G.F. Couto, J.
1. The very maintainability of this Revision Application directed against the Order dated 24th April, 1989, whereby the learned District Judge, Panaji, stayed the Judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji, in a money suit, is the subject of a strong challenge by the respondent. Therefore, while admitting this Writ Petition, my learned brother Kamat, J. who dealt with it at the time of admission made it subject to the maintainability qua Section 46 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968. Further, presumably under the assumption that the challenge to the maintainability of this Revision Application was in respect of the question as to whether a Revision Application against an Order passed under the Rent Control Act lies to the High Court, he added 'Learned Advocate-General to lend assistance to the Court'. The matter came now for hearing, and therefore, the first and the foremost question to be dealt with is whether the Revision Application is maintainable.
2. The respondent has filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 37,028 together with interest thereon at the rate of 15% per annum which sum was the balance of the arrears of rent due to her in respect of the occupation as a lessee of a flat. According to the respondent, the suit flat had been given on lease to the petitioner under an agreement dated 8th May, 1984, for the period of 11 months and on the monthly rent of Rs. 2,300/- The petitioner was also liable to pay half of the monthly taxes as well as water and electricity charges. He had made a security deposit of Rs. 6,900/- and as it happened, he stopped making payments of the monthly rent from April, 1985. Therefore, the respondent made adjustments of the rents against the security deposit amount, and at the time of the filing of the suit, the rent was due from August, 1985, to October 1986, amounting to Rs. 34,500/-
In addition, the petitioner was liable to pay water charges to the tune of Rs. 800 and Municipal Taxes amounting to Rs. 1,728/- for the years 1984 and 1985.
The petitioner resisted the suit on several grounds and he stated that, in any event, he had applied for fixation of fair rent in July, 1985, and the rent has been fixed at Rs. 879.75 per month by Order dated 15th February, 1989. It is, therefore, his case that no amount is due to the respondent.
3. By his Judgment dated 15th February, 1989, the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panaji, partly decreed the suit and directed the petitioner herein to pay to the respondent a sum of Rs. 3,795/- which has been arrived at after adjusting the amounts already paid by him together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. Being aggrieved by this Judgment and decree of the trial Court, the respondent moved an appeal against it in the District Court, Panaji, and along with the said appeal, filed an application for stay dated 15th March, 1989, praying that pending the hearing and final disposal of the appeal, the operation and execution of the aforesaid Judgment of the trial Court be stayed, or in the alternative, the present petitioner be directed to deposit monthly the amount of Rs. 2,300/ - in Court, and further, that the appellant be allowed to withdraw the said amounts.
By his impugned Order dated 24th April, 1989, the learned District Judge stayed the operation of the Judgment of the trial Court to the extent that the petitioner herein was ordered to deposit in Court the amount of rent stipulated under the contract till the final disposal of the appeal, and further, that the appellant would be at liberty to withdraw the deposited amounts corresponding to the fair rent fixed by the trial Court. It is against this order that the present Revision Application was filed.
4. Now, Mr. S.D. Lotlikar, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, has raised a prelimianry objection as to the maintainability of this Revision Application for the reasons that, on one hand, the petitioner has not taken recourse to a revision application to the Administrative Tribunal, a remedy that was available under Section 46 of the Rent Control Act, and on the other, the impugned Order does not amount to a case decided as attracting the application of the provisions of Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code. Although the objection to the maintainability is merely restricted to the grounds as above, it appears that the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and the learned Advocate General looked at it from a larger angle; and therefore, argued at length in respect of the question as to whether or not a revision application lies against an Order passed under the Rent Control Act.
