Judgment:
P.R. Borkar, J.
1. Heard Shri A.S.Shelke, advocate for the appellant and Shri A.D. Sugdare, advocate for the respondent.
2. This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Jalna in Regular Civil Appeal No. 179 of 1991 decided on 12.7.1999; whereby appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned III Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Jalna in Regular Civil Suit No. 444 of 1988 decided on 31.8.1991 was set aside.
3. Brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that the present appellant has filed suit for compensation for malicious prosecution against the present respondent. The Trial Court decreed the suit and awarded compensation of Rs. 1,500/-; whereas the learned District Judge set aside the said decree and dismissed the suit.
4. Facts involved in appeal are undisputed at this stage. Thus, it is admitted position that present appellant is the original plaintiff, who filed Regular Civil Suit No. 444 of 1988 against the respondent for damages for malicious prosecution. Present respondent/defendant has filed the complaint against the appellant/plaintiff under Section 509 of Indian Penal Code at Kadim Jalna police station stating that on 12.8.1985 when the present respondent was at her house, plaintiff went there and insulted her modesty by saying that he was ready to pay Rs. 100/- if she accompany him for sexual act. After complaint was lodged, police registered the crime, investigated the matter and sent chargesheet against the present appellant. S.T.C. No. 3823 of 1985 was registered. The learned Magistrate framed the charge. Four witnesses were examined. After considering the evidence on record, the learned Magistrate acquitted the present appellant and thereafter the appellant filed the suit for getting compensation for malicious prosecution.
5. This Court vide order dated 30.6.2008 framed following question of law.
Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the first appellate court committed patent error while reversing the decree on unsustainable ground that certified copy of judgment rendered by the criminal court in S.T.C. No. 3823 of 1985 was not placed on record and it is an observation based on wrong assumption of fact situation and moreover, that could not be sole ground to dislodge the plaintiff's claim?
6. The record and proceedings is received and at Exh. 21 there is xerox of original certified copy of the judgment delivered by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class,Jalna in S.T.C. No. 3823 of 1985 decided on 1.1.1988. A summary procedure was followed.
7. Perusal of Exh. 21 clearly indicates that it is not the original certified copy though court fee stamp of Rs. 1.30 was affixed on it. Since it is not original certified copy, it can not be said that this is admissible piece of evidence being copy of a copy. It is not that original certified copy was not available or that another certified copy could not have been obtained.
8. The appellate Court in Regular Civil Appeal No. 179 of 1991 in para 8, on internal page 7, observed as under:
It is admitted fact that this particular copy is not certified one. I do not understand as to how this lower court has exhibited and relied on such document which is not certified copy of the judgment. Simply xerox copy of any document cannot be considered while deciding such case.
9. The Trial Court in para 7 of its judgment observed as under:
The plaintiff has produced the zerox copy of the judgment and order of criminal case No. 3823/85 Exh.21. Plaintiff has also produced the certified copy of the judgment of STC. No. 3823/85, the certified copy of the statement of present defendant in the said case, the statement of witness No. 2 Sahebrao, the husband of present defendant and the statement of PW-3, Raosaheb Kondiba....
10. Learned advocate for the appellant argued that these observations in para 7 show that in the Trial Court besides xerox copy of the judgment, the certified copy of the judgment was also produced. But fact remains that when record and proceedings is called for by this Court, there is no original certified copy, but what is on record is the xerox certified copy. Since all papers from 'D' file are not available, it is not clear whether original certified copy was produced and taken away after decision of the Trial Court.
11. Learned advocate for the appellant also brought to my notice the observations in para 9 of the Trial Court judgment to the effect that, 'the plaintiff has produced the certified copy of the judgment and order of summary case No. 3823/85.'
12. There is no dispute that in order to prove malicious prosecution, four elements must be proved by the plaintiff, which are as under:
(i) Criminal proceedings must have been instituted or continued by the defendant;
(ii) The proceedings must have been unsuccessful, that is to say, must have been terminated in favour of plaintiff;
(iii) The defendant must have acted without reasonable and probable cause; and
(iv) The defendant must have acted maliciously.
13. In this case, it is relevant to examine whether the respondent filed complaint without reasonable and probable cause and secondly whether the complaint which culminated in registering the first information report and ultimate trial, was lodged maliciously.
