B.H. Marlapalle, J.
1. This petition filed under Article 226 read with Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India, challenges the detention order dated 12.12.2005 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Brihanmumbai, under Section 3(2) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug Offenders Act, 1981 (for short MPDA Act), against the detenu Shri. Anna Durai @ Dilli Ganpati Devendra, resident of Lakshmi Nagar Society, near Railway Track, Shankardeo Bus Stop, Mahul Road, Mumbai 400 074, by treating him as a dangerous person within the meaning of Section 2(b-1) of the said Act. The order was served on him on 1.1.2006 and he was taken under detention on that date. The order was approved on 17.1.2005 by the State Government whereas the reference to the Advisory Board under Section 10 of the MPDA Act was made on 5.1.2006. The Advisory Board gave its opinion on 14.2.2006, it was considered by the Competent Authority on 15.2.2006 and the order of confirmation was passed on 16.2.2006.
2. Though more than one grounds have been raised to challenge the impugned order, the following two grounds have been argued before us:-
(i) The Petitioner says and states that he is a person and native of Tamil Nadu State. The Petitioner's mother tongue is Tamil. the Petitioner is an illeterate, he is unable to read, write and speak any other language other than Tamil. Even though he is living at Bombay for couple of years with his family members he being illeterate is unable to understand English and Hindi language. The Petitioner says and submits that he is able to understand the vernacular mother tongue Tamil and knows Tamil script the petitioner says and submits that he has been furnished with the grounds of detention and all other documents of the compilation in English and Marathi language alongwith their Hindi translation, which languages are not known to the Petitioner. Law is well settled that a Petitioner should be furnished with grounds and documents in a language known to the Petitioner. In this case, since the petitioner has not been furnished Tamil translation of the grounds and documents inspite of his request made at the time of service. This amounts to non-communication of grounds of detention. the Petitioner further says and submits that as a result of non-furnishing Tamil translation he is deprived from making any effective representation to competent authorities at the earliest. The right of the Petitioner guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India is vitiated. The order of detention is illegal and bad-in-law, ought to be quashed and set aside. The Petitioner also submits that as issued in every case, the sponsoring authority has not read out 332 pages or the grounds of detention nor explained any thing to the petitioner at the time of service and merely asked the Petitioner to put his signature.
(ii) The Petitioner says and submits that a copy of the representation of the Petitioner dated 01.02.2006 was submitted to the Hon'ble Advisory Board for consideration and revocation of the order of detention. The Petitioner says and submits that the State Government nor the Advisory Board has considered the representation of the Petitioner expeditiously or diligently. The State Government is called upon to explain the delay. The continued detention of the Petitioner is illegal and bad-in-law, ought to be quashed and set aside.
3. It was submitted by Mr. Tripathi, the learned Counsel for the detenu that the detenu is a Tamilian illeterate, cannot read or write any script of any indian language, cannot understand any language other than tamil and therefore it was necessary for the Detaining Authority to provide the impugned order, the grounds in support thereof as well as the documents relied upon with tamil translation alongwith the original english copies. As per the learned Counsel providing Hindi translation could not be of any use in the instant case inasmuch as the detenu did not know reading or writing of Hindi and he is not familiar with the said language, except Tamil. This failure on the part of the Detaining Authority has vitiated the the impugned order, and when the order was served on 1.1.2006 the detenu demanded translated copies in Tamil language, it could have been possible for the Detaining Authority to provide translated copies within few days from the execution of the detention order, but the Detaining Authority did not do so and this failure has resulted in the impugned order being void ab-initio on account of its failure to meet the requirements of Article 22(5) of the Constitution as well as the non-communication of the order as contemplated under Section 8 of the MPDA Act. Mr. Tripathi, in support of this ground has relied upon the following judgments:-
Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. : AIR1962SC911 ,
Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack and Anr. : 1969CriLJ274 ,
Shri Lallubhai Jogilal Patel v. Union of India and Ors. : 1981CriLJ288
Kubic Darusz v. Union of India and Ors. : 1990CriLJ796 .
4. On the second ground it was contended by Mr. Tripathi that the contents of the complaint registered as C.R. No. 109 of 2005 with the RCF Police Station for the offences punishable under Section 324 and 506(2) read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code did not make out the case of breach of public order and at the most it could be termed as a case of law and order. Mr. Tripathi also read out the contents of the in-camera statements in support of his submissions that even in the said in-camera statements, there was hardly any case of disturbance or eminent prejudice to the maintenance of public order thereby warranting detention of the petitioner by way of a preventive measure. In support of his challenge on the second point, Mr. Tripathi relied upon the following judgments :-
Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal : 1970CriLJ1136
Ajay Dixit v. State of U.P. and Ors. : 1985CriLJ487
State of U.P. v. Kamal Kishore Saini : AIR1988SC208 .
