M.S. Vaidya, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 18th May 1993 and 29th June, 1993 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Panaji in Sessions Case No. 86 of 1990 on his file convicting the present appellant of the offence punishable under section 302 I.P.C. and sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life.
2. The prosecution case, in brief, was that the appellant Carlos alias Polly was living in some part of a house bearing No. 609 at Vagathor end. In the remaining portion, deceased Georgy D'Souza and his father Isidor D'Souza were living. The accused/appellant was living all alone inasmuch as his sister, who was married woman, was living at Bombay and he had lost his mother. It is hinted by the prosecution that the relations between the appellant on one hand and the victims on the other hand were strained probably because of some property dispute of the house itself. On that background the incident in question is alleged to have taken place on 6-9-1990 at about 12.30 mid-day. On that day deceased Georgy along with P.W. 6 Alex Fernandes were untying the fishing net in the balcony of the said house and deceased Isidor was sitting on a chair in the balcony reading newspaper. The appellant is alleged to have entered from the road side, compound of the premises raising a slogan, as it were, that nobody should live in that house. Georgy naturally asked him the reason therefor. The appellant is then alleged to have answered Georgy in an insolent manner asking him whether the house belonged to his father. Nothing further is said to have happened in pursuance of that dialogue, but according to the prosecution the appellant had entered his own residential tenement and had come out with a wooden pole (described as 'danda'). The appellant is then said to have assaulted Georgy with that danda on his head as a result of which Georgy fell down in the verandah. Blows of that danda are allegedly given to Isidor as a result of which he had also fallen down. P.W. 6 Alex Fernandes who was working with Georgy had jumped out of the house and had managed to escape, before the- assault was made on Isidor. P.W. 8 Maria, P.W. II Angelica D'Souza, P.W. 13 Jerone and P.W. 6 Alex are alleged to have witnessed the incident in parts. Many people gathered when the row was raised and a message was sent with P.W. 1 Hycinth Tinoko to the Calangute Police Station. Some policemen from the Police Station, who was not examined by the prosecution as a witness, is said to have arrived at the scene of offence as a result of the report made by Hycinth Tinoko and according to the prosecution story, the appellant had attempted to attack the policeman as well as the persons who bad gathered there. It is also alleged that the accused pelted at the Police Officer a broken piece of the said wooden pole. On the arrival of the police the onlookers are said to have overpowered the accused, beat him profusely and further, to have tied down his hands so as to prevent him from moving away or commiting any violence.
3. The offence of murder came to be registered and investigations were taken over by P.W. 21, Police Sub-Inspector Umesh Gaonkar, as he then was. Inquests were held on the two dead bodies, certain articles were seized from the scene offence, from the house of Georgy and from the portion of the house occupied by the appellant under a panchanama to which P.W. 7 Michael and P.W. 19 Ganpat Govekar were parties. The appellant was sent for medical examination and treatment to P.W. 15 Dr. Coutinho and the blood sample of the appellant was collected by P.W. 14 Dr. M. Mallya. P.W. 18 Dr. Usgaonkar conducted the post mortem examination on the dead bodies. The clothes of the appellant and both the victims were seized and were got examined through the Chemical Analyser. After concluding the investigations, the charge sheet was submitted against the appellant for an offence punishable under section 302 of I.P.C.
4. For the purpose of decision of this case it is necessary to refer to certain papers which appear in the Miscellaneous file of the present case. The appellant was arrested on 6-9-1990. itself. On 7-9-1990 he was produced before the Judicial Magistrate F.C., Mapusa for remand. The remand report bears only the following order :-
'Heard the accused and the T.O. The accused is remanded to police custody for fourteen (14) days.
Sd/-
7-9-1990.'
Again, after the expiry of the initial police custody remand, the appellant was produced before the same Magistrate on 21-9-1990 at about 2.30 p.m. and the orders passed on the remand report were thus:-
'Accused present. No complaints. Accused remanded to 14 days J.C.
Sd/.
29-9-1990 at 2.30 p.m.'
From these two remand reports it may be noted here only, it is evident that the Magistrate had not interrogated the appellant in any way to ascertain his mental condition or to ascertain on 7-9-1990 from him whether or not, he had any complaint against the police or against anybody else. Remands were granted from time to time to the appellant by the learned Magistrate till, finally, he was committed to the Sessions Court under the Magistrate's order dated 12th December, 1990. It may be noted that even in this committal order there was no reference to the mental condition of the accused particularly with a view to know whether or not at the relevant point of time the Magistrate had found the appellant in normal mental condition.
5. It may also be noted here that the Investigating Officer, for reasons best known to him, had referred the appellant on 18-9-1990 to the Institute of Psychiatry-and Human Behaviour when he had noticed that the accused/appellant was not mixing with the general public and previously also he had attacked somebody in the family of the deceased. He had referred the appellant to the aforesaid Institute, according to his own version in the deposition, 'to rule out the possibility whether he is psychic or otherwise'. He produced on record a report which was marked Exh. A by the learned Sessions Judge, but which was not admitted in evidence for want of adequate proof, which showed that on 18-9-1990, the appellant was referred to the said Institute 'for the examination of his mental condition. It is suspected that the accused is of unsound mind and a need is felt to subject him for psychiatric test'. The aforesaid letter was returned by the Assistant Medical Officer of the Institute of Psychiatry and Human Behaviour, Panaji with a remark, 'Mr. Basilio D'Souza was admitted in I.P.H.B. on 4-11-1985 and discharged on 20th December, 1985. He was treated for schizophrenia and was taking treatment at O.P.D. level till 26-5-1986. He is still suffering from schizophrenia'. It appears that this report obtained by the P.S.I, was not brought to the notice of the Magistrate who committed the appellant to the Sessions Court for trial nor was it brought to the notice of the learned Sessions Judge before the commencement of the trial. This document was produced only in the course of cross-examination of the investigating Officer at the fag end of the trial.
