R.J. Kochar, J.
1. Rule. By consent the writ petition is heard forthwith.
2. The petitioner is aggrieved by an interim order passed by the Industrial Court in Complaint ULP No. 623 of 2002 filed by the employees union to challenge the order of transfer dated 6th June 2002 of one Shri S.P. Iyer, Senior Technician from Mumbai to Shimla. The respondent union has challenged the said order of transfer by filing the aforesaid complaint under Section 28 read with Section 30 and Items 3, 5, 7, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U. and PULP Act, 1971. According to the respondent union, the said transfer order amounted to an unfair labour practice mainly under Item 3 of Schedule IV of the Act. It was contended by the union that the transfer order was mala fide and was in the guise of following management policy and that it amounted to victimisation of the members of the said union. It was also contended that Shri Iyer was the General Secretary of the Union and that he was transferred at the instance of the rival union viz., Federation of Press Trust of India Employees Union. By a resolution passed by the said Federation at an emergency meeting of the General Council held on 28th -29th May 2002 at Lucknow and communicated to the General Manager of the Petitioner by its letter dated 29th May 2002, it was communicated that the respondent union was de-affiliated from the Federation and that the management should take suitable action against the 12 employees whose names were given in the resolution, on the ground that they were indulging into anti organizational activities. Amongst the 12 employees was the general secretary of the respondent union viz., Shri S.P. Iyer. It was also contended by the respondent union that there were about 70 to 80 Senior Technicians who had no work and were sitting idle as the petitioners had given the work on contract basis and, therefore, though the petitioner purported to transfer the said Shri Iyer to Shimla in place of one .Shri Munnu who was retiring and in whose place Shri Iyer was ordered to betransferred, there was no work at Shimla also. According to the respondent Union the said transfer order was simply at the instigation of the rival union to take suitable action against 12 employees who were not the members of the rival union but who were the active members of the respondent union. Shri S.P. Iyer was the General Secretary of the union which was de-affiliated by the Federation.
3. The petitioner appeared before the Industrial Court and contested the complaint defending the order of transfer as bona fide and in good faith refuting the allegations of mala fides and unfair labour practice in the order of transfer. It was contended by the petitioner that the services of the petitioner's employees were transferable and the said Shri Iyer was transferred in the place of a Senior Technician Shri Munnu who was retiring at Shimla and that Shri Iyer being a good employee was required to work at Shimla. The petitioner also denied the allegations of the union that the order of transfer was passed at the instance or at the instigation of the Federation.
4. Both the parties adduced documentary evidence. The Industrial Court heard the application filed by the respondent union for interim orders of restraining the petitioner from giving effect to the transfer order. The Industrial Court by the impugned order dated 15th July 2002 temporarily revoked the order of transfer and directed the petitioner to allow Shri Iyer to report in his post at Mumbai where he was working prior to his transfer. The Industrial Court was also extremely conscious of the urgency of the matter and, therefore, it also expedited the disposal of the complaint as early as possible.
5. Shri Cama, the learned Sr. Advocate for the petitioner assailed the impugned order of the Industrial Court mainly on the ground that the Industrial Court ought not to have stayed the order of transfer which was passed in good faith and within the management power to transfer and deploy its employees in accordance with the administrative exigencies. According to Shri Cama, there was no dispute that the services of Shri Iyer were transferable. He also denied the allegations of the respondent union that Shri Iyer was transferred at the instigation or at the instance of the Federation, the rival union. Shri Cama further pointed out that in the resolution there were 12 names of the persons belonging to the respondent union but the petitioner did not transfer all of them and had it done so in that case, the allegations of mala fides could have been justified. Shri Cama pointed out that it was the exigency of work that Shri Iyer was ordered to be transferred from Mumbai to Shimla as at Shimla, one Shri Munnu, a Senior Technician was to retire from employment and Shri Iyer was to replace the said Shri Munnu in his vacancy. Shri Cama further vehemently submitted that the employee ought to have first reported for work at Shimla and, thereafter, he ought to have made a representation or filed a complaint through its union. Shri Cama pointed out that instead of taking recourse to that proper procedure in the matters of transfer, the union challenged the transfer order without Shri Iyer reporting at Shimla.
