M.F. Saldanha, J.
1. Should persons accused of dealing in dangerous drugs be enlarged on bail merely because of alleged breaches of procedural requirements in the course of investigation. This issue, in relation to the stringent provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (as amended), has arisen recurrently in recent times and requires deep reconsidered by the courts, with many divergent views having been expressed, most of them in favour of the grant of bail. For the reasons enumerated in this judgment, it is essential that the point be very seriously examined and set at rest. Two of my brother Judges have recently expressed the view that a breach of certain procedural provisions of the Act would result in fatal consequences to the prosecution, thereby necessitating the release of the accused on bail. This benefit to the accused, which would not have otherwise arisen and which accrues by default, proceeds on the assumption that such a breach is incurable and , consequently, that the retention in custody of the accused when a certain acquittal at the trial stars one in the face is virtually impermissible. It also presupposes the position that the procedures prescribed by the Act are all mandatory and any breach thereof is incurable and would affect the prosecution in its totality.
2. It has been contended before me in the present case that the two applicants were arrested on 27-6-1991 by officers of the Narcotics Cell near Colony Caterers, Daruwalla House, Mancherji Joshi Road, Parel Colony, Dadar, Bombay, between 15-30 and 16.00 hours. It is alleged that on receipt of certain information, the officers maintained a watch at that place and apprehended the two accused who were carrying two cotton bags containing one kilogram of heroin each. The accused were arrested and a case under section 8(c) read with sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act was registered C.R. No. 56 of 1991. The accused were initially produced before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 37th Court, Esplanade, Bombay, on 28-6-1991 and were remanded to police custody with the direction that they by produced before the learned Special Judge who, in turn, remanded them to judicial custody.
3. On 29-6-1991, my brother I.G. Shah, J., passed an order in Criminal Application No. 954 of 1991 releasing on bail an accused who had not been searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer as provided for in section 50 of the Act on the ground that there was an apparent breach of a statutory provision and, consequently, that it appeared that the accused was unlikely to be convicted. Following this order, on 15-7-1991, my brother Chaudhari, J., in Criminal Application No. 1415 of 1991, inter alia, while construing the provisions of section 50 of the Act observed that even though the seizure panchanama indicated that the Investigated Officer had informed the accused that he himself was a Gazetted Officer that since he was not a person independent of the investigation it appeared that there was no compliance with the letter and spirit of section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act. The applicants before me have relied on these judgments as also on certain other judgments, to which I shall call attention, and have thereby contended that they are entitled to be released on bail.
4. Mr. P.R. Vakil, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicants, has submitted that since two courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction have taken a view which entitles the accused to be released on bail that this Court must, in keeping with those judgments, pass similar orders. Mr. R.F. Lambay, the learned A.P.P., has opposed the grant of bail under any circumstances with furious vehemence which, in the facts in this case, is fully justified. He submitted that no such precedent binds a Judge as far as interim orders, such as the grant of bail, are concerned and that the accused in this case who were found with substantial quantities of heroin should not, under any circumstances, be released as they were a serious and potential danger to society and it was, therefore, contrary to public interest that they be released from custody. Apart from the generalized opposition from the Department and the vehement pleas of the learned A.P.P., which I would have normally upheld, I find it difficult to persuade myself to agree with the views of my learned brothers regarding the interpretation of section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act and the consequences that follow. However, in consonance with judicial discipline, pending a final adjudication of law on the point, these applicants shall have to be released on bail in keeping with the orders earlier passed. The operative part of the order having already been passed, I proceed to record the reasons for what has been stated above.
5. Basically, the applicants have canvassed a contention to the effect that the non-compliance with certain provisions of the Act, which admittedly are statutory provisions, is a mandatory requirement and, consequently, that the situation results in fatal consequences to the prosecution entitling them to contend that the accused in these circumstances could never be convicted. If a conviction is impossible, according to learned Counsel, then the retention of the accused is custody in wholly unjustified and, therefore, as of necessity bail should follow.
