N.V. Dabholkar, J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
2. By the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner challenges communication dated 11-3-2006 forwarded by respondent No. 3 to the petitioner. By the said communication at Exhibit 'G', page 30, respondent No. 3 viz. Registrar of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University, Aurangabad (henceforth referred as 'B.A.M.U.', for the sake of brevity), informed the petitioner of respondent No. 1, the Vice Chancellor of B.A.M.U. having passed orders disqualifying the petitioner from his membership on the Senate and Board of Studies in Economics (henceforth 'BOS', for short), in view of his conviction by IVth Judicial Magistrate (First Class), Aurangabad, in Regular Criminal Case No. 6064/2004, dated 28th February, 2006. It is informed to the petitioner that in view of the disqualification incurred, the petitioner ceases to be a member of the aforesaid authorities of the University. Consequently, it appears; his nomination for election as Chairman of BOS in Economics and the member, Faculty of Social Sciences, have been rejected.
3. There is no dispute that the petitioner is elected as member of the Senate and BOS in Economics of B.A.M.U., as was communicated to him by communications dated 13-12-2005 (Exhibit 'B') and 8-12-2005 (Exhibit 'A'), respectively. On 8th March, 2006, the petitioner filed his nomination for election to the office of Chairman of Board of Studies. The nomination was acknowledged vide acknowledgment Exhibit 'D' and name of the petitioner occurred at serial No. 1 in the list of candidates for the election of the Chairman published on the same day (Exhibit 'E'). As a result of communication under challenge, it appears that fresh list of candidates for election of the Chairman of Board of Studies was published on 11th March 2006 deleting the name of the petitioner and hence this petition challenging the communication dated 11-3-2006.
So far as the conviction due to which communication dated 11th March 2006 is issued by respondent No. 3, a copy of the judgment of Criminal Court is filed along with the Writ Petition at paper book pages 32 to 49. It appears that the petitioner along with one Madhukar Jadhav were charged for offences punishable under sections 353, 341 and 427, read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code. It was alleged that on 1-6-2004, respondent No. 3 had registered a complaint against the two with Begumpura Police Station pertaining to an incident dated 31-5-2004. It was alleged that on retirement of one Dr. Lomte from the post of Director of Board of College and University Development, the Chancellor appointed Shri R.T. Deshmukh, then Principal of Devgiri College, as Director. On 31-5-2004 at about 5 p.m., Shri Deshmukh proceeded to the office of Director for the purpose of taking charge of the said post. He was accompanied by respondent No. 3, the Registrar. At that time, the two accused (petitioner and another) along with their colleagues were present at the Director's office. They expressed their opposition to the appointment of Shri R.T. Deshmukh as Director and threatened him that he will not be allowed to take charge of the post of Director and also asked him to go away from the office. The accused had also broken a table glass, dealt with fist blows to Shri R. T. Deshmukh and snatched away the documents which were to be executed by Shri R. T. Deshmukh in testimony of his having taken charge of the post of Director. Shri Deshmukh was required to return without taking the charge and after Deshmukh left office of Director without taking charge, account persons locked the office of the Director with their own lock. Consequently, the petitioner and another were charged with offences punishable under the provisions of Indian Penal Code, as above because they had obstructed S/Shri R. T. Deshmukh and Dr. V.S. Lomte, Public Servants; from discharging their duty and causing damage to the tune of Rs. 1,100/- by breaking table glass in the process. At the conclusion of the trial by a judgment on 28th February, 2006, the learned Magistrate has held both the accused guilty for offence punishable under Section 353 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 3 months with fine of Rs. 1,000/- each, in default, rigorous imprisonment for 7 days. It appears that the accused have preferred Criminal Appeal before the Court of Session at Aurangabad and also prayed for suspension of sentence and enlargement on bail during the pendency of Criminal Appeal. The order passed by the Sessions Judge on these prayers, reads as follows (paper book page 52) :--
Heard.
Substantive sentence is suspended until final disposal of appeal on merits. In spite of furnishing Srs. and P.R. of Rs. 10,000/- each.
Fine imposed by L.C. be deposited forthwith, if not deposited as yet. Inform L.C. accordingly.
