S.U. Kamdar, J.
1. By the present appeal, the appellants seek to impugn the order and judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 25-9-2003 by which the learned Single Judge has set aside the Industrial Court's judgment dated 10-6-2003.
2. The present appeal raises an issue of interpretation of Section 50 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as MRTU and PULP Act, 1971). We find that there are divergent views taken by two learned Single Judges of this Court one in the impugned order and judgment dated 25-9-2003 (Chandrachud J.) and another of R. J. Kochar J. in the case of V. Ramanathan v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., Mumbai and anr, reported in : (2001)4BOMLR722 . Thus we are deciding the point of law posed before us in this Appeal.
3. Some of the material facts, briefly enumerated are as under :-
4. The appellant No. 1 is a company registered under the Companies Act and inter alia carries on business of manufacturing engineering items. The respondent workman had filed a complaint of unfair labour practice against the appellant under items 5, 9 and 10 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. By an order dated 22-6-2001 the Industrial Court allowed the complaint insofar as items 5 and 9 of Schedule IV of the said Act and held that the appellants have indulged in unfair labour practices. While passing the aforesaid order the Industrial Court, inter alia, directed the appellants to pay 50% wages to the respondent employees for a period of lay off from January, 2000 to July, 2000.
Further directions are given permitting the respondent workmen to resume their duties in the appellant company. It has been further directed that after the period of July, 2000, the workmen should be paid wages continuously until the orders passed by the Industrial Court are complied with. The said order of the Industrial Court was challenged before this Court unsuccessfully.
5. It is an admitted position that after two months of the respondents resuming the job, the appellant company has declared a lockout.
6. The appellant did not comply with the said order passed by the Industrial Court and therefore an application was made by the respondent workmen under Section 50 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 before the Industrial Court for issuance of a recovery certificate for recovery of outstanding dues.
7. The Industrial Court has by an order and judgment dated 10-6-2003 rejected the said application on the ground that it has no jurisdiction under Section 50 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 to consider the said application since it involves a computation of wages for a period January to July, 2000 and for a subsequent period till the workmen are taken on job in November, 2001 under an award. While taking the aforesaid view, the Industrial Court has relied upon a judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of V. Ramanathan v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., Mumbai and anr, (supra) and dismissed the said application.
8. This order of the Industrial Court was challenged before the learned Single Judge who has by the impugned order and judgment inter alia held that the Industrial Court has jurisdiction under Section 50 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 to compute the dues payable under an award passed earlier. While holding so, the learned Single Judge relied upon a series of the judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court of India and has come to the aforesaid conclusion. It is this judgment of the learned Single Judge which is the subject matter of appeal before us.
9. By order dated 23-4-2004 passed by the Division Bench in present Appeal the proposed consent minutes of order has been taken on record. The same was not signed by the learned counsel for the respondents. It was directed thereunder that an amount of Rs. 11,60,000/- was to be deposited and the said amount to be paid over to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. We are informed that accordingly the deposits have been made and the amount has been, handed over to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. We also took the affidavit dated 17-4-2004 filed by the appellants on record. In view of the aforesaid order, the appeal is disposed off in terms of the said order dated 23-4-2004. We however direct that the Industrial Court, Thane, before whom Complaint (ULP) No. 106 of 2002 is pending should dispose of the same expeditiously and in any event within a period of six months from today. Though we are disposing off the present appeal by an aforesaid operative order we feel it necessary to determine the issue of law which arises in the present case.
10. The present appeal raises an issue of law i.e. whether under Section 50 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 it is necessary that the amount should have been a computed, determined sum and that the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to do an arithmetical computation thereunder. Before we consider various judgments, on this issue, we would like to set out the provisions of Section 50 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 which read as under :-
'50. Recovery of money due from employer:- Where any money is due to an employee from an employer under an order passed by the Court under Chapter VI, the employee himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or in the case of death of the employee, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the Court for the recovery of money due to him, and if the Court is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector, who shall, proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrears of land revenue :
Provided that, every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the employee from the employer;
Provided further that, any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the Court is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period.'
