Judgment:
A.D. Mane, J.
1. This criminal writ petition arises out of the proceedings under section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Executive Magistrate, Sillod in exercise of his power conferred on him by sub-section (1) of section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code directed that the disputed property C.T.S. No. 63 of village Satara (Bk.) be taken possession of under the supervision of the Government until proceedings are disposed of. That order passed by the Executive Magistrate was challenged by the respondent in revision and the learned Addl. Sessions Judge by the order dated 9-9-1991 set aside the order of Executive Magistrate and directed party No. 1 to continue in possession over the subject matter of dispute.
2. The question arises whether the revisional Court was justified in interfering with the order passed by the Executive Magistrate under sub-section (1) of section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
3. In order to appreciate this question it may be stated that the object of the section is merely to prevent a breach of the peace by maintaining one or other of the parties in possession which the Court find they had immediately before the dispute. The action which may ultimately be taken is not punitive but preventive, and for that purpose is provisional only until such time as final or formal adjudication on the rights affected may be obtained and carried into effect by a Court competent to deal with the matter in due course of law. That necessarily means that nothing that could affect the past, present or future rights of the parties, was contemplated in the section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
4. There cannot be any dispute that when the Magistrate who has passed the preliminary order was satisfied with the material which was produced before him, mere failure of the Magistrate to mention the ground for passing the order is not enough to interfere with the preliminary order in revision more so when facts as set out in the order by the learned Magistrate would constitute prima facie sufficient material leading to the satisfaction of the Magistrate. In other words a preliminary order under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be passed only when the Magistrate is satisfied that the dispute concerning the property is likely to cause breach of peace. It is nobody's case that there was no any likelihood to cause breach of peace in given set of circumstances as recorded by the learned Magistrate. Therefore, it was not proper for the revisional Court to interfere with the said order.
5. The matter can be considered from another angle. When the Magistrate records his satisfaction as to the existence of breach of peace in his preliminary order, the revisional Court cannot go into the sufficiency or otherwise of the material on which the Magistrate's satisfaction was based. In the present case, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, seems to have exceeded his power of revisional jurisdiction in disturbing preliminary order passed by the Executive Magistrate.
6. In the view that I take, the writ petition must be allowed. It is however, to be noted that by reason of allowing this writ petition, the preliminary order passed by the Magistrate will have to be restored and in that event the Magistrate is required to proceed with the enquiry as contemplated under sub-section (4) read with sub-section (6) of section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Magistrate is, therefore, directed to dispose of the enquiry proceeding as expeditiously as possible. With these directions Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs.
Petition allowed.