4. Heard respective Counsel for respective parties, by making rule returnable forthwith, by mutual consent.
It was submitted by Advocate Shri Sagar, on behalf of the petitioner, that the respondents have no powers and authority to disqualify the petitioner, inasmuch as, such powers are vested only with the Chancellor in terms of subsection (5) of Section 9 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994. Although the disqualification was imposed by reference to conviction of the petitioner in the Criminal Case, it was done without giving an opportunity of being heard. Therefore, letter dated 11-3-2006 is said to be illegal, arbitrary and ultra vires the powers and authority of respondent Nos. 1 and 3. It is also said to be violative of principles of natural justice and mala fide. It was, therefore, prayed that the same may be quashed.
When confronted with the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Advocate Shri Khandare for the respondents, submitted that as a result of Section 44(c) of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, disqualification from membership of any of the authorities of University, such as, Senate, Management Council, Academic Council, Board of Examinations, Faculties, Board of College and University Development, Board of Studies, etc., is a statutory effect and Chancellor is not required to exercise his powers under Section 9(5), especially when such disqualification is incurred by a member as a result of conviction by a Criminal Court. By the impugned communication, the petitioner is informed of cognizance by respondents of the disqualification incurred by the petitioner and consequent ineligibility of the petitioner to contest the election for the post of
Chairman of Board of Studies. In order to support his arguments, Advocate Shri Khandare, has placed reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in the matter of Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang and Ors. : [1995]1SCR456 and more particularly, those contained in para 14 of the judgment.
It was submitted by Advocate Shri Sagar, in reply, that presuming for the sake of argument, of petitioner having incurred disqualification by virtue of his conviction by a Criminal Court, still in order to dislodge him from the Senate, it will require an order by the Chancellor as one contemplated under Section 9(5) of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994. For that purpose, he has placed reliance upon certain Articles of the Constitution, as also, certain provisions of other statutes for the purpose of illustration.
5. We feel that reproduction of the provisions relied upon by the two Counsel would be beneficial for discussion of the reasons.
The relevant portion of Section 44 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, reads as follows :
Disqualification for membership of authority.
A person shall be disqualified for being a member of any of the authorities of University, if he --
(a)...
(b)...
(c) has been convicted of any offence involving moral turpitude.
(d) ...
(e) ...
(f) ...
Section 9, Sub-section (5), as also, Section 108 relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner as the provisions which indicate that it is the Chancellor who has to take drastic action, such as, disqualifying the sitting member by a formal order. Section 9 of the Maharashtra Universities Act reads as follows :
Chancellor and his powers.
(1)to(4)....
(5) Where, in the opinion of the Chancellor, the conduct of any elected or nominated of appointed or co-opted member is detrimental to the smooth functioning of University or any authority or body or committee, he may, after giving such member an opportunity to offer his explanation in writing and after considering such explanation, if any, and satisfying himself that it is necessary so to do, disqualify such member or suspend him for such period as he may deem fit.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 108 of the Maharashtra Universities Act reads as follows :
Questions regarding Interpretation and disputes regarding constitution of the university, authority or body, etc.
If any question arises regarding the interpretation of any provision of this Act, or of any Statute, Ordinance, Regulation or Rule, or whether a person has been duly elected or appointed or nominated or co-opted as or is entitled to be a member of any authority or body of the university, the matter may be referred, on petition by any person or body directly affected, or suo motu by the Vice-Chancellor to the Chancellor, who shall after taking such advice as he thinks necessary, decide the question, and his decision shall be final.
Provided that, such reference shall be made by the Vice-Chancellor to the Chancellor upon a requisition signed by not less than twenty-five members of the Senate.
(Emphasis supplied)
The other provisions from the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, the Articles of the Constitution of India, and provisions of other enactments relied upon by the learned Counsel, during the course of their arguments, shall be referred to, as and when required during the course of discussion of reasons.
6. In our considered opinion, the crux of the dispute lies in considering the question as to how a member of an authority or a body of the University constituted under the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, having incurred any disqualification, as prescribed by Section 44 of the said Act; cease to function, as such. It was the submission of learned Counsel for the respondents, that once such a disqualification is incurred, by virtue of opening clause of Section 44, 'A person shall be disqualified for being a member', the membership of the member having incurred disqualification shall cease as a statutory effect and it would not require any formal declaration or order by the Chancellor as one contemplated by Section 9(5). In this particular case, according to Advocate Shri Khandare; the disqualification incurred being so obvious because of decision of Judicial Magistrate, the Chancellor was not required to conduct any enquiry, as is contemplated under Sub-section (5) of Section 9 and, therefore, the challenge to the communication dated 11th March, 2006 raised by the petitioner is not sustainable.