14. A reference may also be made to Section 509 of Indian Penal Code, though it is cognizable offence. It reads as follows:
509. Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman:- Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard,or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
15. The Trial Court which decreed the suit has considered the evidence led before it, so also in the Criminal Trial. It is abundantly clear that in the criminal trial before the Magistrate, the present respondent No. 1 deposed at Exh. 25. She admitted that she filed complaint for commission of offence under Section 509 of Indian Penal Code against the appellant. She denied that it was a false complaint. She further stated that she filed case against the plaintiff on allegation that the plaintiff came to her house and told her to accompany him for illicit purpose. She also proved her complaint lodged at Kadim Jalna police station. It was submitted before the Trial Court that there was no independent evidence to show that the prosecution was initiated without any probable and reasonable cause. The quest on is whether the incident really happened. Merely because the Magistrate was not satisfied with the evidence placed on record would not be sufficient. Only if it is positively proved that the complaint lodged was false one and no such incident had occurred, then only in the facts of present case, it could be said that there was no reasonable and probable cause for the respondent to approach police station and lodge the complaint against the appellant.
16. The record and proceeding is before this Court and it is clear that on behalf of the plaintiff/appellant, the plaintiff is examined and he stated that the complaint was filed with intent to take revenge and it was a false first information report that he had shown currency note of Rs. 100/- to the complainant with intent to have the illicit relation with respondent and false complaint was filed to lower down his reputation and to cause him mental torture, and, therefore it is malicious.
17. Respondent Kusum Jadhav is examined at Exh. 25 and she stated that on the day of the incident the plaintiff/appellant had come to her house and told her to accompany him for illicit purpose and, therefore, she lodged the complaint. She stated in cross-examination that there were 3-4 houses in the same Wada where she was residing and about six persons were residing there in the building and they had gone for labour work and they returned at 5.30 p.m. She further stated in her cross-examination that prior to the incident only once she had seen the plaintiff when a quarrel had taken place between the plaintiff and her husband and, therefore, she was knowing the plaintiff since prior to the incident. In that incident the appellant is said to have attempted to assault her husband with a belt. If such incident had occurred, then definitely the respondent would know the appellant and would be in a position to identify him when he had come to the house. It is further clear that Sahebrao Jadhav is husband of the respondent and he also supported the case before the Magistrate.
18. One of the major ground on which the Trial Court has relied upon is that it is said that one Limbaji Jadhav who was a witness to the incident is not examined. It may be noted that the case before the Magistrate was a State case and it cannot be said that complainant had any role to play as to whom the Assistant Public Prosecutor should have examined as witnesses. So if benefit of doubt is given to the appellant merely for non-examination of Limbaji, that would not necessarily prove that the complaint was false. One of the major argument is that ordinarily no woman would stake her character simply to involve somebody else in false prosecution. If a false case was to be filed, allegation could be of any other incident. The offence alleged is bailable offence. If there was intention that police should arrest the appellant and thereby his service should be in danger, in that case, the person filing false complaint would have filed complaint for a more serious incident. In this case, the Trial Court has held that the complaint was filed without reasonable and probable cause and with malicious intention. The Appellate Court has taken a contrary view and has held that in the facts and circumstances of the case it could not be said that the complaint was false, lodged without probable and reasonable cause and with malicious intention. It cannot be said that the view taken by the District Court is perverse. It is one of the views possible and when two views are possible in Second Appeal this Court cannot interfere. It would be necessarily a question of fact and not of law.
19. The case of Maria Colaco and Anr. v. Alba Flora Herminda D'Souza and Ors. : AIR2008SC1965 is cited by the learned advocate for the appellant. In that case it is held that normally in second appeal the High Court should not interfere on the questions of fact, but if on the scrutiny of the evidence it is found that the finding recorded by the first appellate court is totally perverse then certainly the High Court can interfere in the matter as it constitutes a question of law.
20. In this view of the matter, I hold that in the first instance there was no certified copy of the judgment on record as can be verified from the record before this Court and secondly if it is presumed for the sake of arguments that it was there when the Trial Court decided the matter, but was taken away subsequently for some reason, still the view taken by the District Court is equally probable and hence there cannot be interference with it in this Second Appeal.
21. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.