6. It is not in dispute that the appellant had lost his mother some years ago and that he was living all alone. It is also on record that his married sister was living at Bombay and she had once reported that the appellant was being treated for schizophrenia at J.J. Hospital since the year 1975. Out of the victims, Isidor was, probably, the uncle of the appellant and Georgy was the cousin brother. Undisputedly, they lived in the family house. But the evidence on record shows that the appellant had all along preferred to live by himself and had not kept much association with his cousins or his uncle. When the appellant was arrested in connection with this offence on 6-9-1990 there was therefore none near and dear to him, who had come forth to take care of the appellant. Neither the police officials nor any of his neighbours appear to have mentioned it before the Magistrate that the appellant was a chronic schizophrenia patient. It was on this background that the fact that the learned Magistrate has granted remands to the appellant without even interrogating him while granting the remand, assumed considerable importance in this case. Even after committal, there was none in the Sessions Court to move on behalf of the appellant the Sessions Court for the protection of the interest of the .appellant till an Advocate came to be appointed to defend the accused under the Legal Aid Scheme. The roznama of the Sessions case indicates that after three adjournments in December, 1990 the case came to be posted on 10-1-1991 and it was on that day that Advocate Shri Dhond came to be appointed as Amicus Curie to defend the accused. Time was given then to Shri Dhond to take instructions and on the adjourned date, i.e., on 21-1-1991, the learned defence Advocate mentioned before the Court that the appellant was not responding to what was being asked and that it appeared that the appellant was not mentally sound. He moved the Court for inquiry under section 329 of Cr.P.C. for determination of the issue whether or not, the appellant was a person of unsound mind and capable of making out his defence. The learned Sessions Judge then wrote a letter to the Superintendent of Institute of Psychiatry and Human Behaviour, Altinho, Panaji and then on 23-3-1991 he proceeded to record the deposition of Court witness No. 1 Dr. Brahamanand Sinai Cuncolienkar. The aforesaid witness proved his report dated 8-3-1991 (Exh. I/A). It may be worthwhile to reproduce that report ad verbatim :-
'Mr. Carlos Basilio was admitted in this institute on 31-1-1991 for observation for the purpose of Medical report.
With available history from the records, observation in the hospital by me and the staff of the hospital and psychological testing, I have come to a following conclusion.
Mr. Carlos Basilio D'Souza is a young man of dark complexion and average body built. At the time of admission he was untidy, unshaven, shakily dressed and would not cooperate freely for examination. He would get irritated if he is asked questions again and again. He was emotionally blunt and denied any hallucinations or delusions. He was started on treatment immediately and he is showing improvement. His psychological tests also confirm that he is suffering from Chronic Schizophrenia with residual symptoms.
OPINION
Mr. Carlos Basilio D'Souza is suffering from Chronic Schzephrenia with Residual symptoms at present. He is fit to stand trial.'
It may be noted here only that this report did not make it clear whether or not, on the date of the offence the appellant was in a normal state of mind. The evidence of the aforesaid Doctor Cuncolienkar was recorded only to ascertain whether or not, the appellant was in a position to understand the proceedings of the trial and to make out his own defence. It appears that the same Doctor was later on examined as a defence witness and that the said Doctor had given an elaborate history about the mental ill health of the present appellant. While deposing as a defence witness, it came on record that the appellant was an In-door patient in the hospital, admitted on 4-11-1985 under an order of the Magistrate, and at that time, his sister had informed that the appellant was taking treatment in J.J. Hospital from 1975 for the same disease. The appellant was an In-door patient in the Institute at Panaji in the period from 4-11-1985 to 20-11-1985 and thereafter, he had taken treatment at O.P.D. till 26-5-1986. He was again admitted in the Hospital on 31-1-1991. The finding was that the appellant was suffering from chronic schizophrenia which was confirmed by psychologist Dr. P.K. Chakravaty. Dr. Cuncolienkar was specific in telling that on the date of his examination of the patient, the appellant could not take care of himself. He told that the period of Schizophrenia could last for any duration from two weeks to 10 years. According to him, emotional apathy, emotional withdrawal, lack of initiative and interest were some of the residual symptoms of Schizophrenia which could be controlled only by rehabilitation. According to him, hallucination and delusion could be controlled by medication but otherwise, they could remain permanently. But, he indicated the possibility that under impulse such a patient might hit or kill any person without any reason in response to the hallucinations and delusion. According to him the appellant was treated as an out-door patient since 4-6-1992 after he was discharged from the hospital on 15-4-1991. According to him, neglect in taking the medicines could be the cause of repeated attacks of Schizophrenia. The Doctor confessed that he could not get any history from the appellant/accused when he was examined on. 31-1-1991 and even the police did not furnish him any history. Dr. Cuncolienkar was clear in saying that at the time of his examination the appellant was not able to understand and answer the question. But subsequently, after the treatment, he could understand and answer the questions. It was at this stage that the trial had commenced before the learned Sessions Judge. There is no evidence on record that after his discharge, the appellant was on medical treatment all these years.
