Judgment:
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. This order will dispose of prayer for ad-interim relief sought by the plaintiffs during the pendency of the Notice of Motion.
2. Heard counsel for the parties. Perused the relevant pleadings and documents.
3. This Motion is opposed only by defendant Nos. 1,2,4 and 5. The other defendants have not bothered to appear inspite of service nor have filed any reply to controvert the claim of the plaintiffs. As against them, therefore, ad-interim relief is granted in terms of prayer Clause (a) to (h). In so far as defendant Nos. 1,2,4 and 5 are concerned, as they have contested the matter we shall now examine the rival claim.
4. The plaintiffs have filed suit to claim relief's against the defendants in relation to their acts of infringement of registered trade marks of the plaintiffs with the Registrar of Trade Marks in Mumbai; and acts of passing off, acts likely to pass off and/or acts enabling passing off by using word 'LION' as part of the name of the concerned defendants; for infringement of copyright, committed by the defendants by adopting the name, designation, emblem and other insignia of the Association, which are deceptively similar to that of the plaintiffs; for infringement of copyright, committed by the Defendants in substantially copying the literary work of plaintiffs in the Constitution and By-Laws entitled 'Purposes'; against acts of deceiving the public by having articles published on websites depicting the defendants activities; against defamatory reports published in the Newspapers, Circulars, Websites, etc. portraying the plaintiffs organisation with disrepute.
5. It is the plaintiffs case that the essential and dominant features of each of the trade marks of the plaintiffs as registered in India are the words 'LION' and/or 'LIONS' and/or 'LIONESS and/or 'LEO' and/or 'LIONS CLUB' and/or 'LIONS INTERNATIONAL' and/or 'LIONS CLUBS INTERNATIONAL' and or the device of a Lion and/or the letter 'L' and/or their emblem to reflect the image of the Lions Clubs in the community, in India and the world over.
6. It is asserted that the plaintiffs trade marks are registered with the Trade Marks Registrar at Bombay in India as well as abroad. For that reason, the plaintiffs are entitled to the exclusive use of such marks and identification of goods bearing the said marks and services carried on under the said marks as and that of the plaintiffs and no one else. According to the plaintiffs, they have maintained strict control to ensure that no manufacturer uses the emblem or related LION insignia or the word LIONS which is the prominent and dominant part of the emblem or insignia except under express permission granted by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have relied on the registration certificates in India regarding the marks which have been renewed from time to time. The plaintiffs are also relying on the various service marks and registered trade marks in India of the plaintiffs with particulars of registrations thereof, which it is asserted, are valid and subsisting. The plaintiffs also claim that they have registered their Website on the internet/Net work solution in the year 1996 of which URL is www.lions.org. which is accessible to any member of public having facility of internet connection on the computer. The nature of information available on the Website has been elaborated by the plaintiffs. For considering prayer for ad-interim relief, it is not necessary to advert all those details. The plaintiffs assert that the affiliate Lions Club in India have been conducting programmes. The Lions Clubs in India affiliated to the plaintiffs are also described as 'INDIA LIONS CLUBS'. The plaintiffs claim that they have been using the emblem consisting of device of two lions which emblem is recognised through out the world and in India and is associated exclusively with the plaintiffs. According to the plaintiffs, in the recent past some members and office bearers of plaintiffs LIONS CLUBS in India became disgruntled, for the reasons best known to them and left the International Association of Lions Clubs of plaintiffs and purported to form Clubs under deceptively similar names such as 'National Association of India Lions', 'Indian Lions', 'Lions of India' and/or 'Bharatiya Lions' and or combination of words before or after the word LION and/or LIONS and/or LIONESS and/or LEO and/or LIONS CLUB. The plaintiffs has referred to one such case in respect of Club which was registered in Ajmer under the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act under the name and style 'The National Society of Indian Lions, Ajmer'. The plaintiffs filed suit against the said association in this Honble Court being Suit No. 1423 of 2000. The plaintiffs assert that there is nexus between the 5th Defendant in the present suit(T.J.Gala) and the defendant No.1 in the said suit being Suit No.1423 of 2000, in as much as their members were once member of plaintiffs association which uses deceptively similar emblem in English as well as in Hindi. The said associations members were guilty of the acts of infringement of trademarks, acts of passing off, infringement of Copy right and wrongful adoption and use of domain name namely 'www.indianlions.org'. In the said suit plaintiffs took out Notice of Motion No.1175 of 2000 praying for interlocutory order. This Honble Court by Judgment dated 