D.Y. Chandrachud, J.
1. By these petitions, the order dated December 21, 1999 passed by the Industrial Court is sought to be impugned by the petitioner which is the National Textile Corporation. All the petitions raise a common question. The facts are similar and those in the first petition may briefly be adverted to.
2. The complaint in question was filed under items 5 and 9 of Schedule IV to the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. In the first complaint, the Complainant, respondent herein, was in the employment of the erstwhile Kohinoor Mills Company Limited as a clerk. In 1983, an Ordinance known as the Textile Undertakings (Taking over of Management) Ordinance, 1983 came to be promulgated by 'virtue of which the Cotton Textile Undertakings of 13 Mills including Kohinoor Mills Company Limited were taken over. The Ordinance was subsequently replaced by an Act of 1983. The case of the respondent herein before the Industrial Court was that his services were neither terminated by the erstwhile Kohinoor Mills Company Limited nor at any time thereafter by the National Textile Corporation after take over. No notification was issued by the CentralGovernment under the Act of 1983 suspending the operation of the contract of employment. In 1982 there was a textile strike which crippled the textile industry. The complainant, however, was not one of those workers who proceeded on strike but he, in fact, offered himself for work during the period of the strike. However, he was neither assigned any work, nor was paid any salary. In the circumstances, it was alleged that by not assigning work to the complainant, the provisions of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act were attracted. The Corporation, according to the Respondent, was duty bound to pay his salary which it had refused to pay. Some time in February 1990, it is alleged that 10 to 15 clerks were called for work by the Corporation but no work was assigned to the complainant Respondent though he reported for work and continued to do so. Besides, a declaration of the commission of an unfair labour practice, the workman, inter alia, sought a direction that he should be assigned work and for the payment of arrears of salary and attendant benefits with effect from August 1, 1990. The workman had also moved an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for the payment of salary for the prior period ending on June 30, 1990.
3. A written statement was filed by the Corporation before the Industrial Court. One of the points canvassed in the Written Statement and which was the only point urged before me, was the refusal of work by the employer to the workman may amount to a closure within the meaning of Section 3(8A) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act which would merely give a right to claim compensation for such closure. Further it is submitted that in such a case the legality and validity of the closure would need to be adjudicated upon and justified and the quantum of compensation as provided under Item 7 of Schedule III of the Act would need to be assessed in accordance with law.
4. The impugned order of the Industrial Court dated December 21, 1999 came to be passed in pursuance of an order of remand passed by a learned single Judge of this Court on August 4, 1997. By the order dated August 4, 1997, the learned single Judge R.M. lODHA, J. relied upon earlier orders passed in similar cases remanding several writ petitions for fresh hearing to the Industrial Court. It may be mentioned that these remand orders came to be passed in view of a Judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court (S.H. KAPADIA, J.) in S. D. Phansekar v. N. T.C. reported in 1997 2 CLR 801. Upon remand, the Industrial Court heard the parties again and passed the impugned order. In the order which is impugned in these proceedings, the Industrial Court essentially held that in so far as the workmen in these cases are concerned, there was no cessation of the relationship of employer and employee at any stage. The Industrial Court relied on the provisions of Section 14 of the Act of 1983 and held that at no stage had the relationship of employer and employee been terminated between the parties. In para 26 of its order, the Court noticed the fact that the witness examined on behalf of the Corporation was not concerned with the working of the department where the complainant had been engaged and on whose Muster Roll his name was borne. There was no evidence forth coming on behalf of the Corporation to the effect that the services of the workmen had been terminated in any manner. The department in which the complainant was working was functioning and the Corporationhad provided work to some employees even after 1983. In these circumstances, the Industrial Court held that there was no reason why the complainant had been singled out while other employees had been preferred for providing employment. In fact, the Industrial Court noted that even after the remand pursuant to the order of this Court, the Corporation had neither raised the requisite pleas nor had adduced any evidence in the light of the observations contained in the order of this Court. The department wherein the complainant was working before the strike, was held to be still functioning. Though it was sought to be urged on behalf of the Corporation that under a settlement with the recognized union, a cut off date for reporting for work had been laid down, yet, it was found that some of the employees had been allowed to resume duties even after the alleged cut off date. Finally, the Industrial Court held that even the case of a closure, which was sought to be made out, would be of no avail since the requisite permission for closure had not been obtained. In the premises, the Court directed the Corporation to provide work to the complainant-workmen on the posts they were working and to pay salary together with the attendant benefits from July 1, 1990.