7. In order to satisfy ourselves regarding the medical history of the appellant, particularly, in the context of his long standing Schizophrenia, we had requested Mr. Bhobe, the learned Public Prosecutor, to make available to us, if possible, the relevant record from the Mental Hospital. Accordingly, he made-that file available to us today. This file contains record from the year 1985 (to be precise 4th November, 1985). It appears that, at that time, the police had taken charge of the insane person because, he had assaulted one man, namely, his uncle, who, according to the appellant, was playing mischief. The patient was under observation and treatment for quite some time and during that period even his uncle Isidor and his cousin as well as his sister who lived at Bombay, were interviewed by the authorities of the Mental Asylum. It was recorded, as far back as on 10-12-1985, that the patient was a known case of Schizophrenia and was treated in the J.J. Hospital, Bombay in 1975, when he was put on tablets Eskozine and E.C.T. The file recorded that thereafter, he stayed with his sister for some time but as he could not pull on well - there, he came to live with his mother. The file recorded, further, that his father had died long before 1982 and his mother had died some time in 1982 and since then the appellant was a lonely person. The file contains a specific mention that the appellant had all along shown a tendency to keep by himself and not to mix up with anybody. The file also recorded that till the death of his mother, he used to have some sort of interaction with deceased Isidor and his cousin Georgy, but not much thereafter. He was discharged from the Hospital in 1986. Thereafter, the file reveals he was brought to the Asylum, again, on 18-9-1990 by the police. The observation of his mental condition on 18-9-1990 as pointed out above vide letter marked 'A', which was tendered on record before the learned Sessions Judge, did not give a very clear picture about his mental condition immediately after commission of the alleged offence. The observations recorded in the file on 18-9-1990 read thus :-
'The patient cannot give information regarding himself and his family background. The patient reports on enquiry, that he was treated by Psychiatric at Bombay, but details are not available. He also reports that he was admitted in this Hospital once in 1984.
The police Inspector who came with the patient and the police constable, gave following information. Patient's father died many years back. He was working in a Studio. Mother died in 1982, while they were in Goa. Patient and his mother were in Goa (Vagathor) in their own house since 1980. After the death of the patient's mother, the patient used to cook at times. Other times he used to eat from hotels with the money he used to get as interest of his investment in the Bank (i.e. Rs. 150/-). At times, patient's sister used to send money from Bombay and patient also used to visit his sister at Bombay. Patient has only one sister who is married and is staying with her family at Bombay. The patient has his common family house at Vagathor, but no property of their own. Informant reports that the patient was always a lonely man, he was not communicative and was not mixing with anybody in the neighbourhood or even with the members of the family who were staying in the same house. On 6th of September, without any provocation, he argued with the cousin brother and on his excitement, he took a pole of the cot and hit him on the head. When his uncle came, he hit him also with the same pole and both died immediately.
Patient talks relevant. Hallucinations are not elicited. Persecutory delusions ale elicited. He is oriented to person but not to time and place. He has no insight into his condition.
According to the police constables, patient was eating and was talking relevantly. He was not cooperative and communicative like a normal person.'
It may be noted here only, may be at the cost of repetition, that the Police Inspector had referred the appellant to the Mental Asylum on his own when the aforesaid findings were recorded. That itself was indicative of the fact that the Investigating machinery had felt that the appellant was not within himself and was not a normal person at the time when he was apprehended by the Police.
8. It is in this context that we may refer to the evidence of Dr. Coutinho, (P.W. 15), to whom the appellant was referred on the date of the offence itself i.e. 6-9-1990. Having noted the injuries on the person of the appellant, the aforesaid witness 'had examined the patient to ascertain, whether or not, the appellant was under the influence of alcohol. In that context, he noted the findings that he was conscious, cooperative and well-oriented in space and time and his breath smelt of alcohol. Indeed, the aforesaid Doctor had collected 10 c.c. of blood from the body of the appellant for alcohol estimation. With all the efforts that we made to trace from the record, we do not find any report on the point of alcohol estimation in the blood. As against this particular observation regarding alcohol smell, we had found in the file maintained at the Mental Asylum the history recorded right from the beginning till the end and it did not show that the appellant was ever known to be taking drinks or drugs and as per the version of his sister, he was hesitant even to take medicines prescribed for him. Another important fact to be noted, in this context, is that though the appellant was apprehended on the spot by his several neighbours and was tied with a rope, none of them had ever said that the breath of the appellant ever smelt of alcohol. We are really doubtful about the correctness of the findings recorded by Dr. Coutinho because, in the first place, there is nothing also on record to substantiate his finding that the breath of the appellant smelt of alcohol. Secondly, there is nothing in his evidence that recorded any abnormality in the mental condition of the appellant. When a little later, on 18th September, 1990, the Psychiatrists themselves had found the appellant not to be a normal person not cooperative and not oriented in space and time, it was difficult to accept the version of Dr. Coutinho that the appellant was really conscious, cooperative and oriented in space and time. At the end of his cross-examination. Dr. Coutinho himself admitted that he did not enquire into the history of illness from the appellant as it was not relevant and as he was not asked for by the police. Thus, in a way, the examination of the appellant conducted by Dr. Coutinho could hardly be a guide to the mental condition or the consciousness of the appellant on the date of the offence. We had to refer to this evidence at the outset, because, this was one of the circumstances considered by the learned Sessions Judge to bring him to the conclusion that Dr. Coutinho's evidence gave an indication that he appellant-accused knew fully well what he was doing and that his mental condition was not impaired or affected at all at that time. To our mind, the learned Sessions Judge has fallen into the aforesaid error because, he had fallen in the error of not obtaining appropriately the record from the Institute of Psychiatry & Human Behaviour, despite the fact that the report marked Exh. 'A' was placed on record, saying that right from 1984 the patient had a history of Schizophrenia. As clearly seen from the observations made on 18-9-1990 in the file of the Institute of Psychiatry and Human Behaviour, the patient was definitely not in a normal position and he had certain 'persecutory delusions' and he was neither co-operative nor was he able to give the particulars about the space and tine. Dr. Coutinho's evidence cannot be considered, therefore, as an evidence which could show that the appellant was in a normal state of mental health on the date of the offence so as to enable him to understand the nature of the act committed by him.
