S.C. Dharmadhikari, J.
1. By this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner prays that the orders dated 26/3/1999 and the order dated 12.10.1999 (Annexure P-1 collectively) be quashed and set aside and the respondents be directed to reinstate him in service with full back wages and consequential benefits.
2. By the orders impugned in this petition, the petitioner challenges the imposition of major penalty of dismissal from services. This penalty was imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, Dy. Director (Vigilance), Government of Goa. In review petition, being Review Petition No. 5/99 which was filed by the petitioner before the Governor of Goa, the Governor of Goa has, by his order dated 12.10.1999 modified the punishment of dismissal from service and substituted it by compulsory retirement.
3. At the relevant time, the petitioner was serving as Asst. Director of Transport, Transport Department of Government of Goa. He joined the services in 1975 as Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector on ad hoc basis and thereafter was promoted on 16.11.1984 as Inspector. His further promotion was Assistant Director of Transport which post he was holding when he was served with an order of suspension (Annexure P-2) dated 24.12.1996. The Governor of Goa invoked the powers conferred by Sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for short, 'the CCS(CCA) Rules). It was stated in the order of suspension that disciplinary proceedings are contemplated against the petitioner.
4. Thereafter, a charge-sheet (Annexure P-3) dated 1/10/1997 was served upon him. Along with the charge-sheet, statement of imputation in support of each article of charge, was enclosed. The petitioner was directed to submit his written statement in defence and also state if he desires to be heard in person. An inquiry was proposed to be held only in respect of those articles of charge which are not admitted. The inquiry was proposed in terms of the CCS(CCA) Rules.
5. The charges are that while functioning as the Asst. Director of Transport at Mapusa during 5.2.1996 to 24.12.1996, the petitioner accepted and entertained several applications in Form 20, 21 and 22 of Rule 47 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules for registration of new vehicles. It is alleged that in gross violation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, and the Rules made thereunder, the petitioner fraudulently got processed and endorsed the registration of new vehicles mentioned in the application, as Registering Authority, without the inspection of the registered vehicles himself or by the Inspecting Authority for certifying that the particulars of the vehicles contained in the applications were true and that the vehicles complied with the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act and Rules made thereunder. It is alleged that the petitioner did this knowingly and after having reasons to believe that the vehicles were neither inspected in showrooms nor physically presented by the purchasers at the time of registration for inspection and that the said vehicles were purchased by the purchasers residing outside the State of Goa. It is alleged that in furtherance of the above act, the petitioner arranged and accepted forged affidavits from the purchasers as evidence of their residence in Goa, which were of posterior dates, to the date of registration of the vehicles. Signatures of the deponents on the affidavits do not tally with the signatures of the registered owners in Form 20 of the applications. By the above acts, the petitioner failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Government Servant, thereby violating Rules 3(1)(i),(ii) and (iii) of C.C.S. (Conduct) Rules, 1964, read with Motor Vehicles Act, and the Rules made thereunder. The above Rules would, hereinafter, be referred to as 'the Conduct Rules'.
6. It is alleged that the Rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act mandates that the applicant filing application for registration of vehicles must produce proof of residence in Goa. Such proof is to be produced by annexing to the application the documents particularly mentioned in the rules relevant for that purpose. In the instant case, there is no compliance of Rule 4 inasmuch as the application did not contain evidence with regard to the correctness of the address and age of the applicants; that there were no documents accompanying the application, but mere affidavit is produced by the applicant to show that he was resident of Goa. This was an affidavit of the applicant himself. But even that did not fulfill the requirement of the Rules in this behalf, inasmuch as it was not sworn before any authority prescribed thereunder. In such circumstances, even the affidavits were completely unacceptable. Further, the petitioner as Registering Authority did not bother to verify and scrutinize the applications in accordance with the Rules. The applications contained various deficiencies, such as nonmentioning of Technical specifications, Engine numbers, chassis numbers, etc. are not mentioned, together with the evidence regarding age and residence of the purchasers. The applications are accompanied by affidavits in some cases which are in a language, other than one specified, in the applications themselves. The petitioner endorsed such applications although he was knowing and had reasons to believe that the new vehicles were not inspected by the Inspecting Authorities.
7. Lastly, the petitioner was charged with failing to maintain a permanent register of motor vehicles as required by Rule 49 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, specially in respect of the vehicles covered by the charges referred to above. By not maintaining such details or having them not filled in in the permanent register, it has become difficult for the Authorities to trace the owners of the registered vehicles in case of any accident or use of such vehicles for any illegal activities.
8. The petitioner replied to the charge-sheet on 6.10.1997 and denied all the charges. The petitioner's reply proceeds on the basis that he was working as the Assistant Director of Transport and that he was the Registering Authority. However, while insisting that he should be furnished copies of all documents relied upon to frame the charges, he contended that he has followed the usual practice of registration of vehicles as is prevalent in the various offices in the Transport Department in Goa and any relaxation, was only in public interest so as not to cause harassment to the members of the public while complying with the provisions of law. Finally, he contended hat 26 vehicles at Mapusa, 38 vehicles at Bicholim were cleared and registered without obtaining any proof of residence as required under Rule 4 of Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 during the period 1.1.95 to 28.2.1997. He named the persons who had been the Registering Authority at the relevant time and also disclosed the vehicle Numbers. Further, he gave details of such registrations within the jurisdiction of the Registering Authority at Margao and contended that this is only a sample for emphasizing the fact of prevailing practice of registration. This practice was prevailing or followed according to the petitioner, but no action has been initiated or contemplated against the Officers who are guilty of more serious violations in compliance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules in matters of registration of vehicles. He contended that he has been implicated malafide on the basis of the alleged false affidavits which are not sworn, procured or obtained by him.
