A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. Group of these 99 writ petitions arise out of the common order passed by the Industrial Court, Nashik, dated July 31, 2000, disposing of in all 202 complaints filed by the workmen. All these writ petitions involve common questions and therefore, same are heard and disposed of together by this common judgment.
2. The Industrial Court has allowed in all 99 complaints which were filed by the respondents in the respective writ petitions, whereas it was pleased to dismiss the remaining complaints. The workmen, whose complaints have been dismissed, have not challenged the common order, which is the subject matter in the present writ petitions. But the employer, petitioner herein, has preferred the present writ petitions challenging the order allowing the complaints filed by the respondents in the respective writ petitions.
3. The facts in all the writ petitions arc almost identical except that the respondents in the respective writ petitions have been appointed on different dates in the posts of watchman. There is no dispute with regard to the date of their appointment in that the Petitioner Corporation had prepared a seniority list which has been placed on record to show the details regarding the joining dates of the respective workmen.
4. The respondents herein filed complaints before the Industrial Court, Nashik for declaration that the petitioner Corporation has indulged in unfair labour practice and to restrain the petitioner Corporation to continue to indulge in such unfair labour practice. The respondents also prayed that they should be regularized in service and given the status and privileges of permanent employee by the petitioner Corporation. The respondents assert that they were working with the petitioner Corporation without any break since from the date of joining and have completed more than 240 days in each, year. In the circumstances, the respondents claim that the petitioner Corporation was under an obligation to regularize them in the employment since they have completed more than 240 days. But, instead, the petitioner Corporation have engaged them on daily wages for years together with intention to deprive them the status and benefit of permanency. The respondents further assert that the posts of watchmen were vacant and they could be absorbed on permanent basis. The respondents assert that the work performed by them was of permanent and perennial in nature and their services were required by the petitioner Corporation even in future. The respondents therefore prayed for the aforesaid declaration and alleged that the petitioner Corporation had committed unfair labour practices within the meaning of Items 6, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, (hereinafter referred to as the said Act).
5. The petitioner resisted the complaints filed by the respective respondents. The petitioner, denied all the material allegations in the complaints. According to the petitioner, the work performed by the respondents was not permanent in nature and their services were not permanent: and that they were retained on temporary basis for years together not with a view to deprive them the benefits of permanency. The petitioner also denied the relationship of employer and employee between the parties. The petitioner also denied that the respondents had completed 240 days service in each calender year. The main contention of the petitioner was that the petitioner is a Corporation under the control of State of Maharashtra and doing business for the benefit of Maharashtra Government and Infact implementing the schemes of Government of Maharashtra. In other words, the stand taken by the petitioner is that the petitioner Corporation is nothing but an implementing agency of State of Maharashtra without having its own funds. The petitioner further contends that the schemes are implemented not only for gain but It is also implemented to keep good environment, improve the environment, control pollution of atmosphere and maintain ecological balance, and the object of scheme is for the interest of public at large and for the benefit of public. It is thus contended that the petitioner Corporation undertakes only schemes of the Government and the schemes are for a specified period of time and on completion of such schemes, provision of funds for the said schemes is also stopped by the Government, in which case the services of respondents engaged for implementing the said scheme, would be of no utility. Thus the petitioner had no option but to discontinue the respondents. However, with a view to provide employment to the respondents, the services were once again engaged in respect of another scheme, which was under way to be undertaken by the petitioner Corporation. In otherwise the stand taken is that the employment of respondents was against a particular scheme and on completion of the said scheme or upon the abandonment of the said scheme, the respondents were not entitled for the relief of permanency and regularisation in service merely on the ground that they have completed 240 days of service. The petitioner, therefore, contended that the respondents cannot be regularized in service nor directed to be made permanent. The petitioner, however, took a stand that the petitioner shall accommodate the respondents in another scheme so as to provide them continuous work and not render them unemployed. The petitioner denied that they have indulged in unfair labour practice within the meaning of Items 6, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Act as alleged. According to the Petitioner none of the unfair labour practices indicated in the said Items, were applicable to the present case.