9. There is one other point which the learned Sessions Judge has missed. Almost every witness examined on behalf of the prosecution, happened to be a witness living in the vicinity of the residence of the appellant and the two deceased persons. Indeed, witness Angelica, (P.W. 11), was a cousin sister of the appellant and she had known the appellant as a member of the family since long. Despite this fact, each and every witness examined by the prosecution, when questioned regarding the mental condition of the appellant, was out to say that he or she, as the case may be, did not know, whether or not, the appellant was suffering from insanity. Again, almost each and every witness has stated that the appellant had never cared to wish to any other person or that the witnesses had ever talked with the appellant. The evidence of this sort given by almost all the witnesses makes one doubtful about the veracity of the witnesses on that point. It appeared that the witnesses did not want to unfold the prosecution story in a truthful manner, but they wanted to plead before the Court ignorance about the insanity of the appellant despite the fact that the appellant was known to them closely enough for several years. The learned Sessions Judge, appears to have grossly overlooked this fact and on that count, he had fallen in an error in thinking that the prosecution story that the appellant was sane and sober at the time of the commission of the offence was worthy of safe reliance. When the record showed that the appellant had a long history of insanity and that none had come forward to care for him till the commencement of his trial for, the offence, the Sessions Judge had a greater responsibility on him to ensure that no injustice was likely to occur to the appellant in the course of the trial. The learned Sessions Judge appears to have missed that point.
10. The learned Sessions Judge has rightly referred to a number of rulings about the burden of proof when an exemption under section 84 of the Indian Penal Code was claimed on behalf of the accused in defence of the prosecution launched against him. The distinction between medical insanity and legal insanity has been rightly recorded by him and he has rightly made out a proposition of the law that what the Court has to look to the mental condition of the accused at the time of the commission of the offence. At the same time, we find that the decision of the Supreme Court in Ratanlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, : 1971CriLJ654 , was cited before him as also the decision in Sanna Eranna v. State of Karnataka, 1983 Cri.L.J. 619. This Court had an occasion to discuss and apply the principle laid down in Ratanlal's case in Tukappa Tamanna Lingardi v. State of Maharashtra, : (1990)92BOMLR441 . It appears that this ruling was not cited before the learned Sessions Judge, but the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Ralantal's case, was the foundation of that case. The appellant before the Supreme Court had taken at the trial stage, a specific plea of unsoundness of mind at the time of the commission of the offence. The Supreme Court had observed that the accused was arrested on or about the date of the offence and had remained in police custody for about 10 days when it was found that he needed medical examination. His medical examination was ordered and made, but there was no evidence either to indicate his condition from the time of his arrest to the time when his case was referred for medical examination. The Supreme Court recorded those facts which were within the knowledge of the police and said that Court would have expected the prosecution to adduce evidence regarding the condition of the accused during the aforesaid time. Noting that the police had made it impossible for the appellant to prove his mental condition at the time of the incident by keeping him in their custody for 10 days from the date of the arrest, not having him examined and sent to judicial custody earlier where he would have been examined by a jail doctor, it was made impossible for him to prove his mental condition at the time of commission of the offence. In that case also, the defence had led evidence about the mental condition of the appellant-accused before the incident in question. A reference was made to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses on certain facts regarding the circumstances attending the alleged commission of the offence, certain antecedent circumstances and certain subsequent circumstances and it was, then, concluded that the defence had discharged the legal burden to rebut the presumption in favour of sanity and had succeeded in proving that the appellant was not capable of understanding the nature of his act at the time of commission of the offence. The aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court as well as the decisions of this Court and the Karnataka High Court, indicated the manner which the trial Court should have dealt with the present appellant at the time of the trial. It appears that the learned Sessions Judge had lost sight of the precautions, that were expected to be taken by the Sessions Court before arriving at a conclusion as to whether or not, the appellant had discharged his burden of proof for the rebuttal of normal presumption of sanity in favour of a person. The omission to consider the aforesaid rulings in their appropriate perspective has misled the learned Sessions Judge and has led him to commit certain errors in the context of arriving at his conclusion about the mental state of the accused/appellant at the time of the commission of the offence.