5. The learned Advocate General has, indeed, dealt with the matter in its larger perspective and to that effect, he invited my attention to some provisions of the Act, which according to him, arc relevant for the determination of the said issue. He first invited my attention to Section 12 of the Act which provides that it is for the Rent Tribunal to determine the fair rent. Secondly, he took me to Section 41 which postulates that the Rent Tribunal will be constituted by one or more persons who are not necessarily Judicial Officers, although in this State, there is a Notification under which the Jurisdiction of Rent Tribunal was vested in District Judges. Then, Section 46 provides for revision, and therefore, once a remedy is provided in the Rent Act itself, the question which arises is whether it is possible to take recourse to any other remedy. The revisional powers conferred in the revisional Authority, i.e. the Administrative Tribunal are, according to the learned Advocate General, wide in nature as it can be seen from the provisions of Section 47 of the Act. The learned Advocate General, then invited my attention to Section 43 of the Act wherein the same powers as vested in a Civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code have been vested in the Controller, Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Board which need not be a Court, as can be inferred from the circumstance that the aforesaid provision of law expressly states that the Controller, the Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Board shall be deemed to be a. Civil Court. Finally, the learned Advocate General brought to my notice the provision of Section 56 which bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in the matters dealt with by the Rent Control Act. He contended that a comprehensive and overall reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Rent Control Act leads to the conclusion that the Appellate Board is a personal designata and not a Civil Court. In this connection, the learned Advocate General submitted that the authorities in Sanjay Dinkar Kulkarni v. Shankerappa Ganappa Pasarkar : AIR1971Bom302 , Jagdish Pershad v. Hardayal Singh : AIR1982Delhi298 Baburao Prahlad Dadve and Ors. v. Hariharrao Kashinathrao Khasgiwale and Ors. 1939 Bom. 279; Sawlram Ramprasad Mills. Co. Ltd. v. Vishnu Pandurang Hingnekar AIR 1950 Nag 14; Shyamaraju Hegde v. U. Venkatesh Bhat and Ors. : [1988]1SCR340 , Aundel Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai : [1987]1SCR485 and Jetha Bai and Sons, Cochin v. Sundardas Ecthenci : [1988]2SCR871 are relevant. He finally submitted that it appears from the scheme of the Act that the intention of the Legislature had been to take away from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court the matters which are covered by the Rent Control Act and to give finality to the decisions given by the Rent Controller, Rent Tribunal and Appellate Board, and therefore a revision application to the High Court does not lie.
6. Before adverting to the aforesaid authorities relied upon by the learned Advocate General, it may be noted that Mr. R.M.S. Khandeparkar, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, strongly contended that the above authorities referred to by the learned Advocate General are not decisive inasmuch as the authority of Nagpur High Court in Sawatrarn Ramprasad Mills Co. Ltd. v. Vishnu Pandurang Hingnekar A.I.R. 1950 Nag 14, deals with the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act and the Division Bench had held that in the scheme of the said Act, the said Authority is not a Civil Court in the narrow sense contemplated in the Code of Civil Procedure, taut an Administrative Tribunal, and as such, not subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court exercisable under Section 115 of the Code, and inasmuch as in the authorities of the Supreme Court reported in : [1987]1SCR485 , : [1988]1SCR340 and : [1988]2SCR871 , the question considered was not as to whether or not a revision application lies to the High Court, but the question of the finality of the decisions. He submitted, placing reliance in the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Yeleswarapu Ramachandra Rao v. State of Madras, (Now Andhra Pradesh and Anr. AIR 1962 AP 58 that considering the scheme of the Act, it is clear that the District Court in the Rent Control Act is not a persona designata. He also contended, placing strong reliance in the decision of the Madras High Court in Raich of Venkatgiri v. Shaikh Mahaboob Saheb and Ors. AIR 1944 Mad 139 that even a Revenue Court is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court exercisable under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code. He also placed reliance in the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in T.V. Subba Rao v. T. Koteswara Rao : AIR1963AP37 , of the Bombay High Court in Smt. Rajiyabi Coemen Sayi and Anr. v. Mackinon Machinazte and Co. Pvt Ltd.; : AIR1970Bom278 and of the Punjab and Harayana High Court in Smt. Vidya Devi v. Firm Madan Lal Prem Kumar AIR 1971 P& H. 150.
