Sharad Manohar, J.
1. Neither law or equity can justify interference with the impugned order passed by the lower Court.
2. The facts are very simple.
The present petitioners are original defendants Nos. 1 & 2. They are the owners and builders of some property. The original plaintiff is present respondent No. 1. He claims to have entered into agreement for purchase of one of the flats in the building which was being constructed by original defendants Nos. 1 & 2. But his case is that he did not enter into agreement for such purchase directly with defendants Nos. 1 & 2, but with defendant No. 3, who, the plaintiff claims, was acting as the agent of the builders, defendants Nos. 1 & 2. Present respondent No. 3, who was original defendant No. 4, was the person who had purchased the self same suit flat from defendants Nos. 1 & 2. Evidently, his interest is the same as that of defendants Nos. 1 & 2.
The plaintiff's contention was that he had entered into an agreement with defendant No. 3 as agent of defendants Nos. 1 & 2 for the purchase of the suit flat, the certain amount was agreed to be paid as purchase price part of which was to be paid not openly but secretary (the transaction of (... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...) No. 1 & 2 totally denied any relation with defendant No. 3 as their agent. Defendant No. 3 on the other hand supported the plaintiff in his contention that defendant No. 3 was acting as the agent of defendant Nos. 1 & 2. The plaintiff's agreement with him acting as agent of defendants Nos. 1 & 2 was also admitted. But he contended that the monies that he received from the plaintiff towards the purchase price was handed over by him to defendant Nos. 1 & 2.
3. We are not really concerned with the merits of the case as such. The only question that arise is as to whether the learned Judge has delivered any 'Judgment' in this case. The evidence was led and all arguments were over on 30-04-1988. The learned Judge even proceeded to deliver the judgment. But while delivering the so-called 'judgment', what he did was that the pleadings were summarised, issues were framed, findings on the issues were recorded, pithily , as 'No', 'Yes', 'Yes', etc. The last issue was that what order & Decree ?
So far as the reasons were concerned, the word 'Reasons' is written by him as the title of the paragraphs. But the entire portion is left by him blank. No reason or ground for coming to the finding is recorded at all. All that he did was that a final order was passed by him and I am told, was even signed by him. By the final order, the plaintiff's suit for specific performance was dismissed against the defendants Nos. 1 & 2. But defendant No. 3 was ordered to pay the amount received by him from the plaintiff. Thus, there was a money decree passed against defendant No. 3, but the suit against defendants Nos. 1 & 2 has been dismissed.
4. However, it is an undisputed fact that 30th April, 1988 was the date on which the learned Judge was to hand over the charge to his successor, because he was on transfer. After signing the bare order, he passed a further order stating therein that on that date it was impossible which he had recorded. He therefore observed that it was just humanly impossible for him to sift the evidence and to give a detailed reasoning and mention the necessary ground for arriving at the finding which he has mentioned as against each of the issue and on this account in the final portion of the order he has observed as follows :---
'Therefore it is desirable to be reheard by my successor if required. Hence the operative part so produced is not complete judgment itself. Adjourned for rehearing of the arguments if required to 6-6-1988 and for completion of the judgment and pronouncing the same. Notices issued through Court to the Advocates for the respective parties vide Outward No. 858/1988 dated 30-4-1988. Adjourned for reargument if required and completion of the judgment to ............. 6-6-1988.'
It is, thus clear that the learned Judge himself did not regard and took upon the documents as the judgment which document Mr. Angal, appearing for the petitioner, wants to be regarded as 'judgment' and he directed, in substance, that his successor should hear the arguments de novo, if necessary, and should deliver his own judgment.
It is against this order that the present petition is filed by defendants Nos. 1 & 2.
5. As will be presently pointed out, a mere glance at the definition of the word 'judgment' is sufficient for dismissal of this writ petition. But in addition to that, every principal of equity cries hoarse that this Court should not interfere with the order passed by the learned Judge.
6. The argument of Mr. Angal is that once the judgment is pronounced and signed, the Court becomes functus officio and has not a ghost of jurisdiction to pass the kind of order that he has passed treating that the judgment is not delivered at all and giving liberty to the parties to argue the matter before his successor.