6. On the basis of pleadings of the rival parties, the Industrial Court framed as many as four issues. The parties adduced common evidence in respect of all the companion matters. Besides documentary evidence, reliance has also been placed on the oral evidence. One Chandan Berji Nirka has been examined as witness No. 1 for the complainants (respondents herein), whereas one Madan Harishchandra Dhantole, working as Assistant Manager for the petitioner Corporation has been examined as witness No. 1 for the petitioner Corporation. The Industrial Court alter analyzing the evidence on record and adverting to the decisions relied upon by the respective parties, was pleased to allow 99 complaints out of the total 202 complaints, filed before it. The Industrial Court has observed that the admitted facts are that the complainants were working with the Corporation as watchmen/forest guards since the dates mentioned in the seniority list of the year 1996, 1997 and 2000, which were filed on record below Exh. U-12. The said list mentions the names of the workmen, date of birth, education, date of appointment and the order from which the workmen was working. Further, undispuledly, from the date of joining, each of the complainant (workmen) was continuously working with the petitioner Corporation without any break and had completed more than 240 days in each year. The Industrial Court accordingly concluded that, no doubt, the complainants were engaged by the petitioner Corporation against afforestation schemes, but it was evident from the record that the work performed by the complainants was permanent and perennial in nature. The Industrial Court further concluded that it could be safely inferred that the petitioner Corporation engaged the services of complainants (respondents) on daily wages for last 15 to 20 years with the intention to deprive them, status and the benefits of permanency. Accordingly the Industrial Court found that the petitioner Corporation had indulged in unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Act. The Industrial Court further observed that the petitioner Corporation had failed to comply with the provisions of circular issued by the Maharashtra Government from time to time and therefore had indulged in unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. Insofar as the objections raised by the petitioner that the complaints were barred by limitation, the same has been negatived by the Industrial Court. Insofar as the companion complaints are concerned, the Industrial Court found that the complainants therein were not entitled for the relief sought and accordingly preferred to dismiss those complaints. In the circumstances, the Industrial Court by the impugned order has allowed only 99 complaints against which the present writ petitions have been preferred by the petitioner Corporation. The Industrial Court besides declaring that the petitioner Corporation had indulged in unfair labour practice under Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Act, has directed the petitioner to stop and desist from engaging in such unfair labour practice. The Industrial Court has issued further direction to the petitioner Corporation to give the status and benefits of permanency to the complainants (respondents in the respective writ petitions) with effect from 1st April 1998 and arrears of consequential benefits to be paid to them with effect from 1st April 1998 by obtaining due sanction from the Government, if required.
7. It is relevant to point out that, it has come in the evidence of witness No. 1 for the petitioner Corporation that only 99 complainants are in the employment; 27 complainants have left the service; 18 complainants have resigned; two complainants expired during the pendency of the complaints: and 6 complainants were given work at Nandurbar. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents/complainants made a statement across the bar on instructions that the complainants who have resigned, had done so, after filing of the complaint sometime in the year 2000. In the circumstances, the decision rendered by the Industrial Court shall have no adverse effect with regard to the said respondents, who have resigned and they would be entitled to get the benefit only till the date of acceptance of their resignation.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has mainly contended that the petitioner is only an implementing agency of the State Government, involved in the implementation of various schemes of afforestation. According to him, the budgetary allocation for watch and ward are provided for the respective schemes and the respondents were engaged from time to time under the said schemes and paid daily wages accordingly. The learned counsel further submits that the schemes formulated by the State Government were composite schemes relating to afforestation as well as employment guarantee schemes. In his submission, since the schemes were also for employment guarantee scheme, the persons employed to perform work under the said scheme, though having worked continuously for more than 240 days in a year, cannot claim the relief of permanency and regularisation. According to him on completion of the said scheme the workmen employed by the petitioner Corporation under such scheme have no vested right of claiming permanency and regularisation of their employment. To support this submission, the learned counsel has relief on various circulars issued by the Government of Maharashtra from time to time, including the Government decision of establishing the petitioner Corporation to implement the Maharashtra Forestry Projects. He further submits that in any case there are no permanent posts of watchmen in the petitioner Corporation against which the respondents could claim regularisation and absorption. According to him, the scope of