P.S. Patankar, J.
1. The question raised in this appeal is in respect of interpretation of the expression 'arising out of the use of a motor vehicle' contained in section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). This question is concluded by the Supreme Court by its judgment dated 17th July 1991 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 14822 of 1990.
2. A few facts are as follows:---
3. On October 29, 1987 at about 3 A.M. a collision took place between a petrol tanker bearing Registration No. MKL-7461 and a truck bearing Registration No. MEH-4197 on the National Highway No. 4 near village Kavathe, Taluka Wai, District Satara. The petrol tanker was proceedings from Pune to Bangalore and the truck was proceeding on the opposite side. As a result of the said collision, the petrol tanker went off the road and fell on its left side. As a result of the overturning of the petrol tanker, the petrol contained in it leaked out and collected nearby. At about 7-15 A.M., an explosion took place in the said petrol tanker resulting in fire. At that time many persons had assembled near the petrol tanker. Due to the explosion and fire, 31 persons died and many suffered burn injures.
4. One of those who expired was one Deepak Uttam More. His legal representative - mother filed a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Satara. The said legal representative also made an application for payment of Rs. 15,000/- as compensation under section 92-A of the Act. The said application was contested by the respondents on the ground that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the application as the explosion and fire resulting in injuries to the deceased could not be said to be an accident 'arising out of the use of a motor vehicle'. The claims Tribunal upheld the defence raised on behalf of the respondents and dismissed the said claim petition.
5. The legal representatives of many other persons who died due to the said explosion and fire filed various claim petitions before the said Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and also filed applications for getting compensation under section 92-A of the Act. The defence raised on behalf of the respondent was same and by common order dated 22nd December, 1989 all those petitions came to be dismissed.
6. The legal representative of Deepak Uttam More challenged the order dated 22nd December, 1989 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Satara, by filing First Appeal No. 54 of 1990. This Court allowed the appeal with costs holding that the accident was 'arising out of the use of a motor vehicle' even though the explosion and fire have taken place nearby after four hours of the accident. The respondents preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 65 of 1990 and Division Bench of this Court dismissed the same with costs.
7. Being aggrieved the respondents-owner of vehicle and the Insurance Company filed the abovementioned Special Leave Petition which was rejected by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed as follows :---
'This would show that as compared to the expression 'caused by', the expression 'arising out of' has a wider connotation. The expression 'caused by' was used in sections 95(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and 96(2)(ii) of the Act. In section 92-A, Parliament, however, chose to use the expression 'arising out of' which indicates that for the purpose of awarding compensation under section 92-A, the casual relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and the accident resulting in death or permanent disablement is not required to be direct and proximate and it can be less immediate. This would imply that accidents should be connected with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection need not be direct and immediate. This construction of the expression 'arising out of the use of a motor vehicle' in section 92-A enlarges the field of protection made available to the victims of an accident and is in consonance with the beneficial object underlying the enactment.'
8. The present appeal is filed by the legal representative the deceased who was involved in the same accident. An application under section 92-A was also filed which was rejected by the learned Member of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Satara by order dated 22nd December, 1989.
9. In view of the judgment finally pronounced by the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition Civil No. 14822 of 1990, this Appeal will have to be allowed and is accordingly allowed with costs.
10. Mr. Vaze, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, contends that his client is entitled to get not only costs but also interest on the said amount. He contends that his client is entitled to get interest from the date of the application filed for getting compensation under section 92-A, or in any case, from the date of the order passed by this Court in First Appeal No. 54 of 1990 dated 5th February, 1990. Mr. Murthy, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, contends that granting of interest is not contemplated when compensation is awarded under section 92-A, and in any case the present is not a case where interest can be awarded to the appellant as the defence was bona fide.
