vehicle totally, then the Tribunal in the final award by virtue of provisions of sub- Section (4) of Section 96 would direct the owner of the offending vehicle to pay to the insurance company the amount which the insurance company had paid to the claimants in pursuance of the award made under Section 92-A of the Act.' I agree with the said view fully. Further, in my opinion, Section 110-E gives wide powers to the Tribunal to pass order against any person in respect of the amount under the award. Similarly some powers of civil court are conferred upon the Tribunal and the Tribunal can mould the final relief for doing justice.
18. Learned advocate for the insurance company submitted that single Judge of this court in Surgonda Babgonda Patil v. Sajabai Bapu Soundade 1989 ACJ 733, has taken the same view. But L.P.A. against the said judgment has been admitted in the said court. First, I find that the learned Judge in the said judgment has come to the conclusion and recorded a finding that victim was gratuitous passenger and that the claim under Section 92-A came to be granted. It was not considered what is the nature of enquiry contemplated under Section 92-A. Therefore, this need not be considered in view of the position and facts of that case and in any case because of the procedure indicated by the Apex Court in the judgment mentioned supra. Hence the following order:
19. First Appeal No. 142 of 1984, First Appeal No. 1135 of 1984, First Appeal No. 1178 of 1984, First Appeal No. 626 of 1986, First Appeal No. 343 of 1986 are dismissed.
20. First Appeal No. 876 of 1985 is allowed in the following manner that the appellant as well as respondent No. 3 shall be liable to pay the amount of Rs. 15,000/-. The respondent No. 3 is directed to deposit the said amount within a period of one month from today in the trial court. If the respondent No. 3 fails to deposit the same then the respondent No. 3 shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of this order.
21. First Appeal No. 423 of 1985 and First Appeal No. 664 of 1990 are also dismissed.
However, in these appeals as it has been shown that the insurance company is held not liable in the final award passed under Section 110-B, the appellant shall be at liberty to move the trial court to get an order that the amount deposited by it under Section 92-A be recovered from the owner of the vehicle who has been held responsible.
22. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs in all these appeals.