jurisdiction of the Industrial Court is circumscribed by the provisions of the Act; and it does not permit the Industrial Court to issue directions against the petitioner Corporation to regularize or to grant permanency to the workmen unless there are sanctioned posts. To make good the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel has relied on various decisions of the Apex Court as well as of the High Court. The learned counsel further submits that in any case there is absolutely no evidence to establish that the petitioner Corporation had employed the complainants for years on dally wages basis with an intention to deprive them of the status and the privileges of the permanent employees. Therefore, according to him, the conclusion reached by the Industrial Court that the petitioner Corporation had Indulged in unfair labour practicewithin the meaning of Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Act is unsustainable in law. The learned counsel further submits that the Industrial Court has clearly misdirected itself in concluding that the petitioner Corporation had also indulged in unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act in as much as there is nothing on record to indicate that the petitioner Corporation had failed to implement any award, settlement or agreement. Accordingly, the learned counsel submits that the basis on which the direction has been issued by the Industrial Court is in appropriate and the impugned order cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny.
9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents supported the reasons assigned by the Industrial Court to Justify the order under challenge. According to them, the Industrial Court has, after considering the relevant material on record and taking into account the decisions of the Apex Court, rightly concluded that the petitioner Corporation has indulged in unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 6 as well as Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. The learned counsel, relying on the decisions of the Apex Court as well as of this Court in support of their submission, submits that the finding recorded by the Industrial Court, that the petitioner Corporation has indulged in unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 6 of Schedule IV, ought not to be interfered with.
10. Before proceeding to consider the rival submissions, it would be appropriate to note some of the admitted facts. There is absolutely no dispute that the petitioner Corporation qualifies the definition of Industry, as well as the respondents would qualify the definition of workmen. There is also no dispute between the parties that the respondents have worked for last 15 to 20 years as indicated in the seniority list by the petitioner Corporation continuously for 240 days from the date of their joining. Further the finding recorded by the Industrial Court on the Issue of limitation is also not assailed by the petitioner Corporation in the present petition. The only dispute that requires scrutiny is, whether the work discharged by the respondents/complainants was of permanent and perennial nature? Whereas, the petitioner Corporation claims that the respondents were engaged to perform the work under the different schemes from time to time, which schemes were formulated and funded by the State Government and the petitioner Corporation was only an implementing agency. In this context, it would be appropriate to first note that, the petitioner Corporation is undisputedly registered as a government company under the Companies Act, thus a separate juristic person. It is true that the petitioner Corporation is implementing the various schemes introduced and funded by the State Government relating to afforestation. On perusal of the Government Resolution dated June 27, 1978, which has been placed on record, would indicate that the petitioner Corporation is a Government of Maharashtra undertaking, established by the Government for the purpose of development of the potentially productive forests of the State through Intensive management. The State Government took a policy decision to establish the petitioner Corporation for the said purpose and, for the successful implementation of the programme specified forests were earmarked to be transferred to the petitioner Corporation on certain conditions referred to in the said Resolution as well as the subsequentResolution issued from time to time. In the circumstances, although expertise of the petitioner Corporation is being utilized for the purpose of development of the potentially productive forests of the State through intensive management: and more particularly as an implementing agency of the State of Maharashtra Forestry Project, the fact remains that the petitioner Corporation is a Government undertaking registered under the provisions of Companies Act, a separate juristic person. There is also no dispute that the services of respondents-complainants have been engaged continuously from time to time by the petitioner Corporation. In that sense, the respondents are in the employment of the petitioner Corporation, which is a separate juristic person. Merely because the petitioner is an implementing agency for the State Government's schemes, that would not alter the jural relationship between the petitioner Corporation and the workmen engaged by them. In the circumstances, in law, there can be no doubt that the respondents-complainants have been engaged by the petitioner Corporation and the relationship of employer and employee existed between them inter se. In other words, merely because the petitioner Corporation is an implementing agency that would not absolve the petitioner Corporation from the rigours of law, and more particularly obligation of an employer postulated under the provisions of the said Act.