The case of Rama Narang (supra) relied upon by Shri Khandare, learned Counsel, was one under the Companies Act, 1956. Appellant, Rama Narang, was appointed as Managing Director of a Company, by name, Narang International Hotels Private Limited, in a general meeting held on 25-6-1990. On 14-11-1990, respondent No. 1 Ramesh Narang, had filed a Company Petition before the Company Judge of this High Court, challenging the validity of the Board meeting dated 25-6-1990 on the ground that the appellant having been convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude, could not hold office of the Managing Director, in view of provisions of Section 267 of the Companies Act. The appellant Rama Narang was tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, in Case No. 134/1985 and was convicted by judgment dated 22-12-1986 for offences punishable under sections 120-B and 420 read with Section 114 of Indian Penal Code. On appeal, High Court of Delhi released him on bail and directed stay of operation of the impugned order. The observations relied upon by learned Counsel, Shri Khandare, from para 14 read as follows :
The operation of Section 267 would take effect as soon as conviction is recorded by a competent Court of an offence involving moral turpitude. Sections 267, 274 and 283 referred to earlier constitute a code whereunder a Director, Managing Director and the whole-time Director are visited with certain disqualifications in the event of conviction.
It is evident that Honourable Apex Court held that the disqualification shall have its own effect as soon as conviction is recorded by a competent Court, by operation of Section 267 of the Companies Act. The relevant text of Section 267 is reproduced in para 10 of the reported judgment and it reads as follows:
No company shall, after the commencement of this Act, appoint or employ or continue the appointment or employment of any person as its managing or whole-time Director who -
(a)...
(b)...
(c) is, or has at any time been convicted by a Court of an offence involving moral turpitude.
(Emphasis supplied)
Although it was submitted by Advocate Shri Khandare, that Section 44 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, and Section 267 of the Companies Act are identical (similar) provisions (not pari materia), the portions underlined from Section 267, in our opinion; give different complexion to the said provision as compared to Section 44. The manner in which Section 44 is couched, gives an impression that absence of these disqualifications is to be ascertained at the stage of entry of particular individual as a member of particular authority or body of the University. The manner in which Section 267 of the Companies Act is worded, mandates denial of continuation to the appointment or employment as Managing or whole-time Director, if the individual is convicted by a Criminal Court of an offence involving moral turpitude at any point of time. The underlined words from Section 267 reproduced hereinabove give clear indication that the person already in the office of Managing or whole-time Director, if convicted by a Criminal Court, while in the office loses his right to continue in the office. Section 44(c) of the Maharashtra Universities Act is not so worded and that is why we have expressed that the said section gives an impression as if it is list of disqualifications, absence of which is to be ascertained before allowing any individual to enter as a member of any authority or body of the University.
We are fortified in taking such a view on reference to Section 43 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, which is an independent provision regarding cessation of membership. We only quote terminal part of the said provision which serves our purpose :
Cessation of membership.he shall cease to be such an officer of the university or a member of such an authority or a body as soon as he ceases to belong to such category and shall be deemed to have vacated his office as such officer or member.
It is evident that Section 43 makes a provision for cessation of membership of the individuals who get elected, nominated, appointed or co-opted, as an officer of University or member of any of the authorities or bodies of the University, by virtue of being eligible to be so elected, nominated, co-opted, etc. under any of the categories of the officers or members specified by or under the relevant provisions of the Act. If legislation in its wisdom desired cessation of membership of a member of any authority or body of the University, immediately after such member already in the office incurring any of the disqualifications as prescribed by Section 44, it could have enacted a provision like Section 43 indicating cessation of membership on incurring disqualification or it could have couched Section 44 in the language Section 267 of the Companies Act, is drafted to indicate cessation of right to continue as a member, immediately on incurring disqualification.
For the sake of illustration, we may refer to Section 60 of the Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Technological University Act, 1989 (Maharashtra Act 22/1989) referred from the book, Law Relating To 'Universities and Colleges in Maharashtra' (in two Volumes) by U.P. Deopujari, Advocate (Volume 2, page 1286). Section 60 is contained in Chapter DC pertaining to Committees, which reads as follows :
Resignation and cessation of membership.
(1)...
(pertaining to resignation)
(2) Any member of any authority or body of the University shall cease to be member thereof, on his being convicted by a Court of law for an offence which involves moral turpitude.
