Deshpande, J.
1. In Writ Petition No. 1670 of 1950 the rule is restricted to the prayer for a direction torespondent No. 1 to enact a uniform Rent Control Legislation throughout the State of Maharashtra and striking down the Notification dated October 24, 1968 whereby house used the nonresidential purposes constructed on a site lying vacact on the 1st day of Janauary, 1967, or on a site made vacate after that date by demolition of any structure standing thereon, is emempted from the provisions of te C, P. and Berar Letting Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949: and non-residential premises construced before the1st day January, 1967, have beenexexpted from the provisions of Chapter-III of the said Order.
2. In Writ Petition o. 1695 of 1985, the petitioner seeks a writ striking down the provisinos of Chapter III of the C. P. and Berar Letting Of Houses and rentControl Order .............. under the C,P. and Berar.
3. In Writ Petition No. 1671 of 1985, petitioner No.1 is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act whichhas been fromed with the object of sageguarding the interest of tenants of the Vidarbha Regioin and bringing about a unified rent Control Act in place of the outdated. C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and rent Control Order, 1949 (for short, 'the Rent Control Order, 1949') frmed under the C. P. and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 (for short, ' the Act of 1946') Petitinoer No. 2 who occupies a shop premises on lease at Akola, is a member of the aforesaid society, Respondant No.2 filed Regular Civil Suit No. 483 of 1984 in the Court of the 3rd Joint Civil Judge (Junior Division) Akola without obtaining the permission of the House Rent Controller, on the strength of the Notification dated October. 24, 1969, (NDC) M. G. G. Sr. No. 19, Dept No. BRA- 2067-27097 E, issued by the Urban Development Public Health and Housing department in exercise of the powers conferrd under clause 30 of the rent Control Order. 1949 which is to th following effect:--
'Non-residential houses,-- In exercise of the powers conferred by clause 30, the Government of Maharashtra hereby exempts-
form all provisions of the said Order any house used for the residential purposes, if it si constructed on a site lying vacant on the 1st day of January 1967, or on a site kmade vacant after that date by demolition of any structure standing thereon;
form the provisions of Chapter-III of the said Order, any house used the nonresidertial purposed it it if constructed before the 1st day of January. 1967.'
The petitioners had applied to the 3rd Joint Civil Judge (Junior Division). Akola for making a referance tothis court under section 113, read with Order 46. Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, but that application having been rejected, and petitioner approached this Court, questioning the Notification as being inviolation of Article 14 of the constution of India.
4. The challenge is based ontheratio of the decision in Motor General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1984 SC 121 had a Division Bench decision of this Court Maharashta : AIR1986Bom64 , holding that Notification NO. 659-66-11 dated 6 th February 1952 issued bythe State government under claues 30 of the Rent Control Cent Order, 1949, exempting form the operating of all the provisions of the said Order any house used to residential purposes, it the house is construced ona site lying vacant on 1st January 1951. Or an a site made vacant on or after that day by demolition of any structure standing in onsuch site is null and void being unconstitutional as violating Article 14 of the constitution. It is urged that theexemption which was though necessary for giving a spurt to the construction activity intitially by granting the exemption has become discriminatory by lapse of time. The challenge is alsotothe continuance of the Act of 1946 and the rent Control Order, 1949, on the ground that what was not discriminatory at the formation of thee bilingual State of Bombal ofn November, 15, 1956 in view of section 19 of the States Reorganisation Act, which continued the provisions of the different Acts prevailing prior to the reorganisation of States with the sual purpose of facilitating early formation of homogenerus units and maintaining political identilyand distinctive character of the region till uniformity is achieved,by passage of time has rendered the continuance meaningless. The contention is that the State can no longer continue the three Acts, viz., the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Retes Control Act, 1947 (for short' the Bombay Act ') the Hyderabad House (Rent Eviction and Lease)( Control Act, 1954 (for short, 'the Hyderabed Act') and the Rent Control Order, 1949 framed underthe Act of 1946 which prevail in the different regions whichnow from the State of Maharashtra as there is no justification for giving a differential treatment to the Vidarbha Region of thestate of Maharashtra by continuing outdtated provisions of the Rent Control Order, which was enacted as far back as in 1949 in the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh and contiuned without any amendment after the laps of nearly 30 years. While the Bombal act by virtue of amendaments made to to it kept pace with the times.
5. In Writ Petition No, 1695 of 1985 it is contended that Chapter IIIof the Rent Control Order, 1949 relating to collection of information an dletting of accommodation. Which enables the Collector tocollect information regarting vacant premises and information regardingvacant premises and toallot those premises to any person belonging to one of the four catgories metioned therein. Confers and unguided and arbitrary power on the Collector exercisable without leaving a choice to the landlord in selectinga tenant or making a representation against foisting a tenant on him by the Collector with regard to the four categories to which the allotment of the premises can be made, viz.,
Any person holing an office of profit under the Union of State Governement of (2) any person holding a post under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board Or (3) a displaced person: or (4) an evicted persoin, it is urged that they were initially selected arbitrarily and by passege of time the classification, which was irratioal at he initial stages has been rendered entriely meaningless and discriminatory.
6. We have so far stated only the broad contours of the challenges raised and we will refer to the details thereof while assessing the merits of the contentions raised.
7. Respondetn No.1 State of Maharashtra, in their return in Writ Petition No. 1671 of 1985, contended that the provisiosns in the different Acts are rational and not discriminatory. Merely because the provisions of the three Acts, whose schemes are different are also difference it is not permissible for the pettitioners topick and choose some particular provisions which are not beneficial tothem, disregarding the more beneficial ones for urging the those provisions are discriminatory. With regard to the Notification exempting non-residential premises are entirely different. Though the Collector under the Rent Control Order, 1949 had power toallot the residential premises under Chapter III of the Order on a Priority basis to various categories viz., displaced persons, exmployees of he Medhya Pradesh Electricity Board and evictees there was no occation toallot the non-residential premises toany categories other than the displaced person. Whil taking inito consideration the subject of allotment of nonresidertial premises in the year 1968, it was realised that the only possible beneficiaries of alotment of non-residential premises could be displaced person. But the year 1968, after 20 years had elapsed after the partition of the country those persons had bveen rehabilitated and new generation, which was not entitled tosuch a benefit had come tintoexistence. This was the reason for issuing the notification exempting from the operation of he provisons of Chapter III of Rent Control Order, 1949 the non-residential houses constructed prior to 1st Jaunary 1967 but the provisions of Chapter-Iicontinued to apply tosuch houses in order to afford protection to the displaced person who were alloted thenon residertial premises. It was urged that the tenants of residerntial and non-residential premise stand on altogether different footings. Because the tenants of residential premises constituted a large community of various categories including theweaker section of the society whereas the tenants section of he society whereas the tenants of the non-residential premises belong of business community carrying and non-residential accommodation constitutes anintergral part of their business establishment. It was not therefore, necessay tocontinue the operation of he provisions of he Rent Control Order 1949 in respect of the non-residential houses constructed after 1st Jaunary, 1967, In view of he vast opportunity created by the Government initiative through development plans the construction of non-residerntial premises has expanded toanunprecedented exrtent wih the result there is no shortage of non-residential accommodation.