6. Shri C.U. Singh, the learned Counsel for the respondent union, supported the order of the Industrial Court in every respect. Shri Singh also with equal vehemence pointed out that Shri Iyer being the General Secretary of the union was picked up first at the instigation of the Federation which had de-affiliated the respondent union and had passed a unanimous resolution requesting the petitioner management to take suitable action against the 12 listed employees including Shri Iyer on the allegations of anti organizational activities indulged bythem. Shri Singh pointed out that the resolution was passed on 29th May 2002 and the same was communicated to the petitioner on the very same day and within no time the petitioner lifted the General Secretary of the union to terrorise the members of the respondent union. Shri Singh submitted that the Industrial Court has rightly found a very strong prima facie case of unfair labour practice and has recorded the reasons for passing the impugned order on the basis of the material on record. The learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that this Court should not interfere with the interlocutory order passed by the Industrial Court giving cogent reasons. Shri Singh also submitted that there were about 70 to 80 senior technicians who are sitting idle and that there was in fact no work for Shri Iyer at Shimla but was only sent to Shimla to break the respondent union and to support the rival federation. According to Shri Singh, the impugned order passed by the Industrial Court was very well within the parameters of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court to prevent occurrence of unfair labour practice complained of by the respondent union.
7. Shri Cama the learned Senior Advocate has given very great emphasis on the observations made by this Court (Shri Srikrishna, J) in the case of Shivaji More and Estate Manager, Maharashtra State Farming Corporation Ltd. and Anr. t1996(72) F.L.R. 447 that the transferred employee must first report to the place where he is transferred and thereafter make a representation or take out legal proceedings thereagainst. The aforesaid observations of the learned Judge begin with the sentence '.....by now it is well settled that in matters of transfer .....'. On a query made by me to Shri Cama to substantiate this proposition of law which the learned Judge has observed as having been well settled, Shri Cama was not able to point out any judgment of the Supreme Court or this Court that such position as observed by the learned Judge was a well settled law. Shri Cama did not and could not point out even a single decision to support the aforesaid well settled position in law. On the contrary Shri Singh, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent union has handed over a true copy of the order dated 9th April 2002 passed by this Court (Rebello, J) in Writ Petition No. 1958 of 2002. The learned Judge has explained the position of law after considering the observations of Srikrishna, J, in the case of Shivaji More. In Writ Petition No. 1958 of 2002, the learned Judge has dealt With legal position in that respect in para 8 of the judgment which is reproduced hereinbelow :--
'8. The first question that has to be answered is whether the petition should not be entertained on the ground that the petitioners have not joined their place of transfers. Reliance for that purpose has been placed in the case of Shivaji More and the Estate Manager, Maharashtra State Farming Corporation Ltd. and Anr. 1996 (72) F.L.R. 447. In that case, no doubt, a learned Judge of this Court has stated that it is well settled that in matters of transfers, the employee who has been served with the transfer order must first report to the place where he is transferred and thereafter, make representation and take out legal proceedings. That statement of law obviously would be in the case of a regular transfer where there is no challenge on the ground of arbitrariness or mala fide or being in violation of the guidelines issued or rules in force. In fact, the Apex Court in Rajendra Roy v. Union of India and Anr., 1993 I L.L.N. 237 has observed as under :--
'Unless such order is passed mala fide or in violation of the rules of service and guidelines for transfer without any proper justification, the Court or the tribunal should not interfere with the order of transfer. In a transferable post an order of transfer is a normal consequence and personal difficulties are matters for consideration of the department.'