29th March, 2006 was pleased to grant interim injunction in terms of prayer Clause (a) to (e) of the Notice of Motion. The said decision is reported in 2006(33) PTC Bom 79. This Judgment has been strongly relied upon by the plaintiffs to urge that most of the defences raised by the defendants for the present proceedings have already been answered in favour of the plaintiffs in the said reported decision. The plaintiffs are also relying on another decision of this Court dated 10th April, 2001 in Notice of Motion No.622 of 2001 in Suit No.865 of 2001 in the case of International Association of Lions Clubs v. Indian Lions Clubs and Anr. which was filed by the plaintiffs against another association indulging in same mischief titled as INDIAN LIONS CLUBS. It is stated that even in the said decision, while considering similar defences, the Court has answered the issue in favour of the plaintiffs by holding that there is definite similarity in the name of the plaintiffs and the name of the defendants in the respective suit. It is further held that if the concerned defendants had no intention to pass off their organisation as an associate of plaintiffs then there was no justification for defendants to use LION in the name of their club. The fact that the name has been dishonestly used has been inferred on the finding that the defendant Club was formed because of the dissatisfaction, by disgruntled members of the plaintiffs organisation. It is observed that if there was dissatisfaction and if they wanted to distance from the plaintiffs, the disgruntled members ought to have adopted the name which is not even remotely connected to that of plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have also asserted that the said decision dated 10th April, 2001 was taken up in appeal before the Division Bench of this Court being Appeal No.413 of 2001. However, the Division Bench declined to stay the operation of the said decision. In other words, the injunction order against another set of organisation called Indian Lions Club is also operating against them. In fact, the said organisation had taken up the matter further in appeal before the Supreme Court which however, came to be dismissed as withdrawn on 30th July, 2001. Suffice it to observe that the plaintiffs in substance allege that the defendants herein have also indulged in the same mischief for which reason, the plaintiffs are entitled to injunction against the present defendants as well.
7. The defendant Nos. 1,2, 4 and 5 have entered appearance after service of notice. The other defendants though served have not appeared, nor filed any reply to counter the plaintiffs claim. In so far as defendant Nos. 4 and 5 are concerned, the affidavit is filed by Bachubhai Gala @ T.J.Gala. In this affidavit, essentially six points have been raised to contest the prayer for grant of ad-interim relief. The first contention is that there is gross delay, latches on the part of the plaintiffs in taking out present application for ad-interim relief. It is stated that in the month of August, 1993, the plaintiffs advocate had sent a legal notice to the defendant No.1 Society dated 23rd August, 1993 alleging infringement of plaintiffs trade marks and for passing off and calling upon the defendant No.1 to cease and/or desist from using the name 'LIONS' or 'LIONS INDIA JABALPUR MIDTOWN' and for other matters referred to in the said legal notice. On receipt of the said legal notice, Dr.Jagjitsingh Khanna, the then founder president of the plaintiff No.1 society filed a Civil Suit in the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh being Civil Suit No. 383/A/1994 for a declaration that the threats of action for infringement passing off or consequently for damages as contained in the said legal notice dated 23rd August, 1993 are unjustified and groundless and for injunction against the plaintiffs herein to desist from continuing their threats in any manner either personally or through their servants and agents. It is stated by the said defendants that the said suit was filed in the representative capacity under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which leave was granted by the trial Court. That suit, after full-fledged trial, came to be decreed in favour of the defendant No.1 Society on 21st April, 2001. The said decree has been allowed to become final by the plaintiffs. It is next asserted on behalf of the defendants that the plaintiffs have concealed these material facts and have suppressed the same from this Honble Court by not disclosing it in the plaint. It is stated that the plaintiffs have therefore, not approached this Honble Court with clean hands, for which reason also not entitled to any ad-interim relief. It is then stated that the decision against the plaintiffs and in favour of the defendant No.1 given by the District Judge, Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh and finding recorded therein will operate as res-judicata between the parties. It is next contended that the defendants have been using their name and logo and/or emblem since long and have been carrying out their selfless activities of humanity and help to poor and needy persons without any interference and obstruction from the plaintiffs for all these 14 years. In other words, the plaintiffs have admittedly allowed the defendants to use name and logo of LIONS INDIA for the period of 14 years and deemed to have