7. As it clearly flows from the above submissions, the controversy is as to whether or not an Order passed by the Rent Controller, Rent Tribunal or the Appellate Board constituted under the provisions of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968, is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code. The key to the solution of this question lies, in my view, in the meaning of a Court subordinate to the High Court spoken of in the aforesaid provision of law. In fact, Section 115 Civil Penal Code provides that the High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto if such subordinate Court had exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it or failed to exercise such jurisdiction or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Therefore, there is no manner of doubt that for the purpose of exercising the powers vested in it under Section 115, the Order sought to be revised must have been passed by a Court subordinate to the High Court. Now, Section 3 of Civil Precedure Code lays down that for the purposes of the Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court. In turn, Section 5 makes it applicable the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code to Revenue Courts and provides in its Sub-section (1) that where any Revenue Courts are governed by the provisions of the Code in those matters of procedure upon which any special enactment applicable to them is silent, the State Government may, by Notification in the Official Gazette, declare that any portions of those provisions which are not expressly made applicable to the Courts, shall not apply to those Courts, or shall only apply to them with such modifications as the State Government may prescribe. Sub-section (2) provides that a Revenue Court in Sub-section (1) means a Court having jurisdiction under any local law to entertain suits or other proceedings relating to the rent, revenue or profits of land used for agricultural purposes, but does not involve a Civil Court having original jurisdiction under the Code to try such suits or proceedings as being suits or proceedings of a civil nature. The Rent Controller. Rent Tribunal and Appellate Board created under the Rent Control Act are clearly falling within the definition of a Revenue Court in Sub-section (2) of Section 5, Civil Procedure Code. Thus, the question is whether such Revenue Court can be said to be a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court for the purposes of attracting the revisional jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Section 115. In Sawatram Ramprasad Mills Co. Ltd. v. Vishnu Pandurang Hingnekar A.I.R. 1950 Nag. 14, the question as to whether the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act is a Civil Court fell for determination. Dealing with the said question, the Division Bench inter alia, observed that the test for determining whether or not a Tribunal is a judicial body as laid in Halsbury's Laws of England can be stated as under :
The distinction appears to be not so much whether the particular tribunal is a Court of justice, but whether it is a Court in law. In determining whether or not tribunal is a judicial body the facts that it has been appointed by a non-judicial authority, that it has no power to administer an oath, that the chairman has a casting vote and that third parties have power to intervene are immaterial, especially if the statute setting it up prescribes a penalty for making false statements, elements to consider are (1) the requirement for a public hearing subject to a power to exclude the public in a proper case, and (2) a provision that a member of the tribunal shall not take part in any decision in which he is personally interested, nor unless he has been present throughout the proceedings.
Therefore, the test as laid down in Halsbury's Laws of England is that a Tribunal will come within the meaning of a Court of Justice when there is a public hearing and when the Members of the Tribunal are precluded from taking part in any decision in which they are personally interested. The Division Bench further observed, relying in what Lopes. L.J., stated in Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society v. Parkinson 1892 (1) Q.B. 431, that the word 'judicial' has two meanings. It may refer to the discharge of duties exercisable by a Judge or by justices in Court, or to administrative duties which need not be performed in Court, but in respect of which it is necessary to bring to hear a judicial mind - that is, a mind to determine what is fair and just in respect of the matters under consideration. The Division Bench further noted that the fact that an Officer is required to decide a case judicially does not necessarily constitute him a Court, because the word 'judicially' in the context means merely a standard of conduct and freedom from bias and interest which are the two attributes of a Judge, 'Judges in the strict sense of the term, in addition to acting judicially, 'administer justice'. By administration of justice is meant the maintenance of right by the State. Every civilised State recognises and tries to maintain and uphold 'rights' and Courts are meant to restore the vinculumjuris which is disturbed when there is an infringement or invasion of a legal right. The power exercised by the State is called judicial power' which has found specific mention in the constitutions of some of the countries', the Court, added. Finally, the Division Bench observed that :
A Court is thus a tribunal appointed by law for the enforcement of legal rights or the punishment of wrong through the sanction of the State. In its civil aspect, the question litigated, which is called a 'lis', is generally between the party in whom the right inhers and the party who is guilty of the infringement of that right or the breach of a correlative duty. Such rights are rights to property to life, liberty and safety of the subjects. The word 'civil' comes from 'civics' abd 'civilis' which means 'citizen' and 'of citizen'. Civil Courts thus deal with matters which pertain to the life of a citizen.