It is clear therefore, from the law declared by the Apex Court that only in such cases of transfer representation can be made. A complaint otherwise on the ground of unfair labour practice is maintainable where the order is passed mala fide or in violation of the rules of service or guidelines of transfer without any proper justification. In fact, before the learned single Judge in More's case what was in issue was transfer from what is known as Lalpuri section to another section in the same local area. It is clear, the learned Judge was aware of the position as in the case of Executive Engineer, Mechanical Division M.H.W. and another, : (1997)IILLJ1068Bom the learned Judge had addressed the question as to whether the transfer order was mala fide. The learned Judge also observed that, as long as the transfer order is not shown to be contrary to the applicant's service rules or mala fides, it is permissible for the Industrial Court to interfere under Item 3 of Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U. and PULP Act. It is therefore, clear that, the observations in the case of Shivaji More (supra) must be restricted to the facts of that case and cannot be generally applied when the transfer is challenged on the ground of mala fide and/or arbitrariness or as amounting to be an act of unfair labour practice or contrary to rules and guidelines for transfer. The position has thereafter being reiterated by the Apex Court in S.S. Kourav and another, : (1995)IILLJ849SC where the Apex Court has observed that in the matter of transfer, the decision to transfer is not vitiated unless it is mala fide or by extraneous consideration without any factual background foundation. In B. Varadh Rao v. State of Karnataka and Ors., : (1986)IILLJ516SC in the matter of transfer order of Government employees the Apex Court observed as under:--
'However, a transfer order which is mala fide and not made in public interest but made for collateral purpose, with oblique motives and in colourable exercise of power is vitiated by abuse of power and is open to challenge before Court being wholly illegal and void.' It is therefore, clear that the transfer from one place to another in public interest or administrative exigencies, would normally not be interfered with and the remedy for the parties in such cases if there be difficulties is to make a representation. In private employment also a similar managerial exercise for administrative exigencies or in the regular courses of employment in terms of the service conditions would not be interfered with. However, where the action is challenged as mala fide or colourable exercise of power or being arbitrary or an unfair labour practices being contrary to known policy laid down in the form of rulesand guidelines, Courts would interfere. The law, therefore, is clear. The complaint is maintainable. The judgment in Shivaji More (supra) has to be confined to those cases where the transfer is a regular transfer or in the same locality to a similar post. The first contention is therefore, rejected.'
The learned Judge has also followed the observations of the Supreme Court and has held that where the action is challenged as mala fide or colourable exercise of power or being arbitrary or unfair labour practice, a complaint would be maintainable. I am in respectful agreement with the exposition of law made by my brother Rebello, J. The facts in the case before Srikrishna, J. were very peculiar and therefore, I agree with the opinion expressed by Rebello, J. that the observations in that judgment should be confined to the facts of that case. In that case the employee was transferred from one department to another department and he had challenged such transfer. The Industrial Court had held that there was no unfair labour practice in the order of transfer of the said employee from one department to another. The employee continued under the orders of this Court at the same place for a period of 7 years. In the aforesaid circumstances, it appears that the learned Judge had made those observations that the employee ought to have reported first for the work at the transferred place and, thereafter, made a representation.
8. An employee is entitled to challenge his transfer order being mala fide and under the guise of following the management policy as contemplated under Item 3 of Schedule IV of the Act and is also entitled to get an interim order under Section 30(1) of the Act for prevention of the alleged unfair labour practice. In my humble opinion, it is not contemplated by the Legislature that the employee should challenge the order of transfer after reporting for work at the transferred place. In other words what it means that the employee has to first accept the unfair labour practice alleged by him and, thereafter, make a representation or initiate legal proceedings against such transfer from the transferred place. What is contemplated by this Act is even prevention of such unfair labour practice. The employee is, therefore, entitled to pray for an order of prevention of an unfair labour practice. The Industrial Court is empowered to pass an order to stay the order of transfer and prevent temporarily the unfair labour practice complained of by such an employee. If the transfer orders are routine transfer orders such as periodical transfer orders and if any employee has a hardship and genuine grievance, he has to make such an application or representation after accepting the order of transfer and joining the duty at the transferred place. Under the present law, a malicious order or mala fide transfer can always be challenged as unfair labour practice and can always be prevented by the Industrial Court, if it gets satisfied that the ingredients of the unfair labour practice proved by the employee. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of Shri Cama that Shri Iyer should have first joined at Shimla and thereafter he should have filed the complaint at Mumbai. Requiring Shri Iyer first to report at Shimla from Mumbai and, thereafter, pray for prevention of the unfair labour practice would be to reduce the efficacy of the provisions of the Act for prevention of the unfair labour practice. Justice Srikrishna had made the observations in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case before him. There is no elaborate discussion orreasoning given by the learned Judge in the judgment to become a binding ratio of the decision. It appears that in that case, the learned Judge was rightly upset by the attitude of the employee who was merely shifted from one department to another within the same precincts or may be within the same town and he continued there for more than 7 years under the orders of this Court. In such circumstances it was necessary for the learned Judge to have observed that the employee should first report for work in the department where he was transferred in the same precincts and, thereafter, he should have made a representation. In my opinion, the learned Judge was fully justified in making these observations in the facts of that case. Those observations, however, have to be confined to the facts of that case only not as a general proposition of law to become a binding ratio decidendi as rightly observed by Rebello, J. in his subsequent judgment which is elaborate and which lays down the law after following the judgment of the Supreme Court. I respectfully agree with the judgment of Rebello, J. and I follow the same as the binding precedent, which is subsequent in the point of time and which gives the reasoning to become a ratio decidendi.
