Judgment:
1. All these writ petitions under Articles 14, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India impugn the orders of the Industrial Court made on different dates in complaints under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')
2. The Petitioners in all these petitions are ex-employees of the First Respondent Bank who have been superannuated from Service upon completing the age of 55 years. The petitioners filed complaints under the Act before the Industrial Court in which they alleged that the Certified Standing Orders applicable to the Establishment of the First Respondent provided that , 'Every employee shall be retired from service on attaining the age of 55 years', that they were entitled to continue in service upto the age of 60 years by reason of a provision contained in the Model Standing Orders issued under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, applicable to the First Respondent Bank, under which the age of superannuation prescribed is 60 years. It was contended in the complaints filed by the petitioners that they were entitled to continue in service upto the age of 60 years and that the termination of their services upon reaching the age of 55 years was, therefore, an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Items 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Act. The petitioners, therefore, sought declaration of unfair labour practice on the part of the First Respondent and relief by way of a direction to continue their services till the age of 60 years. The First Respondent opposed the complaints and contended that there was no Model Standing Order applicable to the Co-operative Banking Industry governing the age of superannuation. The First Respondent pointed out that under its Certified Standing Orders, which were certified in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 the age of superannuation is prescribed as 55 years and, therefore, the action of terminating the services of the petitioners upon reaching the age of 55 years was fully justified and did not amount to unfair labour practice as alleged or otherwise.
3. The learned counsel on both sides have invited my attention to the impugned orders of the Industrial Court. The most unfortunate facet of the matter is that, neither the learned Advocate who appeared before the Trial Court, nor the learned Judge of the Industrial Court, really went into the question as to whether there were any Model Standing Orders framed by the appropriate Government under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act applicable to the Co-operative Banking industry under which the age of superannuation was fixed at 60 years. It must, however, be said to the credit of the learned Judge of the Industrial Court that, though he missed the obvious and vital point, his reasoning on the assumptive basis that there was such Model Standing Orders is correct. I am, however, not concerned with a finding arrived at on the basis of an assumption, which the learned counsel conceded was wrong. In my view, therefore, there is no substance in these writ petitions whatsoever since the basis on which the complaints were moved is itself knocked out.
4. Mr. Kochar, learned counsel for the petitioners, however, with considerable tenacity sought to make the best of a bad bargain. He contended that, under the Certified Standing Orders of the First Respondent, the age of superannuation for the Clerks is provided at 55 years. The relevant clause 22(7) reads as follows :
'Every employee shall be retired from services on attaining the age of 55 years. Extension not extending one year at a time, or three years in all may be given at the discretion of the Manager.'
It was obligatory upon the Manager making the order of superannuation to apply his mind to the question of granting extension to the employee and, if he chooses to exercise his discretion of not granting such extension, the order ought to have been a speaking order indicating the basis on which the extension was not granted, contends Mr. Kochar. Mr. Kochar contends that there is, breach of the Standing Orders under items 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Act since this was admittedly not done.
5. Mr. Kochar then pointed out that in ground 4(d) in the writ petition, seven instances have been given of the employees of different categories who have been permitted to work beyond the age of 55 years. From this Mr. Kochar contends that there was a case of unfair discrimination as against the petitioners who had been removed from service upon reaching the age of 55 years. On both these grounds, Mr. Kochar contends.that the petitioners are entitled to the reliefs claimed in the complaints.
6. In my view, the petitions are bound to fail. The only contention urged before the Industrial Court was that, by virtue of the Model Standing Orders, which according to the petitioners superseded the Certified Standing Orders, the petitioners were entitled to continue in service upto the age of 60 years. As I have already pointed out, there was no basis for this contention at all, since admittedly no Model Standing Orders have been framed under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act in respect of the Co-operative Banking Industry. The contention which Mr. Kochar now urges cannot be permitted to be urged for the first time in these writ petitions. Mr. Kochar urged that the contention urged by him was a pure question of law which arises on interpretation of the Certified Standing Orders. It is not possible to accept the contention. The Industrial Court was not called upon to interpret the concerned Model Standing Orders, but was specifically invited to hold that there was non-implementation of the applicable Model Standing Orders. The issue of exercise of discretion was neither raised before the Industrial Court in trial, nor is any material placed on record here to impugn the exercise of discretion on the part of the First Respondent.
7. Turning to the second contention as to discrimination, it is obviously a mixed question of facts of law. There is neither pleading nor material as to the facts of discrimination, as urged. Merely because some alleged facts have been referred to in one ground of the writ petitions, it is not possible for this Court to assume it to be true and decide the question of discrimination urged across the Bar as a last ditch argument. I am unable to accept the contention.
8. In the result, I find that there is no substance in these writ petitions. All these writ petitions are dismissed. Rules granted therein are discharged with no orders as to costs.