Judgment:
S.J. Vazifdar, J.
1. The second Respondent is the Union of India. Respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are the General Manager, S & P. Department, Deputy General Manager (Personnel) and Assistant Manager (Administration S & P), Department of Respondent No. 1 respectively.
2. The Petition challenges an order of the Respondents dated February 21, 1997 terminating the petitioner's services with immediate effect on the ground that he had submitted a bogus caste certificate with the intention of enjoying the benefits due to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes candidates.
3. The main submission of Shri Dighe is that for the same alleged offence the petitioner had already been punished and admittedly after the punishment was fully; implemented the petitioner continued in service. In fact, the first Respondent has on several occasions thereafter expressed its appreciation and commended in writing the Petitioner's diligence. The submission is well founded.
4. It is necessary therefore to set out the facts prior to the impugned order dated February 21, 1997.
The petitioner was served a show cause on November 2, 1984 alleging that he had submitted a letter to the first respondent stating that he belonged to the 'Moger' caste which was recognised as a Scheduled Castes and also an affidavit sworn before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai, stating that he belonged to 'Moger Caste' which is recognised as a Scheduled Caste. It was further alleged that the petitioner in fact belonged to the Mogaveera Caste, which is not a Scheduled Caste. The petitioner was, therefore, charged with furnishing wrong information about his caste. He was called upon to furnish his explanation for the same failing which Respondent No. 1 stated that suitable disciplinary action would be taken against him.
5. The petitioner by his letter dated November 9, 1984 while giving his explanation stated that the Moger as well as Mogaveera communities carry on the profession of fishing; that since Moger fishermen in North Kanara are recognised as belonging to a Scheduled Caste and as he belonged to a 'fishermen folk' of South Kanara, he construed his community to be Scheduled Caste and, therefore, treated Mogaveera as synonymous with Moger. Having realised that the Mogaveera community to which he belongs is not a Scheduled Caste, he expressed his regret and stated that he had no intention of furnishing wrong information.
6. The first respondent by its order dated November 13, 1984 after considering the representation of the Petitioner observed that the petitioner has been in service for the past nine years and this was the first act of alleged misconduct on his part. It was further stated that considering the fact that the petitioner had admitted the charge levelled against him and in view of the satisfactory service rendered by him for the past nine years, the ends of justice would be met if his increment due on September 1, 1984 was deferred by 6 months. It was also ordered that the petitioner would be due for increment on March 1, 1985.
7. It is the admitted position that the punishment imposed by this order was implemented. The petitioner was reverted back to the post where he was appointed and working for nine years. Moreover he did not gain monetarily for such appointment on the promotional post since he was receiving the same pay scale having reached the maximum in that scale. The penalty of stoppage of increment for six months was also imposed upon him. After reversion to his original post he was promoted as Senior Clerk (Stores Clearing).
8. Thereafter on November 22, 1985, December 29, 1986 and April 8, 1990 the petitioner was in fact promoted to various posts. He was promoted as Senior Clerk (Stores Clearing) w.e.f. March 1, 1985 in the Stores and Purchase Department. With effect from January 1, 1987 he was promoted as Office Assistant. With effect from January 1, 1993 he was promoted as Senior Office Assistant. Between 1988 and 1994 the petitioner even received certificates of appreciation from the first Respondent for his services. The certificates are annexed to the petition.
9. As stated above, for the alleged offences committed by the petitioner, the order dated November 13, 1984 was passed against him. Almost 12 years later, the first respondent passed the impugned order on February 21, 1997. By this order, for the same offence for which the petitioner had already been punished by the order dated November 13, 1984, Respondent No. 1 terminated the services of the petitioner purportedly in accordance with Rule 13(1) of the Model Standing Orders (Central) Schedule I read with para 22 of the President's directive. The impugned order does not consider the effect of the order dated November 13, 1984. The limited question for our consideration, therefore, is whether in view of the order dated November 13, 1994 having already been passed and implemented, it is open to Respondent No. 1 to issue another order, twelve years later at that, imposing a further punishment of such a drastic nature in respect of the same alleged conduct of the petitioner. Our answer is in the negative.
10. We are of the view that the impugned order is unsustainable. The impugned order is in respect of the same alleged offences on the part of petitioner for which Respondent had already taken action and implemented the same. Merely because the Presidential directive was issued subsequently to the effect that if verification reveals that his claim that he belongs to SC/ST is false, the services of an employee will be terminated forthwith without assigning any further reasons can be no justification for imposing a further penalty in respect of an offence which has already been dealt with. This would lead to disastrous consequences especially for employees, if authorities are permitted to reopen cases merely on the ground that by virtue of Governmental directions certain penalties are to be imposed once again despite the fact that in respect of the same conduct, departmental proceedings are already concluded and orders are passed and implemented. We refrain from expressing any opinion on the question as to whether adjudicating authorities are bound by such directives. Even assuming they are, they cannot be made applicable in the present case in view of the petitioner having already been punished once.
11. In the circumstances we pass the following order:
Rule made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (b). The Respondent No. 1 shall pay to the petitioner costs of this petition fixed at Rs. 1,000/-.
Certified copy expedited.