11. In order to demonstrate how the learned Sessions Judge has fallen into error in this respect, we may now refer to certain facts. Admittedly, the appellant and the two deceased persons, namely, Georgy and Isidor, lived separately in different parts of one and the same house. Deceased - Isidor was the uncle of the appellant/accused and the father of deceased-Georgy and Angelica (W.P. 11). According to the eye-witnesses, on 6-9-1990 at about 12.30 noon, P.W. 6 - Alex Fernandes and deceased Georgy were untying a fishing net in the balcony of the residence of deceased Georgy and the old man Isidor was sitting by their side on a bench reading some newspaper. Suddenly the appellant had appeared at the entrance of the compound of the premises in question shouting that none should live in the house in question. According to the prosecution, when Georgy questioned the appellant why he was saying so, the appellant had entered the house with a sort of a pole used either as a leg of a table or of the mosquito net stand and assaulted, first, deceased-Georgy on his head. When Georgy' fell down, he is said to have attacked Isidor. The consequence was that both of them died on the spot. Thus, the appellant is alleged to have committed two murders at that juncture.
12. The fact that the two persons-Georgy and Isidor had died unnatural deaths at the relevant lime, could hardly be in dispute. The medical evidence contained in the post-mortem examination notes at Exhs. 18-A and 18-B, which are duly proved by Dr. Madhukar Usgaonkar, (P.W. 18), read with the two Inquest Reports (Exhs. 2-A and 2-B) duly proved by P.W. 2 Martin Fernandes, prove the unnatural deaths.
13. The question regarding the complicity of the appellant in connection with those deaths also may not be a matter of serious doubt. Though for the reasons to which we come later, we are not very much convinced about the evidence and truthfulness of all the alleged eye witnesses and the witnesses who are said to have come on the scene of offence immediately after the incident, the appellant was caught on the spot itself by the persons who had gathered there. Some policeman, who were never examined by the prosecution as a witness, had been brought there after P.W. I Hycinth Tinoko had reported the matter to the police. They had apprehended the appellant on the scene of offence itself. Out of the eye witnesses. P.W. 6 Alex Fernandes, who was working with deceased Georgy at the relevant point of time and who had witnessed the blows given by the appellant to Georgy and, P.W. 11 Angelica, the inmate of the house and who had arrived on the scene of offence immediately after the first cry was raised, had noticed the presence of the appellant on the scene of offence immediately after both the deceased were attacked. Though the learned Sessions Judge had not accepted the plea given by the appellant at the outset, the fact remains that at the commencement of the trial also the appellant had pleaded guilty to the charge. It appears, however, that when the recording of evidence commenced, in the cross examination-in-chief of P.W. 2, the appellant .had .told the Court that he had killed only one person. All these circumstances considered collectively along with some other circumstances on record can enable one to conclude that the fatal attack was made by the appellant alone.
14. The reasons why we felt that the eye witnesses were not disclosing the whole story may be, now, adverted to. Curiously enough, most of the alleged eye witnesses, even Alex Fernandes, (P.W. 6), who was working with deceased Georgy at the relevant point of time, do not ever say that they or any of them had seen the attack made by the appellant on Isidor. It was only P.W. 6, Alex Fernandes who told of the danda blow given on the head of deceased Georgy. Others had gathered there a little later and it could be a matter of doubt whether the others had really witnessed even the blow given to deceased Georgy. Secondly, though so many witnesses were examined by the prosecution to say that the appellant had attacked and that the appellant was caught on the scene of offence itself on the same day and within few minutes after the incident in question, not a single witness told that the cloths of the appellant did bear any stains of blood. The blood stained clothes allegedly found on the person of the appellant were not seized from him on the date of the offence itself, but they were seized on 7-9-1990 i.e. on the next day and it was said in the panchanama that they were attached at Calangute Police Station. The description as given in the panchanama showed that the appellant had, then, a light grey colour full shirt with stains of blood on the chest and one short-pant which was suspected to bear stains of blood. Had there been stains of blood on his person in the manner indicated in the Panchanama or in the evidence of P.W. 16, Jonson Rebello, there would have been some reference to that in the evidence of the eye-witnesses. The third reason for which we find the evidence of the alleged eye-witnesses and the witnesses who are alleged to have gathered on the scene of offence immediately after the incident to be doubtful is that, none of them clarified the reason for which the offence in question had taken place. The genesis of the alleged offence is not made clear by any of them. It was not the case made out by any of the witnesses examined by the prosecution that the appellant had a long standing dispute with his uncle or his cousin over the house property. It was only the Police Inspector Gaonkar, (P.W. 21), who had said in his deposition that the appellant had strained relations with Georgy and his father since after the death of the mother of the appellant and since then he had been picking up quarrels with them. Even then, according to Inspector Gaonkar, there was no property dispute between them. P.W. 4, Arnold D'Souza. referred to apprehension of the appellant some time in 1984 on account of a fight. This had some reference in the file maintained by the Institute of Psychiatry and Human Behaviour, which was tendered before us, wherein it was stated that the police had apprehended the appellant because he had assaulted his uncle with a belief that uncle Isidor had been playing some mischief Even then, the entire file did not make out a story that there was a property dispute between the appellant and his uncle's family. Yet the learned Sessions Judge observed in his judgment that there was some property dispute between the appellant and his uncle's family. The basis of such an observation (para 29 of his judgment) is, however, not known. None of the prosecution witnesses say that on the date of the offence itself or in the near proximity prior to that date, there was any quarrel worth the name between the appellant on one side and deceased' Georgy and/or deceased Isidor on the other side, which could provoke the appellant to such an attack. There is nothing in the evidence on record which could show that on the date of the offence