We had drawn attention of learned Counsel Shri Khandare to this provision and Shri Khandare could not point out similar provision in the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994.
Section 267 of the Companies Act was held by the Honourable Apex Court as a provision intended to be mandatory in character because of typical language used in the said provision which is absent in Section 44 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994.
7. Learned Counsel, Shri Sagar, for the petitioner, has placed reliance upon Articles 102 and 103 of the Constitution of India read with Section 11A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. No doubt, these are provisions regarding Members of Parliament, but are placed reliance upon by the learned Counsel in order to persuade us to interpret Section 44 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, by drawing analogy. Article 102 of the Constitution of India enlists disqualification for member of either House of Parliament. No doubt, there is no direct reference to conviction by a Criminal Court as a disqualification in the Article, but that would be covered, according to learned Counsel Shri Sagar; in Clause (e) by virtue of Section 11A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'the R.P. Act, 1951'). The relevant portion of Article 102 reads thus :
Disqualification for membership.
(1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament --
(a)to(d)...
(e) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by Parliament.' However, reliance on Section 11A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, by Advocate Shri Sagar is misplaced reliance. The said provision is relating to disqualification for voting, arising out of conviction and corrupt practices. The disqualifications for membership of Parliament and State Legislators are covered in sections 8 and 8A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and on reference to Sub-section (3) of Section 8, it can be seen that the said provision is worded in much strong terms than Section 44 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, which reads as follows :
Disqualification on conviction for certain offences.
(1)...
(2)...
(3) A person convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years other than any offence referred to in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction and shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is evident that the Representation of the People Act, 1951, makes a provision, although worded in manner different than Section 267 of the Companies Act, to give the disqualification immediate effect. In fact, Sub-section (4) also provides for suspension of the effects of disqualification in case of conviction of a person who is already a member of the Parliament, until 3 months and further until disposal of appeal by the Criminal Court, if within the period of these three months, an appeal or application for revision is brought against the conviction.
Article 103 of the Constitution of India requires, question whether a member of either House of Parliament has incurred any disqualification mentioned in Article 102, to be referred for the decision of the President and Sub-Article (2) of Article 103 requires the President to obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and to act according to such opinion. Learned Counsel, Shri Sagar, appears to be justified in relying upon Article 102 read with Article 103 of the Constitution of India to propound that mere incurring disqualification is not sufficient to throw out the member from the authority or body of the University but that would require a formal decision.
8. On reference to the impugned communication, it is evident from the clause '...and as per orders passed by the Honourable Vice Chancellor...', a cognizance of disqualification incurred by the petitioner is taken by the Vice Chancellor and not the Chancellor. The Maharashtra Universities Act contains separate provisions in Section 9 and Section 14, so far as powers of the Chancellor and powers and duties of Vice Chancellor. We have already reproduced Sub-section (5) of Section 9 of the Maharashtra Universities Act which empowers the Chancellor either to disqualify or suspend a member of any authority or body or committee of the University, in case, conduct of such member is detrimental to the smooth functioning of the University or any authority or body or committee. This power can be exercised against all types of members elected, nominated, appointed or co-opted. The said provision contemplates an opportunity of offering an explanation to the delinquent member. We have also reproduced Section 108 of the Maharashtra Universities Act which indicates that not only the questions regarding interpretation and disputes regarding constitution of the University, but even the issue whether any person is entitled to be member of any authority or body of the University can be referred, either on the petition by any person or suo motu by the Vice Chancellor, to the Chancellor for a decision. Reading sections 9(5), 44 and 108 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, together, in the absence of suitable language within Section 44 of the said Act, indicating immediate cessation of membership of a member on incurring disqualification, as prescribed by Section 44, we feel justified in accepting the submission of Advocate Shri Sagar, that although the petitioner might have incurred a disqualification, his membership was required to be brought to an end by a formal order under Section 9(5) to be passed by the Chancellor in accordance with the said provision.
Such an interpretation stands strengthened by the fact that although there is specific provision regarding cessation of membership contained in Section 43, the said provision within its fold does not speak anything about a sitting member incurring disqualification after entering the office of an authority or body of the University and consequent immediate cessation of membership. The Writ Petition, therefore, ought to succeed to that extent.