9. After written statement was received by the authority concerned, further steps were taken inasmuch as an Inquiry Officer was appointed. The Inquiry Officer held the inquiry and afforded opportunity to the petitioner as also the Department and submitted his report dated 15.1.1999. A copy of this report is annexed to the paper book.
10. It is upon the submission of the report in terms of the procedure contemplated by the Rules that the Disciplinary Authority arrived at the conclusion that major penalty of dismissal needs to be imposed, as the lapses, irregularities and negligence of the petitioner are of serious nature. The Disciplinary Authority consulted the Goa Public Service Commission which agreed with the conclusions and that is how the subject penalty was imposed. The matter was carried in review as aforesaid and the Governor modified the punishment.
11. These orders are subject matter of challenge in this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. This petition was admitted and placed for hearing and final disposal before us. In the meanwhile, another petition being Writ Petition No. 65/06 was filed by one Smt. Imelda D'Souza. She was working, at the relevant time, as Cashier and was served with the charge-sheet. Upon the charge-sheet being served defence was submitted and an inquiry was held against her. She was served with an order imposing penalty of removal from Government Service. Her petition was directed to be heard along with the present petition.
12. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, the learned Government Advocate and the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 65/06 agree that the only plea common in the petitions is the issue of jurisdiction of the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority. The argument which is commonly contended is that the Goa State came into being with effect from 30.5.1987. The Goa State being established and Goa Reorganisation Act promulgated, the employees became and have been treated as Goa Government employees and the CCS(CCA) Rules do not apply to the said employees. Their continuation in service, so also the disciplinary power over them is now available under some other Rules. The CCS(CCA) Rules and the Conduct Rules being inapplicable, the inquiry against them under the said Rules is without jurisdiction and, therefore, the dismissal order is nonest and deserves to be quashed and set aside. Shri Kakodkar, learned Senior Counsel appearing in Writ Petition No. 235/01 argued this issue of jurisdiction and his submissions have been adopted by Shri Sonak, appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 65/2006. However, Shri Rivonkar, learned Government Advocate applied for time for filing an affidavit-in-reply as far as merits of the controversy in Writ Petition No. 65/06. He submitted that if the jurisdictional issue in both the matters is decided and the inquiry, is held to be legal and valid, then, on merits he would like to file a detailed affidavit in Writ Petition No. 65/06 and prays that time be granted to do the same. In the view taken by us as set out in the subsequent paragraphs, this request of Shri Rivonkar is granted and the said Writ Petition is adjourned for four weeks. The Writ Petition No. 65/06 shall be placed for hearing after four weeks as prayed.
13. Now turning to the contentions of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 235/01, Shri Kakodkar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner contended before us that the CCS(CCA) Rules are not applicable to the employees of Goa Government. He submits that these are applicable only to Central Government employees and such of the employees of the Central Government whose services have been made over to the State Government or they are placed on deputation with the State Government. Therefore, after the Goa State came into being, the Rules applicable to the Central Government employees are no longer applicable and, therefore, the respondents could not have resorted to these rules and proceeded against the petitioner. No charge-sheet could have been issued invoking these Rules, nor could an inquiry officer be appointed to conduct an inquiry in furtherance of such charge-sheet. If the inquiry could not have been initiated at all and its initiation itself being vitiated, then, all further steps are also vitiated and the order of dismissal must, therefore, be set aside on this ground alone. In other words, if the initiation of inquiry is ab initio void and without jurisdiction, then, the final order in the inquiry also is nonest and must be quashed and set aside on this ground alone.
14. Without prejudice and in the alternative, Shri Kakodkar submitts that the initiation of disciplinary proceedings is malafide inasmuch as no action was taken against the other Assistant Directors of the Transport Department for similar alleged lapses in the matter of registration of motor vehicles. He submits that the inquiry was held after long unexplained delay of over one year after suspension and decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings. He next submitted that the Government in Vigilance Department has no jurisdiction to issue charge sheet or impose penalty on the petitioner as the petitioner belongs to Transport Department and that only Transport Department could be a disciplinary authority for the petitioner. Mr. Kakodkar submits that the articles of charge and the supporting imputations do not make out any misconduct on the part of the petitioner.
15. Mr. Kakodkar then submits that the inquiry proceedings are an outrage on the principles of natural justice and fair play as the petitioner was not permitted to engage a Lawyer, although the nature of articles of charge and the voluminous material produced by the Department to sustain them required grant of such permission. Shri Kakodkar submits that the inquiry authority rushed through the inquiry some how to complete it within the time limit specified by this Court, resulting in refusal of legitimate request of the petitioner in aid of proper defence. He submits that the Department was allowed to produce and rely on over 900 files relating to registration of motor vehicles; whereas the petitioner was restricted to merely four files out of 2500 relied upon to show that the practice followed in regard to registration at Mapusa was nothing different from the practice at other offices in Goa and that there were similar alleged lapses.