11. Mr. Vaze, invited my attention to the provisions contained in section 110-CC of the Act which deals with awarding of interest. No doubt, the section speaks about the power of the Court or Claims Tribunal to grant interest whenever a claim for compensation is made under the Act. The section is couched in wider language. In my view, there is no reason why in proper case interest should not be awarded even when the claim is made under section 92-A. The learned Advocate appearing for the respondents contends that section 92-A itself does not make any provision for granting of interest. Further he invited my attention to Rule 306-B of the Bombay Motor Vehicle Rules, 1959. Rule 306-B deals with award of compensation under section 92-A. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 306-B is as follows:---
'(4) The Claims Tribunal in passing order under sub-rule (2) shall direct the insurer or owner of the vehicle involved in the accident to pay the amount of compensation to the claimant within two weeks from the date of the said order.'
However, neither section 92-A nor Rule 306-B(4) preclude a Court or Tribunal from awarding interest in proper cases.
12. Mr. Murthy invited my attention to the observations made by the Supreme Court in the above mentioned judgment i.e.---
'This would show that Rules 291-A, 306-A and 306-B contain adequate provisions which would enable the Claims Tribunal to satisfy itself in respect of the matters necessary for awarding compensation under section 92-A of the Act and in view of these special provisions which were introduced in the rules by the amendments in 1984, the Claims Tribunal is not required to follow the normal procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules with regard to adjudication of a claim under section 110-A of the Act for the purpose of making an order on a claim petition under section 92-A of the Act.'
No doubt, these observations suggest that the Claims Tribunal is not required to follow the normal procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules, while deciding the claim under section 92-A, which are required to be followed for deciding the claim under section 110A of the Act. The object in making those provision is very clear i.e. to deal with the claim under section 92-A expeditiously and to grant the relief immediately. However there is nothing in the Act or the Rules suggesting that interest cannot be granted in a case, while adjudicating the application under section 92-A of the Act. The discretion which is conferred under section 110-CC can be exercised by the Court or the Tribunal in both cases i.e. while deciding the application under section 92-A or section 110-A. But while deciding the application under section 92-A, it may be slow in granting interest as it is a case of no fault liability.
13. However, I find that the present case is not a fit one to award interest. In my view, the defence raised on behalf of the respondents was quite bona fide and legitimate. In fact, the Claims Tribunal accepted the said defence. The question involved was also vexed and complicated. The Supreme Court granted special leave and decided it. It was also having heavy financial implications. I further find that this Court neither in the First Appeal nor in the Letters Patent Appeal granted interest. Similarly, the Supreme Court also did not award interest.
Further, in the present case, in the application filed under section 92-A, no prayer was made for granting interest. Similarly, no point has been taken in the Appeal Memo regarding grant of interest. The position is same in respect of everything in the appeal which was decided earlier by this Court and by the Supreme Court. No interest was awarded by this Court in the First Appeal or in the Letters Patent Appeal or by the Supreme Court in the Special Leave Petition.
14. Mr. Vaze, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, relied upon 1986 A.C.J. 792, Sharifunnisa & others v. Basappa Ramchandra Date & others, and contended that the appellant was entitled to get 12% interest in view of the depreciation in the value of money. It was a case relating to the grant of compensation under section 110-A of the Act and this Court accepted the contention that proper rate of interest to be awarded should be at least 12% because there was considerable lapse of time between the date of accident and ultimate realisation of the amount and in the meanwhile the value of the Rupee depreciated and the dependants of victims in many cases have also to maintain themselves on borrowings. In the said cases this Court, therefore, increased the rate of interest from 6% and 12%. However, in my view, the present litigation was a bona fide one and not undertaken just to delay the claim. In fact Mr. Murthy, immediately conceded the legal position. Further, the appellant has not pointed out any special difficulty in undertaking these proceedings. Hence I feel that no interest be awarded to appellant.
15. In the result, the appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order dated 22nd December, 1989, passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Satara is set aside and the respondents are directed to pay to the appellant the amount of Rs. 15,000/- under section 92-A of the Act within two weeks from today. The appellant will also be entitled to get the costs of this appeal as also the application before the Tribunal. With the consent of both the sides, the said costs are quantified at Rs. 2,000/-. The said costs shall be deposited in this Court within two weeks from today and Mr. Vaze, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant, undertakes to pay the balance of Court fees that may be payable as the appeal is allowed. The appellant is permitted to withdraw the said amounts. In case respondents fail to pay or deposit within two weeks from today then they shall be liable to pay interest at 12% per annum from today.