The same view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajiyabi v. M.M. and Co. Pvt. Ltd. : AIR1970Bom278 . After quoting several authorities of the Supreme Court, the Division Bench, placing reliance in Virinder Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab : 1956CriLJ326 observed that the Supreme Court has made it clear that, originally, the term 'Court' meant, among other meanings, the Sovereign's palace. It has acquired the meaning of the place where justice was administered and further has come to mean the persons who exercise judicial functions under authority derived either immediately or mediately from the Sovereign. That, all Tribunals are not, however, Courts in the sense in which the term is employed, namely to denote such tribunals as exercising jurisdiction over persons by reason of the sanction of the law and not merely by reason of voluntary submission to their jurisdiction. The Court also observed, placing reliance in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court that what broadly distinguishes a Court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and to declare the rights of the parties in a definitive Judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it and it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. Thus, when a question arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act, it possesses all the attributes of a Court. A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties, and then involves four requisites : (1) the presentation (not necessarily orally) of their case by the parties to the dispute: (2) if the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) if the dispute between them is a question of law, the submission of legal arguments by the parties; and (4) a decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including required a ruling on any disputed question of law.
8. The Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 was enacted, as disclosed by its preamble, to provide for the control of rents and evictions and of rates of hotels and lodging houses, and for the requisition of vacant buildings, in the Union Territory of Goa. Daman and Diu. A detailed examination of the provisions of the said Act and of its scheme makes it clear that it was the intention of the Legislature to take away the matters dealt with in the said Act from the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. This becomes more than evident from the provision of Section 56 which bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts by providing that save as provided in the Act, no court shall have jurisdiction to settle, determine or deal with any question which is by or under the Act required to be settled, determined or dealt with by the Controller, Rent Tribunal, Appellate Board, Administrative Tribunal or the Administrator, and further, that no Order passed by any such Authority under the Act shall be called in question in any Court. The Act has provided for a special machinery for the disposal of the disputes relating to leases, eviction and rent. In fact, in Chapter 8 of the Act, provisions have been made relating to the Authorities which are vested with jurisdiction to deal with the aforesaid questions. Section 41(1) provides that the Administrator may by notification made in the Official Gazette, constitute for any local area an Appellate Board and a Rent Tribunal consisting of one or more persons as may be prescribed for the purposes of the Act. Sub-section (2) lays down that the Administrator may also, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint an authorised Officer, a Controller and as many additional Controllers as he thinks fit for any local areas. These authorities, that is to say, the Controller. The Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Board, have been vested with the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as can be seen from Section 43 of the Act. Then, Section 45 provides for appeals from the Orders passed by the Rent Tribunal to the Appellate Board. Appeals also are provided to the Administrative Tribunal as well as a revision application to the Administrative Tribunal in Section 46. The Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act is thus a complete Code, and undoubtedly, the authorities created under the said Act were vested with powers of a Court. While disposing of the matters, no doubt, also the said authorities had to dispose of the matters before them, judicially, by giving a proper hearing to the parties and allowing them, if the, case required to lead evidence in support of their ease. This being so, the aforesaid authorities created under the Act to deal with the matters related with the leases, rents and evictions, have all the trappings of a Court, and therefore, for all the purposes, following the above referred authorities one has to hold that the said Authorities are well within the meaning of a Court. But the question that arises and requires to be dealt is whether such Authorities, although Courts, are Civil Courts amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code.