A mere perusal of the said section indicates that the said provisions are in fact summary provisions and provide for recovery of dues by an employee from the employer which are already due and payable and/or determined by the earlier proceedings. The provisions of Section 50 nowhere prescribe that the money which is due and payable should be the exact determined sum and that an Industrial Court cannot undertake an exercise of simple arithmetical calculation. Once the rights of the parties are already determined under a valid award or an order then for the execution of such determined rights the provisions of Section 50 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 are enacted. The provisions of Section 50 of the said MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 are in pari materia with the provisions of Section 33(C)(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which have been the subject matter of interpretation in various pronouncements of the Honourable Supreme Court of India. The provisions of Section 33(C)(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are as under :-
'33C. Recovery of money due from an employer.-- (1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA or Chapter VB the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrears of land revenue;
Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer;
Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period.'
11. Thus, a survey of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court judgments under Section 33(C)(1) would be useful to determine the nature of jurisdiction of an Industrial Court under Section 50 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971.
12. In the case of Kays Construction Co. (Private) Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., : (1965)IILLJ429SC , while considering the words 'money due' the Supreme Court has held as under :-
'7. That there is some difference between the two sub-sections is obvious enough. It arises from the fact that the benefit contemplated in the second sub-section is not 'money due' but some advantage or perquisite which can be reckoned in terms of money. The Divisional Bench has given apt examples of benefits which are computable in terms of money, but till so computed are not 'money due'. For instance, loss of the benefit of free quarters is not loss of 'money due' though such loss can be reckoned in terms of money by inquiry and equation. The contrast between 'money due' on the one hand and a 'benefit' which is not 'money due' but which can become so after the money equivalent is determined on the other marks out the areas of the operation of the two sub-sections. If the word 'benefit' were taken to cover a case of mere arithmetical calculation of wages, the first sub-section would hardly have any play. Every case of calculation, however, simple, would have to go first before a Tribunal. In our judgment, a case such as the present, where the money due is back wages for the period of unemployment is covered by the first sub-section and not the second. No doubt some calculation enters the determination of the amount for which the certificate will eventually issue but this calculation is not of the type mentioned in the second sub- section and cannot be made to fit in the elaborate phrase 'benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money'. The contrast in the two sub-sections between 'money due' under the first sub-section and the necessity of reckoning the benefit in terms of money before the benefit becomes 'money due' under the second sub-section shows that mere arithmetical calculations of the amount due are not required to be dealt with under the elaborate procedure of the second sub-section. The appellant no doubt conjured up a number of obstructions in the way of this simple calculation. These objections dealt with the 'amount due' and they are being investigated because State Government must first satisfy itself that the amount claimed is in fact due. But the antithesis between 'money due' and a 'benefit which must be computed in terms of money' still remains, for the inquiry being made is not of the kind contemplated by the second sub-section but is one for the satisfaction of the State Government under the first sub-section. It is verification of the claim to money within the first sub-section and not determination in terms of money of the value of a benefit. The judgment of the Division Bench was thus right. The appeal fails and will be dismissed with costs.
The companion appeal will also be dismissed but we make no order about costs in that appeal.'
13. Following the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court in the case of The Sawtram Ramprasad Mills Co. Ltd., Akola v. Baliram Vkandaji and Anr., : (1966)ILLJ41SC , has held as under :-
'5. The next contention is that the claim for lay off is not a claim for money due because calculations have to be made before the money due can be found. This argument has been considered on more than one occasion and it was rejected recently by this Court in Kays Construction Co. (P)Ltd., v. State of V.P. (C. As. 1108 and 1109 of 1963. D/-26-11- 1964; : (1965)IILLJ429SC . It is not essential that the claim which can be brought before the Government or its delegate under Section 33-C(1) must always be for a predetermined sum. The Government or the Labour Court may satisfy itself about the exact amount and then take action under that section. In the present case the dates of lay off are known and each workman will show to the Second Labour Court that he is qualified to receive compensation for lay off. That will be shown from the muster roll which the employer is required to maintain and it will then be a simple arithmetical calculation which, in our judgment, Section 33C permits to be made. If there is any question whether there was lay off or not the Labour Court will decide it. This argument, therefore, has no force.'