5. Mrs. Pai, the learned APP on the other hand has supported the impugned order. She submitted that the detenu aged about more than 35 years was working as a welder before his detention and he has been residing at Mumbai for the last more than 20 years. She relied upon the statement of the detenu recorded by the police officers on 1.1.2006 after the detention order was served and pointed out that the detenu himself disclosed that he is well-versed with Hindi language. So long as the detenu has working knowledge of Hindi the action of the Detaining Authority in providing the documents with Hindi translation does not lack in fulfilling the legal requirements to support the impugned order of detention, urged Mrs. Pai.
6. On the point of public order, the learned APP submitted that the contents of the complaint on the basis of which the C.R. No. 109 of 2005 has been registered as well as both the in-camera statements are clear and they certainly make out a case of disturbance to public order or threat to public order by unleashing the rein of terror by brandishing deadly weapons like chopper and knife etc.
7. By referring to the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Harikisan (supra), in the case of Hadibandhu Das (supra), the subsequent Constitution Bench held that the grounds in support of the order served on the detenu without providing any translation in the language known to the detenu amount to denial of right of being communicated the grounds for detention as well as the failure to afford an opportunity of making a representation against the said order. Mere oral explanation of a complicated order of detention and the ground furnished in support thereof would not meet the legal requirements. In the case of Lallubhai Patel (supra), their Lordships noted the affidavit filed in support of the detention order stating that the grounds of detention were explained in Gujarathi to the detenu and observed:-..But that is not a sufficient compliance with the mandate of Article 22(5) of the Constitution, which requires that the grounds of detention must be 'communicated' to the detenu. 'Communicate' is a strong word. It means the sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the 'grounds' should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language, which he understands. The whole purpose of communicating the 'grounds' to the detenu is to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation. If the 'grounds' are only verbally explained to the detenu and nothing in writing is left with him, in a language which he understands, then that purpose is not served and the constitutional mandate in Article 22(5) is infringed...
8. In the case of Kubic Darusz (supra), while reiterating that the detention order, grounds of detention and the documents referred to and relied upon are to be communicated to the detenu in the language understood by him so that he could make effective representation against his detention, Their Lordships reproduced the following observations made in the case of Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Kerala 1985 Supp SCC 144:-
There is no rule of law that common sense should be put in cold storage while considering constitutional provisions for safeguards against misuse of powers by authorities though these constitutional provisions should be strictly construed. Bearing this salutary principle in mind and having regard to the conduct of the detenue -Venilal Mehta specially in the mercy petition and other communications, the version of the detenu Venilal in feigning lack of any knowledge of English must be judged in the proper perspective. He was, however, in any event given by June 30, 1984, the Hindi translation of the grounds of which he claimed ignorance. The gist of the annexures which were given in Malayalam language had been stated in the grounds. That he does not know anything except Gujarathi is merely the ipse dixit of Venilal Mehta and is not the last word and the Court is not denuded of its power to examine the truth. He goes to the extent that he signed the mercy petition not knowing the contents, nor understanding the same merely because his wife sent it though he was 60 years old and he was in business and he was writing at a time when he was under arrest, his room had been searched, gold biscuits had been recovered from him. Court is not the place where one can sell all tales. The Detaining Authority came to the conclusion that he knew both Hindi and English. It has been stated so in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondent. We are of the opinion that the detenu Venilal Mehta was merely feigning ignorance of English.
9. On the touch-stone of the above referred legal position, let us examine the present detenu's case. Though he claims to be illeterate and his mother tongue is tamil, admittedly, he entered Mumbai around the age of 15 years. It has come in his statement before the police that he was at Ludhiana, Punjab and studying in Hindi Medium School in II Standard before he came to Mumbai. In his statement recorded on 1.1.2006 by the police officer who served the detention order on him, he stated that he was staying in Mumbai for more than 20 years in the locality surrounded by Maharashtrians and he as well as his family members had knowledge of Hindi and they were able to speak Hindi in good manner. He also stated that his friends being Hindi speaking he talks to them to the maximum extent in Hindi language. He filed representation before the Advisory Board which was drafted by his lawyer and he signed in english. It was contended by Mr. Tripathi, the learned Counsel for the detenu that the detenu does not know english as well, though he signed the representation in english. We may accept this reasoning having regard to the way the detenu has signed the representation, but, that does not mean that he does not understand Hindi language.
Being in Mumbai and engaged in some vocation as a welder, it must be held that the detenu understands Hindi and it is not necessary that he must have proficiency in the same language as has been noted in the judgments referred to hereinabove. Working knowledge of Hindi of the detenu cannot be denied and therefore, the detaining authority rightly provided the translated copies in the said language. There is no infirmity in compliance with the requirements of Section 8 of the MPDA Act while communicating the detention order to the detenu and it cannot be said that the opportunity to submit the effective representation was in any way denied. Hence, the first ground of challenge fails.