itself, the appellant had any reason whatsoever to say that none should occupy the house in question. The very fact that the appellant did say so and entered the house in a mood which was, probably, quarrelsome, itself, could lead one to the conclusion, on the background of history of his mental condition, that on the relevant date and at the relevant point of time, the appellant was out of his mind. Nobody even expected that the appellant would attack anybody whatever he has said while making his entry in the compound. Even according to Alex Fernandes, the appellant entered the balcony from the side of the appellant's house and, then, suddenly attacked deceased Georgy. Had there been any reason to anticipate the action of the appellant, witness Alex would have certainly taken steps to prevent the 'attack. It was but natural for Alex to get frightened seeing the heavy blow given on the head of the deceased Georgy, as a result of which Georgy fell down on the floor. Alex told that as he was frightened, he rushed in the inner part of the Georgy's house and, then, managed his escape through window. It was on this count he had not seen the remaining part of the incident, but by the time P.W. II, Angelica entered the balcony, both Georgy and Isidor had fallen on the ground and were, probably, dead. From the evidence of Alex Farnandes (P.W. 6), or, from the evidence of P.W. II, Angelica, nothing further could be gathered as to what the accused said in respect of the occupation of the house or why he did say so, at that juncture. It was P.W. 3 Mauvin D'Souza, who had arrived on the scene of offence little later, who claimed to have asked the appellant whether the appellant was happy in killing Georgy and Isidor. According to him, the reply given by the appellant was that he could do whatever he liked. This answer also did not explain anything regarding the cause of the assault. All that it indicated is the fact that the appellant was not able to contain himself or to control himself and he was in a mood which was grossly violent. P.W. 9, Mahableshwar Govekar, was another person who tried to introduce a story of the same type, but which had no corroboration whatsoever on the point. According to him, one Steeve, whom he had met, had told him that the accused had threatened him saying that if he were to go close to the accused he would be the third person to be killed. Steeve was not examined by the prosecution at all in the Court. Therefore, the alleged report by Steeve to Mahableshwar, could hardly be admissible in evidence against the appellant. Some witnesses made out a story that while in verandah, the appellant flung at a policeman, who arrived soon on the scene of offence, some broken wooden piece. The aforesaid constable at whom it was allegedly flung, was not examined by the prosecution. Thus, the evidence of none of the alleged eye witnesses and none of the witnesses who had gathered on the scene of offence, explained the genesis of the offence and yet everybody was out to plead ignorance of the insanity of the appellant. It is on this count that we are inclined to look with a pinch of salt at the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses.
15. Coming, then, to the circumstances indicative of the mood of the appellant, we have referred amply to the antecedents of the appellant till the date of the offence to show how the appellant was a moody person, how he was a Schizophrenia almost since 1975 and how at least on one occasion or two, he was violent in the past. We have also indicated how the neighbouring eye-witnesses examined by the prosecution did not come out with a true story about the mental condition of the appellant though the appellant had been living in the same house at least since the year 1980. That indicated a positive attempt to suppress from the Court material regarding the insanity of the appellant. Coming, then, to the circumstances which were concurrent with the commission of the offence, we may note that on the date of the offence, nothing had happened on account of which the appellant should have felt provoked to attack deceased Georgy and Isidor. The medical file itself shows, as already referred to above, a note on the basis of the information given by the Police Officer that the attack on the two deceased persons was made without any provocation. Nobody knew what the appellant did from morning on the date of the offence till the time of the occurrence of the incident. As pointed out above, at 12.30 noon, the appellant suddenly appeared in the compound and started saying something which had no relevance whatsoever with his previous conduct in connection with the occupation of the house. There is reason to suppose that in a fit of insanity, he just desired that none should occupy the house. There is hardly any reason to suppose that he had capacity to premeditate the attack on the two victims or that the attack m question was really premeditated. The attack could be an outcome of what the psychiatrists described in the file as 'persecuroty delusions'. It is significant to note in this context, that P.W. 6, Alex Fernandes, told in his deposition that the appellant had first entered his portion of the house and had, then, returned from there with a wooden pole, one metre in length and about 3 inches in diameter. There is reason to be doubtful about this detail also because; in the first place, Alex Fernandes himself was not able to identity either Article 4 or Article 12 as the article which was brought by the appellant and, secondly, because the panchanama regarding the seizure showed that M.O. Article 4 (Exh. 21-A) which was a broken pole of the length of 14 inches, was found at Fatima Bar & Restaurant. This article was wrongly identified by the panch P.W. 7 Michael D'Souza, as Article No. 9 though it was, in fact. Article No. 4. Article No. 9 happens to be a wooden pole of 30' length, which was seized under panchanama Exh. 12-A and it was found in the corner of the second room from the main entrance of the partition occupied by deceased Georgy and his father. It was not seized from the house of the appellant. The third Article MO 12 was a wooden pole of the length of 3 feet and it was produced by witness Angelica from her part of the house. It .was seized under panchanama Exh. 19-A and the panchanama narrated that according to Angelica, the appellant had taken, from a corner in her portion of the house, one pole for making the attack on the victims. Thus, if it is doubtful, whether or not, the appellant had entered the balcony with some wooden pole, it could hardly be said that he had come to the balcony in question prepared for making the attack on the victims. The target of attack also was not very clear to the mind of the appellant. First he attacked Georgy, may be because Georgy had questioned him back. There was hardly any reason for the appellant to attack Isidor. None, even P.W. 6 Alex Fernandes, stated that anything was transpired between the appellant on one side and deceased Isidor on the