16. Shri Kakodkar then submits that Inquiry Officer relied upon statements of some persons given before the police which were attached by the Presenting Officer to his written brief after closure of the inquiry which were not given to the petitioner during the course of inquiry. Shri Kakodkar urges that the findings of the inquiry officer and that of disciplinary authority are perverse and vitiated for non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 14(18) of the CCS(CCA) Rules which mandates that the delinquent official be given opportunity to explain the material/evidence against him, thereby causing great prejudice to the petitioner. He submits that reliance on evidence of witnesses whose credibility was severely impaired or who stood condemned by their own mouth has caused prejudice to the petitioner. Mr. Kakodkar submits that the findings are not justified and are contrary to the material/evidence on record. That the inquiring authority disregarded the material/evidence favourable to the petitioner. Shri Kakodkar submits that the inquiry officer did not assess and deal with the petitioners contentions/representations. Shri Kakodkar submits that admittedly, there was no loss to revenue or damage to public interest by the alleged lapses. Lastly and in further alternative, he urged that the penalty imposed is grossly disproportionate. Considering delinquency of the petitioner and his past record, he deserves a lesser punishment. In any event, the decision to do away with his services on account of the disproportionate punishment imposed on him vis a vis misconduct alleged is in violation of the mandate of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
17. Shri Kakodkar places reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contentions:
(a) C.L. Subramaniam v. The Collector of Customs, Cochin reported in 1972 SC 2178;
(b) Union of India and Ors. v. J. Ahmed reported in : (1979)IILLJ14SC ,
(c) Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Ors. reported in : (2007)4SCC566 ;
18. On the other hand, Shri Rivonkar, learned Government Advocate contended that powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a judicial review are extremely limited. It is not a Court of further appeal. In this limited jurisdiction, this Court cannot reappreciate and reappraise the materials before the Disciplinary Authority. He submits that the inquiry is in accordance with law and at no stage the petitioner urged that the Inquiry Officer had no jurisdiction or that the Disciplinary Authority cannot punish him. The petitioner fully participated in the inquiry. The petitioner himself made applications invoking the CCS(CCA) Rules and provisions under the Conduct Rules. He himself relied upon these Rules in support of his contentions as far as appointment of Defence Representative and inspection of relevant and necessary documents. Further, he relied upon these very rules in support of his argument of the alleged breach of principles of natural justice. Having participated in the proceedings without demur or protest, it is not open for him to urge that the inquiry is without jurisdiction. The petitioner cannot approbate and reprobate and, therefore, he is estopped from contending that the order is void being without jurisdiction.
19. That apart, placing reliance upon the CCS(CCA) Rules and the Goa, Daman and Diu Reorganisation Act, 1987 (for short, 'the Goa Reorganisation Act'), it is urged by Shri Rivonkar that the CCS(CCA) Rules continue to apply to the Government employees, unless the Goa State steps in and frames its own rules. The CCS(CCA) Rules have been framed in pursuance of under Article 309 of the Constitution of India and in terms of Section 60(6) of the Goa Reorganisation Act, these rules are saved. Once they are saved by law and continue to apply to the employees, unless replaced by state Rules, then, inquiry could have been initiated by taking recourse to them.
Having taken recourse to these Rules and initiated an inquiry under the CCS(CCA) Rules, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the inquiry itself is bad in law. Shri Rivonkar contended that the words 'conditions of service' appearing in proviso to Section 60(6) of the Goa Reorganisation Act would demonstrate that disciplinary provisions in the Central Rules continue to apply and they cannot be altered to the prejudice of the employees. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention of Shri Kakodkar in that behalf.
20. On merits, Shri Rivonkar submitted that the inquiry was fair and full opportunity was given to the petitioner to put forward his defence. He was granted opportunity to inspect the documents, to cross examine the witnesses and to rely upon his own documents. There was no haste in conclusion of the inquiry. The inquiry was not initiated after unreasonable and unexplained delay. Further, the inquiry cannot be said to be vitiated as the petitioner participated in the same and placed his version before the Inquiry Officer. Some technical flaws in the proceedings would not be enough to set aside the inquiry. No prejudice is caused during the conduct of the inquiry and, therefore, the submissions in that behalf are misconceived and untenable. The petitioner has not denied that registers were not maintained or if maintained, there were no entries with regard to the subject vehicles. There was no proof of age and residence. That the affidavits were submitted after the date of the application. That the signatures on these affidavits do not tally with the signatures on the applications and that the petitioner did not inspect subject vehicles, nor caused any inspection to be done. In the absence of the relevant details pertaining to the vehicles, the same have been registered by following some prevailing practice. If this is the version, then, he has admitted the acts attributed to him. In such circumstances, the arguments now canvassed are an afterthought and should be rejected. For all these reasons, the petition deserves to be dismissed.
21. Shri Rivonkar has taken us through Sections 40 and 41 of the Motor Vehicles Act, so also Rule 47 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 and contended that these provisions are mandatory. He submits that the petitioner is 'Registering Authority' and must ensure compliance thereof by the Department. There is, admittedly, a default committed in compliance with these rules. Ultimately, the responsibility is that of the petitioner and he cannot be heard to say that the duty is of his subordinates. He submits that the burden cannot be passed on to somebody else by the petitioner. This is not a case of some error in discharge of duty or mistake, but a clear case of breach of duty in law. In such circumstances, the relevant service rules are attracted and the petitioner is guilty under the same. The Inquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority and the Honourable Governor have rightly concluded that the petitioner has committed serious lapses, irregularities and negligence while performing his duties and said negligence is of a serious nature. The petitioner is, therefore, guilty of lack of devotion to duty and he as acted in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant. For the said acts, he must be visited with major penalty. Shri Rivonkar urges that even the penalty is modified and in such circumstances, there is no merit in the petition and it must be dismissed.
22. For properly appreciating the rival contentions, firstly, it is necessary to consider the factual position.
23. It is undisputed before us that the petitioner was working as Assistant Director of Transport, Directorate of Transport, Government of Goa and at the relevant time he was posted at Mapusa. Further, it is undisputed that he was the 'Registering Authority' within the meaning of the said term appearing in the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules made thereunder. So also, the Goa Motor Vehicles Rules, 1991. The petitioner proceeded on the basis that the CCS(CCA) Rules and the Conduct Rules were applicable to him. In this behalf, what the CCS(CCA) Rules disclose is that they are applicable to the Central Civil Servant and civilian post of the corresponding class in the defence service. The term is, thus, defined in inclusive manner. The term 'Government servant' is defined under Rule 2(h), to mean a person who is a member of service or holds a civil post under the Union and includes any such person in foreign service or whose services are temporarily placed at the disposal of a State Government, or a local or other authority. The term also means a person who is a member of a service or holds a civil post under a State Government and whose services are temporarily placed at the disposal of the Central Government. It also includes a person in the service of a local or other authority and whose services are temporarily placed at the disposal of the Central Government.