6. In the earlier orders referred to by me, this contention has been accepted. Whether the provisions in respect of which breach has been alleged are mandatory or directory is a question that will have to be examined if it is argued that the alleged breach is fatal to the prosecution. To my mind, the matter is not as simple as it is made out to be because what is, in fact, alleged is a breach of sorts. Often-times in law a situation is remedial or curable or it is open to the prosecution to tender a satisfactory explanation therefore, It is therefore, difficult to accept the submission at this premature stage of the proceeding that the accused is bound to be acquitted. Strangely enough, while pointing an accusing finger at the investigating authorities, there is not even an averment in the application to the effect that the heroin in question was not recovered from the accused. We are, therefore, left with this curious and most unfortunate situation that the accused from whom substantial quantities of a dangerous drugs were recovered solemnly and boldly contend before a Court of law that they must still be enlarged on bail merely because of alleged procedural lapses.
7. A Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in the case of Collector, Cuttack v. Mavadhar, : AIR1973Ori173 , while dealing with the Land Acquisition Act had occasion to observe as follows :---
'In deciding whether section 9 of the Act is mandatory or not, regard must be had to the context, subject-matter and the object of the Land Acquisition Act. Lord Campbell has-said in the case of Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner 1861(30) L.J. Ch. 379, (pp. 380-381) :---
'No universal rule can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactment shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of Courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be considered.'
There is a passage in the text book 'Statutory Constitution' by Crawford at page 516 which runs as follows :---
'The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design and the consequences which would follow construing it the one way or the other.'
This passage has received approval from the Supreme Court in many cases. In ascertaining the real intention of the legislature the Court has to consider amongst other things the nature and design of the statute and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstance, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions, the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited with by some penalty, the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom and above all whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered'. Vide State of U.P. v. Baburam, : 1961CriLJ773 .
'One line of approach in this connection is that if by holding a statutory provision mandatory, serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons without very much furthering the object of the enactment, the said statutory provision will be considered as directory'.
The situation that emerges, consequently, is that this Court, at the stage when bail is asked for, is supposed to indulge in a prospective mental exercise and form a near certain hypothesis as to whether or not it may be reasonably assumed that even if the prosecution is otherwise able to establish the possession or recovery of dangerous drugs that the delays or procedural lapses that are complained of would still entitle the accused to an acquittal. To my mind, this reasoning almost goes against the very objective of the N.D.P.S. Act and the principles of fairplay because, among other things, it assumes the position that the infirmities pleaded are insurmountable or that the prosecution will not be able to validly explain them away.
8. For this purpose, I shall straightaway illustrate the principal ground of attack, namely, that the search was not conduct in the presence of a Gazetted Officer. Having regard to the seriousness of the consequences involved, the law provides that the crucial stage relating to the recovery or seizure from the person of the accused should not be left to the supervision of the subordinate Police Officer for two obvious reasons, the first of them being that the steps taken at that stage being vital to the success of the prosecution, no scope for error should be left and, equally important, that any unfair practice, such as the possibility of planning, etc. or the exact spots from where the recovery was made from the person of the accused must be correctly recorded. Experience has shown that in a larger number of cases where the Police are required to Act on information or at short notice that it is rather difficult for them, having regard to the time, place or situation, to obtain the services of Gazetted Officer. Undoubtedly, whenever possible, the services of an independent Gazetted Officer should be availed of. If, however, as in the present case, a seizure has taken place on a public road in the afternoon, it is not expected that the accused be detained there and that the Police go in search of an independent Gazetted Officer who in all probability will not be available in a short time span. If a Police Officer of sufficient rank who happens to be a Gazetted Officer is present, it would be difficult to argue that there has been any breach of the provisions of section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act. I do not subscribe to the view, in the circumstances, that the Police will have to go in search of some other Gazetted Officer. Undoubtedly, it is open to the defence to cross-examine the officer concerned and to allege that he was interested in the success of the raid and whatever follows from it, but there is no presumption against a Gazetted Officer of the Police force that it must be assumed that he is dishonest. It could equally well be argued that any other Gazetted Officer, also being a Government servant, was amenable to the influence of the Police and was, therefore, a party to fabrication and if these arguments are to be accepted, particularly at the stage of granting bail, it would be virtually impossible for the Police to function. The Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed out that a practical and commonsense approach must be adopted and such an approach necessarily demands that a Gazetted Officer belonging to the Police Department who points out to the accused that he is entitled to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer has complied with the requirements of the section. If the accused demands the presence of an independent Gazetted Officer, it is open to the Police to indicate the reasons as to why they did or did not comply with the said requisition, and if the accused states that he declines to insist on another independent Gazetted Officer, it is open to the Police to record that fact. The mere absence in the inventory of any reference to these factors will not, to my mind, justify an inference at the stage of granting bail that the circumstance is fatal to the prosecution.