9. Now I come to the question of the legality and validity of the impugned order passed by the Industrial Court on the application for interim reliefs under Section 30(2) of the M.R.T.U. & PULP Act. The Industrial Court has, in a very well written and reasoned order discussing and considering all the submissions made on behalf of both the sides, found a very strong prima facie case in favour of the respondent union. The Industrial Court was well within its jurisdiction under Section 30(2) of the Act to pass such an order. It will be appropriate to reproduce Section 30(2) of the Act.'In any proceeding before it under this Act, the Court may pass suchinterim order (including any temporary relief or restraining order) as itdeems just and proper (including directions to the person to withdrawtemporarily the practice complained of, which is an issue in suchproceedings), pending final decision; provided that, the Court may, on anapplication in that behalf, review any interim order passed by it.'From Section 30(2) above it is very clear that the Industrial Court isempowered to pass such interim orders including any temporary relief as it woulddeem just and proper and also to direct the withdrawal of such order temporarily.The Industrial Court has recorded, in my opinion, good reasons for directing thepetitioner to withdraw the order of transfer temporarily during the pendency ofthe final decision of the complaint. It is not that the Industrial Court has notconsidered the contention of the parties and the material on record. The IndustrialCourt has considered the whole case and the principles deducible from therulings cited before it and it deemed just and proper to direct the petitioner towithdraw the order of transfer temporarily. I do not find any illegality,impropriety or invalidity in the impugned order passed by the Industrial Court atthe interim stage. It is well within the sound discretion of the Industrial Court topass such just and proper orders in the given circumstances. The Industrial Courthas considered the allegations of the mala fides in issuing the impugned transferorder which was passed by the petitioner immediately after receipt of theresolution and communicated by the Federation in its letter dated 29th May 2002wherein, the management was virtually directed to take suitable action againstnot only one but 12 employees who allegedly indulged into 'anti organizational activities'. One of the twelve listed was Shri S.P. Iyer, the General Secretary of the respondent Union. The petitioner has taken 'a suitable action' as suggested by the Federation by ordering immediate transfer of the General Secretary of the Union, Shri Iyer to Shimla. In my opinion, the Industrial Court has rightly considered the said uncontroverted and uncontrovertible material as a very strong prima facie case in favour of the union as a foundation of unfair labour practice as contemplated by item 3 of Schedule IV of the Act. Any reasonable man would definitely consider such a letter from a rival union to the management to take certain action against the members of its rival union as a very strong prima facie case in favour of the challenge to such an action. The Industrial Court has also considered the judgment of this Court (Rebello, J.). The Industrial Court has also taken into account, as a part of the strong prima facie case, that there were 70 to 80 Senior Technicians sitting idle as revealed from the log book of the petitioner and what was the position of nature of the work done by them and that since last two years they were sitting idle without any work. The Industrial Court has not finally decided and held in favour of the union that the petitioner had engaged in an unfair labour practice as alleged. The Industrial Court has only recorded its strong prima facie case as proved by the Union and has based its order within its sound discretion which it thought to be just and proper. The Industrial Court's order cannot be said to be either arbitrary or baseless or perverse.
10. According to me, it is pertinent to note that the petitioner has picked up first the general secretary of the rival union for throwing him out from Mumbai to Shimla. If the general secretary of a union meets with such a fate, the whole activities of the union get paralysed. Other members also get demoralized and scared and to desert the union and to surrender to the Federation to get protection against the wrath of the management. The hit list is already submitted by the Federation as the rival of the respondent union. The petitioners appear to have acted on the said hit list provided by the Federation and the petitioner has immediately acted on the basis of the said resolution. The Industrial Court has considered all the pros and cons of the matter and has rightly passed the interim order of directing the petitioner to temporarily revoke the order of transfer. In my opinion, the balance of convenience is in favour of the respondent union and the concerned employee Shri Iyer. The impugned order of the Industrial Court is perfectly in the interest of justice and there is no warrant to interfere with the said order. There is no miscarriage of justice to interfere with the impugned order under the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
11. Shri Cama has cited the following decisions passed by this Court in the cases between the petitioner itself and its employees particularly in respect of transfer orders.
a) Press Trust of India Ltd. Employees Union and Anr. v. Press Trust of India Ltd. and Ors., 1998 2 CLR 1159, Press Trust of India Ltd. and Anr. v. Parag B. Rabade and Ors., 1999 2 CLR 577.