other side for which the appellant had attacked Isidor. As regards the nature of attack on both the victims, one can gather, at least from the number of injuries noted in the P.M. notes on the persons of each of the victims, that the blows were severe and many on each of the victims. In fact, there appears hardly any reason for which the appellant had to be so violent in attacking the victims. After the attack, the appellant did not try to run away. True it is that witnesses say that they were afraid of going near the appellant, but that was a description of the mental state of the witnesses; it was not on account of any acts done by the appellant towards the witnesses that they had got such a fear. It is said that the appellant had pelted at a police constable a broken piece of wood, but that could hardly be an act of violence as such, commensurate with the violence exhibited earlier in the context of victims. Moreover, till the arrival of that constable, the appellant was all alone but not violent in his acts. Somebody had pelted a stone at him and the appellant had picked up that stone. Arnold D'Souza, (P.W. 4), indeed, told that he had snatched away the stone from the hand of the appellant and thrown it aside. Thus there is reason to suppose that even after the attack, the appellant was not ferocious towards each and everybody. Indeed, the witnesses who had gathered there had caught him. Initially his hands were tied down. It was by witnesses that he would run away and, therefore, later on, his legs were also tied down. None of the witnesses say that the appellant had resisted the act of tying down his hands or legs. Thus, all the circumstances concurrent to the incident of the offence in question can, if appreciated properly, point out to the abnormal mental state of the appellant.
16. As regards the subsequent events, we have already noted above how from 18-9-1990 onwards the appellant was produced time and again, before the Doctors at the Institute of Psychiatry and Human Behaviour and how at some points of time, at least, he was interned there and further, how the authorities there confirmed their earlier finding that he was suffering from Schizophrenia. The findings recorded by the Doctors at the Institute from 18-9-1990 which are enumerated above at length are relevant in this respect.
17. Thus, considering the circumstances, antecedent, concurrent and subsequent to the incident of offence, there is every reason to suppose that the defence had rebutted the presumption of sanity which was in favour of the prosecution and it was for the prosecution to prove that the appellant was really sane and sober when he had committed the act in question. The events which were discussed above as concurrent events indicate how the appellant was not in normal state of his mind and, probably, how he was unable to understand what he was doing.
18. While considering the evidence of P.W. 6, Alex Fernandes, on the theory of accused coming to the balcony with a pole from his residence, we have indicated how that story appeared doubtful on the face of it. A further doubt on that story is cast on account of the evidence of other witnesses regarding the identification of the article with which the attack was allegedly made on the two victims. In the first place, not a single witness examined before the Court told what the appellant did with the pole with which he had assaulted the deceased. None has stated that it was carried by the appellant to some other place or that the appellant had left it on the scene of offence or that he had placed it in the inner part of the house of the victims. P.W. 6 Alex Fernandes, who was closest to the victims, could not clearly identify the article which was allegedly used as a weapon by the appellant. He said in his deposition that it was something like MO 4 or MO 12. MO 4 is a part of the pole of the length of about 14 inches, whereas MO 12 is an Article 30 inches in length. Therefore, if it could be understood properly, according to Alex, the weapon of attack was only a portion of a pole which was either 14 inches or 30 inch in length, P.W. 8, Maria D'Souza, who was at the Fatima Bar & Restaurant, at the relevant point of time, and who had come out on hearing the noise, identified Article 4 as the weapon of attack which, again, probably meant a piece of a pole. P.W. 9 Mahableshwar did not identify the weapon of attack/but he identified MO 9 which was a part of a pole 30' in length as the article thrown by the appellant at the police. It is to be noted that article was not found in the compound nor it was that seized from the compound. Alex D'Souza (P.W. 18) who saw the incident, initially from the balcony of his own house across the road which, according to him, was about 25 to 30 metres wide, told in his examination-in-chief that appellant was having a wooden piece and he was hitting the same on the bodies of Isidor and Georgy. According to him, the cries were raised by one Jennie. He also told that Jerone D'Souza also was already in the verandah of the victims Georgy and Isidor. He did not identify any of the three articles before the Court as a weapon of the attack. But even if it was assumed that he wanted to refer to the wooden piece that could be either MO 4 or MO 9. P.W. 8 Maria Jenny D'Souza did not identify the article, but she said that the object with which the attack was made was something like MO 4 i.e. a piece 14' in length. P.W 13, Jerone D'Souza, who also told that he has seen the appellant assaulting both victims, identified MO 4 as the article with which the assault was made but with a further appendage that at the time of the assault. Article 4 was not a broken article as it was before the Court, but it was intact. That means, according to him, the weapon of attack was a pole of at least 3 feet in length. It is relevant in this context also to note that none of the eye witnesses have stated that in the course of the assault, the pole used by the appellant for the assault, was broken on the scene of offence itself. P.W. II, Angelica, who came from the kitchen and saw the attack only on victim Georgy, identified MO 4, but she was specific in saying that it was not MO 12, which was 3 feet in length. The rest of the witnesses have not identified the weapon of attack. Thus it is seen from the evidence of the eye witnesses that no consistent story could be made out as to whether or not, the attack was made with a pole which was 3 feet in length or with a pole which was 14 inches in length or a pole which was 30 inches in length. MO 4, MO 9 and MO 12 were, the three articles before the Court and of three different lengths, as aforesaid. This consideration also does contribute to the doubt expressed by us as to, whether or not, the witnesses had really seen the whole or the material part of the attack on both the victims. The claim of P.W. 13, Jerone D'Souza, and P.W. 10 Alex that the appellant was seen assaulting both the victims also becomes doubtful, in view of the circumstances discussed above.