9. Section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act deals with the conditions under which the search of persons shall be conducted. This is not to be confused with the circumstances in which a raiding party seizes contraband from any place other than an area associated with the persons of the accused. It needs to be clarified that section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act will have no application even in relation to examination of bags of containers that the accused may be carrying. In respect of all such items, section 50 would not have any application. Obviously, the personal search of an accused under this Act is in those situations a parallel of which can be drawn from the Customs Act where a suspicion arises that the contraband has been concealed in the clothing or possibly in the areas in and around the body. It is obvious that this sort of a body search as one may define it, fastens a very strong nexus between the contraband if recovered and the accused because it would then be difficult to dispute knowledge or for that matter possession. It is in relation to this restricted category of cases that section 50 has been enacted and possibly for a variety of reasons including the avoidance of embarrassment to the accused that special provisions have been set down in relation to such a search.
10. The law in these situations requires that the accused should not be left to the tender mercies of persons of the rank of Police Constables and that if the person of the accused is to be searched, it should be done in the presence of a Gazetted Officer. In a given case, it is open to the Police to complete the formalities of seizure in respect of the recoveries made from areas other than the persons of the accused and to thereafter take the accused to be a Gazetted Officer at a later point of time. If, however, a Gazetted Officer is present, in other words, a responsible Police Officer of the requisition rank, it is certainly open to the Police to conduct the personal search on the spot unless for reasons of decency or otherwise, it is necessary or advisable to proceed elsewhere. I do not share the view that section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act prescribes that a Gazetted Police Officer other than the one associated with the case, is contemplated. It is impermissible to read into the section something that is not specifically ordained in it nor is it permissible to graft on words or clauses that are not contained there. If such was the intention of the legislature, section 50 would have incorporated the clause ' a Gazetted Officer', other than a Police Officer connected with the case'.
11. Much capital has been made out of the point that under section 50, it is absolutely essential for the raiding party to search the person of the accused only in the presence of a Gazetted Officer. The clause 'if the accused so requires' does entitle the accused to make a demand that he should be searched only in the presence of a Gazetted Officer. It does not leave the choice of a Gazetted Officer to the accused and, therefore, if a Gazetted Officer is present then he may be searched in the presence of that Gazetted Officer and if one is not present, he should be taken to one such. It needs to be emphasised that if the panchanama indicates that the accused declined the offer to be searched before a Gazetted Officer that it may still be open at the trial to the accused to challenge the correctness of that statement if, according to the accused, it is false. In those of the cases, where no recovery is alleged as a result of the personal search of the accused, the provisions of section 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act do not apply and, therefore, any challenge on this ground would be wholly redundant. It is imperative, therefore, that in cases of seizures from places other than the person of the accused even if the personal search procedure is challenged, it would not affect the other seizures; seized; for that matter even if recovery in respect of part of the contraband from the person is assailed, because the stages are severable. Furthermore, in the case where it is alleged that the recovery was from the person of the accused and the search was in breach of the procedure prescribed under section 50, the officers concerned may require to be pulled up and it may also create sufficient doubt in the mind of the Court about the recovery alleged to have been made from the person of the accused, all of which are issues basically concerning the appreciation of evidence at the time of the trial because it will depend on the reliability of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, including the panchas, and other circumstances of the cases but these are niceties which are certainly outside the ambit of consideration at the preliminary stage of granting bail.
12. The authorities on the subject ultimately indicate that there is no universal rule to aid in determining whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of the Court to try to get the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the Statute to be construed. See Craice on Statute Law, 5th Edition page 246; H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, : 1955CriLJ526 . Therefore, the test laid down by Lord Campbell is ultimately the safest when he says, 'consider the importance of the provision that has been disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act; and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the matter is what is called imperative or only directory.'
13. On this basis if one were to examine the legislative intent of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, it will be self-evident that the dominant intention of the legislature was to control, regulate and prohibit operations relating to dangerous drugs. Towards this dominant purpose, a simple scrutiny will, therefore, indicate that the procedures prescribed thereunder are geared towards achievement of this definite objective and not with the intent of frustrating it. The interpretation of the sections prescribing the procedure would, therefore, have to be governed by the objective of furthering what was intended to be achieved and not in the opposite direction. It would, consequently, be crystal clear that a breach of such procedure would not render an action under this Act void; in other words that these procedural requirements are only directory.