8. In respect of the challenge raised to Chapter III of the Rent Control Order, 1949, in 'Writ Petition No. 1695 of 1985, the State Government justified its application by virtue of sectin 119 of the State Reorganisation Act and the observations of the Supreme Court in Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt v. The Commissioner Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department. : [1980]1SCR368 , was submitted that the provisions of the Rent Control Order, 1949 gave more protection to the tenants than the laws whichare in force in the Bombal States, and ..........
9. We will first take up the challenge raised to the continuation of the three Acts in the State of Maharashtra since the formation of the bilingual State of Bombay, on November 15, 1956. The pleadings Writ Petition No. 1670 of 1985 donot go beyond pointing out the differences in the different provisions obtaining the Bombal Act and the rent Control Order. 1949 There is no Pleading that the operation of these three Acts in different parts of the Stae otherwise are so discriminatory as tobe violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. We were taken through t;he different provision of the Rent Control Order. 1949, and the Bombay Act, The submissionwas that the Rent Control Order 1949 has not kept pace with changing times,. Whilethe Bombal Act was amended on twenty- one occasions form time to time and furthere amendments were under consideration. This submission by itself without reference to the substantive provisions which precede amendment/ cannot be of any assistance to the petitioners The amendments were occasined on acount of he distinctive festures ofhetow enactmentsand their conditions in differnts areas where the conditions were not identical. The processresulting in the amendments is far too complex tofound an argument of discrimintion only of the abasisof plurality of he occassions of whichthe amendments wree brought about in the Bombay Act. The contention that the Retn Control Order. 1949 is limited to only 30 clauses while the Bombal Act is more exhaustive anddetailed one, is only tobe stated tobe rejected because it would not be the number of clauses or sections in a particular enactment which would make it discirminatory. The materail differnce in the two enactmetns in our view lies firsly in the non-application of the Rent Control Order, 1949 to open sites while the Bombay Act, by virtue of section 5 (viii) brings within its sweep not onlybuildings but any land not being used for agricultural purposes and secondly the duplication of the proceedings which the rent control litigations in vidarbha have to undergo the landlord or the tenant being first required to approach the House rent Controller and than intheevent of the landlord seeeking possession of the demised premsies to apprach the Civil Court fo appropriate relief after obtaininine .........of the Rent Controller togive a notice determining thelease. These provisions though different cannot obviously be regarded as discriminatory. It has tobe remebered that reasons for the different provisions are historical. In that they were enacted by two different legislatures legislating for two different geographical units before theycame to be amalgamated under the States Reorganisation Act. May be inview of the area towhich the Rent Control Order, 1949 was to be applied was less populous and there was not presure on the availability of open sities it was not thought necessart toextend protection to the lessees of openplots whil an account of greater urbanisation in the area covered by the Bombay. Act protection was thought advisable even in respect of open plots which arenot used for agricutural purpose. It is impossible tosay that these provisions are dicrminatory unless there is proper inivestigation iintohow they affect tenats and landlords who resider in the areas where they operate.
10. thought in vidarbha Region the area towhich the Rent Control order 1949 applies there is certain duplication or preceedings as a person is required to approach the Rent Controller, before the canfile a suit in the Civil Court for appropriate relief the differecne in the procedure by itself would lnot signify anything unless by proper pleadings and evidence it be pointed out that theexistence of the two sets of authorities in Vidarbha Region results in a hardship such as to render their existence discriminatory. Reference was made by Shri Lohiya tge learned Counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1670 of 1985, in order to show unequal treatment under the Bombay Act and the Rent Control Order, 1949, to several factors, viz., the different considerations uponwhich the standard rents have tobe fixed in the Bombay and the Vidarbha areas the prohibition regarding creation of subtenancies the provision bearing upon the lanllord's right topermitted increase the consequences of habitual defaults the absence of provision in the Rent Control order 1949 for ascertianing the comparative hardship tot he tenants in thevent of a decree for possesion the provisions regarding reparis the absence of provision ... long standing unauthroised sub-tenancies in Vidarbha region the provision for ensuring contiuation of essential services and the conferred of authourity on the Rent Controller to decide complex matters though he happens only totbe a Revenue Officer.
11. We have examined carefully each of these factors and we find that though there may be some differences in the manner in which the diffferent provisions have been arranged in the Bombay Act and the Rent control Order. 1949 the sechemes of two laws being different in substances there was nor nore thanmarginsal difference in the provisions of the two legislations on the points which have been attempted tobe made out by Shrim Lohiya, In the Rent Control Order, 1949 provisions existed in the shape of claues 6, 7, and 7 A for substantialaly freezing the rents at the level theyexisted in April 1940, which are tobe found in the definition of 'standard rent' in clause 10 of section 5 of the Bombay Act read withsecitons 10, 10 A and !0 AA. Thje grievance was that whatever protection thetenant had under claues 6, 7, ad 7A of he Rent Control Order, 1949 has been taken awat by a Division Bench decision of this court in Omprakash Mulchand Khatri v. Fattelal Maganlal and Company 1986 Mh LJ 414 : AIR 1987 Bom 3 There it was observed that was nothing basically wrong in intitial fixing of a particular outer limit with relation of the 1st of Aprial 1940 as the cut off date in the provision of clauses 6 and 7 of the Rent Control Order, 1949 However, theindefiniter continuation of the formula without any justification despite wholly changed circumstances during a long span of tume of whichjudicialnotice can be taken gives blowe to the validity as regards the cour of date 1 st April, 1940 and as a result the provisions of claues 6, 7 and 7A being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution are struck down being unconstitutional If these were the reasons why therents should not be freezed to their 1940 level, it is difficult tosay how a grievance can be way because of similar provisions remaining in the Bombay Act.
