ORDER
R.M. Lodha, J.
1. The plaintiff Subhash Babbar filed the suit against the defendants namely (1) Sanjha Jansatta (2) Vivek Goenka, (3) Prakhash Joshi, (4) Rahul Dev, (5) Sunita and (6) Indian Express News Paper (Bombay) Ltd. in the Court for a decree of Rs. 5 crores by way of compensatory damages. The plaintiff avers that by publication of the article 'Parde Ke Peechhe Kya Hai' in the issue of Hindi Newspaper 'Sanjha Jansatta' dated 13-1-1994, he was defamed. According to him, the defendants levelled insulting accusations andmade derogatory and defamatory statements against him in the said news article. The newspaper Sanjha Jansatta is published throughout the country and by the said publication, the plaintiff says his reputation, character and pride was lowered in the eyes of the society. It is averred in the plaint that plaintiff through his representative filed complaint in the Press Council of India, New Delhi on 24-1 -1994 under the Press Council Act, 1978 against the defendants for the publication of the said defamatory article. In the said complaint the defendants filed their reply on 25-4-1994 and plaintiff filed his rejoinder on 12-7-1994. The rejoinder was filed by the defendants on 29-9-94. The said complaint was finally decided on 4-8-1995 which according to the plaintiff was decided in his favour and thereafter the present suit has been filed.
2. The defendants by this Chamber Summons pray that the plaint be rejected on the ground that it is barred by law.
3. The learned counsel appearing for the defendants in support of chamber summons contends that the suit is barred under Article 75 of the Indian Limitation Act. According to her, Article 75 provides for the limitation for suit for compensation based on label and period of one year is prescribed which begins from the date such defamatory article was published. The learned counsel for the defendants would urge that according to the averments made in the plaint, the alleged defamatory article was published in the newspaper Sanjha Jansatta on 13-1-1994 and the claim for compensation based on said libel would commence from that date. The limitation, therefore, of one year prescribed under Article 75 commences from 13-1-1994 and the present suit filed on 14-12-1995, beyond the period of one year from the date of publication of the alleged defamatory article is barred.
4. Opposing the contention raised by the learned counsel for the defendants, on the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that the time taken in prosecuting the complaint before the Press Council of India, New Delhi under the Press Council Act, 1978 should be excluded. In this connection he relied upon Sections 12 and 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would thus submit that after exclusion of the period, from 24-1-1994 to 4-8-1995, the time taken in disposal of the complaint, the suit is within limitation.
5. I have considered the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. The learned Counsel for the parties do not dispute that the relevant article is Article 75 of Limitation Act, Article 75 read thus :
____________________________________________________________
Description Period of Time from which
of suit limitation begins to run
____________________________________________________________
'For compensation one year When the libel
for libel is published.'
6. Indisputably, the offending article in Sanjha Jansatta was published on 13-1-1994 which is the basis of claim in the suit for compensation. There is no dispute that the suit has been filed on 14-12-1995. Obviously, therefore, if the plaintiff is not entitled to exclusion of time under Articles 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred under the Limitation Act. The only question is whether the plaintiff can claim any benefit of Sections 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act for the time taken in prosecution of complaint under Press Council Act, 1978.
7. Sections 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act reads as under :--
'12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.- (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded.
(3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed or where an application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which the decree or order is founded shall also be excluded.
(4) In computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.
Explanation.-- In computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded.'
'14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction.-- (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another Civil Proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of Sub-section (1) shail apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the Court under Rule 1 of that Order where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the Court or other cause of a like nature.
Explanation. -- For the purposes of this section,
(a) in excluding the time during which a formal civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted.
(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting, an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding;
(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.'
8. A bare perusal of Section 12 of Limitation Act would show that the said section has no application whatsoever so far as present controversy is concerned. Sub-section (I) of Section 12 provides trial in computing period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. That is not the controversy here. The date on which the present suit was filed has to be excluded but that does not help the plaintiff. Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) on its face have no application to the suits. As regards Section 14 of the Limitation Act, it may be observed that it provides exclusion of time taken in bonafide prosecuting proceedings in Court without jurisdiction. The proceedings by way of complaint filed by the plaintiff before Press Council of India under the Press Council Act is a proceeding of entirely different nature having no emblemise of 'civil proceeding' as contemplated under Section 14. Section 14 only permits exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation of the suit where the plaintiff has been prosecuting another civil proceeding with due diligence and ultimately does find that the said Court where such civil proceedings was filed had no jurisdiction. The filing of the complaint by the plaintiff before the Press Council of India under the Press Council Act has nothing to do with the damages the plaintiff is seeking against defendants for defamatory publication of article. The damages sought by the plaintiff in the suit could not have been claimed in the complaint filed by him before Press Council of India nor was complaint filed for the said purpose. The complaint filed by the plaintiff was not 'another civil proceeding' prosecuted by the plaintiff even if be assume with due diligence and in good faith, relating to the same matter in issue before the Court. The Press Council of India is neither Court non the complaint is a Civil Proceeding as contemplate under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and therefore, the plaintiff cannot derive any advantage of the time consumed in prosecuting complaint before the Press Council of India, In other words the plaintiff is not entitled to the time from 24-1-1994 to 4-8-1995 during which the complaint remained pending before Press Council of India. 9. Section 3 of Limitation Act provides that subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) every suit instituted after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as defence. Section 3 is a mandatory provision and irrespective of absence of plea by the defendant, casts a duty upon the Court to dismiss the suit if it is instituted after the period of limitation. In the present case, however, the defendants have raised the legal plea of limitation at the first possible time and it is prayed by them that plaint be rejected being barred by law of limitation. In view of the discussion aforesaid, 1 have no hesitation in holding that the provisions of Sections 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act are not attracted in the present case and suit is clearly barred under Article 75 of the Limitation Act. The claim of compensation based on purported defamatory article published in the newspaper 'Sanjha Jansatta' on 13-1-1994 the suit ought to have been filed within one year therefrom and having not done, the suit is time barred and, therefore, the plaint is liable to be rejected.
10. Consequently, chamber summons taken out by the defendant is allowed and plaint is rejected being barred by law.
11. Certified copy expedited.