24. Term 'service' is defined under Rule 2(m) to mean a civil service of the Union. The Rules are applicable to other Government servants, including every civilian Government servant in the Defence Services, but is inapplicable to those persons which are specifically mentioned in Rule 3, Clauses (a) to (e).
25. Part II of the Rules, deals with Classification of Services and Posts. Whereas, Part III deals with Appointing Authority. Part IV is entitled 'Suspension' and Part V provides for Penalties and Disciplinary Authorities. Part VI sets out a procedure for imposing penalties. Part VII provides for appeals. Whereas Part VIII provides for revision and review. Part IX is entitled 'Miscellaneous'. It is not the case of the petitioner that these rules were inapplicable to him when he entered service. However, his submission is that his services are now under the Government of Goa. His submission is that by virtue of Goa Reorganisation Act and on establishment of the State of Goa, these Rules are inapplicable to him.
26. As far as the Rules are concerned, Rule 1 thereof makes it very clear that they apply to other persons appointed to civil service or posts (including civilian in the Defence Services) in connection with the affairs of the Union. Thus, it is not the case of the petitioner that the CCS(CCA) Rules or the Conduct Rules were not governing the field prior to the State of Goa being established. Goa was an Union Territory and admittedly both the Rules were applicable.
27. Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules reads as under ;
(1) Every Government servant shall at all times-
(i) maintain absolute integrity;
(ii) maintain devotion to duty; and
(iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government servant.
(2) (i) Every Government servant holding a supervisory post shall take all possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to the duty of all Government servants for the time being under his control and authority;
(ii) No Government servant shall, in the performance of his official duties, or in the exercise of powers conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior;
(iii) The direction of the official superior shall ordinarily be in writing. Oral directions to subordinates shall be avoided, as far as possible. Where the issue of oral direction becomes unavoidable, the official superior shall confirm it in writing immediately thereafter;
(v) A Government servant who has received oral direction from his official superior shall seek confirmation of the same in writing as early as possible, whereupon it shall be the duty of the official superior to confirm the direction in writing.
EXPLANATION I. - A Government servant who habitually fails to perform the task assigned to him within the time set for the purpose and with the quality of performance expected of him shall be deemed to be lacking in devotion to duty within the meaning of Clause (ii) of Sub-rule (1).
EXPLANATION II. - Nothing in Clause (ii) of subrule (2) shall be construed as empowering a Government servant to evade his responsibilities by seeking instructions from, or approval of, a superior officer or authority, when such instructions are not necessary under the scheme of distribution of powers and responsibilities.
Thus, the conduct rules are specifically dealing with the conduct of the Government servants and provides for several aspects of it. The Government servant has to all times maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and should not act in a manner which is unbecoming of a Government servant. A bare reading of the reproduced rule would indicate that every Government servant holding supervisory post shall take all possible steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to the duty of all Government servants for the time being under his control and authority. It is not as if the Government servant has no freedom and independence even when acting at the behest or command of his superior. That aspect has also been taken care of. Thus, while ensuring his freedom and independence, so also conferring upon him enough powers, otherwise, the Conduct Rules provide that the Government servant must discharge his duty as a Government servant with absolute integrity and devotion. Ultimately, the powers that are conferred upon him are in the nature of trust. He should not abuse them or act in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant. When we are speaking of public employment, then, the public trust doctrine comes into play and no Government servant can act in a manner by which the trust reposed in him is breached.
28. The Goa Reorganisation Act is an Act providing for the reorganization of the Union territory of Goa, Daman and Diu for matters connected therewith. Part II of the same deals with reorganisation of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. Section 3 deals with formation of State of Goa and Section 4 provides for formation of Union Territory of Daman and Diu. The Constitution of India is amended to the extent indicated in Section 5. Part III provides for Representation in the Legislatures. Part IV provides for High Court. Part V deals with authorisation of expenditure and distribution of revenues. Part VI deals with assets and liabilities. We may not refer to these provisions, in details, as they are not relevant for the present petition.
29. Part VII makes provision with regard to arrangements, corporations and inter-state agreements. Then comes Section VIII, which contains provisions as to services. Section 59 makes provision relating to All India Services and defines the expression 'State Cadre'. The strength and composition of the cadre of Goa shall, on and from the appointed day, be such as is determined by the Central Government in consultation with the State Government. Section 59(3) and (4) read thus:
(3) The members of each of the said Services borne on the Union territories cadre immediately before the appointed day shall continue to be in the cadre of the same service of the Union territory in which they stand allocated before the appointed day.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the operation, on or after the appointed day, of the All India Services Act, 1951, or the rules made thereunder, in relation to the State cadre of the said services and in relation to the members of those services borne on the said cadres.
A bare perusal of the same would indicate that the services of the members of Union territory cadre which are in force immediately before the appointed day have been continued in the same cadre and the same services in the Union territory are allocated to the Goa State. The section is not affecting anything prior to the appointed day, including operation of All India Services Act, 1951 or Rules made thereunder in relation to the cadre of the said services. It is apparent that the Legislature was aware of the extension of cadre of Union territory and while granting independent power to the State Government to determine its own strength and composition as far as services are concerned, did not affect the provisions and services hitherto under the control of the Union territory.