12. With regar to thesub-tenancies no sub-tenancies without the consent of the lanldlord can be created in either ....15 A was made in the Bombay Act enablinig certain licensees in occupation on Jauary 1 1963 to become tenatns. While tosuch concession had been extended ot the licencess in Vidarbha region Judicial notice however can be taken of thle fact that there had been greater urbanization and pressure of population inlthe industrialised cities of old Bombay area and the Legislature was entitled totake into consideration the conditions obtaining in that region ofr providing relief to a certain category of persons. We cannot regard these prvisons of the different enactments operating of the diffent enactments operating in different areas as discriminatory in the absence of better material.
13. the conseqences of habitural defaluts uunder both the enactments appear tobe more or less the same and the provisions in the Rent Control Order, 1949 are sufficient to take care of the extravagent claims which the landlords may make ofr obtaining possession of the premises which have beeb let out. The scope of those provisions rendered bythis Court. This is so also with regard to the provisions regarding essential repairs and alterations and the remedies in theevent of an interruption in the essential services.
14. Reference was made inn thecourse of the arguments to the observations of the Supreme Court in Bhaiyalal Shukla v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1962 (Supp) 2 SCR 257: AIR 1963 Sc 981 : Anant Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh : AIR1963SC853 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhopal sugar Industries Ltd., : [1964]52ITR443(SC) and Sri Vishwasha Thirtha Swamiar v. State of Mysore : [1972]1SCR137 On a consideration of these decisions in the context of thle validity of section 76 (1) of the Madtas Act of 1951 in its application of the South Kanara District of the State of Mysore now the state of Karnataka by the Supreme Court in Shri Swamiji of shri Admar Mutt v. The commissioner Hidu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department : [1980]1SCR368 their Lordship observed as follows:--
'These decisions are authority for the validity of S. 76 (1) of the Madras Act of 1951 in its application to the South Kanra District of the State of Mysore, now the state of Karnataka. This court has said time and again that dissimilar treatment does not necessarily offend against the guarantee of equality contained in ART 14 of the Constitution. The rider is that there has to be a valid basis for classification and the clssification must bear nexus with the object of the impuged provision. In matters arising out of reorganisation of laws of a State toterritories, which were within that State but which have become a part of another state is not disciminatory since the classification rests on grographical consideration founded on historical reasons.'
15. On hehalf of the petitioners reference was made of the observations in Shri Admare Mutt's case (cited supra) There their Lordships observed after holding that the continued application of the madras act of 1951 which was just five or six years after the passing of the States Reorganisation Act was no shown by adquate data as being violative of Arcile 14, as follows-
'But that is how that matter stands today Twenty-three years have gone by since the States Reorganisation Act was passed but unhappily no seious effort has been made by theSTate Legislature to intoruduce any legislative - apart from two abortive attempts in 1963 and 1977 - to eremove the inequality between the temples and Mutts situated in the South Kanara District and those situated in other areas of Karnataka. Inequality is so cleary writ large ontlhefact of the impugned statute in its applicant to the Distfict of Souty Kanara only that it is periloualybear the periphery of unconstitutionaly. We have restrained ourselves from declareing the law as inapplicable to the District of South Kanara formtoday but we would like to make it clear that if the Karnataka Legislature does not act promptly and remove the inequality arising out of the application of the Madras Act of 1951 to the District of South Kanara only, the Act will have to suffer a serious and successful challenge in;thenot distant future. We do hopt that the Government of Karantake will act promptly and move an appropriate legislation. Say within a year or so. A comprehensive legislationwhich will apply to all temples and Mutts Karnataka which are equally situated in the context of the levt of fee, may perhaps afford a satisfactory solution to the problem, This, however, is a tentative view-point because we have not investigated whether the Madras Act of 1951 particularly Sec. 76 (1) thereof, is a piece of hostile legislation of the kind that would involve the violation of Article 14 Facts in regard there tomay have tobe explored, if and when occasion arises.
16. We have already pointed out that we have before us no material to show that the continued operation of the three different enactments operates in a discriminatory manner in the different areas towhichthey apply and their contmuation has resulted the a situation so grave as in invite a finding of this Court that the continuance of the Rent Control Order, 1949 must be prevented The following observationns of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh V. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. : [1964]52ITR443(SC) , are instructive;--
'It would be impossible to lay down any definite time limit within which the State had to make necessary adustments so as to effectuate the equalityclause of the Constitution That intitially there was a valid geographical classification of regions inlthe same State justifying unequal laws when the State was formed must be accepted. But whether the continuance of unequal laws by itself sustained the plea of unlawful discrimiantion inview of changed circumstances could only be ascertained after a full and throough enquiry into the continuance of he grounds onwhich the inequality could rationally be founded and the change of circumstances if any which obliterated the compulation of expedency and necessity existing at the time when the Reorganisation Act was enacted.'
In the Bhopal Sugar Industries cae (supra) it was further pointed out that mere existence of agricultrual income impost in one region. And absence of such impost in another region may not necessarily justify and inference of unlawful, discrimination. It would follow, therefore, that the mere plea of different treatment is itself not sufficient to justify the plea of infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution.
17. Shri Lohiya then referred to the case of Motor General Traders V. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1984 Sc 121 but there the Supreme Court while refereing to the previous cases, clearly pointed out in para 22 as follows:--
'In all these cases while it is true that no provision was actually struck down there is a firm foundation laid insupport of thle proposition that want was once a non-discriminatory piece of legislation may in course of time become discriminatory and be exposed toa successful challenge on the ground that it violated Article 14 of the Constitution. This is a sufficient answer to the contention that if at the time when the Act (A. P. Buildings (lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act (15 of 1960 ) was enacted. Section 32(b) of the Act was not unconstitutional it cannot at any time thereafter be challenged on the ground of unconstitutionality.'