11. The next point that has been vehemently argued on behalf of the petitioner Corporation is that the schemes under which the respondents-complainants were engaged, were not only with regard to afforestation programmes but also relating to employment guarantee schemes, therefore, the respondents cannot claim vested right for the relief of regularisation and permanency merely because they have continuously worked for more than 240 days in a year. Support was sought to be drawn from a decision of Apex Court. Factually, this aspect is being raised for the first time before this Court. In my view, although the petitioner Corporation was engaged in implementing the composite schemes of afforestation as well as employment guarantee scheme, that would not make any difference to the mandate of law, in view of the specific provisions of the said Act. Reliance was placed on different circulars Inter alia, Government Resolution dated June 31, 1997, to contend that it was a composite scheme of afforestation and employment guarantee scheme. This circular would only indicate that, the Government in Its perspective thought it appropriate to fusion the two programmes and present a composite scheme. Undoubtedly, in the nature of things afforestation programme by itself would generate employment and resultantly cater to the employment guarantee scheme. In the first place, such a scheme cannot be said to be purely employment guarantee scheme but the dominant purpose of the scheme is obviously to alleviate the degraded and denuded forest and non-forest waste land. Moreover, as observed earlier, the respondents-complainants were not engaged by the State Government as such against the employment guarantee scheme but by the petitioner Corporation, which has been specifically created for development of potentially productive forests of the State and not to implement employment guarantee schemes. Such a scheme might have been implemented by the petitioner Corporation, but that was one of the schemes undertaken by the petitioner Corporation. By now it is well settled that even the departments of the Government are industry and liable tofulfil the obligations under the Act of 1971, lest indulge in any unfair labour practice. Understood thus, the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner Corporation that the scheme was also for employment guarantee scheme, therefore, deprived the respondents of their claim for permanency is wholly misconceived.
12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has mainly placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi and others,. In the said decision the Apex Court has held that to get an employment under a scheme which was Intended to tackle the problem of poverty and then to claim the regularisation and permanency on the basis of the said employment is to frustrate the scheme itself and no Court can be a party to such exercise. The said decision, no doubt has highlighted various considerations that prevail while granting employment under such schemes, however, in our case the schemes evolved by the State Government cannot be equated with the scheme which was the subject matter before the Apex Court in the said decision. The view that I propose to take is fortified by the decision of the Apex Court in Chief Conservator of Forests and Anr. v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare,. This decision in my view is the direct authority on the point that arises for consideration in the present case. This decision has distinguished the earlier decision of the Apex Court in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union (supra) (see para 25). I shall advert to this decision in detail a little later. The learned counsel has also relied on the other decisions of the Apex Court in Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, Jabalpur, M. P. v. Bal Kishan Soni and others,; State of U. P. and Ors. v. Ajay Kumar,; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Suresh Kumar Verma and Anr..; Ashwani Kumar and Ors. v. State of Bihar and others, and unreported decision of the Apex Court in Gram Sevak Prashikshan Kendra v. The Workmen,. All these authorities have been cited to support the proposition that the persons employed to perform the work under the scheme cannot claim the relief of permanency and regularisation. In my view, none of these decisions have any bearing on the question that arises for consideration in the present case. On the other hand, the decision of the Apex Court in Chief Conservator of Forests & Anr. v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare (supra) would apply with full force to the case on hand. In this decision, the Apex Court dealt with the Forest