9. I already mentioned that Section 115, Civil Procedure Code empowers the High Court to call for the records of any case which was decided by any Court subordinate to it. I also mentioned that Section 3 of the Code provides that for the purposes of the Code of Civil Procedure, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court 'and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District. Court. It would thus appear from the above provisions of law that the Authorities under the Rent Control Act arc not falling within the meaning of a Civil Court so as to attract the revisional jurisdiction of a High Court. In this connection, same support is also found in Sub-section (2) of Section 5, Civil Procedure Code which defines Revenue Court for the purposes of Sub-section (1) as meaning a Court having jurisdiction under any local law to entertain suits and other-proceedings relating to rent, revenue or profits of land used for agricultural purposes. It is clarified that the said Revenue Court does not include in its sweep, a Civil Court having original jurisdiction under the Code to try such suits and proceedings as being suits and proceedings of a civil matter. The Authorities under the Act are undoubtedly, falling within the definition of Revenue Court given in Sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Act. Therefore, prima facie, it appears that the decisions passed by the aforesaid Authorities while disposing the matters before them are not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. However, Mr. Khandeparkar, placing reliance in the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Shaik Mehahoob Saheb and Ors. A.I.R. 1944 Mad 139, contended that the provisions of Section 115. Civil Procedure Code are applicable also to the Revenue Courts. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court was dealing with the provisions of the Madras Agriculturists' 'Relief Act. It appears that a question arose as to whether an application made to Sub-Collector by tenants is or not a proceeding to which the provisions of the Madras Land Act can have application and whether the revisional powers of the High Court must be determined on the footing that the said proceedings were proceedings under the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act which confers no appellate jurisdiction on the High Court over the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 14(4) of the same Act. Patanjali Sastri, J. (as he then was). Speaking for the Court made a detailed examination of the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, and finally, held the view that the Revenue Courts were subordinate to the High Court, and therefore, subject to its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115. He observed as under:-
In 1883, a Full Bench of five Judges of the Allahabad High Court had to consider whether Sections 43 and 373 of the Code were applicable to proceedings before the Rent Courts established under the N.W.P. Rent Act, 1881. And the learned Judges by the majority at four to one followed the decision in 9 Cal. 295 and answered the reference by saying that 'the Revenue Courts of these provinces in those matters of procedure upon which the 'Rent Act' is silent are governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code'. Stuart C.J. who dissented criticised the majority view as 'based on considerations which are beyond the domain of judicial exposition'. 5 All 406. In 1885, the Calcutta High Court in 12 Cal. 50 followed the Allahabad decision, These decisions led to the introduction of Section 4A (corresponding to the present Section 5) in the Code of 1882 by Act 8 of 1888, in order evidently, to make the position, as enunciated by the Allahabad Full Bench clear by legislation, adopting the very language used by the learned Judges. So far, therefore, from Section 5 affording any ground for supposing that a general distinction between Civil and Revenue Courts is maintained in the Code, is strongly supports the view that the Code is applicable to Revenue Courts also except, of course, where it is excluded by any special or local law or by any inconsistent provisions of such law or by notification by the Provincial Government. It follows that, the declaration of the relative subordination of 'Civil Courts' in Section 3 for the purpose of the Code must be taken to cover Revenue Courts as well in the absence of any saving of such Courts, and they must be deemed to be subordinate to the High Court and subject to its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115.
The learned Judge, however, made also a reference to the view taken in 49 Calcutta 931, by Rankin, J. who held that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 107, Government of India Act. 1915, over an order of the Rent Controller's Court, under the Calcutta Rent Act. was not attracted. Rankin, J. observed as follows:-
The words 'Civil Courts' in the Code appear to have a special meaning though this again is nowhere defined. I take them to mean Civil Courts exercising all the powers of-Civil Courts as distinguished from Courts which only exercise powers over civil matters of a special class or classes, e.g. the Rent Courts under Act 10 of 1859, and the Land Acquisition Judges.
It would appear from the above observations made by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court that although it was held that a Revenue Court is a Civil Court within the meaning of Section 3 of the Code and subordinate to the High Court, an exception was made when there is a special or local law to the contrary or that is inconsistent with any provision of such special or local law.