While distinguishing the earlier cases their Lordship pointed out that the legislature had to consider which of thle different laws should be selected of enforcement in the entire State either with or wihout modifications. This certainly needs enquiry andinvestigation because of the deversities prevailing ineach reorganised State. On enquiry probadly the Legislature might have preferred toapply the very legislation impugned before th Court for the entire State . In these circumstances it was felt that it was not possibloe to decide whether a particular law which was challenged before themwas discriminatory or not inlthe absence or necessary pleadings and relevant material. With regard to the case of Motor general Traders therei Lordships pointed out that the question wasnot not of selecting any particular local law for extension to the other parts of a State and that was a case where the Legislature. While passing the law had given theexemption apparently as an incentive toencourage buildings activity and the counsel were not able to show how the contunance of the exemption in thecase of persons who have built houses more than two decades ago will act as an incentive to builders of new houses now. If that is really so, than there is no justification tocontinue to have the resrictions tocontinue of thave the restrictions imposed by the Act of buildings buit prior to Augest 26, 1957 also and the whole Act should have tobe repealed. In the said Motoer 'General Traders case it was found that no invertigation as contemplated in the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court was necessary and the long period that had elapsed after the passing of the Act itself served as a crucial foactor in deciding the question whether the impugned law had become discriminatory or not because the ground onwhich the classification of buildings intotwo categories was made was not a historical or geographical one but was and economic.one . Exemption was granted by way of an incentive toencouage building activity and in the circumstances such exexption could not be allowed to last for ever.
This being the position of law as laid down by the Supreme Court in a servies of decisions and as finally explained in the Moter Gentral Trader's case AIR 1984 Sc 121, merely by reference to the differenct provisions of the three enactments prevailing in the differenct parts of this State, in the absence of proper pleading and relevant material before this Court it is impossible tohold that the Rent Control Order, 1949, merely because of the existence of the two other enactments, is discriminatory, and the challenge on this count in Writ Petition No. 1670 of 1985 cannot be sustained.
18. We have referred to the position that the rule was restricted in this case to prayer clause (c) by which a direction was sought against the State toenact a unified law in the matter of Rent Control Legislatio throughtout the State of Maharashtra with retrospective effect, and validity of the notification dated October 234, 1968 nthe contention was that the rule could not hav ebeen sorestricted. We need not examine this point ingreateer detail in view of out finding that the continuance of the Rent Control Order, 1949, is not violativer of Article 14 of the Constitution which would desentitiled the petitioners form seeking relief as the prayer clause. 9a) By prayer clause (b) the petitioners sought a direction to the State to extent the exisiting Bombay Act No. LVIII of 1947 to the region of Vidarbha immediately with retrospective effect No such direction can, however be given because it would amount to issuing a writ to the Legislature ot enact a certainLaw. Nor can the direction as sought by prayer clause c) to enact a uniform law, can be given At one stage,Shri Lohiya urged that if no writ could be issued to the Legislature, then this Court may stricke down the Reht Control Order, 1949 and the order two enactments and thus, bring pressure onlthe State to enace such a legislation. We see no merit in this argument. It is not the function of this court to bring pressure on the Statefor adopting a particular course. All that this Court has toconsider is whether the Act is discrminatory and violative of certain provisions of the Constitution and requires being struck down. Even if we were to take a different view regarding the applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution to the Rent Control Order, 1949 we would have refrained form striking down its provisions, because that would have left the tenants without any protenction the protection which in a rich measure is available tothem under the Rent Control Order, 1949.
19. In fariness, Shri Jaiswal the learned Assistant Government Pleader told us that the State Government had been seriously considering the question of rationalisation and unification of the rent laws in the State In fact, this court took note in Prabjakar Rokde v. State of Kaharasthra : AIR1986Bom64 . That the two expert reports of the bodies constituted by the State itself were under consideration. The Rent Act Enquiry Committee popularly know as 'Tembhe Committee' was appionted bythe governement of Maharashatra in the Year 1975 (urban Development), Public Health and Housing Department by Resolution No, BRA 2174/9011/75 e, dated 20th February 1975 as amended by Resulution No. BRA 2174/9011 d-57, dated 6th August 1975) and the Committee after deliberations and review of various legislations prevailing in the State had made a report in 1977 recommending certain measures and having a uniform legislation in the whole state. Maharasthra State Law Commission alsogive its Twelth Report on the unification and consolidation of the Rent restriction and laws in the State as far back in July 1979 observing The Commission dies not see not difficulty in the way of unification and ocnsolidation on the rent restriction laws in the State 'A draft Bill also fornmed part of the said reprt. Shir Jaiswal stated theat the state Government proposes in introduce a bill toamend Bombay Rent Act in the ensuing Nagpur Session of the State Legislature and is seriously consdering the question of having a unified legislation Presumably the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of tis own people, its laws are directed toproblems made manifest by experience and tis discriminations are bases on adequate ground as pointed out in ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S, R, Tendolkar : [1959]1SCR279 . It is best toleave the matter there in view of the statement made on behalf of the state before us in the hope that the legislature would seeits way to do what is appropriate.
20. that brings us to the question of validity of the provisions of Chapter IIIof the Central Provinces and Bear Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 The following statement of Objectes and Reasons of he Central Provinces and Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Bill, 1946 (Bill No. 7 of 1947) prepared to 15 th August, 1946 and which emerged as the Act speaks for itself;
'The influx of a large population totowns as a result of was conditions necessitated the promulgation of the Central Provinces and Berar House Rent, 1942 under the Defence of India rules will lapse at the end of September 1946 The abnormal conditions created by the war still persits and are not likely tosubsider for some time. Rent Control measures will therefore, continue to be necessay and Government proposes totake powers for regulating house rents in urban areas by new legislation. It is proposed to keep thelaw in operation for a limted to keep thelaw in operation for a limted period of three years. It normal conditions return earler steps wil l be tamke to repeal it.'
Section 2 of thle C. P. & Berar Regulation of letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 (Act No. XI of 1946) is as follows.:--
'2 Regulation to letting and subleting etc. The Provincial Government may, by general or special Order which shall extend to such areas as the provincial government amy, by notification direct provided of regulating the letting and subleting of any whether furnished ro unfurnished and whether with or without board and in particular-
for controlling for rents for such accommodation either generally orwhen let to specified persons or class of person or in specified circumstances.
for preventing the eviction of tenants of sub-tenants form such accommodation in specified cirumstances.
for requring such accommodation to belet either generally or to specified persons or clases of person or in specified circumstances and
for collectingany information or statisfics with a view to regualting any of the aforesaid matters.'