14. After considering the aforesaid two judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of U.P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. R. K. Shukla and Anr., etc., : (1969)IILLJ728SC was called upon to consider the provisions of Section 6-H(2) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and while considering and comparing the said section with the provisions of Section 33-C(1) the Supreme Court has in paragraph 14 held as under :-
'14. The decision in the Central Bank of India v. P. S. Rajagopalan and Ors. (supra), to which we have already referred, makes it clear that all disputes relating to claims which may be computed in terms of money are not necessarily within the terms of Section 33-C(2). Again in Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd., v. Rameswar and Ors., Shelat, J. observed :-
'..... that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed [under Section 33-C(2)] must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workmen and his employer. Since the scope of sub-section (2) is wider than that of sub-section (1) and the sub-section is not confined to cases arising under an award, settlement or under the provisions of Chapter V-A, there is no reason to hold that a benefit provided for under a statute or a scheme made thereunder, without there being anything contrary under such statute or Section 33-C(2), cannot fall within sub-section (2). Consequently, the benefit provided in the bonus scheme made under the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act, 1948, which remains to be computed must fall under sub-section (2) and the Labour Court therefore had jurisdiction to entertain and try such a claim, it being a claim in respect of an existing right arising from the relationship of an industrial workman and his employer.'That judgment clearly indicates that in order that a claim may be adjudicated upon under Section 33-C(2), there must be an existing right and the right must arise under an award, settlement or under the provisions of Chapter V-A, or it must be a benefit provided by a statute or a scheme made thereunder and there must be nothing contrary under such statute or Section 33-C(2). But the possibility of a mere claim arising under Chapter V-A is not envisaged by the Court in that case as conferring jurisdiction upon the Labour Court to decide matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal.
The legislative intention disclosed by Sections 33-C(1) and 33-C(2) is fairly clear. Under Section 33-C(1) where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A, the workman himself, or any other person authorised by him in writing in that behalf, may make an application to the appropriate Government to recover the money due to him. Where the workman who is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, applies in that behalf the Labour Court may under Section 33-C(2) decide the questions arising as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit shall be computed. Section 33-C(2) is wider than Section 33-C(1). Matters which do not fall within the terms of Section 33-C(1) may, if the workman is shown to be entitled to receive the benefits, fall within the terms of Section 33-C(2). If the liability arises from an award, settlement or under the provisions of Chapter V-A, or by virtue of a statute or a scheme made thereunder, mere denial by the employer may not be sufficient to negative the claim under Section 33-C(2) before the Labour Court. Where however the right to retrenchment compensation which is the foundation of the claim is itself a matter which is exclusively within the competence of the Industrial Tribunal to be adjudicated upon a reference, it would be straining the language of Section 33-C(2) to hold that the question whether there has been retrenchment may be decided by the Labour Court. The power of the Labour Court is to compute the compensation claimed to be payable to the workmen on the footing that there has been retrenchment of the workmen. Where retrenchment is conceded, and the only matter in dispute is that by virtue of Section 25-FF no liability to pay compensation has arisen, the Labour Court will be competent to decide the question. In such a case the question is one of computation and not of determination, of the conditions precedent to the accrual of liability. Where, however, the dispute is whether workmen have been retrenched and computation of the amount is subsidiary or incidental, in our judgment, the Labour Court will have no authority to trespass upon the powers of the Tribunal with which it is statutorily invested. In the unreported judgment of this Court in The Hoard of Director of the South Arcot Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd., v. N. K. Mohammed Khan etc. (supra) apparently the only argument advanced before this Court was that Section 25-FF applied to that case having regard to the fact that the terras of employment under the new employer were not less favourable than those immediately applicable to them before the transfer, and the Court proceeded to hold that the Labour Court was competent to determine the compensation.'
15. The aforesaid three judgments of the Supreme Court of India though considers the provisions of Section 33-C(1) but as we have indicated above, the same are in pari materia with Section 50 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 and therefore the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases will apply with equal force while construing the provision of Section 50 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. Apart therefrom, the aforesaid judgments, in the case of U.P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd., v. R. K. Shukla and Anr., etc., the Supreme Court itself has compared the provisions of Section 33-C (1) and (2) with Section 6-H of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and has come to the conclusion that under Section 6-H of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act an amount can be computed and the necessary relief can be granted by the Industrial Court. In our view thus the comparison of Section 50 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 with the provisions of Section 33-C(1) leaves no manner of doubt that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under Section 50 permits simple arithmetic calculation for the purpose of granting effective relief to the party. Undoubtedly, under Section 50 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 the authorities are not empowered to determine the rights between the parties but once the rights are determined by an adjudication then, it is open to the Industrial Court to grant relief under Section 50 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971 even though under the said section it possess only executory jurisdiction. We are also of the view that Section 50 of MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 is provided with a view to enable a party to have recourse to an expeditious remedy. We are therefore of the view that we must prefer an interpretation which advances the object of the Act rather than defeat the same.