14. It would be useful to advert to certain decisions on the subject though the majority of them are in relation to post-trial proceedings in appeal. In the case of Abdul v. State of Maharashtra 1990 Mh.L.J. 990, a Division Bench of this Court took the view that even though the provisions of sections 41 to 58 are mandatory and were not complied with, the procedural infirmity by itself will not vitiate the conviction. Reliance was placed in that decision on an earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Abdul Sattar v. The State 1989(1) Bom CR 188. As far as the decisions of this High Court are concerned, the concensus has been that breach of the procedural requirements will not ipso facto vitiate the prosecution unless the accused can demonstrate that it has resulted in prejudice. The Rajasthan High Court has, however, taken the view in the case of Chhoteylal v. The State of Rajasthan, reported in 1990(1) Crimes, page 246, that observance of sections 50, 52 and 55 of the Act were mandatory and that in the face of breach of these provisions a conviction cannot be sustained.
15. Mr. Vakil has strongly relied on a decision of the Indore Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Mari Appa v. State of M.P., reported in 1990 Cr.L.J. 1990., has observed that, 'If the procedure laid down under the Act is not followed, it would not be proper for the Court to refuse bail particularly when the procedural safeguards, violated have a material bearing on trial of the case. Therefore, non-compliance with the provisions of sections 42 and 50 entitled the accused to be released on bail'. The learned Judge has further observed as follows :---
'No doubt the Court is expected to keep the object of the Act before it while dealing with bail petition under section 31 of the Act, but the object of the Act cannot be allowed to defeat the basic rights available even to an accused under Article 21 of the Constitution. No Court would be justified in ignoring the procedural safeguards as provided in the Act having a vital bearing on the constitutional rights'.
16. The learned Judge has proceeded on the basis that while denying bail to an accused, it is necessary for the Court to ensure that the prosecution has acted in keeping with the procedure prescribed by law and, therefore, if admittedly there is a breach of the procedure, that it would not justify the retention of the accused in custody because Article 21 of the Constitution would then have an overriding effect. That view, with utmost respect, overlooks the fact that the curtailment of the liberty of the accused has taken place on the basis of an alleged seizure of drugs by the Police and the question as to whether in so doing the procedural safeguards have been complied with or not is an issue yet to be decided at the trial because the prosecution may still be able to establish that it has acted within the framework of the Act. Secondly, the procedural prescribed by law presupposes several Acts and several stages and, therefore, it would virtually go back to the question as to whether that provision was mandatory or obligatory, and more importantly if in a series of actions where one or more of them is questioned whether it would not be perfectly permissible to severe that aspect or that stage from the rest. Typically where the contraband has been recovered from places other than the personal search and where it is the section 50 procedure that is attacked, the rest of the action would still be perfectly valid.
17. While analysing section 50, it would be useful to advert to the Miranda Rule as prevailing in the United States. This rule is a salutary safeguards against custodial interrogation and the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 66(384) U.S. 436, held that unless and until the warnings (Miranda Rules as noted below) or a waiver of these rights are demonstrated, no evidence obtained in the interrogation may be used against the accused.
'Miranda Rule-Prior to any custodial interrogation (that is, questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person is taken into or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way) the person must be warned :
1. That he has a right to remain silent.
2. That any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him.
3. That he has a right to the presence of an attorney;
4. That if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires'.
The Constitutional foundation and justification which Chief Justice Warren found (as quoted below) for the underlying principle of this rule is equally obtainable and applicable under the Indian Constitution :
'.......(T)he constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a Government State or federal must accord to the dignity an integrity of its citizens. To maintain a 'Fair state individual balance', to require the Government to shoulder the entire load'...... to respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demand that the Government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labours, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth .........We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law enforcement officer during in-custody questioning. An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuation described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in Courts or often official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery'.
18. Mr. Vakil sought to make a capital out of the fact that he has produced a certified copy of an application made to the trial Court on 29-7-1991 asking for a copy of the First Information Report and the endorsement of the learned Magistrate confirming that the same had not been filed before the Court. Mr. Vakil contended that it is a requirement of section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 that this document be filed before the learned Magistrate at the earliest point of time in order to avoid the possibility of tampering. It is well settled law that failure to send a report as required by this section is a breach of duty, but it does not cause any prejudice to the accused or vitiate the trial. See (Hafiz Mohamed) 32 Cr.L.J. page 638. What is required under section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is that the Police place before the learned Magistrate in the form of a remand application the gist of the First Information Report and there is no requirement that a copy of the same must be lodged with the Court. The Police in this case have filed the requisite remand application on 28-7-1991 and, consequently, there is no non-compliance with this provision of law.