Pursuant to the provisions of the Act the C. P. and Berar Letting of House and Rent Control Order 1949 was issued on July 26. 1949 Chapter I thereof containst the definition clauese, Chapter II relates to fixation of rents and other terms Chapter III contains Provisions about collectionof information and letting of accommodation and Chapter IV contains supplementary provision.
21. Chapter III. Which is material contains claues 22 to 27 Under Clause 22 the landlord had to intimate the vacant, withing seven days to the Collector of the district in the prescribed form and is prevented form letting out or occupying the house except in accordance with clause 23, Under sub-claues (2) of claues 22, no person sahll occupy any house in repect of which this Chapter (Chapter IIII ) applices exerpt under an order undcer subclause (1) of clauses 23 or clause 24 or on an assurance form the landlord that the house in being permitted tobe occuped in accordance withsub-clause (2) fo clause 23.
Clases 23 runs as follows;--
'23 (1) On receipt of the intimation in accordance with clause 22 the Collector may within fifteen days formt he receipt of th said intimation order the landlord tolet the vacant house of any person holding an office or profit under the (a) Union of State Government or to any person holding apost or to a displaced person or to an evicted person and thereup notwithstandingany agreement tothe contrary the landlord shall let the housee to such person and place him in possession thereof immediately it if is vacant or as soon as it becomes vacant.
Provided that if the landlord has in the intimation given under clause 22, stated that he needs the house for his own occuption the Collector shall, if satisfied after due enquiry that the house is so neede permit the landlord to occupythe same.
If no order is passed and served upon the landlord within the period specified in sub-clause (1) he shall be free tolet the cavant house to any person.'
Under clause 24, when no intimation as provided under claues 22 is received the Collectory may order the landlord to let the same to any person belonging toany of the four categories mentioned in claues s23, and order the landlord ot comply with the order, Under Clause 24 A the Collector may pass an order requiring the landlord to let the house toany of the persons belonging to let the house to any of the persons belonging to the four cactgories whil under clause, 24 B the person to who, the house is alloted is liable to pay the rent the house is allotted from the date on which it becomes available for occuption. Under Clauses 25, the tenancy of any person holding any office of profit under the Union or State Government Or to any person holding a post under the Madhtya Pradesh Electrictiy Board and placed in possession of a house by an order under clause 23 of 24 A shall teminate on the date of the transfer of or grant of leave other thancasual leave tosuch person, or on the date drom which such person ceases tohold an office of profit under the Union of State Government or ceases tohold a post under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board as the case may be and the said person shall vacate the said house within seven days of such date and the landlord and tenant shallgive intimation prescribed in clauses 22 to the Collector in respect of such house. The Collector under the Proviso tothat clause is empowered toextent the tenancy for a period not exceedings foru months. One sufficient cause being shown, Clause 26 prohibits sub-letting of he accomodation allotted under clasuess 23, 34 of 24 A while claues 27 precribes the manner in which the orders are to be served.
22. the main challenges raised by Shri Shareef the learned Council for the Petitioner In Writ Petition No. 1695 of 1985 to the provision of Chapter III are these The categorisation of the four classes the favourable treatment byclause 23 is irrational and arbitrary treatment by clauses 23 is irational and arbitraty and there is no valid basis for such classification. The persons belonging to these categories are almost inexhaustible and in view of the preference shown to these categories an ordinary citizen is rendered without any shelter because he cannot be consiered for suibalr accommodation unless all the claims belonging to the favoured categories are exhauated. The results in invidious discrimination and has no nexus with the object to be achieved viz., providing housing accomodation on account of the influx of a large population tot he towns as a result of was conditions when the benefit was not obviously tobe condined only to certain categories.
23. Uner claues 2 (2) of th Rent Control Order 1949, 'Displaced person' means any person who on account on the setting up of the Dominions of India and Pakistan or on account of civil distrubances or fear of such disturbances in any area now forming part of Pakinstan had been displaced form of has left his place of residernce insuch area after the 1st day of March 1947 and has not subsequently been residing inIndia. Under sub-claues (2-A) 'Evicted person' means a tenant whose landlord has been granted permission togive notice to detemine the lease on a ground specified in iterm (IV) of sub-clause (3) of clause 13 9I, E. for the purpose of bona fide occupation) The third cate gory viz., the employees of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, has apparantly become non existent because there has been no amendement inthis respect after the formation of bilingual state of Bombay or the State of Maharasthra when Madhaya Pradeah Electricity Board had ceased tooperated in the Vidardha area and the employees there of do not form a part of the class of beneficiaries for which claues 23 can perated.
24. The second ground raised is that unguibed power of allotment has been conferred on the Collector in the matter of selecting houses and alloting them to the Persons belonging to these categories a power which is to be exercises without the consent of the landlord. Or without providing for the representation by the landlord to the choice of the tenant and compelling the landlord toaccept whoever is alloted the premises as the tenant. These powers verge almost onexpropriating They are not regulated by providing for the appeal. Further, after the lapse of nearly forty years, it is not necessart tocontinue the preference for displaced person and there is no reason to prefer and evicted person as defined in the Rent Control Order, 1949, or a government servant tot eh exclusion of the classes of people who fall outside these categories.
25. We will take up the four categories of person who have been included in claues 23 for consideration serially We see consederable force in the Argument that a displaced person will not continue tot be entitled toany favourable treatement after a lapse of nearly 39 years since the partition of the country. There was obviously a need for providing for the rehabilitation of displace persons upon the pertition when they had to migrate tothis country form their ancestral home and the provision which was obviously necessary then, by lapse of time has ceased tothave any relevance tot he present day conditions. In fact inits return the State itself has stated that one of the reasons for excluding them the and granting exemption under the notificaiton dated October 24, 1968,, was that no special provision is now necessary for displeced persons after a long lapse of time, and the consideration which then existed have now worne out, a new generation having come up which does not require this protection It would therefore, be impossible tosustain the provision of Chapter III which operate to exclude the other categories and provide for the protection of displeced persons since their continuance would be per sediscriminatory.