consented and/or acquiesced to the acts and activities of the Defendants in the name of LIONS INDIA and with their logo. It is stated that defendant No.1 is registered society under Madhya Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 1975. It is categorically denied that the defendants have committed infringement in any manner as alleged by the plaintiffs. It is then stated that neither the name nor logo and/or emblem of the defendant No.1 society is deceptively similar to that of the plaintiffs and or would confuse any one. It is stated that the emblem device used by the plaintiffs is of two half faces lions on either sides of logo, whereas in the defendants logo, lions face is full and front facing. It is lastly asserted that the defendant No.1 society was not engaged in sale, trade or dealing with any goods or articles with trade marks of the plaintiffs as such. Whereas the defendant No.1 was rendering selfless services to the society at large and human mankind for upliftment of the poor and needy persons. To buttress the argument that there is marked distinction in similarity between goods and goods and similarity between services and services and there cannot be similarity between goods on the one hand, and/or services on the other, reliance is placed on an unreported decision of Single Judge of our High Court dated 4th June, 2007 in Notice of Motion No.3640 of 2006 and Notice of Motion No.4044 of 2006 in Suit No.2996 of 2006 in the case of Balkrishna Hatcheries v. Nandos International Ltd. and Anr. (para 12 thereof). Reliance is also placed on an unreported Judgment of Single Judge of our High Court dated 19th January, 2007 in Notice of Motion No.2128 of 2003 in the case of L. Liladhar and Co. and Anr. v. Rathod and Co. and Anr.; and on the Division Bench Judgment of our High Court decided on 7th March, 2007 in Appeal No.111 of 2007 arising from the decision of the Single Judge in the case of L.Liladhar and Co. and Anr.(Supra).
8. Having considered the rival pleadings and documents on record, I have no difficulty in accepting the argument of the plaintiffs, at this stage of the proceeding, that the claim of the plaintiffs about the exclusivity to use their name and registered trade mark has already been subject matter of atleast two proceedings before this Court. In both the decisions, the claim of the plaintiffs in this behalf has been accepted. The plaintiffs have rightly pressed into service decision in the case of International Associations of Lions Clubs v. National Association of Indian Lions and Ors. reported in 2006(33) PTC 79 Bom as well as unreported decision dated 10th April, 2001 in Notice of Motion No.622 of 2001 in Suit No.865 of 2001 in the case of International Association of Lions Club v. Indian Lions Clubs and Ors. In the said reported decision, in paragraph-8, the Court found as follows:
I have considered the rival contentions between the parties. In so far as the question of establishment of the reputation of the plaintiffs is concerned, the same is established beyond any doubt. The plaintiffs are the internationally well known organisation and are conducting activities on a very large scale. The plaintiffs have got large number of clubs in India and large number of people are their members and the club is closely associated with the plaintiffs and plaintiffs activities in India including the City of Bombay carried on a very large extent. The plaintiffs have thus acquired a huge reputation in the word Lion, Lioness and Leos in association with their names namely Lions Club of International. The plaintiffs have equally acquired a huge reputation in the emblem with picture of Lions on both sides. The Lion emblem is also well known in India. By virtue of the fact that the plaintiffs are carrying out its activities in social sector and even in charity sector the plaintiffs name and the emblem is associated with the plaintiffs and its activities. Thus, in my opinion, the question that whether the plaintiffs have acquired a reputation or not in the word Lion, Lioness and Leo must be answered in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also advertised the said word Lion,j Lioness and Leos in relation to their activities in various newspapers and in pamphlets and posters. It is thus without any doubt clear that the reputation of the plaintiffs in the word Lion, Lioness and Leo and Leos has been the very huge reputation and, therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to protect the same.
On the same lines in the unreported decision of another single Judge in Notice of Motion No. 622 of 2001, this Court accepted the claim of the plaintiffs in the following words.
So far as the question of grant of ad-interim order is concerned, the plaintiffs claim to be an international organisation which is functioning since 1956. The plaintiffs claim that there are about 44,450 Lions Clubs all over the world and it has 1,55,000 members in 4,300 Chartered Clubs in India. The plaintiffs claim that the organisation viz. Lions Club has acquired the distinctive identity in the minds of public in India who associates exclusively with the plaintiffs and the affiliated organisations set up under the charter granted by the plaintiffs.
Ordinarily the plaintiffs would be entitled to get the relief's on the same lines, as was granted in favour of the plaintiffs in earlier two suits, albeit against different organisations.