5. The only point which was sought to be urged by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Corporation was that even if there was a refusal to provide work as alleged, this would amount to a closure and, nonetheless, the legality and justification for the closure would need to be determined in an adjudication under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, in the absence of which the workers would not be entitled to any relief. There is no substance whatsoever in this submission. First and foremost, there is an admitted relationship of employer and employee between the complainant workmen and the Corporation. That relationship has never been terminated or brought to an end either before the Take Over legislation or subsequent thereto at any stage. The Industrial Court in its order referred to the provisions of Section 14 of the Act of 1983 under which every person who was a workman within the meaning of the Industrial DisputesAct, 1947 and had been immediately before the appointed day in the employment of the Textile Undertakings would become on and from the appointed day an employee of the National Textile Corporation on the same service conditions and would continue to do so until his employment was duly terminated. Admittedly, there has been no termination of the relationship of employer and employee. Secondly, the admitted position is that more than 100 employees were employed in the establishment. There was no closure permission within the meaning of Section 25-O of the Act. There was no valid or lawful closure. Thirdly, as a matter of fact it has been found that the department where the complainants were working still continued to function. The Industrial Court justifiably held that in these circumstances, it was not open to the Corporation to select a few employees for : being allotted work and for the payment of wages. Fourthly, the remedy, if any, under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act cannot operate to oust the remedy under the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971. Concurrent remedies are available under the provisions of Industrial Legislation and merely because one remedy was available could not be a ground to legitimately hold that complaints under the MRTU & PULP Act were not maintainable. : What the decision of the learned single Judge in S.D. Phansekar v. NTC (supra), underlined was that matters such as the refusal to give work, and the reasons thereof could not be investigated into in proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This followed the well settled position in law in regard to the nature of the proceedings under Section 33-C(2), so that where the liability of the parties needs to be determined, recourse cannot be had to the proceedings under Section 33-C(2). In the present case, on the other hand, findings have been arrived at after evidence was led in complaints under the MRTU &PULP; Act, 1971. Finally, regard must be had to the fact that the object of the 1983 Act, was to reorganize and rehabilitate the textile undertakings and thereby protect the interests of the workmen employed therein. As the Supreme Court held in NTC v. RMMS, : (1993)ILLJ954SC , 'this recital in the preamble makes it clear that one of the principal objects of the Act is to protect the interests of the workmen who were already employed in the textile mills.' The Court further held thus : (1993)ILLJ954SC :
'14. The said provisions state that if the contract of employment of a workman is to be terminated, the custodian can do so if he is of the opinion that it is unduly onerous. However, while terminating the contract, he has to give one month's notice in writing or salary or wages, as the case may be, for one month in lieu of the notice. This provision is consistent with the object of the Act and also with the provisions of the I.D. Act. It is, therefore, amply clear that Section 3(3) and 3(4) do not have the effect of terminating the contract of employment of the workmen. It is also not disputed that neither the custodian nor the appellants who stepped into his shoes had at any time put an end to the contract of employment of any of the workmen involved in the present dispute pursuant to the provisions of Section 13.'
6. From this perspective therefore, the orders passed by the Industrial Court in these cases are consistent with the legal position and subserve the underlying spirit of the legislation. Consequently, I do not find any substance in the petitions which are accordingly dismissed.
7. Certified copy of this order expedited.
8. An ordinary copy of this order may be made available to the parties.