Department of the State of Maharashtra and held that the scheme undertaken by the Forest Department; and even the social forestry work, cannot be regarded as a sovereign function of the State and it would be open to the employees engaged to perform the work under such schemes, to invoke the provisions of Act of 1971. The view taken by the ApexCourt is that the department of the State Government is an industry and the employees employed on daily wages by the State Government are covered and protected by the provisions of the Act of 1971. This decision of the Apex Court, a fortiori applies with full force to the petitioner Corporation. The petitioner Corporation is a separate juristic person which had employed the services of the respondents complainants to implement the scheme framed and funded by the State Government relating to afforestation. The Apex Court after analyzing the gamut of case law has held that the scheme of afforestation in which the workmen were employed, cannot be regarded as a part of the inalienable or inescapable function of the State. The Apex Court went on to observe that there can be no doubt that such a work could well be undertaken by any agency which is not required to be even an instrumentality of the State. This is precisely what has happened in the present case, for the schemes undertaken by the petitioner Corporation are essentially afforestation programme schemes. Accordingly, it is not open to the petitioner Corporation to contend that the various schemes of afforestation undertaken by it is a sovereign function of the State. Merely because the State Government has thought it appropriate to marry or amalgamate the scheme of afforestation and employment guarantee scheme, that cannot denude the persons employed under such a scheme of the benefits, privileges and protection guaranteed by the Act of 1971. I have already held that the schemes implemented by the petitioner Corporation, though composite, are essentially schemes of afforestation programme of the State. In other words, inspite of the decision of the Government to blend the two schemes as observed earlier, it would not change the dominant purpose of afforestation: and, the employment guarantee scheme is only incidental to it, for by the very nature of things employment is bound to be generated while implementing the afforestation programmes. Further, from the circulars that have been placed on record it would be evident that even the World Bank has financed some of the afforestation schemes and even those schemes have been implemented by the petitioner Corporation. Even while implementing the said schemes, the respondents were engaged on daily wages basis by the petitioner. There is no dispute that the petitioner's hands are full of different schemes which have been and are being implemented one after the other. It is, therefore, not possible to deny the reliefs to the complainants merely because the schemes implemented by the petitioner Corporation are of temporary nature. But, as observed by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision, these schemes are adopted by the State Government having permanent basis. The fact that the respondents complainants have been continued for over 15/20 years by the petitioner Corporation itself presupposes that the schemes are perennial and introduced on permanent basis. The Apex Court in the said decision has also observed that the environment pollution care work, whose need is on increase because of increase in pollution, permanency is thus writ large on the face of such types of work. It is relevant to note that it was seriously argued on behalf of the State Government before the Apex Court that the financial implications of absorbing all the workmen would be to the extent of Rs. 300 crores, but the said argument did not find favour with the Court, as is evident from the observations made in para 28 thereof, instead the Apex Court observed that, the argument relating tofinancial burden is one of despair or in terrorem and that the Court was neither impressed by the first nor frightened by the second. The Court further clarified that the benefit of the said decision shall be extended to all the casual labourers of Forest Department or any other department of the Government. After this Judgment of the Apex Court, it is too late in the day for the petitioner Corporation to contend that the respondents-complainants are not entitled for the reliefs of regularisation and permanency, even though they have continuously worked for more than 240 days in a year for the last 15/20 years. The inescapable conclusion is that the provisions of the Act of 1971 cannot be frustrated by taking pedantic approach suggested by the petitioner.