9. The defendants would however, contend that the plaintiffs are not entitled for such relief in the present suit as there is already decision against the plaintiffs in the suit filed by the defendant No.1 before the District Judge, Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh dated 21st April, 2001, which was allowed to become final. The decree passed by the said trial Court in favour of the defendant NO.1 was on the following terms.
In the result suit is allowed with cost and is decreed in favour of plaintiff and against defendant as under:
(a) It is declared that the registered notice dated 23.8.93(actual date 28.1.94) sent by defendant to Lion Indias office at Mid-town, Jabalpur is illegal and not binding on plaintiff Society Lions India Mid-town, Jabalpur.
(b) Defendant is permanently restrained from making any interference, either himself or by his employees or servants directly or indirectly, in the day to day working of Lions India and Lion India Mid-town, Jabalpur, of which plaintiff is member.
(c) In the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, defendant shall bear his own and also that of plaintiff in whole; Counsel fee if certified as per schedule. Decree be drawn accordingly.
10. It is argued that that decision and findings recorded therein will operate as resjudicata against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs on the other hand would contend that the suit filed by the defendant No.1 before the District Judge, Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh was to seek relief regarding groundless threats of action for infringement in legal proceedings, in terms of Section 142 of the Trade Marks Act,1999. According to the plaintiffs, the decree passed therein can neither preclude the plaintiffs from instituting present suit nor the finding in the said suit which was unnecessary to decide the issue in the context of Section 142 of the Act will be binding on the plaintiffs in the present suit-which is for injunction and to enforce the statutory protection available to the plaintiffs. In support of this submission, counsel for the plaintiffs has relied on the decision in the case of Madura Coats Limited, Madurai & Ors.v. Chetan Dev, reported in , in particular paragraph Nos. 5 to 7 thereof. Reliance is placed on another decision in the case of Dolphin Laboratories Pvt.Ltd. v. Kaptab Pharmaceuticals reported in : AIR1981Cal76 , in particular paragraphs 16 to 20 thereof. Exposition in this decision in fact has been followed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Madura Coats Limited(Supra).
11. There is substance in the abovesaid submission canvassed on behalf of the plaintiffs. Even if the plaintiffs would succeed in getting favourable finding on the aforesaid two counts, the question is: whether ad-interim relief should be granted to the Plaintiffs in the fact situation of the present case? This aspect will have to be considered in the light of twofold assertions made by the defendants. The defendants would contend that there is gross delay, latches and/or acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs in approaching this Court praying for ad-interim relief's as pressed. This is so because, as back as in August, 1993, the plaintiffs had given legal notice dated 23rd August, 1993 to the defendant No.1 to cease and desist from using the name LIONS or LIONS INDIA JABALPUR MIDTOWN and for other matters. After the said notice, the defendant No.1 filed suit before the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh, as referred to earlier. However, even though decree came to be passed in the said suit on 21st April, 2001, the plaintiffs did not take any positive step and allowed the defendant No.1 to use the name and logo 'LIONS INDIA'. Thus, it is a clear case of deemed consent and/or acquiescence to the acts and activities of the defendants in the name of LIONS INDIA and with their logo. Besides, the plaintiffs have intentionally not disclosed this fact in the plaint though it was a material fact. In other words, the plaintiffs have suppressed material facts from this Honble Court and have approached the Court with unclean hands, thereby disrobing themselves for grant of any equitable relief.