30. This becomes apparent if one peruses Section 60 of the Reorganisation Act. Sub-section (1) thereof mandates that every person employed in connection with the affairs of the Union territory or the State of Goa and serving, immediately before the appointed day in the district of Goa of the existing Union territory shall, on and from that day continue to serve in connection with the affairs of the Sate of Goa and be deemed to be provisionally allotted to serve in connection with the affairs of the said State. Deputations were excluded from the purview of Section 60(1)(b). Sub- Section (2) provides that the Central Government shall determine by general or special order, whether every person referred to in Clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 60 shall be finally allotted for service in the state of Goa or under the Union in connection with the affairs of the Union territory of Goa, Daman and Diu or not and Sub-section (3) of Section 60 provides for consequence of final allotment by the Central Government to the State of Goa. Further consequences of final allotment are provided in Sub-section (4) and Sub-section (5). Sub-section (6) of Section 60 has been pressed into service and it reads thus:
Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect, on or after the appointed day, the operation of the provisions of Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution in relation to the determination of the conditions of service of persons serving in connection with the affairs of the State of Goa or the Union: Provided that the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of any person referred to in Sub-section (1) or subsection (2) shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval the Central Government.
A bare perusal of the same would indicate that Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution in relation to the determination of the conditions of service of persons serving in connection with the affairs of the State of Goa or the Union remain unaffected after the appointed day. While continuing various conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of any person referred to in Section 60(1) or Section 60(2), the Legislature has ensured that such conditions shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval of the Central Government.
31. Then comes Sub-section (7) which provides that all services prior to the appointed day rendered by a person allotted under Sub-section (2) in connection with the affairs of the existing Union territory shall for purposes of the rules regarding his conditions of service, be deemed to have been rendered in connection with the affairs of the State or the Union to which he is finally allotted.
32. Section 61 reads thus:
61. Provisions as to continuance of officers in the same posts. Every person who immediately before the appointed day is holding or discharging the duties of any post or office in connection with the affairs of the existing Union territory shall continue to hold the same post or office and shall be deemed, on and from that day, to have been duly appointed on the same terms and conditions of appointment and on the same tenure to that post or office by the Government of, or the other appropriate authority, in the State of Goa or of the Union, as the case may be:
Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a competent authority, on or after the appointed day, from passing in relation to such person any order affecting his continuance in such post or office.
A bare perusal of Section 61 would indicate that every person, who immediately before the appointed day, is holding or discharging the duties of any post or office in connection with the affairs of the existing Union territory, shall continue to hold the same post or office and shall be deemed, on and from that day, to have been duly appointed on the same terms and conditions of appointment and on the same tenure to that post or office by the Government of, or the other appropriate authority, in the State of Goa or of the Union, as the case may be. Admittedly, the petitioner joined the services on 26.6.1975 in the Department of Transport under the then Union territory of Goa and was promoted as Motor Vehicles Inspector in the year 1984. Since he was promoted as Assst. Director of Transport in the Transport Department of Goa on regular post on 15.1.1992, it is apparent that his services rendered prior to the appointed day i.e. 30th May, 1987 have been taken into consideration by the State of Goa. He has been continued in service by virtue of the above statutory provisions and unless and until it is demonstrated that his services have been governed after the appointed day by different set of rules which replace the CCS(CCA) Rules and Conduct Rules or modified or substituted them in some manner, we have to proceed on the basis that the Rules applicable to the petitioner continue to remain in force. That such Rules are not replaced or superseded by any Rules is also an admitted position. In such circumstances, the Central Rules which have been made pursuant to the Constitutional provision referred to in Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution of India, they cannot be said to be straight away inapplicable, the moment Goa State is established or the Goa Reorganisation Act is brought into effect or force. If such had been the Legislative intent, it would have expressed it in clearest terms. On the other hand, it is to the contrary. It does not provide as contended by Mr. Kakodkar that the Central Rules are inapplicable after the services of the petitioner have been made over to the State of Goa. In such circumstances, we are unable to conclude that the inquiry which was initiated under the Central Rules was null, void and totally without jurisdiction, as contended by him.
33. If this was not to be the case, then, there was no occasion for Shri Kakodkar to contend that Section 60(6) of the Goa Reorganisation Act does not take within its import the disciplinary proceeding or the power to impose punishment pursuant thereto. His contention is that the term 'conditions of service of persons' would not include the provisions under the CCS(CCA) Rules and the Conduct Rules. The Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) provisions for disciplinary inquiries are not included in the words 'conditions of service of persons'. They would have to be construed to take within their import only matters of pay and allowances etc. and not disciplinary matters. We are unable to accept this contention as well.
34. It is not as if such a controversy has not been dealt with earlier. In a decision reported in Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mirja Khasim Ali Beg and Anr. reported in : (1977)ILLJ262SC , while construing identical provision of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956, this is what the Honourable Supreme Court has observed:
A bare perusal of Sub-section (7) of Section 115 of the Sates Reorganisation Act, 1956, reproduced above makes it clear that nothing contained in that section could, after the appointed day i.e. November 1, 1956, affect the operation of the provisions of Chapter I or Part XIV of the Constitution which includes Articles 311 thereof in relation to the determination of the conditions of service of persons serving with in connection with the affairs of the Union or any State and the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to any person who is allotted to another State could varied to his prejudice except with the previous approval of the Central Government. Reference in this connection may be made to two decisions of this Court in M.D. Shukla v. State of Gujarat : [1970]3SCR515 and N. Raghavendra Rao v. Deputy Commissioner of South Kanara, Mangalore : [1964]7SCR549 . In the later case, it was held by this Court that the effect of Sub-section (7) of Section 115 of the States Reorganisation Act is to preserve the power of the State to make rules under Article 309 of the Constitution but the proviso imposes a limitation on the exercise of that power, the limitation being that the State cannot vary the conditions of service applicable immediately before November 1, 1956, to the disadvantage of persons mentioned in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 115 of the Act. In the view of the Court, the broad purpose underlying the proviso to Section 115(7) of the Act was to ensure that the conditions of the service of the aforesaid persons shall not be changed except with the prior approval of the Central Government i.e. before embarking on varying the conditions of service, the State Governments should obtain the concurrence of the Central Government. Now as pointed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in North West Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain Anand and by this Court in Pradyat Kumar Bose v. The Hon'ble Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court : [1955]2SCR1331 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul Singh : [1970]3SCR302 , the expression 'conditions of service' is an expression of wide import and the dismissal from service is a matter which falls within the conditions of service of public servants. It is also well settled that it is not possible by means of any legislative provision or rule to take away the guarantee provided by Article 311(1) of the Constitution which lays down that no public servant shall be dismissed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed and if any such legislative provision or rule lays down otherwise, it will clearly be ultra vires. (See Rangachari v. Secretary of State North West Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain Anand (supra) and The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Babu Ram Upadhya : 1961CriLJ773 . It follows, therefore, that the protections including the constitutional protection enshrined in Article 311(1) of the Constitution enjoyed by persons holding civil post under the State like the first respondents prior to the coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 could not, after the appointed day i.e. November 1, 1956, be kept away, whittled down or impaired by any legislative enactment or rule.