19. This leads us to the consideration of the points which were relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge for arriving at a conclusion that the appellant was sane and sober at the time of the commission of the offence. They are considered by the learned Sessions Judge in paras 29 and 30 of his judgment. Out of the circumstances referred to by him we have already considered, the circumstance regarding the motive, the story that the appellant had entered his house to bring from there a 3 feet long wooden pole the brutal nature of the attack. The question put by witness Mauvin D'Souza (P.W. 3) to the appellant as to whether he was happy in killing Georgy and Isidor and the reply allegedly given by the appellant, the findings recorded by the Medical Officer Dr. Coutinho and the abuse allegedly hurled by the appellant at the police coupled with pelting of a wooden piece at the police. In our opinion, many of these circumstances were indicative more of the insane condition of the appellant .and the loss of his own control on his own mind and actions. It was difficult to infer from them necessarily that the appellant was aware of what he was doing at the relevant point of time. The learned Sessions Judge has, then, referred to P.W. 3, Mauvin D'Souza's version that he had seen the appellant going for shopping, walking, purchasing newspapers and other items etc. It was not even the case of the defence that the appellant could not do such acts at any time. Mauvin D'Souza's version does not show that on the date of the offence, the appellant was seen doing any of the aforesaid acts. Therefore, Mauvin D'Souza's evidence does not prove the mental condition of the appellant as on the date of the offence. The learned Sessions Judge has, then, referred to evidence of P.W. 13 Jerone D'Souza, who told that when he had proclaimed the death of both of the victims on the scene of offence itself, the appellant had raised the wooden pole to hit Jerone D'Souza himself. He also referred to the version of Mahableshwar (P.W. 9), who had told, whom one Steeve allegedly came and told that the appellant-accused threatened that if he were to come near, he would be the third person to be killed. The learned Sessions Judge has referred to the dialogue between the two and the actions of the appellant vis-a-vis the policeman who had reached the scene of offence. He also referred to the pelting of a stone by the appellant, which was earlier hurled at him by somebody in the crowd. The learned Sessions Judge referred to all these circumstances to conclude that they could indicate how the accused had resisted for some time his being caught and had 'kept many people at bay'. It is difficult to uphold such an inference drawn by the learned Sessions Judge on the background of the facts and circumstances discussed above. We have already pointed out how the appellant had made no effort to run away and to surrender himself to the crowd which had gathered there.
20. Mr. Nitin Sardessai, learned Counsel for the appellant, was again right in pointing out how the learned Sessions Judge has fallen into a serious error in using several circumstances against the appellant though they were not put to the appellant in his statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. For instance, he points out that there was no question put to the appellant in his statement in respect of the alleged motive of the appellant in commission of the offence. Secondly, the observations recorded by P.W. 15, Dr. Coutinho, on the basis of which the learned Sessions Judge thought that the appellant was sane and sober when the appellant was examined by Dr. Coutinho on the date of the offence itself, were not put to the appellant. The findings regarding the speech, gait, ability to walk on a straight line, muscular co-ordination etc. recorded by Dr. Coutinho at Exh. 15-B, were not put to the appellant. The only questions put in that context were questions which pertained to the smell of alcohol. It may be noted here only that as regards the smell of alcohol also, the learned Sessions Judge has considered from the report only what was interpreted by him as adverse to the appellant though the manner in which the findings were recorded in that respect, were certainly not very clear. By and large, the entire report shows that except on first three findings recorded by him, whenever Dr. Coutinho wanted to record a specific positive or negative finding, he had scored off the words which he did not want to remain in the report. On the first three items, namely, smell of alcohol from mouth, smell of alcohol from breath and state of clothing be had encircled the words 'NO' twice and the word 'soiled ' once. May it be that Dr. Coutinho wanted to lay emphasis-more on the word 'NO' in the context of first two findings and the word 'soiled' in the context of third finding. This is particularly so because, in the context of clothing 'he has left the two words unscored, namely, 'normal' and 'torn' Mr. Sardessai was critical of this method of questioning the appellant : taking from the report only what was in fact ambiguous but what was felt adverse by the learned Judge.
Lastly, but not the least, it was pointed out by Mr. Sardessai that before recording the statement of the appellant under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the learned Judge had recorded a 'wearning' for the appellant in the following terms :-
'The accused was warned that he is not bound to answer the questions put to him by the Court and in case he chooses to answer, the same may be taken as evidence against him.'
No part of section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires a Judge recording the statement