12. The plaintiffs on the other hand would contend that the fact that in the earlier point of time, legal notice was given to the defendant no.1 or the fact that the defendant No.1 had instituted suit to assert right under Section 142 of the Act, those are not relevant facts in deciding the claim of the plaintiffs in the present proceeding. It is also argued that the plaintiffs cannot be denied prayer for ad-interim relief merely because the suit has been filed by the plaintiffs only recently in 2007. This is so because, the suit filed by the defendant No.1 against the Plaintiffs came to be decided only on 21st April, 2001; as proceedings were pending between the parties, filing of the present suit cannot be termed as suffering from any delay, latches or acquiescence as such. Counsel for the plaintiffs would then rely on three decisions to contend that assuming that the plaintiffs have suppressed the facts relevant for deciding the present proceeding, even so, that by itself cannot be the basis to deny the prayer for ad-interim relief. The plaintiffs relied on the decision of Division Bench of our High Court in the case of CIBA Ltd. v. M.Ramalingam reported in : AIR1958Bom56 . Reliance is also placed on another decision of our High Court in the case of Shaw Wallace and Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. Mohan Rocky Spring Water Breweries Ltd. reported in : 2006(3)BomCR252 and lastly decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reported in Reports of Patent, Design, and Trade Mark cases(Vol.L) No.12 page 379 in the case of J.H.Coles Proprietary Ltd.(In Liquidation) v. Need. Relying on the aforesaid authorities, it is submitted that in the proceedings of the present kind, the Court should not deny interim protection merely on the argument of delay in making the application or of non-disclosure of some facts by the Plaintiffs. For, the matter must be approached from the point of view of whether the applicant stood by and thereby caused substantial injury to the respondent and the injury was so substantial that the injury would outweigh the interest of the public which the Court must consider whether the trade mark is likely to deceive. It is is well established that temporary injunction cannot be denied to the plaintiffs, because an order of temporary injunction in a suit for infringement or passing off is to be made not only to protect the right of the plaintiffs, but also to protect interest of the general public. The purpose of granting temporary injunction is, therefore, to protect the general public from not being deceived or misled to buy the goods or services from the defendants under mistaken belief that the same were of the plaintiffs. Relying on the exposition of the Privy Council, it was submitted that the fact that earlier legal notice sent by the plaintiffs or the suit filed by the defendant No.1 is not mentioned in the present plaint should not be the basis to deny interim protection claimed by the plaintiffs. Even in the case of J.H.Coles Proprietary Ltd.(In Liquidation)(supra) the plaintiffs had made and vended shirts under the name of Fords Eureka shirts. The Court went on to observe that the plaintiffs would not be debarred from the protection of their trade mark because he described himself in advertisements as patentee whereas no patent applied. The Court in that case went on to the extent of observing that even if the misdescription could be said to constitute a fraud, it was a collateral matter. Even in the case of Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd.(Supra) in the plaint no disclosure was made about filing of the suit. Statement was made in paragraph-3 of the plaint that on the date on which the suit was filed nobody else was using the numeral '5000' in respect of the beer, which was incorrect statement made by the plaintiffs. Even then the Court went on to grant relief to the said plaintiffs.
13. In my considered opinion, even if the plaintiffs are right in contending that non-mention of the fact of filing of suit by the defendant No. 1 in the District Court at Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh is not a relevant fact for deciding the points in issue in the main suit, which will have to proceed independently; even then for the purpose of considering prayer for grant of 'ad-interim relief', which is to be granted in urgent situation or where it cannot brook delay, disclosure of the fact of institution of the such a suit by defendant No.1 and the outcome thereof and more importantly of the fact that the plaintiffs themselves had sent legal notice to the defendant No.1 dated 23rd August, 1993, were crucial facts for considering the claim of imminent urgency put forth by the plaintiffs, for grant of ad-interim relief. Although the plaintiffs have attempted to get over this difficulty by relying on the exposition in the decisions referred to above to contend that the plaintiffs cannot be debarred from getting the injunction, especially when grant of such injunction is in public interest. That consideration may be relevant at the later stage to grant or not to grant interlocutory order to the plaintiffs during the pendency of the suit, at the final hearing of the present notice of Motion. For the present, while considering prayer for grant of ad-interim relief, which is not to be granted for asking but on being satisfied that there is imminent urgency for granting the same; to consider that aspect the argument of the defendants of delay, latches and acquiescence by the plaintiffs will be a relevant matter. Indeed, the defendants have pressed into service two unreported decisions of our High Court to support that position. I may however, in addition refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines (P) Ltd. reported in : [1994]1SCR708 . In the said decision, the Apex Court has expounded that acquiescence is one of the defences available under Section 30(1)(b) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. The Apex Court then went on to observe that acquiescence is sitting by, when another is invading the rights and spending money on it. It is a course of conduct inconsistent with the claim for exclusive rights in a trade mark, trade name etc. It implies positive acts; not merely silence or inaction such as is involved in latches. The Apex Court has further observed that it is important to distinguish mere negligence and acquiescence. It went on to observe that acquiescence is one facet of delay. For, if the plaintiffs stood by knowingly and let the defendants built up an important trade until it had become necessary to crush it, then the plaintiffs would be stopped by their acquiescence. If the acquiescence in the infringement amounts to consent, it will be a complete defence. The above legal position has been restated by the Apex Court in the case of Ramdev Food Products(P)Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel reported in : 2006(33)PTC281(SC) . I am conscious of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Midas Hygiene Industries(P)Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia reported in : 2004(28)PTC121(SC) , where the Apex Court has observed that grant of injunction becomes necessary if it prima facie appears that the adoption of the mark itself is dishonest. That is one principle to be considered while examining prayer for grant of interlocutory relief. However, in the present case, as presently advised, I am inclined to accept the argument of the defendants that the plaintiffs were sitting by or allowing the stated defendants to use the name, trade marks and logo for all these 14 years. This course of conduct of the plaintiffs is inconsistent with the claim for exclusiveness of rights in a trade mark, trade name etc. On these reasoning, the plaintiffs will not be entitled for 'ad-interim relief' as prayed atleast against defendant Nos. 1,2,4 and 5 herein.