The simple answer to this plea is that it fallacious, because there was no judgment delivered or signed by the learned Judge at all. For verifying this position, just a cursory glance at the definition of the word 'judgment' in section 2(9) of the Civil Procedure Code is enough. The definition runs as follows :---
'(9) 'Judgment' means the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order'.
In order to qualify itself to be called a 'judgment', the document or writing, whatever you may call it, must be a statement by the learned Judge giving the reasons, that is to say the grounds, on which he is coming to the particular conclusion and passing the particular order or decree. In this case, it does appear that he has arrived at some kind of a conclusion. But no one can make out the reasons on the basis of which he arrived at conclusion. Such a writing cannot qualify itself for the nomenclature of a'Judgment' and if no judgment is signed, then no amount of signatures put by the learned Judge upon the document, which Mr. Angal wants to be described as a judgment, will convert it into a judgment. In my opinion, this simple answer is enough to dispose of this petition.
But since Mr. Angal has strenuously tried to put forth certain other points, which are really speaking, the same thing being stated differently, I will briefly refer to the points.
7. Firstly, he contended that this document which he wants to be called as judgment may not be judgment within the definition of the C.P.C., but once the document is signed, the Counsel argues, he has no jurisdiction to treat it as if he has not signed it and to regard that no judgment is given by him. According to the Counsel, this is the function of the Appeal Court. In other words, what he implies is that the learned Judge has become functus officio the moment the writing purporting to be a judgment is signed by him. He did not use the word 'functus officio', but, in fairness to him, I must observe that this is what he implies.
I would have no difficult in accepting the argument if what the learned Judge signed was in fact a judgment as contemplated by the Court. Supposing the learned Judge has badly summarised the pleadings, has framed wrong issues, has given perfunctory reasons and has passed a final order, would be, all the same, 'Judgment' and once he has signed the judgment he will certainly become functus officio. The only remedy for the person who is aggrieved by such final order would be the appeal against the same. But the position in the instant case is that the learned Judge has not signed any signed any judgment as such at all. The question of the learned Judge becoming functus officio, does not arise.
8. But even looking at the question from the point of view of equity, this Court must be extremely circumspect in the matter of interfering with the orders of such character. What the learned Counsel initially argued was that it was necessary for the party aggrieved by the judgment to file an appeal to the Appeal Court. But he was fair enough to concede that if an appeal is filed, the judgment will have to be set aside by the Appeal Court, because the judgment contains no reasons and no grounds. In other words, what the learned Counsel wants is that the appeal should be filed; that the Appeal Court will have no other option but to allow the appeal, to set aside the order of the Trial Court and to send the matter back to the Trial Court directing the successor Judge to record his own findings on the issues, to record his reasons for the same and to pass his own final order consistent with those findings. Even Mr. Angal concedes that the same position would thus follow as the one which exists how by virtue of the impugned order. But for bringing about this same position, the parties and the Courts must waste their time, monies and energy. At least this Court will have a face set against such a plea bringing about such meaningless and anomalous results. What will ultimately happen has been done at this stage itself and I see no reason to interfere with the order, sitting as it is I am in my writ jurisdiction, which aims at bringing about justice and not at squibbling with the niceties & technicalities of law assuming that there existed any logical substance in them.
9. The learned Counsel further argued that the aggrieved party may not file an appeal.
In the first place, Mr. Agarwal, appearing for respondent No. 1, specifically stated that respondent No. 1 was bound to file and did intend filing an appeal against the so-called final order based on reasons as it is. But I find it difficult to swallow such a plea even otherwise. To my mind, even assuming that the parties may not desire to file an appeal because they find that the ultimate order is correct, the same result would follow whether the order is retained or not. This is so, because if the parties, that is to say the present respondents choose not to file an appeal because they agree with the ultimate order, well, they not pester the successor of the Judge by arguing the entire matter de novo. A money decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff and against defendant No. 3. If neither of them wants to file an appeal and are agreeable to the so called final order as it stands, they may say so to the learned successor Judge and the matter would end in some kind of order by consent. I see no reason why such an eventuality should have any bearing upon the interpretation of the word 'Judgment' defined by section 2(9) of the C.P.C.
10. In my opinion, the petitioner no merit. The rule earlier issued is, therefore, discharged. However, there shall be no order as to costs.