13. The next argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that, in the absence of sanctioned posts, the Industrial Court could not have Issued directions to the petitioner Corporation to regularize the respondents and in any case give them status and benefits of permanency with effect from 1st April 1998. Even this submission is totally devoid of any merit, and, if we were to entertain such a submission, it would be clearly in the teeth of the decision of the Apex Court, in Conservator of Forest V. Jagannath Kondhare (supra). Besides, section 30 of the Act, in my view, is a suri generis provision. Section 30 of the Act reads thus :
'30. (1) Where a Court decides that any person any person names, in the complaint has engaged in, or is engaging in, any unfair labour practice, it may in its order :
(a) declare that an unfair practice has been engaged in or is being engaged in by that person, and specify any other person who has engaged in, or is engaging in the unfair labour practice;
(b) direct all such persons to cease and desist from such unfair labour practice, and taken such affirmative action (including payment of reasonable compensation to the employee or employees affected by the unfair labour practice, or reinstatement of the employee or employees with or without back wages, or the payment of reasonable compensation), as may in the opinion of the Court be necessary to effectuate the policy of the Act;
(c) where a recognized union has engaged in or is engaging in, any unfair labour practice, direct that its recognition shall be cancelled or that all or any of Its rights under sub-section (1) of section 20 or its right under section 23 shall be suspended.
(2) In any proceeding before it under this Act, the Court, may pass such interim order (including any temporary relief or restraining order) as it deems just and proper (including directions to the person to withdraw temporarily the practice complained of, which is an issue in such proceeding), pending final decision :
Provided that, the Court may, on an application in that behalf, review any interim order passed by it. (3) For the purpose of holding an enquiry or proceeding under this Act, the Court shall have the same powers as are vested in Courts in respect of -
(a) proof of facts by affidavit;
(b) summoning the enforcing the attendance of any person, and examining him on oath;
(c) compelling the production of documents; and
(d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses.
(4) The Court shall also have powers to call upon any of the parties to proceedings before it to furnish in writing, and in such forms as it may think proper, any information, which is considered relevant for the purpose of any proceedings before it, and the party so called upon shall thereupon furnish the information to the best of its knowledge and belief, and if so required by the Court to do so, verify the same in such manner as may be prescribed.'
On plain language of this provision, it is seen that it empowers the Court not only to declare that an unfair practice has been engaged in or is being engaged in by that person, but also direct all such concerned persons to cease and desist from indulging in such unfair labour practice and to take such affirmative action, as may be appropriate in the opinion of the Court to effectuate the policy of the Act. Section 32 of the Act stipulates that the Court has power to decide all matters arising out of any application or a complaint referred to it for the decision under any of the provisions of this Act. This is a non-obstante provision. Therefore, the discretion vested in the Court, by virtue of the abovesaid provision, is very wide. It is open for the Court to pass any such order that would, in its opinion, be necessary to effectuate the policy of the Act. The decisions which have been relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner that the Court cannot issue directions of regularisation and absorption in absence of sanctioned posts, are, therefore, inapplicable in view of the specific provisions in the Act of 1971. This provision authorises the Court to issue all necessary directions to effectuate the policy of the Act which would include directing the employer indulging in unfair labour practice to create sanctioned posts so as to give status of permanency to the workmen. By the very nature of unfair labour practice stipulated in Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Act, once the Court records a clear finding that the work performed by the employee is of permanent nature and perennial one, then, as a necessary corollary, it is the duty of the Court to issue such directions including direction to the employer engaged in commission of said unfair labour practice to create a sanctioned post so as to give status and privileges of permanent employee to the workmen. The respondents have rightly relied on the decision of this Court in Chief Officer, Sangli Municipal Council v. Dharamsingh Hiralal Nagarkar,' to contend that such a plea is not open to the petitioner. In the present case, no doubt the petitioner is a government undertaking, but is a separate juristic entity. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner Corporation is/was under an obligation to take prior approval of the State Government before appointing any employee to discharge duty for implementing the schemes. Assuming that the petitioner is required to seek State Government's approval to create sanctioned posts, however, factually the petitioner has already made recommendation in that behalf to the Government and in any case the Court while dealing with the proceedings under this Act is competent to issue appropriate directions to effectuate the policy of this enactments. Accordingly, I have no hesitation in rejecting this submission of the petitioner and hold that the Industrial Court in exercise of powers under section 30 of the Act of 1971 should not be deterred by the fact that there is no sanctioned post, but once it finds that the work performed by the employee is of perennial nature and permanent one then,it is the duty of the Court to direct the employer to sanction the posts so as to give status and benefits of permanency to the employee with effect from a specified date as in its opinion would be just and proper. Such a direction would-be essential, being an affirmative action, may, imperative to effectuate the policy of the said Act.
