S.A. Bobade, J.
1. Heard Shri Saboo, the learned counsel for the Petitioner, Shri Kothale, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, and Shri Deopujari, A.G.P. for State.
2. The petitioner, who is Secretary of the Andh Vidyalaya, Amravati, has challenged the order of the School Tribunal dated 23rd August, 1988. By the impugned order, the School Tribunal has set aside the termination of the respondent No. 1 and directed her reinstatement as a maid servant in the services of Andh Vidyalaya, Amravati.
3. Mr. Saboo, the learned counsel advanced firstly, submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the School Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service Regulation Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as 'M.E.P.S. Act' for short), in view of the fact that Andh Vidyalaya, Amravati (hereinafter referred to as 'school' for short) is not a school contemplated by the provisions of the Act.
4. The Andh Vidyalaya, Amravati, is a school run by the Blind Welfare Association, Amravati. It is recognised by the Social Welfare Department of the Government of Maharashtra under its Recognition No. ERU/RECOGNITION/ 283-84/KA-7 dated 11-5-1983. The School is meant for education of blind boys and girls, for such children between ages 7 to 18 residing in the campus of the institution. The respondent No. 1 was employed as maid servant for a period of two years on probation by order dated 30-9-1985 with effect from 4-2-1987 for looking after and assisting the blind boys and girls. Her services were temporarily terminated during the period of probation.
5. The School runs classes only from Class 1st to Class 7th. The School is a Primary School and there is no dispute before me that the school is a Primary School. The question is, therefore, whether a Primary School imparting primary education to deaf and dumb students, is a private school within, a meaning of Section 9 of the M.E.P.S, Act, which provides for an appeal to employees, who are dismissed, removed or whose services are otherwise terminated or who are reduced in rank, by the order passed by the management and also in certain other cases. Section 9(1), which is relevant reads as follows :--
'Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract for the timebeing in force (any employee in a private school -
(a) who is dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank, by the order passed by the management; or
(b) who is superseded by the Management while making an appointment to any post by promotion,
and who is aggrieved, shall have a right of appeal and may appeal against any such order or supersession to the Tribunal constituted under Section 8.):
Provided that, no such appeal shall lie to the Tribunal in any case where the matter has already been decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction or is pending before such Court, on the appointed date or where the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank was passed by the Management at any time before the 1st July, 1976.' Section 9 confers a right of appeal to aggrieved employee of a 'private school'.
6. 'Private School' is defined under Sub-section (20) of Section 2, which reads, as follows:--
'private school' means a recognised school established or administered by a Management, other than the Government or a local authority'
7. The question 'recognised' by whom, is answered by Sub-section (21) of Section 2, which defines 'recognised'. It reads as follows:
21 'recognised' means recognised by the Director, the Divisional Board or the State Board, or by any officer authorised by him
8. Sub-section (24) defines 'School' to include a 'primary school'. Therefore, the term 'private school' must mean a 'private school', whether a primary, secondary school, higher secondary school etc. must mean a 'school' which is recognised by the Director, the Divisional Board or the State Board, or by any officer authorised by him or by any of such Boards;
9. Now, it is an admitted position that the school in question has not been recognised by the Director, the Divisional Board or the State Board, or by any officer authorised by him or by any of such Boards, as contemplated by Sub-section (21) (supra). It is recognised only by the Social Welfare Department. It is, therefore, clear that the School in question is not recognised school within the meaning of Sub-section (21) of Section 2. Since it is not recognised, as contemplated by Sub-section (21), it cannot be said to be a 'private school', which has been defined to mean the 'recognised school'.
10. Mr. Kothale, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, however, submitted that the school which is a primary school must be treated differently. According to learned counsel, Primary schools are recognised under Section 39 of Bombay Primary Education Act, 1947, which reads as follows:--
'(1) Every primary school other than a primary school maintained by the [State] Government or by a [Zilla Parishad or school board] or by an authorised municipality which fulfils the conditions prescribed in this behalf shall be entitled to recognition as an approved School.