26. Shri Jaiswal the learned Assistant Government Pleader conceded that the persons holding office of profit under the Union or State Government or holdings post under the Madhya Electricty Board would not be entitled toanyconcession inrespect of non-residential premises and these categories were inadvertently continued in Chapter III With regard to the evicted persons though it cannot be denied that some provision would be necessart to accomodating them if they are to be evicted formteh premises thay occuped by virtue of the premissio granted by the Rent Controller under clause 13 (3) (iv) it is difficult to see how they as a class can stand on a better footing thanthose others who have also an accommodation of their own and had beenwriting for accommodation even for a period longer while the evicted persons were already occcupying certain premises for their residence. In relation to them those belonging to the evicted category would in any event. No stand on a better footing.
27. Shri Jaiswal, however, urged that provision was necessary for allotting ressidetial houses to the persons holding office or profit under Union of State Government because they had toface the Hardship of trnasfer from had toface the hardship of trnsafer form one part of the country or the State to another and special provision would benecessary for them. We fail tosee how the hardship tothis case for persons can be said tobe more than to the others similarly situated only because they happen to the employees of private employers or other public corporation who would have toface similar harship Preferring as a class Union or State Government employees in our view, would be per so denial of an opportunity to the persons who do not belong tothese categories of secruing housing accommodation.
28. Shri shareef urged that when information in sought it the form given in the Schedule in reference toclause 22 all that the landlord is to state besides giving the other details and description of the premises. is only the name of the person to whom it is proposed to be let and noting elase, There is no opportunity. If the Collector takes a decision toinduct a particular person as a landlord's tenant for the landlord tomake a representation against the choice of the tenant made bythe Collector, and the has toaccept whoever is imposed upon him as a tenant. There are no guidelines regarding the manner in which the Collector should exercise his power, and it is not regulated by a provision for appeal. It is difficult to regard the powers conferred on the Collector in the matter of allotment of the houses as anything but arbitrary.
29. It is necessary to understand the context in which the Writ Petition No. 1695 of 1985 has been filed The petitioner Dinanath Chandani's father was a tenant of House No. 69 in Circle No. 7/12 which was owned by respondent No. 2-Jethmal. After the death of the petitioner's father the petitioner along with the other legal representatives, became the second respondant tenant and their tenancy is governed by the provisions of the Rent Control Order 1949 Asa sequal to the stricking down of the notification dated February 6, 1952, exempting from the operation of the provisions of the Rent Control Order, 1949 and house used for residential purposes constructed an site lying vacant of Jauary 1, 1951 by the decision of the Division Bench of this court in Prabhakar Rokde v. State of Maharashtra : AIR1986Bom64 , the provision of Chapter III would apply to the petitioner's lease and as a notice has been sent by respendent 2, the landlord to the petitioner contending that the tenancy had become voidas it was created in pursuance Chapter-II he has been exposed toa proceeding for eviction.
30. In Ms/ Kakubhai and Co. v. Nathmal 1976 MLJ 450 (sic), this Court took the view the tenancy contravention of Claues 23 of the Rent Control Order, 1949, was void. The Supreme Court in Nanakram v. Kundalari. : [1986]2SCR839 , observed that there is a prohibition in Clause 2 (2) ion any other person seeking to occupy the house except in accordance with Clauses 23. In Clauses 23 it is the Deputy Commissione whofalls in one of the categories specified in the clause or if he is satisfied he may permit the landlord himself tooccupy the house. The Deputy Commissioner has power under Clause 28 of the Rent Control Order totake steps and use force for the purpose of securing compliance with or for providing or retifying and contravention or the Rent Control Order. The Supreme Court observed that he Rent Control Order nowhere mandates that the Deputy Commissioner must eiect a perosnwhohas entered into possessison of a house in violation of Clauses 22. If upona view of the circumstances previling, the Deputy Commissioner takes no action in the matter there is no reason why the lease between the landlord and the tenant althout inconsistent with Claues 22, shoul not be binding as between the parties thereto and the transaction is not a viod one. The lease not being void. It is not open toeither party toavoid the lease on the round that it is inconsistant with clause 22. The parties would be bound as between them to observe the conditions of the lease and it cannot be assailed byeither pary in the prceeding between them,. in view of the position laid down bytheSupreme Court toexercisae the power under Clause 28, inview of the non-compliance of the provisions of Chapter -IIII.
31. Reference was made on behalf of the respondents ot decision of thle Supreme Court in S. P. Inadathppa v. R. P. Sharma Air 1961 Sc 1523 where the provisions of Section 3 (3) (a) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act (30 of 1951 ) containing similar provisions, had been uphel The provisions however, o fthe section were more comprehensive and may be quoted inextenso;-
'Section 3 (#) (a) - On receipt of the intimation under Sub-sec (2) the Controller shall taking into conseferation any r epresentation made bythelandlord and after making such inquiry as he considers necessay select the State Government of the Central Government of the government of anyother State of India, or any local authority or any edcational orother public institutino or any officer onay Governemnt authorityor institutino aforesaid or anyother person (herinafter referred to as the allottee') tobe inducted as a tenant in the house and direct the lanlord by written order (herinafter referred to asteallotment ofder') tolet the house to such allottee at such rent as shall be specifined in the allotment orderand todeliver possession of the house to the allottee onsuch date as shallbe specified in the said order.
Provided that beforemiking an allotment order infavour ofany authority or person other that the State Government the Central Government or the government of any State in India or a local authority the controller shall consider any representation of the landlord about the suitability of the proposed tenant and shall not allot the house to any person who in the opinion of the controller is an unsuitable tenant.
It was in the light of these provisions that Supreme Court madethe following observation,--
'Does the Act then by leaving it to the Controller to select any person there than a Government local authority public institutin or anofficer of the any these as the tenant impose an unreasonable restirction on the right of property? We donot think it does so. If the Controller could validly choose a Government a local authority or any institution - which as we have sadi is not disputed --- it can make no difference that instead of such a tenant the Controller choose a private individual as a tenant. The idea of this provision is that people in need should be found accommodation. Persons in need of accomodation are the public and therefore serving their needwould be servinga public purpse. An individual would be a member of the publiand as the accommodation available can be let out to one a restriction caused by selection of the member of the publicwould be one in the interest of the general public. Such a restriciton is furtheremorenot unreasonable. It is enforced only whenthe onwe foes not whant te house for his one use. It can them make no reasonable difference to the owner if a private individual is chosen ass thetenant The Act further make sample provision of see that the tenant chosen is suitbale. By providing the appeal otthe District Judge anda right to move the High Court in revison full sagegurad has been given tosecure that anunsuitableperson is not foristed on an ownere as his tenant.'