Some what identical view has been take by a Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court in a decision reported in . It observed in para 10 of its Judgment as under:
Again, while upholding the validity of Mysore General Services, (Revenue Subordinate Branch) Recruitment Rules (1959), the Supreme Court did not hold in : [1964]7SCR549 (a case to which reference will be made a little later in connection with another submission of the Counsel for the petitioners) that rules relating to departmental promotion do not fall under the genus 'conditions of service'. Specific reference was made, inter alia, to rules for departmental promotion and it was held that a change in service conditions brought about by the 1959 Mysore Rules was valid. Laying down the efficiency and other qualifications for securing the best services like the prescribing of a qualifying test for being eligible for promotion would certainly not be violative of the guarantee of equal opportunity conferred by Article 16 of the Constitution, but it cannot, in my opinion, be said that rules laying down such conditions are anything, but, 'conditions of service'. For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the conditions of service of the petitioners have been affected by the provisions contained in Rr 6(f) and 7(1)(e)(i) regarding they are being ineligible for consideration for promotion to the posts of assistants without passing the qualifying test.
35. In a prior decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in M. Ramappa v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. Reported in : (1966)IILLJ152SC , the issue of inconsistency of the earlier provisions vis-a-vis State Reorganisation contemplated by the Reorganisation 1956 was considered. The conclusion was, unless it is demonstrated that there is anything inconsistent in other law, the question of the State Reorganisation Act and its provisions having effect notwithstanding would not arise.
36. A Full Bench of Punjab High Court in Moti Lal Bhagwan Das and Ors. v. The Union of India and Ors. Reported in , while outlying the object and purpose of Section 115(7) of the State Reorganisation Act, which is on par with Section 60(6) of the Goa Reorganisation Act, held that just because the Parliament authorises the Central Government to deal with service matters concerning the services, it does not mean that such power is to go on for ever, overriding the power of the Governor under Article 309. Therefore, all that Sub-sections (7) says is that after the appointed day, the provisions of Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution will continue to operate until such time as the variation contemplated thereunder is done by the State Government.
37. It appears to us that the intention is obvious. There is no desire to have a vacuum or no man's land, the moment the State of Goa is established and the services are made over to it. As long as the services are made over and being utilized by the State, until such time as it carries out the necessary exercise contemplated in law, there must be some provision in the field to govern the service conditions. Therefore, the existing service conditions continue to Govern the persons whose services are made over to the State. If that had not been the intent, then, obviously, a vacuum is created. Those services could have been made over, but with no governing service conditions. Once the provisions are appreciated in their proper perspective, then it is not possible to uphold the contention of Shri Kakodkar, which is adopted by Shri Sonak, to the contrary. For these reasons, we are unable to uphold the argument that inquiry and the consequent punishment is without jurisdiction. The Decisions, which, we have noticed above conclude the issue.
38. As far as merits are concerned, we are of the view that there is no substance in the contention of Shri Kakodkar that the petitioner was handicapped and could not defend himself properly. The Reliance placed by Shri Kakodkar on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court on C.L. Subramaniam's case (supra) is misplaced. There, in the facts peculiar to that case, the Supreme Court held that the appellant was pitted against a trained Prosecutor. Once he was pitted against the trained Prosecutor, who was experienced in conducting departmental inquiries and the Disciplinary Authority did not consider at all the grievance of the appellant before the Supreme Court that he should be given legal assistance, that the Supreme Court reached the conclusion relied upon in paras 13 to 16 and 19 of the said decision.
39. In our case, there is obviously a factual distinction. The petitioner himself in his letter, addressed to the Chief Minister of Goa on 7.1.1997 urged that the Presenting Officer is a Deputy Collector. There is a vast difference between the term 'Judicial Officer' used in this letter and the 'Deputy Collector'. The application is absolutely vague and does not demonstrate as to how the Petitioner would be handicapped and prejudiced, if a person with legal background is not allowed to defend him. The decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in Venkataraman Samba Murthy v. Union of India and Anr. reported in 1986 Mah. L.J. 60 and the decision of the Supreme Court in The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and Ors. reported in : (1983)ILLJ1SC are distinguishable on facts. The Supreme Court itself in a later decision has clarified this aspect in the case of State of Kerala and Ors. v. Kannan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. reported in : (1991)2SCC282 . It is not as if the discretion is improperly exercised merely because the request to engage a Lawyer is rejected. The petitioner does not request for services of a Lawyer, but that of a person with legal background. The petitioner is not pitted against a person experienced in law or with the legal background. The Inquiry Officer who has been appointed in this case is the Managing Director of Goa Construction Housing and Finance Corporation Ltd. The person who was appointed as the Presenting Officer was one time a Deputy Collector. In such circumstances, we are of the opinion that the discretion in refusing the petitioner to be defended by a legal practitioner has been rightly exercised. That apart, the petitioner has fully participated in the inquiry and has not been prejudiced in any manner on that count.