19. I have already dealt with the question regarding the alleged non-compliance with certain provisions of the N.D.P.S. Act and the argument that such a situation would ipso facto entitle the accused to the grant of bail. It is necessary to re-emphasise that section 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act, which limits situations in which bail may be granted, specifies that the Court can grant bail if it is satisfied that 'there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail'. What needs to be specially noted is that from the material before the Court if it appears that a particularly accused is not guilty of any offence under the Act and is wrongly being prosecuted, bail ought to be granted. As an example, one could cite the familiar situation where a seizure of drugs is made and the prosecuting authority arrests an accused person on the ground that he is connected with that material, but it appears to the Court that the nexus is non-exists or insufficient. Section 37 of N.D.P.S. Act does not contemplate a situation which would entitle a Court to conclude that non-compliance with the procedure, regardless of other evidence which is conclusive or convincing would still entitle the accused to an acquittal. The short question, therefore, is whether non-compliance vitiates a prosecution, and this question can only be conclusively answered in most cases, at the trial.
20. The Courts afford to overlook the specific requirement of the second part of section 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act, which is to the effect that the Courts must be satisfied that the accused will not repeat the offence. Judicial notice will have to be taken in the cases of persons who are alleged to be dealing with, distributing or transporting drugs that if they are released on bail, there is a strong possibility, having regard to the nature of the trade, that they will repeat the offence. What is important is that the section uses the word 'and' which means that even if the Court is satisfied about the first ingredient that it should also be established to the satisfaction of the Court that the offence is unlikely to be repeated. If the accused is a person with no known occupation or if the accused is a person who is a trader using his business as a cover for this activity, or a manufacturer who is not really interested in legally using the equipment in his possession which yields enormous benefits when used in the drugs trade, such as the cases of small pharmaceutical units, who prefer to manufacture madrax tablets in preference to the medicines that they are supposed to manufacture, the Court would be justified in withholding the bail.
21. The Legislature obviously had in mind a situation whereby a person who is nabbed would come out on bail and continue to deal in drugs and, therefore, this provision was specifically incorporated in section 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act, the reason being that if a person is apprehended on such a charge, his connection with the trade having been, prima facie, established, for the good of society, he should be kept in custody until the trial. Courts are obliged, as of necessity, to Act on the basis of this requirement which is incorporated in section 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act.
22. The two predominant considerations at the stage of granting bail are that the Court is required to examine the nature of the charge and the effect of releasing, even on the basis of security, a person accused of such a charge on bail. The nature of the charge itself may justify in appropriate cases the refusal of bail such as where an accused person given to acts of violence reasonably appears to be a danger to society. The Courts do not in such cases run the risk of releasing such a person on bail and exposing public safety and the law and order machinery to a repetition of the incident. Similarly, if the indications are that an accused person is in all like hood bound to repeat the offences, the whole purpose of having arrested him is completely frustrated by a bail order. The release of the accused on bail is not de hors the requirement of public interest and the acts which are detrimental to public order require to be both prevented and curtailed.
23. Offences under the N.D.P.S. Act are universally considered to be among the ones which are categorised as being the most detrimental to all sections of the community. Having regard to the disastrous effects of drug trafficking, particularly to the children and youth of the community where the results are shattering, different countries have prescribed punishments of a high order including in some parts of the World capital punishment for such involvement. An accused facing a drug's charge is a person on par with any other criminal who is accused of a high degree of violence to society. It is also common knowledge that there are no conceivable means of curtailing the repetition and further involvement in these offences and, therefore, to my mind, the legislature itself in this country has prescribed for good reason, that in this class of cases bail should be the exception and not the rule or rather that bail shall be a special exception and will be available in the rarest of cases. This position cannot, therefore be upset by a situation whereby on technical or hypothetical pleas persons who otherwise would not qualify for bail succeed in circumventing the other provisions of the Act which specifically prohibit the grant of bail.
24. In this view of the matter, the legal position at this point of time requires serious reconsideration.