32. the Provisions of chapter-III of the present Rent Control Order, 1949 are obviously not similar. The disciminatory nature is weit large on its provisons because the calss which had been selected for the beneficial treatment is sosmall compared with the large majoritywhich has been excluded. Even person, who are similarly situtated. With the State and the Central Government employees, have been excluded with regard to the classof the evictes it is apparent that onluy the houses constructed before 1951 which had fallen vacant were available for allotment bythe Collectro as new constructions made after 1951 were emempted by a notification which was later struck down in Prabjakar Rokde's case : AIR1986Bom64 . In respect of he persons who would have suffered eviction formthe houses ocnstructed after 1951, no protection was available, because their eviction was not conditional uponthe obtaining a cerrificate formthe Rent Controller under Clause 13 (3) (iv) of the Rent Control Order, 1949 in respect of residential premises. We are not dealing withteh class of displaced persons because uponthe admissino made bythe State itself they are not now eligible bythe benefit of theexemption, There is thus no reational basis for the classification introuduced by Clauses 23 in the selecting perosn who hole office of rofit under the Union of the Tate Government or the evictees, in erspect o fresidential premises constructed prior to 1951 and that classification does not have any rational nexus with the object sought totbe acheved bythe C. P. & Berar Bill No. 7 of 1946 and Section 2 of the C. P. & Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946.
33. The observations of the Supreme Court in Special Courts Bill, 1978, : [1979]2SCR476 furnishthe guidelines intheis respect;--
'BY the process of classification of State has the power of determining who shoul be regarded as a class for purpose of legislatin and in relation toa law enacted on aparticular subject. This power no doubt in some degree is likely toproduce some inequalitybut if a law deals with the liberties of a number of well-defined clases it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection ontlhe ground that it has no application ot other persons, Classification thus means segregation in clases which have a systematic relatin. Usually found incommon properties and characteristics. It postulates a rational basis and does not mean herding together of certain person and clases arbitraily.
6. the law can make and set apart the clases according to the need of the society and as suggested by experience. It can reorganise even degree of evilbut the classification shoud neverbe arbitrary artificial or evasive.
7. the classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational that is tosay it must not only be bases on some qualities or characteristics which are to the found inall the person grouped together andnot inothers who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have reasonable relation the the object of the legislation. Inorder to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligiable differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together formther and (2) that different must have a rational ralation to the object sought tobe achieved bythe Act.
8. The different which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinctthings and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. In shourt while Article 14 forbiuds class discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities uponpersons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons similarly situated relation of the privileges sought to be conferred or the liabilities proposed tobe imposed, it does not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such classification is not arbitrary in the sence abovementioned.'
It, therefore, follows that the arbitrary selection of the persons for discriminatory treatment is not founded on intelligable differentiahaving rational relation to the object, if any, to be achieved an dwould be clearly invalid.
The arbitrary nature of the provisions of Chapter III is further highlighted bythe irrational treatment of even the allottes of the houses by clauses 25, under which the tenancy of any person holding an office of profit under the Union or State Government or toany person holding a post under the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board and placed in possession of a house by an order under Clause 23 or 24-A shall terminater on the date of the transfer, of or grant of leave other than casual leave, to such person or on the date which person cease tohold an office of profit under of Union or State Government of ceases of hold a post under th Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board as the cas may be and the said peron shall give intimation prescibled in clause 22 ot the Collector in respect of such house. It is difficult toseel what purpose the regulatory provsions of the Rent Control Order, 1949 would serve by enabling the Collector to throw out a person towhom the house the ben allotted merely because he ceased tohold the office of profit. It is apparent that a tenancy is created in respect of such that person and the effect would be to abruptly put an end tosuch a tenancy bythe draconian provision of Clause 25inrrespective of the fact that such a personwould require residential premises evenafter his ceasing to hold an office of profit or while proceedings on leave. No suchconsequence would ensue in respect of the other classes selected for the benefical treatment under Chapter-III namely, 'displaced persons' and evictees' who would be free to occupty the premises once they are allotted to them without any constriant.
We have indicated above the unbriddled powers given to the Collectorin the matter of allotment. Though in the Schedule to claues 22, a form is prescribed for obtatining the information from the tenant, there is no provision for obtaing any infromation form the person to whom the collector may allort the house under Clause 23 and about his requiremnts. Chapter III does not provide for any prohibition in the matter of allotment of premises, even if the proposed allottee may have a houses of his won and may not need the premises proposed tobe allotted. Nothing can be more inequitable than one which would obviously put a private individual who requres premises urgantly for his genuine needs to a disa dvantage as he would always stand excluded form consideration because theletting of the houses has to be regulated through the agency of the Collector Provisions similar to the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act (30 of 1951) to which we have referred requiring the consideration of the question of the suitability of the tenant after hearing the representations of the landlord regalated further by a right of appeal and access to the High Court are not tobe found in the rent Countrol Order. 1949the challenge of Section 3 (3) of the Mysore Act was under Article 19(10)(f) of the Constitution of India. While rejecting the challenge under Article 19(1)(f) their Lordship observed in S. P. Jinadathapp's case AIR 1961 Sc 1523 that if a tenant had challenged the validity oif the provision relying of Article 14, which was no the case before them, that challenge would not have beeb of substance because there was ample gudance given to the authority as to how he chose the tenants who dirstly had tobe suitble and all persons were entitled to apply forbeing selected as tenants and so had an equal chance toget the house. The choice had to the made form amongst the applicants and that choice depended on the examination of the comparative merits of their claims. The owner alsohad a right tohave his views in the matter being given due consderation bytleh authority selecting the tenant. In the absence of similar provisions in the present Rent Control Order 1949 we are satisfied that the Provisions of Chapter- III are a piece of invidious delegated legislation whichfall foul of Article 14 of the Constitution and have tobe struck down.