(2) Such recognition shall be given by the [Zilla Parishad or school board] or by the [State] Government or by an officer authorised by it in this behalf, and the manner in which grant-in-aid is to be given to 'such approved schools shall be as prescribed.'
Therefore, according to the learned counsel in the case of primary school, it does not matter, if the primary school is not recognised by the Director of Education Board or the State Board or by any other officer, as contemplated by Sub-section (21) of Section 2 of M.E.P.S. Act. This contention cannot be accepted. The term used words and phrases used in a statute must be understood with reference to the meaning given to them in that statute and not with reference to other statute. Here the words 'private school' is defined to mean a 'recognised school' established or administered by a Management. The term 'recognised' is itself be defined to mean one, recognised by the Director of Education Board etc. Therefore, merely because a private school including a primary school is capable of being recognised under some other law as an approved school, it would not mean that it is liable to be treated as an recognised school under the M.E.P.S. Act. Moreover, Section 39 of the Bombay Primary Education Act, 1947 provides for recognition of a primary school as 'approved schools'. The aforesaid recognition as 'approved' schools is meant for the purposes of that Act, and has no bearing on the concept of recognised school under the present Act. I am fortified this view by a decision of Full Bench of this Court in Suryakant v. V.N.V.J.B.J.A.P. Mandal, reported in 2002(5) M.L.J. 659. The Full Bench has in clear terms observed that an Ashram School which runs classes from 1st to 7th standards do not require recognition of any of the authorities specified in Section 2 of the Act, and it would, therefore, not be a private school within the meaning of the Act. An employee working in such a school, therefore, is not entitled to approach the School Tribunal under Section 9 of the Act. In fact, the Full Bench took the view that 'Ashram School Code 2001' which provided remedy of an appeal to the employees working in Primary Ashram School is contrary to the provision of Section 9 of M.E.P.S Act, and is, therefore, invalid.
11. Incidentally, it must be noted that the Full Bench approved the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Taramati Bafna Blind Welfare and Research Institute, Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra. (Writ petition No. 2919 of 1999). The Division Bench held in this case that 'private school' must be recognised in accordance with Sub-section (20) of the Act, that is by a Director, as contemplated by Sub-section (21) of Section 2. The Division Bench took the view that the term 'Director' means the Director of Education or Director of Technical Education or Director of Vocational Education and Training or the Director of Art as the case may be appointed as such by the State Government'.
12. See Sub-section (6) of Section 2, in fact, the Division Bench held that the subject 'blind school' was not recognised by the Director or Divisional Board or the State Board as required under Section 2(20) of the Act. On the other hand, it was recognised by the Director of' Social Welfare, which was not covered by the definition of expression 'Director' under Section 2(6) of the M.E.P.S. Act. The Division Bench, therefore, construed the term 'employee' to mean that any member of teaching and non-teaching staff of a recognised school. The Division Bench appears to have concluded that therefore, an employee who is employed in such a school, which is not recognised by 'Director' as contemplated by Section 2(6), such as in the case of Blind School, would not be an employee for the purposes of M.E.P.S. Act. The Full Bench has approved the view taken by the Division Bench.
13. Mr. Kothale, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 relied on a judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in Vasant v. Presiding Officer, School Tribunal reported in 2000(4) M.L.J. 417 taking a contrary view. This view seems to be no longer good law, in view of the judgment of the Full Bench.
14. Having regard to above position, I am of the view that the respondent was not an employee within the meaning of M.E.P.S. Act, the school in question not being a private school under the M.E.P.S. Act. The School Tribunal therefore, had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. In this view of the matter, the impugned order is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause 'A'. There shall be no order as to costs.
15. Having regard to the facts that the respondent No. 1 has been reinstated, and has been in employment for about 13 years. I consider it appropriate and in the interest of justice to direct that the petitioner shall not terminate the respondent No. 1's services for a period of one month from today, to enable the respondent No. 1 to take steps as may be advised.