10. Now, it was strongly contended by the learned Advocate General that it is clear from the various provisions of the Act that the intendment of the Legislature was not to only oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters dealt with under the Rent Control Act, but also, to make the Orders passed by the Authorities under the same Act, final. The learned Advocate General invited my attention, in this connection, to Section 12 of the Act which provides that the determination of the fair rent is to be made by the Rent Tribunal. He also invited my attention to the provisions of Section 41 under which powers had been vested in the Administrator to constitute an Appellate Board and a Rent Tribunal consisting of one or more persons. Special emphasis was put by the learned Advocate General in the provision that the aforesaid provision of law lays down that the Appellate Board or the Tribunal would be consisting of one or more persons and not necessarily by a particular Court. Then, he urged that Section 43 clearly indicates that the Authorities under the Act are not Civil Courts, since on one hand, powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure are vested in the said Authorities, and on the other, it is specifically provided that any proceedings before the Controller, the Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Board shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193, 219 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and that the Controller, the Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Board shall be deemed to be Civil Courts within the meaning of Sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He contended that the circumstance that the Appellate Board spoken of in Section 41 is constituted by the District Judge, in no manner, alters the situation since the Distirct Judge is merely a persona designata to discharge the functions of the Appellate Board under the Act.
11. There is, undoubtedly, great force in the above submissions of the learned Advocate General. While vesting in the Administrator powers to constitute an Appellate Board and a Rent Tribunal, Section 41 of the Act does not provide that such Appellate Board or Rent Tribunal should be a particular Court. On the contrary, it lays down that such Authorities should consist of one or more persons of the choice of the Administrator. In addition Section 43 of the Rent Control Act vests in the Authorities created under, the Act, i.e., the Controller, the Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Board, the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and further postulates that, proceedings before the Controller, Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Board shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings, and further, that the said Rent Controller, the Rent Tribunal and the Appellate Board shall be deemed to be Civil Courts within the meaning of Sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The wording of Section 43 gives a strong indication that the aforesaid Authorities created under the Act are not Civil Courts within the meaning given to it in Section 3, and therefore, they are not Courts subordinate to the High Court in order to attract the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115. Civil Procedure Code. This is so, because had the said Authorities been Civil Courts within the meaning given in the Civil Procedure Code, then the deeming provision of Section 43 of the Rent Control Act would have been entirely otiose and unnecessary,. I am supported in this view by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Manager, Spring Mills v. G.D. Ambekar AIR 1949 Bom. 188 as well as by the view taken by Chagla, J. (as he then was). In People's Own Provident and Gen. Insurance Co. v. Guracharya : AIR1946Bom200 . In the latter case, Chagla. J. was considering the powers of the Debt Adjustment Board under the Bombay Agricultural Debtors' Relief Act. Section 7 of the said Act provided that the Board shall have the same powers as are vested in Civil Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure and reliance had been placed on this provision to submit that the Debt Adjustment Board was a Court within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code so as to attract the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code. Negativing the said submission. Chagla, J. observed as under:-
The very tact that the Legislature had to vest the Board with powers which a Civil Court possesses goes to show that the Board is not a Court. The fact that similar powers which a Civil Court possesses arc given to this Board by the statute does not constitute it a Court.
This argument found favour with the Division Bench in Ambekar's case. There, the question as to whether the authority under the Payment of Wages Act was a Civil Court amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115. Civil Procedure Code came for consideration. The Court observed that Sections 18 and 22 of the aforesaid Act make it clear that the authority cannot be regarded as a Court of civil judicature, since if the said authority were a Civil Court, it would hardly have been necessary to enact that for certain purposes it should have the powers of a Civil Court.