That brings us to the consideration of the validity of the Notification dated 24 the Octobe, 1968 which has been dhallenged inWrit Petition No. 1970 of 1985. We would first consider part 'A' of the notification which exempts any house used foir non-residential purpose, if it is construced on a site lying vacant on the 1st day to January, 1867 or on a site made vacant after that date by demolition of any structure standing thereon. This exemption whichwas granted for giving an impetus to construction activites had have been is in existence for more than fifteen years. In view of he principles laid down in motor General Traders' case AIR 1984 Sc 121 and Prabhakar Rokde's case, : AIR1986Bom64 , the ratio of which directly applies tothis notification also It is evident that thoug the exemption may not have been objectionable as a transitional or temporary measure at an initial stage, it became discirminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it persited invoer a long period without any justification. The exemption was granted by way of incentive toencourage buildings activity and, in the circumstances such exemption cannot be allowed tolast for ever. The Supreme court observed that there is some justification for exempting new buildings say which are give, sevenor ten years old from the Act, in order to provide anincentive tobuilders of new buildings but there is hardly any justification toallow buildings whichwere constructed more than ten years ago toremain outside the scopt of the Act. The landlords of such buildings must have realised a large part of investment made on such buildings by way of rents during all these years abd the Court cannot fail to take into account that owing to continuous influx of pupulation intourban areas in recent years the rates of rents have gone up every where and that the landlords of such buildings have been able to take advantage of the situation createdby the shortage of urban housing accommodation which in now a universal phenomenon.
the respondent State contended that the houses used for non-residential purposes would be in a class apart from those used for residential purposes and considerations inthetwo cases would be different . This argumetn is not longer available inview of what the Supreme Court has stated in Rattan Arya v. State of Tamil Nadu, : [1986]2SCR596 , while considering the provisions of Section 30 (ii) of the Tamil. Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 which provied that tenants of residential buildings paying monthly rent exceedings Re. 400/- excepted from the protection of the Act whereas no such restriction imposed in respect of tenants of non-residential buildings.
'The scheme and structure the policy and plan of the Act are aimed at regulating the conditions of tenancy controlling the rents and preventinig unreasonable eviction of tenants of all residential and non-residential buildings. For the advancement of these objects tenants are invested with certain rights and landlords are subjected to certain obligations. They are not rights which are peculiarly capable of enjoyment by occupants of non-residetnialbuildings only as against occupants of low-rent buildings only as against occupants of high rent buildings. Neither form the Preamble nor form the provisions of the Act it is possible todiscern any basis for distinction made in Section 30 (ii) between the tenant of a residentailbuildings and the tenant of a non-residential buindings and that based on the rent paid by the respective tenatns. The is no justification at all for picking out the class of tenants of residential buildings paying a rent of more than four hundred rupees per month todeny them the rights conferred generally onall tenants of non-residenrtial buildings cannot be said to be in a disadvantagrous position as compared with tenants of residerntial buildings and therefore, they need greater protection. The argument based on protection of the weaker section of the community is entirely inconsistent with the protention given the tenants of non-residential buildings who are in a position toapy much higher rents than the rents which those who are in occuption of residentail buildings can ever pay. Therefore, Section 30 (ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control ) Act, 1960 has tobe struck down ao violative of Article 14.'
As there here also none of the main provisions of the Act make any serious distinction between residentail and non-residential buildings, and the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State alsodoes not state why any distinction should be made between residential and non-residential buildings in the matter of affording the prtection of the Act, to say that a non-residential buildings is different from a residerntial buildings is merely different form a residential buildings is merely tosay what is self evident and means nothing.
Part-A of the notification dated October 24, 1968 therefore, being irrational and arbitrary and having no nexus with the object tobe achieved by the Rent control Order, 1959 cannot be allowed tostand intheteeth of Article 14 of the Constitution and it has tobe struck down,
Part-B of the notification exempts from the provisions of Chapter- III of the Rent Control Rent 1949 any house used for non-residential purpose, ir it is constructed before the 1st day of January, 1967 Since in our view the whole of Chapter III cannot stand the question of contnuing part B of the notification would be survive.
Shri Jaiswal the learned Assistant Government Pleader Urged that since two the clases enumerated in Clause 23 (1) namely the person holding office of profit under the Union of Stae Government or holding pose ;under Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board would not require non-residential accommodation and the category of displaced person has ceased tobe eligible for nay differential treatment the exemption granted formthe provisions of Chapter-III would be available onluy to evicted persons andits is not necessary tostrike downthe exemption which would now be restricted to only one class, namely the evicted person We have already indicated the untenability of the distinction earlier. In out view, the notification date October 24, 1968 willhave tobe struck down as a whole in the circumstances of the present case uponthe view that the have taken.
Next question which arises is whether Chapter II of the Rent Control Order, 1949 should be struck down as a whole . The provisions of Claues 22 to 27 revolve around the main and substantive provision made under Clause 23 (1)for allotment to the sour categories and are severable formt he other provisions of the Rent Control Order which have not been challenged before It was not even suggested before us that the other provisions of the Rent control Order 1949 cannot stand independently in Motor General traders case AIR 1984 Sc 121, we find that Chapter III of the Rent Control Order, 1949 is severable and is not so intrinsically bound up as to made the Rent control Order unworkable after it is struck down.
42.In the resut the challenge raised in Writ Petition No. 1670 of 1985 to the continuance of the C. P. & Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Ace, 1946 and the C. P. & Berar Letting Houses & Rent control Order, 1949 Made therunder on account of the existence of the Bombay Rents, Hotal and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, and Hyderabad Houses (Rent Eviction and Lease) Control Act. 1954 is rejected. The impugned notification dated October 24, 1968, is decleard nulland viod being unconstitutional.
The challenge raised in Writ Petition No. 1965 of 1985 to the provisions of Chapter III of the C. P. & Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 framed under the C. P. & Berar regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1946 as unconstitutional being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, is upheld and the said Chapter- III is struck down as being unconstitutional.
We, however, ,make it clear that this decision would not affect the validity of any proceedings in which a decree or order of eviction has become final and the landlord had already taken possession of the building or any part there of pursuant thereto.
In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as the costs of both the petitioners.
43. Order accordingly.