H.W. Dhabe, J.
1. A common question of law arising in the Writ Petition No. 2049 of 1985 (M/s. Bashir Oil Mills & 6 Others v. Union of India and five others) and in the Writ Petition No. 133 of 1986 (Maheshwari Solvent Extractions v. Union of India and Anr.) was decided by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court rendered on 27.2.1987 to which one of us (Dhabe, J.) was a party. It was held in the said judgment that the definition of the expression 'vegetable oil' given in Section 3(h) of the National Oil Seeds and Vegetable Oils Development Board Act, 1983 (for short the Board Act) which is applicable for levy of cess under Section 3 of the Vegetable Oils Cess Act, 1983 (for short the Cess Act) covers natural oils produced directly from the plant such as its limbs, flowers, seeds, barks, etc., the development of which and not of the highly processed oil is the object of the Board Act. It was thus held in the said judgment that the vegetable oil extracted from oil cakes which are not directly derived from the plant as such but are by-products of the oil seeds after the oil is extracted from them by the process of solvent extraction is not 'vegetable oil' within the meaning of Section 3(h) of the Board Act.
2. After the above decision, the Union of India and Ors. i.e. the respondents in these writ petitions have filed Misc. Civil Application No. 118/1987 and Misc. Civil Application No. 119/1987 in these writ petitions claiming re-hearing/further hearing of these writ petitions. It is clear that after the judgment was rendered in these writ petitions, there is no question of re-hearing/further hearing in these writ petitions and hence the above applications are really speaking applications for review of the above judgment. While these review applications were pending, the learned Counsel for the Union of India noticed that the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Andhra Pradesh Rice Bran Solvent Extractors Association v. Union of India : 1988(37)ELT198(AP) A.P. had taken a view that oil produced from the rice bran by the method of solvent extraction is vegetable oil within the meaning of Section 3(h) of the Board Act, whereas in the case of U.P. Solvent Extractor's Association, Kanpur v. Union of India and Ors. 1988 All L.J. 471 : 1988 (18) ECR 44, the Allahabad High Court has taken a contrary view viz. that oil extracted from rice bran by the process of solvent extraction is not vegetable oil within the meaning of the said expression under the Board Act. He, therefore, filed civil application Nos. 3827/1988 and 3828/1988 claiming alternatively that leave to appeal to the Supreme Court should be granted to the Union of India and Ors. i.e. the respondents against the judgment in these writ petitions under Article 133(1) read with Article 134-A of the Constitution of India. It may be seen that Article 134-A is introduced in the Constitution by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, which came into force with effect from 1.8.1979.
3. As regards the prayer of the respondents for review of the judgment in these writ petitions, we do not find that there is any case made out for review of the judgment. It is well settled that even if the view taken on law by the Court is erroneous, it is not a ground for review. Moreover, the view taken by this Court in these writ petitions stands supported by the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the judgment, cited supra. The prayer for review of the judgment in these writ petitions, therefore, deserves to be rejected.
4. As regards the question of granting certificate under Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India to appeal to the Supreme Court, the submission on behalf of the Union of India and Ors. is that there is a difference of view in the decisions of the High Courts because the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the judgment cited supra has taken a contrary view in interpreting the definition of the expression 'vegetable oil' under Section 3(h) of the Board Act. It is, therefore, urged that the instant case involves a substantial question of law of general importance and that the instant question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.
5. It is, however, urged on behalf of the petitioners in the writ petitions that the applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India are not maintainable in view of the provisions of Article 134-A of the Constitution of India. In support of the above submission, reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Keshava S. Jamkhandi v. Ramchandra S. Jamkhandi : AIR1981Kant97 in which, after referring to the objects and reasons for inserting Article 134-A in the Constitution of India and after drawing aid for construction from the speech of Shri Shanti Bhushan, the mover of the Amendment, it is held that Article 134-A is introduced in the Constitution in order to curtail unnecessary delay in moving the Supreme Court in appeal. It is, therefore, held in the above case that the question of grant of certificate under Article 133 (1) as provided in Article 134-A either on its own motion by the High Court or on oral application made by the party aggrieved has to be considered immediately after the judgment is delivered by the High Court. It is, therefore, submitted on behalf of the petitioners in these writ petitions that against the judgment rendered in these writ petitions the applications for grant of certificate under Article 133 (1) of the Constitution are moved after an inordinate delay by the Union of India and Ors. and, therefore, the said applications cannot be considered in view of the provisions of Article 134-A of the Constitution of India.
6. The judgment of the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court no doubt supports the submission made on behalf of the petitioners in these writ petitions. Faced with the difficulty that the applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 (1) of the Constitution of India arc made after an inordinate delay, it is urged on behalf of the Union of India and others that this Court should grant leave suo mow as provided in Clause (a) of Article 134-A of the Constitution. In appreciating the above submission, it may be seen that even the question of grant of leave suo mow has to be considered immediately after the judgment is rendered and, therefore, it is not open to the Union of India and others to invoke our jurisdiction to consider the question of grant of certificate suo mow after an inordinate delay. In view of the inordinate delay in claiming the certificate under Article 133 (1) of the Constitution, the question of grant of certificate to the Union of India and others cannot be considered by us.
7. Further, in our view, there is another reason also why the certificate under Article 133 (1) of the Constitution cannot be granted in these writ petitions. In the judgment in these writ petitions we have noted in para 17 that at the time these writ petitions were heard, a Bill was introduced in the Parliament to repeal the Cess Act so as to abolish all levy upon the vegetable oils because such a levy was to be detriment of the small producers of vegetable oils in the country. In view of the above fact, the question of interpretation of the expression 'vegetable oil' under Section 3(h) of the Board Act has ceased to be the question of law of general importance within the meaning of Clause (a) of Article 133 (1) of the Constitution of India. At any rate, it cannot be said that the said question needs to be decided now by the Supreme Court, as required by Clause (b) of Article 133 (1) of the Constitution of India.
In the result, Misc. Civil Application No. 118 of 1987 with Civil Application No. 3827/1988 and Misc. Civil Application No. 119 of 1987 with Civil Application No. 3828/1988 therein are rejected. There would, however, be no order as to costs.