16. In light of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, we find that the view of the learned Single Judge (Chandrachud, J.) in the judgment impugned herein cannot be faulted. We find that the said view taken by the learned Single Judge on the basis of comparison of the provisions of Section 50 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 and the provisions of Section 33-C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is in consonance and in conformity with the views expressed by the Honourable Supreme Court of India and therefore we uphold the same as a correct proposition of law. However, we find that the view expressed by another learned Single Judge (R. J. Kochar, J.) in the case of V. Ramanathan v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., Mumbai and anr, (supra) in paragraph 8 thereof in the following terms is not a correct proposition of law on the interpretation of Section 50 of the said MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. The said paragraph 8 reads as under:-
'8. I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order of the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court of Shri Baja had not determined the amount or arrears. He had determined the question of entitlement of the employees under settlement of 1971 and he had left at that end by saying that to pay out all arrears or amount due and payable. If he were to determine and compute this arrears, in that case, the provision of Section 50 would have been instantly attracted. Shri Baja had left the arrears to be computed. Whether such arrears are due and payable has to be decided by appropriate Court on computation. The provision of Section 50 is to execute the final order passed by a Court of law and not to determine the amounts and not to find out whether arrears were due and payable. The purpose of Section 50 is to assist a claim for recovery of his determined dues and not to adjudicate or determine such dues whether they are payable or not. It is significant to read form 24 which specifically mentions as under :-'2. This Court has ordered that a sum of Rs. - should be paid by Opponent No.- to the employee in Application (ULP) No. - decided by this Court on.........'
The Legislature has provided a form under Section 50 and in the said form the applicant is required to give the exact sum recoverable as per the order of the Court. What is the exact sum due and payable must be determined before resorting to Section 50 of the Act, it is not the function of the Court under Section 50 to investigate what are the amounts due and payable. The Court under Section 50 must be told that the arrears were already determined and they were a particular amount. Such Court cannot be called upon to determine and adjudicate any other question or any other triable issues. In the present case the authority of the petitioner was questioned, jurisdiction of the Industrial Court at Mumbai was challenged and thirdly, it was averred by the company that the amounts were already paid and that the employees had settled their dues. It was also averred that the petitioner had no authority from one of the employees to file such an application. All these contentions are to be properly decided by an appropriate forum and not a forum under Section 50 of the Act.
17. We hold that the aforesaid view of the learned Single Judge (Kochar J.) on interpretation of Section 50 is an erroneous view and contrary to the view laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments and thus we overrule the same. We also find that the learned Single Judge (Kochar J.) himself has in the case of Surendra Industries Ltd. v. A. L. Alaspurkar 2002 II CLR 736 has taken the contrary view wherein he has held as under:
'15. The Industrial Court shall issue recovery certificate under Section 50 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act after computing the dues under its order within four weeks from the receipt of the writ of this Court and the Collector shall recover the amount under the said certificate from the petitioner company within three months from the date of the receipt of the certificate from the Industrial Court. The petitioner would be at liberty to recover the said amount from the original employer by filing a civil suit in accordance with the law, if it is entitled to recover, as already mentioned by me hereinabove.'
18. In the light of the aforesaid discussion in our view the ratio in the case of V. Ramanathan v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., Mumbai and Anr., has been wrongly decided and thus we overrule the same. In our view the judgment under appeal sets out a correct proposition of law and therefore we upheld the same.
19. In the aforesaid circumstances, we hold that a simple arithmetic calculation is permissible exercise by the Industrial Court under Section 50 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 if the rights of the parties are already determined and/or decided and/or adjudicated upon.
20. We dispose of the present appeal accordingly. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
Parties to act on an ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Private Secretary of this Court.