G.F. Couto, J.
1. The petitioner is the wife of the Peter Camile D'Costa, who has been detained under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Ordinance, 1988. By this Writ Petition, she challenges the Order of Detention dated 29th August, 1988, passed by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India against her husband under Section 3(1) of the aforesaid Act, purportedly with a view to preventing him from engaging in the transportation, concealment and conspiring in the export from India of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, as well as the Declaration No. 36/88 made on 3rd October, 1988, by the Additional Secretary to the Government of India under Section 10(1) of the same Act.
2. The facts that led to the issuance of the aforesaid Order of Detention and Declaration are that on September 5, 1987, the officers of the Rummeging Section of Customs Preventive Collectorate, Bombay boarded vessel 'M. V. Vishva Nandini' which was berthed at 12-A Indira Dock. On search conducted in the Cabin No. 167 which was, at the relavant time, occupied by the detenue and one Julie Cerreia, some drugs had been found. Further search was conducted in several other rooms of the vessel, and in all, 313' packets, each of them containing 1,000 Mandrex tablets, worth Rs. 13,000/-, had been found, as well as 5 packets of brown sugar, weighing 8 Kgs. and worth about Rs. 8,00,000/-. In addition, foreign currency equivalent to Rs. 3,430/- was also found. All these articles, that is Mandrex tablets, brown sugar and foreign currency, were seized by the Customs Authorities. Thereafter, investigation was made and the Customs Authorities were satisfied that the detenu was involved in activities of transporting the aforesaid drugs outside India. Hence, the impugned Detention Order and the Declaration were made.
3. The petitioner challenges the aforesaid Detention Order and Declaration on several grounds. However, at the time of the hearing, Mr. Rebello, the learned counsel appearing for her, confined the challenge to only one ground. He, indeed, submitted that, although in the grounds of detention a reference is made to the fact that the petitioner has-been enlarged on bail, the fact remains that the application for bail and the order passed therein by the concerned Judge were not placed before the Detaining Authority. According to the learned counsel, the said bail application and Order are vital documents which, if placed before the Detaining Authority, would have definitely influenced it in the formation of the subjective satisfaction. The Detention Order is, therefore, vitiated and liable to be quashed and set aside. Reliance was placed in support of the above submission, in the decision of the Division Bench of this Court (Puranik & Guttal, JJ.) in Criminal Writ Petn. No. 1085 of 1988, Roven T. D'Cruz v. The Union of India a copy of which was placed before us.
4. The said Writ Petition No. 1085 of 1988 is a companion Petition insofar as the present Writ Petition is concerned. The detenu in the said case had been detained under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcatic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Ordinance, 1988, on account of the very same incident on basis of which the husband of the petitioner had been arrested. Therefore, the said decision of the Division Bench has special relevance to the case before us.
5. Undoubtedly, the fact that the detenu was arrested in connection of a particular incident on basis of which the Detention Order is passed and that he has been released on bail is material for the purpose of the formation of the subjective satisfaction on the part of the Detaining Authority. Equally, the Order passed by the competent Court on such application is also relevant for the formation of the said subjective satisfaction. It flows from the grounds of detention that in the present case, the Detailing Authority has considered the circumstance that the detenu has been arrested in connection with the incident which formed the basis for the issuance of his Detention Order as well as of the fact that he has been enlarged on bail. However, it is not denied that the said application and the order passed by the competent Court has not been placed before the same authority. Now, in Writ Petn. No. 1085 of 1988, the detenu had been enlarged on bail by the competent Court, but the application for bail with the order passed thereon had not been placed before the Detaining Authority. Only, a note to the effect was made by the Public Prosecutor stating that the detenu in that case has been released on bail by the trial Court. It was contended before the Division Bench that the said Note was not sufficient, and therefore, the Detention Order was vitiated. Dealing with the aforesaid contention, the Division Bench observed as under :--
'The impugned order was made on 29-8-1988, nine months after the order was made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay. Had the Detaining Authority before him the reasons why the petitioner was released on bail and had he before him a report as to whether the petitioner had complied with the conditions of bail bond, these facts would have influenced his decision.'
The Division Bench, thereafter, allowed the aforesaid writ petition for the aforesaid reasons. We already mentioned that the Writ Petn. No. 1085 of 1988 is a companion petition insofar as the writ petition before us is concerned. In fact, the Detention Orders passed against the detenu in the aforesaid writ petition and in the present writ petition were occasioned by the same incident which took place on 5th September, 1987, and the consequent seizure by the Customs Authorities of Mandrex tablets, brown sugar and foreign currency. The detenues in both cases had been arrested by the Customs Authorities, and in the present case, the detenue Peter has been arrested on 8th September, 1987, being released on bail on 4th November, 1987. The Detention Order was passed against him only on 29th August, 1988, i.e. with a lapse of about nine months. In the present case also, the application for bail and the order passed thereon had not been placed before the Detaining Authority, and apparently, it had been merely brought to its notice that the detenue had been released on bail. What were the contents of the order granting bail were not placed before the Detaining Authority, and more particularly, if any conditions had been imposed by the Court on the detenu.
6. The facts and circumstances of the case before us are similar and almost identical to those of the case disposed of in Writ Petition No. 1085 of 1988. Both the Detention Orders had arisen of the same incident, and therefore, in this background, we think that the view taken by the Division Bench in the Writ Petn. No. 1086 of 1988 cannot be departed from and is to be followed.
7. Accordingly, we held that the impugned order and Declaration are vitiated and liable to be quashed and set aside. The rule is therefore, made' absolute in terms of prayers (a) and a(i). The detenu to be set free, if not required in any other case.