40. There is no substance in the contention that the inquiry has been delayed. The inquiry was commenced within one year of the suspension of the petitioner and in the peculiar facts and circumstances, we do not find this is an unreasonably and unduly long period to vitiate the inquiry. Equally, there is no substance in the contention that the inquiry was concluded hastily and the petitioner was not allowed to defend himself adequately and properly. The petitioner was allowed to inspect such of the files and documents as have been relied upon by the respondents and the Inquiry Officer. Merely because voluminous files and records are produced during the course of inquiry, does not mean that the request to produce equal number of files by the petitioner must be granted. Ultimately, sample cases have been relied upon from these files. The petitioner was aware of these sample cases. The petitioner fully new the charges that he has to meet. He was aware of the background and the facts in which the charges were framed. He was fully aware of the fact that he has been proceeded against on account of his showing lack of devotion to duty in not maintaining the registers as far as registration of the vehicles during the relevant period. That the vehicles have been registered without following the due procedure prescribed in law and that they have been registered by violating and bypassing the mandatory requirements. Such being the nature of charges and sample cases having been brought to the notice of the petitioner and the Inquiry Officer. The witnesses of the Respondents being cross examined, we are of the opinion that the petitioner is not prejudiced in any manner on account of the alleged refusal to produce the documents and files by him. The inquiry is not hastily concluded, but the manner in which the Inquiry Officer proceeded demonstrates that it was with a view to comply with the order and directions of this Court in a writ petition instituted by the petitioner himself that the Inquiring Officer impressed upon the parties the urgency. The request of the petitioner is to conclude the inquiry expeditiously. The Inquiry Officer has proceeded in this direction and that by itself is no ground to conclude that the inquiry proceedings are vitiated on account of undue haste on the part of the Inquiry Officer.
41. Lastly, what remains is the manner in which the Inquiry Officer has examined the witnesses. The submission is that irrelevant and inadmissible evidence has been taken into consideration and relied upon and relevant and admissible evidence has been discarded. Apart from the fact that the contention is vague, what we find from the record is that the Inquiry Officer may have committed an error on some occasions in relying upon the versions of persons whose statements were recorded during the preliminary investigation and inquiry, but his final conclusions and findings are not based only on this material. The Inquiry Officer had before him, the statements of witnesses and the documents, contents of which are not disputed. Each of the witnesses have been allowed to be cross examined by the petitioner. Merely because the charge of fraud or forgery as alleged has not been conclusively established and proved that, by itself, is not enough to conclude that the petitioner is not guilty of the charges framed by the respondents. It is pertinent to note that the Petitioner does not allege malafides or bad faith on the part of Respondents at all.
42. In this behalf, the record would indicate that the charge was that the petitioner was receiving applications directly. In normal course, on receipt of the applications, verification and scrutiny is undertaken by subordinates. They satisfy themselves as to whether the application is in order and meets the requirement under the Rules with regard to proof of age and residence. Thereafter, the applications are placed before the Petitioner, the Registering Authority. The Authority is the Petitioner. He has to satisfy himself about compliance with the Act and Rules. None can dispute the fact that the registration of motor vehicles is a responsible function. Specialized staff is deputed for this purpose. The petitioner for his experience in the field was posted as the Registering Authority at Mapusa. He was aware that the registration of vehicles is not something which can be done mechanically and as a matter of routine. Every new vehicle brought for registration need not be registered straight away. The vehicles should be registered only after the purchaser and other concerned with the same satisfy the Authority with regard to the age and residential address of the purchaser.
43. It is common ground that at the relevant time, purchases of new vehicles in Goa was undertaken with a view to avoid paying higher taxes and duties. The purchases were undertaken by persons who were residing out of Goa, for obvious reasons. Had they purchased the vehicles in their own States, they may have to pay higher rates, taxes and duties, in addition to the purchase price, registration charges and insurance charges. To avoid that and to seek concessions and remissions that an attempt was made to show that the vehicles have been purchased in the State of Goa. For that purpose affidavits were filed by these persons, stating therein that they have been residing in Goa. Some details with regard to residential addresses are mentioned in these affidavits. Admittedly, no supporting documents were filed by such persons. In such circumstances, registration of new vehicles without verification and scrutiny with regard to the residential address and without insisting on residential proof, was a major risk not only as far as identity of vehicles during the accidents, but identity of persons buying and dealing in such vehicles. The vehicles are put to use for several purposes, legal or illegal, moral or immoral. Whenever, said acts are detected, it is difficult day by day to trace out the persons involved in the same. That poses security risks as well. In such circumstances, the witnesses testify before the Inquiry Officer that the petitioner directed them to adopt such a method, by which the purchasers were not being called upon to prove their residence in Goa. The witness after witness came to depose on these lines. The petitioner does not dispute this basic fact. He does not dispute that some of the forms for registration were directly handed over to him and he took them to the subordinates and issued instructions to register the vehicles. Pursuant to his instructions and directions that these vehicles have been registered. We have been taken through the voluminous documents by Shri Kakodkar to demonstrate that the witnesses have been subordinates of the petitioner for some time or other and, therefore, have an axe to grind against him.
44. There is no general presumption that a subordinate will depose against his superior for all times to come in all cases. Every thing depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. We find from the deposition of Shri Vishnu Simepuruskar, from the statements and depositions of one Shri Arolkar, Shri S.V. Tar, P.T. Ambre, and others that not just subordinates but others in the Department have also demonstrated as to how the petitioner was responsible for violation of the Rules. If the defence of the petitioner is also perused carefully, it is apparent to us that he does not dispute that the vehicles have been registered within the area of his jurisdiction and control without proof of residence and age being placed on record. It is in such circumstances that we refrain from commenting upon the versions of each of the witnesses and their statements in cross examination. This is not a Court of appeal, as has been rightly urged by Shri Rivonkar. We cannot undertake appreciation and reappreciation of the evidence before the Authorities.