12. My attention was specifically invited to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan pillai AIR 1987 SC 293 as well as in Shyamaraju Hegde v. U. Venkatesha Bhat and Ors. : [1988]1SCR340 and in Jetha Bai and Sons, Cochin v. Sunderdas Rathenai : [1988]2SCR871 . In Aundal Animal's case, the question as to whether a second revision application to the High Court was lying under the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act fell for determination of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The Court after considering the relevant provisions of the Act and after reviewing several authorities, observed as under:-
In our opinion, the Full Bench misconstrued the provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 18 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of Section 18 clearly states that such decision of the appellate authority as mentioned in Section 18 of the Act shall not be liable to be questioned except in the manner under Section 20 of the Act. There was thereby an implied prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court when a revision has been provided under Section 20 of the Act in question. When Section 18(5) of the Act specifically states that shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law except in the manner provided under Section 20, it cannot be said that the High Court which is a Court of law and which is a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure could revise again an order after revision under Section 20 of the Act. That would mean there would be a trial by four Courts, that would be repugnant to the scheme manifest in the different section of the Act in question. Public policy or public interest demands curtailment of law's delay and justice demands finality within quick disposal of case. The language of the provisions of Section 18(5) read with Section 20 inhibits further revision. The Court must so construe.
13. An apparently different view was taken by the Supreme Court in Shyamaraju Hegde v. U. Venkatesha Bhat and Ors. : [1988]1SCR340 . In that case, the, Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, and more particularly, with the question as to whether an Order passed by the District Judge in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 50(2) of the Act was revisable by the High Court under Section 50(1) of the Karnataka Rent Act read with Section 115. Civil Procedure Code. Ranganathan Mishra, J. Speaking for the Court. After reviewing several authorities of the Karnataka High Court, as well as of the Supreme Court held the view that a revision application was lying to the High Court under Section 115. Civil Procedure Code.
The apparently contradictory views taken by the Supreme Court in Aundal Ammal's case and Shyamaraju Hedge's case gave cause to the matter being taken up by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court in Jetha Bai and Sons. Cochin v. Sunderdas Rathenai : [1988]2SCR871 . After analysing the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court and the relevant provisions of the Karnataka and Kerala Acts. The majority of the Judges held the view that there was no conflict between the decisions in Aundal Animal's case and in Shyamaraju Hegde's case, and therefore, the majority held the view that the question as to whether a fresh thinking is called for on the scope of Section 20 read with Section 18(5) of the Kerala Act was not called for and on the contrary, the view taken in Aundal Ammal's case was reiterated and approved. However, Ranganathan, J. in a dissenting Judgment, held the view that there are no substantial differences between the Kerala and the Karnataka Acts and that everything turns on the correct interpretation of the language used in the Act. The learned Judge after analysing the provisions of Section 18(5) read with Section 20 held the view that Section 18(5) is a provision of a general nature intended to prevent Orders of the Rent Controller from being challenged in the Court, but this provision does not and cannot preclude the applicability of Section 100, Civil Procedure Code to an Order passed by this Court, not as a persona designata but as a Civil Court of the land.
14. A careful reading of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court in Aundal Ammal's, Shyamarqju Hegde's and M/s. Jetha Bai and Sons' cases makes it clear that everything turns on the intendment of the Legislature in that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was meant to be entirely ousted and in that the decisions of the authorities under the Rent Control Act had been given finality. It is, therefore, necessary to see what was the intendment of the Legislature in that regard while enacting the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968. Section 56 as already mentioned bars the jurisdiction of the Courts in the matters which are to be settled determined and dealt with by and under the Act, by the Rent Tribunal, Appellate Board and Administrative Tribunal.
Save as provided in this Act, no Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, determine or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, determined or dealt with by the Controller, the Rent Tribunal, the Appellate Board, the Administrative Tribunal, or the Administrator, and no order passed by any such authorities under this Act shall be called in question in any Court.