On reference to Section 14 and more particularly, Sub-sections (5), (7) and (11) of the Maharashtra Universities Act, pertaining to powers and duties of Vice Chancellor, it can be seen that Sub-section casts a duty on the Vice Chancellor to ensure that directives of the State Government, provisions of the Act and statutes are strictly observed and the decisions of the authorities, bodies and committees are properly implemented. Sub-section (7) empowers the Vice Chancellor, in case of emergency, to take immediate action but such immediate action, as can be seen from the further text of the said section, is the action otherwise contemplated by some authority or body. In the scheme of the Act, provisions regarding the Chancellor are contained in Chapter III which pertains to officers of the University. The authorities and bodies of the University are covered in Chapter IV. Hence Sub-section (7) of Section 14 cannot be read to be enabling Vice Chancellor to exercise the powers of Chancellor, in case of an emergency. Similarly, Sub-section (11) empowers the Vice Chancellor as Chairman of the authority or body or committee to suspend a member from the meeting of the authority, body or committee for specific reason i.e. such member persisting to obstruct or stall the proceedings. The powers of the Vice Chancellor are limited to cause suspension of the obstructing member for the particular meeting. Section 14 does not indicate that Vice Chancellor is empowered to take cognizance of disqualification incurred by any member of a body or authority and cause cessation of membership of such an individual.
9. Advocate Shri Khandare has placed on record a xerox copy of the nomination paper of the petitioner for election as member of faculty of Social Sciences and Chairman, Board of Studies. In fact, Shri Khandare relied upon declaration and undertaking at the foot of the nomination paper. The undertaking requires the candidate to declare that he is eligible to contest the election and he is not subject to and has not incurred any of the disqualifications under Section 44 of the Maharashtra Universities Act. Although, according to Advocate Shri Khandare, requisition of such a declaration supports interpretation of Section 44, as tried to be propounded by him, we are of the diagonally opposite view. On the contrary, it supports interpretation as propounded by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and found acceptable by us i.e. Section 44 is a list of disqualifications which are required to be ascertained at the stage of entry of an individual to any particular office, authority, body or committee of the University.
The later half of the impugned letter also indicates that nomination paper of the petitioner is rejected because of his conviction by the Judicial Magistrate. By clause 'c' of Section 44, conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude, is disqualification for membership. Naturally, the same would be a disqualification for chairmanship since a person who is not sure of his membership cannot be the Chairman of the authority or body.
On reference to Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, by Bryan A. Garner, the term 'moral turpitude' can be understood as 'conduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality'. The same is explained thus :
Moral turpitude means, in general, shameful wickedness - so extreme a departure from ordinary standards of honest, goods morals, justice, or ethics as to be shocking to the moral sense of the community. It has also been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which one person owes to another, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between people.
By the impugned communication, the petitioner is informed of rejection of his nomination for further election as Chairman of Board of Studies and member of faculty of Social Sciences. The interpretation of Section 44 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, as is accepted by us, enables the competent authority to examine the eligibility of an aspiring candidate by ascertaining absence of disqualification. The disqualification having been incurred by decision of the Criminal Court dated 28th February, 2006, the authorities conducting elections are justified in taking cognizance of the same for limited purpose of examination, although so far no order under Section 9(5) of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, is passed by the Chancellor. This is because the aspiring candidate is require to satisfy the election authorities of absence of disqualification as provided under Section 44. We have referred to the meaning of 'moral turpitude' since we have on record the details of the act of the petitioner for which he is convicted by the Magistrate. Admittedly, although substantive sentence is suspended, conviction is not suspended (refer judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rama Narang (supra) relied upon). The conduct of the petitioner in indulging in violence to oppose a person appointed as Director of Board of College and University Development from taking charge of the said post, is certainly a departure from ordinary standards of ethics shocking to the moral sense of the community of professors or teaching staff of University to which the petitioner belongs. We, therefore, feel that the petitioner has incurred a disqualification as contemplated under Section 44(c) of the Maharashtra Universities Act and we are, therefore, not inclined to allow the petition so far as it challenges rejection of nomination of the petitioner to the chairmanship of Board of Studies and member of faculty of Social Sciences.
10. The Writ Petition, therefore, partly succeeds.
We uphold the contention of the petitioner, that in order to cause cessation of the membership of the petitioner, incurring of disqualification by itself is not sufficient and it may require an order by the Chancellor in the light of sections 9(5) and 108 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994. However, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned communication so far as it intimates the petitioner of rejection of his nomination papers for contesting elections for the posts of Chairman and Faculty Member.
Rule made absolute accordingly.