45. As long as there is material on record to indicate that the petitioner acted in a manner which would demonstrate his lack of devotion to duty, it is enough to conclude that the charges are proved. Ultimately, departmental inquiry is not akin to proceedings before a criminal Court. The standard is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but preponderance of probabilities. Merely because fraud and forgery is not established conclusively and depositions and material in that behalf is inadequate, does not mean that the petitioner cannot be faulted for his serious acts of negligence. The misconduct as contended by Shri Kakodkar is not what is urged against the petitioner. This is not the case where the petitioner has been proceeded on account of mere negligence or some errors or mistakes in performance of his duties as Asst. Director of Transport. He was proceeded against, for the acts demonstrating lack of devotion to duties and acting in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant. Negligence, carelessness and serious irregularities are but facets of these broader aspects. It cannot be said that lack of devotion and indulging in acts unbecoming of a Government servant would necessarily mean cases of misconduct as are mentioned in service Rules. Every thing depends upon service to service. In the instant case, the Conduct Rules have been pressed into service and it is not the case of the petitioner before the Inquiry Officer or before us that the failure to maintain devotion to duty and acting in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant would cover only such acts as are termed as 'misconduct' under the service regulations.
46. It is the petitioner's perception, as far as these aspects are concerned. If it is the petitioner's perception that only such acts would be covered by the above term, then, we cannot accede to it for the above reasons.
47. In this context, reference can usefully be made to a decision of the Honourble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. K.K. Dhawan reported in : (1993)ILLJ777SC . In some what identical circumstances and dealing with similar controversy this is what the Supreme Court has observed:
16. ...In this context reference may be made to the following observations of Lopes, C.J. in Pearce v. Foster (1866) 17 QBD 536.
If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duty in the service, it is misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal. That misconduct, according to my view, need not be misconduct in the carrying on of the service of the business. It is sufficient if it is conduct which is prejudicial or is likely to be prejudicial to the interests or to the reputation of the master, and the master will be justified, not only if he discovers it at the time, but also if he discovers it afterward, in dismissing that servant.28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has to be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct of the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer. The legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action can be taken in the following cases:
i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty;
ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty;
iii) if he had acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a government servant;
iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers;
v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;
vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive however small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago 'though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great.
29. The instances above catalogued are not exhaustive. However, we may add that for a mere technical violation or merely because the order is wrong and the action not falling under the above enumerated instances, disciplinary action is not warranted. Here, we may utter a word of caution. Each case will depend upon the facts and no absolute rule can be postulated.
48. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the acts which have been culled out by the Inquiry Officer would make out a case of the petitioner being guilty of serious lapses and irregularities, so also negligence of serious nature which can safely be termed as failure to maintain devotion to duties and acting in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant.
49. Once above conclusion is arrived at, then, on merits also we are not in agreement with Shri Kakodkar that the findings and conclusions are perverse or that they are vitiated by serious errors apparent on the face of the record. Neither is this case of the Inquiry Officer failing to consider relevant and admissible evidence, nor is it a case of taking into consideration inadmissible and irrelevant evidence. This is a case where one cannot conclude that the concurrent findings of the Disciplinary Authority and the Reviewing Authority can be said to be such as no reasonable person could arrive at or they are vitiated for non-application of mind. It cannot be concluded that the authorities have acted arbitrarily, capriciously or highhandedly, so as to frustrate the mandate of Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
50. Once the above conclusion is reached, it is not necessary to refer to the decisions relied upon. Suffice it to state that the decision in Union of India and Ors. v. J. Ahmed (supra) itself demonstrates that the misconduct would include acts of negligence, gross or habitual negligence in performance of duties. This decision has been referred to in subsequent decisions. Ambit of the term 'misconduct' has been construed with reference to the subject matter and the context wherein the term occurs. Regard being had to the scope and the purpose it seeks to serve. It is not as if the decision relied upon by Shri Kakodkar has not been explained. The Supreme Court in later decisions has dealt with this aspect and clarified that no general rule can be laid down and every thing must depend upon the facts and circumstances in each case. Here, the petitioner being serving as Assistant Director of Transport and empowered to register new motor vehicles after due verification and scrutiny of the purchasers and on adequate proof of their identity, is indeed performing a salutary public duty. This public function and the object and the purpose of the Motor Vehicles Acts and Rules framed thereunder, have been placed in the forefront. It is enough to conclude that the negligence or lack of devotion to duty with which the petitioner was charged is serious enough to be termed as 'misconduct' as well. In such circumstances, the decisions relied upon by Shri Kakodkar are of no assistance. They are distinguishable on facts.
50A.. Lastly, the fervent plea of Shri Kakodkar that what the Petitioner did was to follow settled practice in the Department. He went by the procedure adopted at the relevant time by other similarly placed officials. These officials are not charged with violation or breach of the Rules but the Petitioner alone is singled out is the submission. This is indeed a weak argument. Repelling identical contention, this is what the Supreme Court observes in Union of India and Anr. v. International Trading Co. and Anr. (reported in : AIR2003SC3983 ):
14. What remains now to be considered is the effect of permission granted to the 32 vessels. As highlighted by learned Counsel for the appellants, even if it is accepted that there was any improper permission, that may render such permissions vulnerable so far as 32 vessels are concerned. But it cannot come to the aid of respondents. It is not necessary to deal with that aspect because two wrongs do not make one right. A party cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case; direction should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right, but would be perpetuating another wrong. In such matters there is no discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short 'the Constitution') cannot be presented into service in such cases. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on par. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that wrong has been committed on some other cases by introducing a concept of negative equality respondents cannot strengthen their case. They have to establish strength of their case on some other basis and not by claiming negative equality.
51. For the above reasons, we are of the view that there is no merit in the writ petition and it deserves to be dismissed. Rule is accordingly discharged. However, there will be no order as to costs.
52. Writ Petition No. 65/2006, is adjourned to 29th August, 2008, at the request of Shri Rivonkar.