The facts in both these cases are different and they cannot be equated with the peculiar facts of this case, wherein the General Secretary of a rival union was transferred from Mumbai to Shimla at the behest of the rival Federation whichhad resolved that suitable action be taken against the listed employees. The petitioner management was quick to oblige the Federation by order of transfer of General Secretary of the Union. It is, therefore, not necessary for me to discuss the facts of these cases cited before me. There is no quarrel with the law laid down by the learned Judges in the above decisions in the facts and circumstances of those cases before them. In the case before my learned brother Lodha, J. the Union had given challenge to the very power of the management to transfer the employee and therefore, the learned Judge declined to interfere at the interim stage to decide and hold that the management had no power to transfer and that there was no material at that stage to infer mala fides in the order of transfer. In the case before me there was sufficient material to infer prima facie a case of unfair labour practice.
12. In the case before my learned brother A.P. Shah, J., in the subsequent petition, the fanciful challenge by the union to the transfer of a Senior Reporter to the desk of a Senior Sub-editor on the ground that both the jobs were not interchangeable and that the allocation of desk duties was punitive and opposed to Section 9A of the I. D. Act, 1947. In these circumstances, the learned Judge very rightly considered the important element of flexibility and mobility in the administration of news agency. There does not appear that there was any material of mala fides in re-allocation of the duties of the employee concerned in that case. Again, in the case before me the Industrial Court has rightly found strong prima facie material for interim orders, which I have also scrutinised and found cogent to support the prima facie view of the Industrial Court.
13. In the case of Barailly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd., 1960 I LLJ 556 the following head note precisely states the law laid down by the Supreme Court and there cannot be any quarrel with that proposition of law but I fail to understand how this case helps Shri Cama as in the present case there is sufficient reliable evidence in support of the prima facie finding of mala fides in the impugned order of transfer. The head note in the case of Barailly Electricity (supra) reads as under:--
'that transferring a cooly from one department to another is a matter of internal arrangement and industrial tribunals should be very careful before they interfere with the orders made in the discharge of the management function in such behalf. Further it is hardly necessary to emphasize that the finding of mala fides could be made by industrial tribunals only after sufficient reliable evidence is led in support of it. Such a finding should not be made lightheartedly or in a casual manner, as done in the instant case.'
In the case of the Rajendra Roy, : AIR1993SC1236 the Supreme Court has again expounded the law on transfer in the following para 7 of the judgment, which reads as under :--
'After considering the respective contentions of the parties, it appears to us that the appellant has not been able to substantiate that the impugned order of transfer was passed mala fide against him for an oblique purpose and/or for wrecking vengeance against him because the respondent No. 2 was anxious to get rid of him and he seized the opportunity of transferring him from Delhi to Calcutta by transferring Shri Patra back toOrissa from Calcutta. It is true that the order of transfer often causes a lot of difficulties and dislocation in the family set up of the concerned employees but on that score the order of transfer is not liable to be struck down. Unless such order is passed mala fide or in violation of the rules of service and guidelines for transfer without any proper justification, the Court and the Tribunal should not interfere with the order of transfer. In a transferable post an order of transfer is a normal consequence and personal difficulties are matters for consideration of the department. We are in agreement with the Central Administrative Tribunal that the appellant has not been able to lay any firm foundation to substantiate the case of malice or mala fide against the respondents in passing the impugned order of transfer. It does not appear to us that the appellant has been moved out just to get rid of him and the impugned order of transfer was passed mala fide by seizing an opportunity to transfer Shri Patra to Orissa from Calcutta. It may not be always possible to establish malice in fact in a straight-cut manner. In an appropriate case, it is possible to draw reasonable inference of mala fide action from the pleadings and antecedent facts and circumstances. But for such inference there must be firm foundation of facts pleaded and established. Such inference cannot be drawn on the basis of insinuation and vague suggestions. In this case, we are unable to draw any inference of mala fide action in transferring the appellant from the facts pleaded before the Tribunal. It appears that Shri Patra was transferred to Calcutta and after joining the post he had made representation on account of personal hardship. Such representation was considered and a decision was taken to transfer him back to Orissa region. As a result, a necessity arose to transfer an employee to Calcutta to replace Shri Patra. It cannot be reasonably contended by the appellant that he should have been spared and some one else would have been transferred. The appellant has not made any representation about the personal hardship to the department. As such there was no occasion for the department to consider such representation. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed but we make no order as to costs. It is, however, made clear that the appellant will be free to make representation to the concerned department about personal hardship, if any, being suffered by the appellant in view of the impugned order. It is reasonably expected that if such representation is made, the same should be considered by the department as expeditiously as practicable.'