14. The next argument on behalf of the petitioner is that neither Item No. 6 nor Item No. 9 of Schedule IV of the Act are attracted in the present case. I find that there is no clinching material on record to indicate that the petitioner-Corporation had failed to implement any award, settlement or agreement. It is only in such a situation that Item No. 9 of Schedule IV of the Act is attracted. The Industrial Court however has merely observed that the petitioner Corporation has failed to comply with the provisions of circular issued by the State of Maharashtra from time to time to conclude that the petitioner Corporation had indulged in unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV. However, in my view, this assumption is wholly inappropriate. Assuming that the petitioner had infringed the circulars Issued by the Government, but the same by itself will not attract Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. To attract Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act it was incumbent upon the complainants to establish that there was any award, settlement or agreement between the parties. In absence of such evidence, it is not possible to conclude that the petitioner Corporation had engaged in any unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act.
15. However, the conclusion reached by the Industrial Court that the petitioner Corporation did engage in the commission of unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Act is unexceptionable. The Industrial Court has, rightly recorded the said conclusion, having regard to the evidence that has come on record - that the work performed by the complainants-respondents was of permanent nature and perennial one; and that each of the complainant, who has succeeded before the Industrial Court, was doing the work continuously for more than 240 days in a year for last 15/20 years; and that the petitioner Corporation failed to place any material on record to show that they had no option but to engage these complainants only on daily wages basis for such period. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, contends that having regard to the language of Item No. 6 of Schedule IV of the Act it was Incumbent upon the complainants to establish beyond doubt that the petitioner Corporation had engaged their services with an object of depriving them the status and privileges of permanent employees. The Industrial Court, in my view, has, rightly negatived this submission. From the discussion in para 20 of the judgment, it will be seen that the Industrial Court has taken into account all the relevant factors to infer that the petitioner Corporation had engaged the complainants with an object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent employees. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner had brought on record that the petitioner Corporation has recommended to the State Government to sanction posts, so as to grant permanency to the workmen. Besides this, reliance is also placed on the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Punjabrao Krishi Vidyapeeth, Akola v. GeneralSecretary. Krishi Vidyapeeth Kamgar Union, and Ors., which has taken a view that the employee should adduce proof that the object in employing labourers as temporary for years together was to deprive them of the status and the benefits of permanency so as to attract Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Act. I find no merit in this submission. In my view, the Industrial Court has rightly drawn inference against the petitioner Corporation. Moreover, having regard to the decision of the Apex Court in Chief Conservator of Forests (supra), the view taken by this Court in the aforesaid decision in Punjabrao Krishi Vidyapeeth Akola(supra), impliedly stands overruled. The Apex Court in paras 21 and 22 of the said decision considered the contention regarding the burden of workmen to establish that the object of continuing them for years was to deprive them their status and privileges of permanent employment. The Apex Court in para 22 has clearly observed that, while Incorporating Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Act, the object of the State Act, inter alia, being prevention of certain unfair labour practices, the same would be thwarted or get frustrated if such a burden is placed on a workman which he cannot reasonably discharge. In other words, in view of the abovesaid dicta of the Apex Court, it is not open for the petitioner to contend that the burden was on the complainants, to adduce evidence to show that the object of employing them for years on dally wages was to deprive them the status and privileges of permanent employment.
16. In the circumstances, I find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the Industrial Court in allowing the 99 complaints filed on behalf of the respondents in the respective writ petitions. Accordingly, all these petitions are devoid of merits and deserve to be dismissed with costs.
Accordingly all these writ petitions fail and are dismissed with costs in cause.
Rule stands discharged.
17. Parties to act on the authenticated copy of this order supplied by the Court Sheristedar.