14. However, at the same time, to secure the interest of the unwary public, it is appropriate that the said defendants are required to promptly give wide publicity of the fact that they are neither the constituents nor the affiliates of the plaintiffs organisation. The plaintiffs are denied 'ad-interim relief's' against these defendant Nos. 1,2,4 and 5 only if the said defendants were to give wide publicity in this behalf. I am conscious of the fact that refusal to grant of ad-interim relief to the plaintiffs in the present suit would sound to be an inconsistent approach with the orders already operating in favour of the plaintiffs against other associations. But that is inevitable on the finding that the Plaintiffs acquiesced in the acts of the said defendants as it was fully aware about their activities going on unabated for a long time. However, as observed earlier, to obviate any confusion in the minds of the common public, interest of justice would be met if the defendants were required to forthwith give wide publicity of the fact that they are neither the constituents nor the affiliates of the plaintiffs organisation. Besides, the defendants will refrain from defaming and sullying the impeccable reputation earned by the plaintiffs by making speeches and publishing articles insinuating that there is flight of substantial amount of Indian money being transmitted from India to the Head Quarters in USA by the plaintiffs, from publishing defamatory Articles in Newspapers and Circulars and other material without just cause or excuse, thereby subjecting the plaintiffs to hatred, ridicule and contempt and/or likely to subject the Plaintiffs to hatred, ridicule and contempt, 'without any lawful justification or excuse' and further prejudicing the Plaintiffs in the way of their social service activities and furthermore indulging in such acts of character assassination of the plaintiffs. The defendants cannot claim any right to do such activities which are bound to defame and sully the reputation of the plaintiffs without any just cause or excuse. Thus understood, the plaintiffs would be entitled for ad-interim relief against defendant Nos.1,2,4 and 5 only in terms of prayer Clause (h) of the Motion, which reads thus:
(h) that pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit the Defendants by themselves, their Office bearers, servants, agents and Associate Clubs be restrained by an Order and interim injunction from defaming and sullying the impeccable reputation earned by the Plaintiffs by making speeches and publishing articles insinuating that there is flight of substantial amount of India money being transmitted from India to the Head Quarters in USA by the Plaintiffs, when in reality it is a nominal amount, and furthermore from publishing defamatory Articles in Newspapers and Circulars and other material without just cause or excuse, thereby subjecting the Plaintiffs to hatred, ridicule and contempt and/or likely to subject the Plaintiffs to hatred, ridicule and contempt, without any lawful justification or excuse and further prejudicing the Plaintiffs in the way of their social service activities and furthermore indulging in such acts of character assassination of the Plaintiffs.
In other words, the plaintiffs are denied ad-interim relief aginst the defendant Nos.1,2, 4 and 5, in so far as other prayers in the Notice of Motion are concerned on condition that the said defendants will forthwith give wide publicity of the fact that they are neither the constituents or the affiliates of the plaintiffs- so that the unwary public is not deceived or misled or confused in any manner. In addition, the plaintiffs will also be entitled to give wide publicity in this behalf, while ensuring that no other insinuation or comment is made against the said defendant Nos. 1,2,4 and 5.
15. Notice of Motion be placed for hearing on 6th August, 2007. Needless to observe that the view taken in this decision is only a tentative view at the ad-interim stage. All questions will have to be considered and decided on its own merits at the hearing of the Motion.
16. Defendant Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 waive notice. Plaintiffs to serve remaining defendants by advocates notice either personally and/or by courier and/or by speed post and/or by email and/or by fax and file affidavit of service in registry before the returnable date.
17. Parties to exchange pleadings well in advance, to be filed in the Registry on or before 31st July, 2007.