I repeat that the present case answers all the tests laid down by the Supreme Court above. There cannot be more firm foundation than the one recorded by the Industrial Court to find prima facie strong case of unfair labour practice under Item 3 of Schedule IV of the Act within the jurisdiction under Section 30(2) to order to withdraw temporarily the order of transfer of Shri Iyer, the General Secretary of the rival union named in the hit list of the rival Federation for 'suitable action.'
14. In the case of Management of Additions Paints and Chemicals Ltd. v. Workmen, represented by the Secretary (A. P. and C) Assistants' Association and Anr. reported in : (2001)ILLJ957SC , the facts are entirely different as wouldbe found in the following concluding para No. 6 which is reproduced hereinbelow:--
'We have heard the parties, read the impugned judgment as well as the judgment of the Single Judge and the Award of the Tribunal. In our view, there is no infirmity either in the Award or in the judgment of the Single Judge or in the judgment of the Division Bench. The employee Nagarajan had refused to accept the transfer order and refused to report for duty after his transfer. We see no substance in the contention that he was entitled not to join. In our view, the dispute could have been raised and agitated even after joining. There was no justification for not reporting for duty. In spite of Nagarajan not having worked he has been awarded 25% of backwages. This was within the discretion of the Court and we see no reason to interfere. At the request of the appellants in C.A. No. 392 of 1997, they are granted time of eight weeks from today to pay 25% of the backwages.'
Even this case does not help the petitioner. I further fail to appreciate the attempt on the part of the learned Counsel to multiply the cases to be cited as there is no dispute on the principle of transfers of the employees which cannot be contrary to the Rules and cannot be actuated by mala fides. And, the case of mala fides must be proved on the basis of cogent and sufficient material and that the transfer orders cannot be interfered with lightly. Everything depends on the evidence and material brought on record to substantiate the charge of mala fides, malice or unfair labour practice.
15. The Industrial Court has found very strong prima facie case which has no parallel in other cases cited before me.
16. The last but not the least observation which I am constrained to make which we must bear in our mind while entertaining a challenge to any interlocutory or interim order passed by the labour/Industrial Court. Though the following observations were made by the Supreme Court in the Appeal in the context of criminal proceedings, the same would be more aptly applicable even in the context of the labour matters. The philosophy and the principles can be applied in all the matters where interlocutory orders are challenged. The other day the employer came with a challenge to an innocuous order of clubbing two complaints between the same parties and more or less the similar dispute in both the complaints so that time could be saved by the Court. Even such orders are brought under Article 226 by the parties who can afford the litigation to be prolonged on one or the other ground howsoever flimsy that might be! The Supreme Court has given as apt reply to all such parties in the case of Santosh De and Anr. v. Archana Guha and Ors., reported in : 1995CriLJ2640 as under:--
'15. The facts of this case impel us to say how easy it has become today to delay the trial of criminal cases. An accused so minded can stall the proceedings for decades together, if he has the means to do so. Any and every single interlocutory is challenged in the superior Courts and the superior Courts, we are pained to say, are falling prey to their stratagems. We expect the superior Courts to resist all such attempts. Unless a grave illegality is committed, the superior Courts should not interfere. Theyshould allow the Court which is seized of the matter to go on with it. There is always an Appellate Court to correct the errors. One should keep in mind the principle behind Section 465, Criminal Procedure Code. Any and every irregularity or infraction of a procedural provision cannot constitute a ground for interference by a superior Court unless such irregularity or infraction has caused irreparable prejudice to the party and requires to be corrected at that stage itself. Such frequent interference by superior Courts at the interlocutory stages tends to defeat the ends of justice instead of serving those ends. It should not be that a man with enough means is able to keep the law at bay. That would mean the failure of the very system.'
17. There is no substance in the petition and the same is dismissed.
18. Rule is discharged. No orders as to costs.