10. Now coming to the second ground we have perused the FIR copy and in-camera statements recorded of witnesses A and B, as are available in the files produced before us. The incident for which C.R. No. 109 of 2005 has been registered is preceded by an earlier days threat to the complainant. On 7.6.2005 the complainant Shri. Ayub Shaikh, the political party worker in Ward No. 185 was assaulted at about 23.30 hours while he was walking in front of MHADA Vasahat near TATA Power House, by the detenu and his associates. As per the complainant they were waiting for him and as soon as he reached the place where they were waiting, he was stopped by one of the associates of the detenu while the detenu whipped out the chopper concealed in his trouser and by pointing it towards the complainant he threatened him and thereafter kept it back on his body. The complainant was hit by an ironconclusionchain around his neck by the detenu. The complainant was lifted and thrown on the ground and one of the associates by name Manish @ Kanya Sunder Shetty rested the knife on the complainant's chest. The complainant was further assaulted with fists and blows and when he cried for help shouting 'Bachao', 'Bachao', the persons from nearby locality gathered, and the detenu and his associates Manish @ Kanya Sundar Shetty brandished chopper and knife respectively while Raju Babar took away an iron chain from the detenu and brandished in the air, threatening the persons gathered 'beware if you move any further'. The gang thereafter left the place and while leaving the complainant was threatened that this incident was only a trailer and if he continued to demonstrate his wisdom he would be cut into pieces and thrown into the Calico Company Compound. The incident happened on the public road and it was not very late in night keeping in mind the Mumbai City life even in the suburbs. There is no reason to believe that at 23.30 hours the members of public will not be on the roads even in the suburbs. The incident definitely was of a 'public order' and not 'law and order'.
11. The statement of witness 'A' was recorded in-camera on 16.11.2005 and he described about the incident taken place in the second week of August, 2005 at about 20.30 hours, while he was returning from BPCL Company. The witness was a labour contractor and when he had reached the Calico Company, the detenu and two of his unknown associates stopped him and the detenu brandished the knife and demanded money from the witness. He was threatened to pay an amount of 15,000/-or otherwise face the consequences. The threat given to the witness was 'from tomorrow onwards you will not see any labour in BPCL Company'. On refusal of the witness to pay the money, two of the detenu's associates rested choppers on his stomach and the detenu forcibly took away Rs. 3500/- from the shirt pocket of the witness. Seeing this incident the pedestrians had gathered there and they were also threatened by the detenue saying that they should run away otherwise they will be dealt with the knife which was in his hand. While leaving, the detenue and his associates threatened the witness not to complaint about the incident to the police.
12. Statement of witness 'B' was recorded on 19.11.2005. Witness 'B' has stated that the detenue was collecting haft-money from hawkers, shop keepers, pedestrians and rickshaw drivers at the point of knife and sura. He described the incident taken place in forth week of September, 2005 at about 21.00 hours. While the witness was alone present in the shop at Vashinaka, the detenu and his two associates entered the shop of the witness and demanded haft-money. On refusal the detenu caught hold of the shirt of the witness and slapped him. The detenu's associates entered into the shop and started putting cigarette packets into their pockets, and when the witness tried to stop them, the detenu pushed him back and removed a knife from his pant pocket and rested on the stomach of the witness and threatened him by saying 'in case they shout they will be dealt with the knife'. The detenu thereafter opened cash counter and when the detenu pleaded not to do so, the detenu assaulted the witness on his right wrist with knife and forcibly took away Rs. 950/-from the cash counter and also threatened the witness saying 'the shop would be set on fire if he files a complaint with the police'. The people had gathered around to whom the detenu and his associates threatened saying 'they will be killed in case they come forward', and hence, due to fear nobody came forward to help the witness. Instead they ran away helter-skelter and the nearby shop-keepers downed their shutters, the residents closed their house doors. These incidents spoken above by the witnesses 'A' and 'B' clearly make out the case of disturbance or prejudice to the public order and they cannot be described as the incidents of mere law and order.
13. In the case of Gulab Mehra v. State of U.P. and Ors. : 1988CriLJ168 , their Lordships stated that whether an act relates to law and order or to public order depends upon the effect of the act on the life of the community or in other words the reach and effect and potentiality of the act if so put as to disturb or dislocate the even tempo of the life of the community, it will be an act which will affect public order. In the case of Arun Ghosh (supra), a four Judge Bench held that the public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquility. It is the degree of disturbance and its effect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order.
The question to ask is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed?
In the case of Ajay Dixit (supra), the Supreme Court stated as under:-
when the liberty of the citizen is put within the reach of authority and the scrutiny by Courts is barred, the action must comply not only with the substantive requirements of law but it should be with those forms which alone can indicate the substance. The learned Judges further observed that the contravention 'of law' always affects 'order' but before it could be said to affect 'public order', it must affect the community or the public at large. One has to imagine three concentric circles, the largest representing 'law and order', the next representing 'public order' and the smallest representing 'security of State'. An act may affect 'law and order' but not 'public order', just as an act may affect 'public order' but not 'security of the State'. Therefore one must be careful in using these expressions.
14. Having regards to the incidents as described by witnesss 'A' and 'B' in their in-camera statements, and the verifications done by the ACP and more particularly about the truthfullness of the incidents, we have no doubts in our minds that there was sufficient material before the Detaining Authority on the breach or prejudice caused or likely to be caused to the public order and therefore, he was justified in taking preventive measure by passing the detention order. No interference is called for on any of the two grounds argued before us by the learned Counsel for the detenu.
15. In the premises, this Petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged.