Judgment:
1. This Petition challenges the order of the Cooperative Court as also the Cooperative Appellate Court regarding maintainability of the dispute before the cooperative Court. Both the Courts below are of the view that a dispute relating to forced resignation as member of a co-operative society is maintainable under Section 91 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act.
2. The facts giving rise to the present petition are as under:
Respondent No. 1 was a member of the Committee of Petitioner No. 1 Society. On 3.8.1996, Respondent No. 1 alongwith other members tendered their resignation as members of the society. On 7.8.1996, the Petitioner informed Respondent No. 1 and other members that their resignations were accepted. In November, 1999, a dispute application was filed by Respondent No. 1 before the Cooperative Court for a declaration that the resignation submitted by her was null and void as the same was tendered by her under coercion. The Petitioners filed a written statement objecting to filing of such a dispute as according to it, the Cooperative court had no jurisdiction to try such an issue. The Petitioners insisted that the preliminary issue regarding maintainability of the dispute be decided. The application was heard and rejected by the Cooperative Court. The Cooperative Court held that the dispute was maintainable under Section 91 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioners preferred an appeal on 31.1.2001. The Co-operative Appellate Court held that the Dispute filed by Respondent No. 1 was tenable under Section 91 of the Act and was not barred by limitation. It is against these orders that the Petitioners had filed the present Petition.
3. The main contention raised on behalf of the Petitioners is that the Cooperative Court under Section 91 of the Act is not the proper forum to decide as to whether Respondent No. 1 after tendering her resignation continued to be a member of the cooperative society. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that on a perusal of sections of the Act, it is clear that it is the Registrar appointed under the Act who can take cognisance of an aspect such as this namely, as to whether the name of Respondent No. 1 was rightly removed from the register of members. The learned Counsel submits that the issue of cessation of membership is an issue arising out of pertaining to membership of the cooperative society. The power to decide the issues arising from the admission or refusal of membership and cessation of the same are conferred exclusively on the Registrar. An appeal is provided under Section 157 of that Act and thereafter, a revision before the State Government. It is submitted that this in effect is a complete code in itself conferring powers on the Registrar under Sections 22, 23, 25, 29, 35 r/w 77-A, 78, 79, 83 and 89A. It is further urged that by implication these powers of the Cooperative Court to take cognisance of disputes arising out pertaining to membership are limited and jurisdiction in such matters does not lie with the cooperative Court but with the Registrar. It is also submitted that the words 'management of business of the society' found in Section 91 of the Act have to be given a restricted meaning in accordance with the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gujarat State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. P.R. Mankad and Anr. reported in : [1979]2SCR1023 and Deccan Merchants Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. Jugraj Jain reported in : [1969]1SCR887 . It is further submitted on behalf of the Petitioners that in any event the dispute is barred by limitation as it relates to an act or omission of the Society qua a general body meeting of 7.8.1996. The submission was that since the words 'the act or omission on the part of either party to the dispute' which appear in Section 92(1)(b) cover the case of a positive act of omission of either of the party, the case of resignation is not contemplated. It is submitted that the period prescribed in the Limitation Act, 1963 for a declaration of the nature prayed for in the dispute, would be applicable and the dispute was clearly barred by limitation as it has been filed 3-1/2 years from the date of resignation from the membership.
4. On the other hand, it has been argued on behalf of Respondent No. 1 that she was forced to tender her resignation and having no option, she did so on 7.8.1996. The learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 submitted that the dispute under Section 91 of the Act was maintainable as the jurisdiction to decide as to whether the society had forced Respondent No. 1 to tender her resignation was a dispute touching the management of the society as well as its business and, therefore, the dispute filed under Section 91 was maintainable. It was then urged that the proviso to Section 91 excludes certain kinds of disputes and, therefore, no other disputes could be excluded from the purview of this section as that would mean that something more was being read into the section. It is further submitted that if there is cessation of membership, the Registrar would have the power to direct the society to remove the name of such a person from the membership register. It is further submitted that although there has been a cessation membership on account of the resignation of Respondent No. 1, this resignation was a forced resignation and the only forum in which Respondent No. 1 would have a right to question such a resignation and its acceptance would be before the cooperative Court. It is submitted that the Registrar has no power whatsoever to decide the issue as to whether the resignation once tendered is legal or valid.
5. As regards limitation, the learned Counsel submitted that the dispute relates to the act of the society and, therefore, falls under Section 92(1)(b) for which the period of limitation is six years from the date of the act. He submitted that the challenge is to the action of the society forcing Respondent No. 1 to resign and this dispute relates to an act or omission on the part of the society and, therefore, the period of limitation is six years and the dispute having been filed well within this period it is not barred by limitation. Respondent No. 1 also contended that the pleas taken up by the Petitioner are fanciful and raised only with a view to delay the proceedings before the cooperative Court.
6. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has taken me through the scheme of the Act conferring powers on the Registrar in respect of the Membership of the societies. Section 25 of the Act stipulates that a person ceases to be a member of a society on his resignation from the membership being accepted or on transfer of his share or on his death or removal or expulsion. Under Section 75-A of the Act, the committee of the society is required to remove from the register of its members the name of the person who has ceased to be a member or who stands disqualified under the provisions of the Act for being a member or continuing to be a member of the society. The Registrar is empowered to direct the society to remove the name of such member from register. It is true that the Registrar is empowered to direct such removal of the name from the membership register but this would not entail deciding the issue as to whether the resignation which has been accepted by a society has been forced upon a member by the society or has been voluntarily given. The expulsion has been specifically enumerated under Section 35 of the Act. The Registrar must give approval to any resolution expelling a member of the society. The Registrar under the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 35 has been empowered to sanction the readmission or admission within a specified period to any member who has been expelled in special circumstances. However, there is no such corresponding jurisdiction given to the Registrar regarding resignations or forced resignations. To equate a forced resignation with an expulsion would be incorrect as there is a dispute as to whether the resignation is in fact forced. Therefore, the submission of the learned Counsel that Section 35 of the Act r/w Rule 29 of the Rules empower the Registrar to consider the dispute raised by Respondent No. 1 cannot be sustained.
7. It is true that the power conferred upon the Registrar under Sections 22, 23, 25, 31 and 35 r/w provisions of 77A, 78, 79, 83, 89A exclude by implication the power of the Cooperative Court to take cognisance of the disputes arising under these sections, but, the present dispute is not of the nature specified in these sections. The cooperative Court's jurisdiction cannot, therefore, be excluded by implication even if the words 'management of business of the society' have to be given restricted meaning as observed by the Apex Court. Acceptance of a resignation by the managing committee in a meeting held on 7.8.1996 would touch the management of business of society and, therefore, the dispute would be maintainable under Section 91 of the Act.
8. Section 92 of the Act prescribes that the period of limitation in the case of a dispute referred to he cooperative Court when the dispute is between a society or its committee and a member, or past member, or the nominee, heir or legal representative of a deceased member is six years, if the dispute relates to an act or omission on the part of either party to the dispute. Assuming the dispute had arisen because of the resignation, that is, the act of Respondent No. 1, the resignation is tendered on 7.8.1996 and the dispute has been filed in 1999. Therefore, the question of there being any delay in filing the dispute under Section 92 of the Act does not arise. If the act of the Petitioners of accepting the resignation is considered basis on which the dispute had arisen, the dispute is still within the time stipulated. Therefore, in my opinion, the dispute before the Cooperative Court is maintainable.
9. In the result, Rule is discharge. No costs.