The wording of the above extracted provision of law is such that there is no manner of doubt as regards the intention of the Legislature in that it is clear that the Legislature intended to give finality to the orders passed by the authorities constituted under the Act and to oust entirely the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. This is manifest especially in view of the final portion of the said section where it is said 'no order passed by any such authorities under this Act shall be called in question in any Court'. Thus, it appears more than clear that the Legislature intended to give finality to the decisions passed by the authorities constituted under the Rent Control Act in the matters which are to be settled, determined, and dealt with by them, and therefore, it would appear on the strength of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court that no revision application lies to the High Court against orders passed by the authorities created under the Rent Control Act. It is no doubt true that the rule is that the ouster of the power of the High Court is not to be readily inferred, but using the words of Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) in Sawatram Ramprasad Mills' case (supra) 'where the Legislature by clear words creates a new Tribunal, self-contained and exclusive, then the matter which needs to be considered is not whether the jurisdiction of the High Court is taken away but whether it was at all there'. I have already mentioned that the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act is a self-contained Code and that the intendment of the Legislature was to entirely oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, giving finality to the decisions made by the authorities created under the Act on the matters which are to be settled, determined or dealt with by them. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court was not existing in this case, and therefore, the question of its ouster does not at all arise. I, therefore, hold that the orders passed by the authorities constituted under the aforesaid Act are not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115. Civil Procedure Code. I may only mention that the said authorities are mere Revenue Courts within the meaning given in Sub-section (2) of Section 5. Civil Procedure Code. The High Court has undoubtedly, superintendence over such authorities in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution.
15. Having dealt with the main submissions made before me, I now turn to the limited challenge of the maintainability of this Revision Application raised by Mr. Lotlikar. It was already mentioned that the learned Counsel assailed the maintainability of the present Revision Application on two grounds, namely (1) that it was not open to the petitioner to approach this Court in a revision application without availing himself first of the remedy of a revision to the Administrative Tribunal which was permissible under Section 46 of the Rent Control Act; and (2) that the impugned decision, in any event, does not constitute a case decided.
Section 46 of the Rent Control Act provides for revision of the Order passed by the authorised Officer, the Controller, the Rent Tribunal or the Appellate Board. It reads as under:-
The Administrative Tribunal may, in exceptional circumstances, on the application of any party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed under this Act by the Authorised Officer, the Controller, the Rent Tribunal, or the Appellate Board for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of such order and may pass such order thereon as it thinks fit :
Provided that no such record shall be called for after the expiry of ninety days from the date of the order.
Undoubtedly, the powers of revision conferred on the Administrative Tribunal by Section 46 can be exercised suo motu by the Tribunal, but also on basis of an application made to it by the aggrieved party. Mr. Khandeparkar in an attempt to justify the failure of the present petitioner to exhaust the remedies available to him under the Rent Control Act, urged that the revisional powers given to the Administrative Tribunal by Section 46 are not wide enough and are to be utilised only in exceptional circumstances. Therefore, according to him, it was always open to the petitioner to approach this Court in a revision application. In my view, this submission has no substance, since under Section 47, the revisional powers are wide enough to correct any error committed by the Authorities constituted under the Act. Section 46 also indicates that the scope of the revision is wide enough and covers the correctness, legality and propriety of the impugned order. This being the case. I am also of the view that even if the orders of the authorities constituted under the Rent Control Act were amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, it was not open to the petitioner to approach this Court directly without exhausting the remedies available to him under the Act. That apart, Mr. Lotlikar is also in a very strong ground when he submits that the impugned Order does not constitute a case decided. In fact, what the learned District Judge did by his impugned Order dated 24th April, 1989 is to grant the stay of the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge. Senior Division, Panaji, on 15th February, 1989, and to direct the petitioner to deposit in Court the rents in arrears calculated on the basis of the agreement of lease. He further allowed the respondent to withdraw from the amount deposited, the amount corresponding to the fair rent fixed by the trial Court. There is no finality in this Order and therefore, there is no case decided. This is also another ground to hold that this Revision is not maintainable.
16. Having arrived at the above findings as regards the maintainability of the present Revision Application, it is not necessary for me to deal with the merits of this Revision Application. In any event, I may also express my view that even if the Revision Application was maintainable, there was no reason in the facts and circumstances of this case, for this Court to interfere with the impugned Order, since if the said Order is allowed to stand, it would not occasion a failure of justice or cause any irreparable injury to the petitioner.
17. The result, therefore, is that this Revision Application is dismissed with costs.
18. Mr. Khandeparkar prays that six weeks' time be granted to the petitioner to comply with the order of the District Court. Mr. Lotlikar has no objection. Accordingly, the application of Mr. Khandeparkar is allowed and six weeks' time as prayed for is granted for the compliance with the order of the District Court.