V.C. Daga, J.
1. This appeal arises from the Judgment and Decreeof the Addl. District Judge, Mapusa in Regular CivilAppeal No.64/1990 dated 31.1.1996, reversing the Judgmentand Decree passed by the Civil Judge, Sr. Division, atPanaji in Civil Suit No.35/80/C dated 28.9.1990, whereinthe suit for eviction has been found to be notmaintainable, in view of the extension of Rent ControlLegislation to the area in which the suit building issituated.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. The factual background of the case can bestated quite shortly.
3. The original plaintiff, late Shri DattatrayaWalaulikar vide Agreement dated 2.8.1971 had allowed oneVasudeo Dhempe to use western half portion of the housesituated in Village of Nerul, Bardez, Goa on monthlypayment of Rs.25/- for a period of 36 months on the leaveand licence basis.
4. The original licensee, said Shri VasudeoDhempe left for heavenly abode on 2.7.1972. The presentdefendants continued to use and occupy the said house ashis heirs and successors. The defendants did not pay thelicence fee to the plaintiff since the date of death ofsaid Vassudeo. Inspite of the expiry of the agreement on1.8.1974, the defendants continued to occupy the saidhouse. They did not vacate the same. The plaintiff,therefore, by notice dated 10.1.1980 terminated thetenancy of the defendants and called upon them to vacatethe said house on or about 2.2.1980. However, thedefendants neither vacated the suit house, nor any amounttowards the use and occupation charges was paid by them,which compelled the plaintiff to file suit for possessionwith consequential reliefs.
5. On being summoned, the defendants appearedand filed their written statement and contended thereinthat the suit house was taken on lease for residentialpurpose as well as for commercial purpose to carry onbusiness in the said premises. The defendants claimed tohave constructed two rooms with the consent of theoriginal plaintiff by spending amount of Rs.10,000/-.The defendants denied that they were in arrears of rent.In short, according to the defendants, the plaintiff wasnot entitled to claim vacant possession of the suit houseor arrears of rent. It appears that during pendency ofthe suit, original plaintiff also left for heavenly abodeand came to be substituted by his legal representatives,who are, hereinafter, referred to as 'plaintiffs' forshort.
6. The trial Court, relevant to the pleadings,framed relevant issues and tried suit on merits. TrialCourt was pleased to decree the suit with costs anddirected the defendants to deliver vacant possession ofthe suit house within 90 days from the date of Judgmentand Decree and further directed payment of Rs.1,500/-towards arrears of rent for five years and mesne profitsat the rate of Rs.100/- per month from 2.2.1980 tillvacant possession is delivered.
7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Judgment andDecree, the present respondents, the original defendantspreferred an appeal before the Addl. District Court,Mapusa being Regular Civil Appeal No.64/90. The same washeard by the learned Addl. District Judge, Mapusa, whowas pleased to hold that on account of change in law tothe extent it benefits the tenants, the suit was notmaintainable. He relied upon the provisions of Section59 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent &Eviction;) Control Act, 1968 ('the Goa Rent Control Act'for short) while allowing appeal and dismissed suit onthe preliminary issue without considering the merits ofthe matter.
8. Aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree passedby the learned Addl. District Judge, Mapusa presentsecond appeal is preferred by the appellants (originalplaintiffs). This appeal throws up an interestingquestion of some potential general significance inrelation to the law of the Goa Rent Control Act; inparticular to the extent of applicability of the said Actto the pending suits; on the date on which it was extendedto the entire remaining area of present State of Goa.
RIVAL CONTENTIONS
Appellants submissions :
9. At the outset, learned Counsel appearing forthe appellants contended that it was obligatory on thepart of the Lower Appellate Court to decide all theissues which were involved in the appeal. He furthercontended that the suit could not have been dismissed forthe reasons stated in the impugned Judgment. In hissubmission the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was nottaken away by the amended provisions of the Goa RentControl Act. He pointed out that at the time when thesuit was filed i.e. on 4.2.1980, the suit building wasgoverned by decree No.43525; since the Goa Rent ControlAct was in force only in respect of certain areasnotified under Notification No.RD/BLDG/77/69 II dated30.9.1969 and the Village Nerul, wherein the suitbuilding is situate was outside the areas notified underthe said notification.
10. During the pendency of the suit, videNotification No.RD/BLDG.77/69-II dated 23.12.1980 theprovisions of the Goa Rent Control Act came to beextended and the entire area of Union Territory of Goa,Daman and Diu (now State of Goa in relation to the thenUnion Territory of Goa) was brought within the purview ofthe said Act. He further pointed out that althoughSection 56 of the said Act barred the jurisdiction of theCivil Court to settle, determine or deal with anyquestion which is by or under the said Act required to besettled, determined or dealt with by the Rent Controller,the Rent Tribunal, the Appellate Board, theAdministrative Tribunal or the Administrator, but Section59(2) specifically excludes from the purview of Section56, suits or proceedings which were pending at thecommencement of the Goa Rent Control Act notwithstandingrepeal of the provisions of decree No.43525 dated7.3.1961 and Legislative Diploma No.1409, dated 14.2.1952and, the corresponding provisions of other law for thetime being in force. In his submission, at the relevanttime when the suit was filed, Portuguese Rent ControlAct; in the form of Decree No.43525; was in force andas per the said Portuguese Rent Control Act, the suit inrespect of the termination of the tenancy, eviction ofthe tenants, recovery of the rents, etc., was triable bythe Civil Court and no other separate authority had anyjurisdiction to try such suits.
11. Learned Counsel reiterated that in view ofthe express provision of Section 59(2), the pendingsuits, on the date of extension of the provisions of theGoa Rent Control Act to the new areas, were saved andexpress jurisdiction of the Civil Court was retained todecide, determine or deal with the suit for eviction ofthe tenants.
12. Alternatively, learned Counsel for theappellants submitted that the present suit was filed bythe appellants for (a) eviction of respondents from thesuit building; (b) recovery of arrears of rents; and(c) mesne profits, as such, the entire suit could nothave been dismissed by the Lower Appellate Court even onthe interpretation of Section 59(2) of the Goa RentControl Act adopted by it. At any rate, the secondprayer for recovery of the arrears of rents was very muchtriable by the Civil Court and to that extent, the suitwas very much maintainable. He, thus, tried to findfault with the Judgment of the Lower Appellate Court alsoon this count.
13. He further argued that the question ofjurisdiction of Civil Court to try suit on account of theextension of the Goa Rent Control Act was neither raisedin the trial Court, although the suit was prosecuted inthe trial Court after the extension of the said RentControl Act, nor the said point of jurisdiction was takenin the memo of appeal filed by the respondents before theLower Appellate Court. The said question of jurisdictionwas raised for the first time at the time of finalhearing of appeal as such the learned Lower AppellateCourt ought not to have dealt with this question and atany rate, could not have dismissed the appeal holdingthat on account of the extension of the Goa Rent ControlAct to the area in question, during the pendency of thesuit, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred inspite of the fact, true and proper interpretation of theclear provision of Section 59(2) was brought to thenotice of the learned first appellant Court.
14. The learned Counsel for the appellants urgedthat in the instant case, the suit was validly institutedon 4.2.1980, the Goa Rent Control Act came to be extendedto the area in which suit house is situate on 23.12.1980i.e. during the pendency of the suit and Section 59(2)of the said Rent Control Act emphatically saved thejurisdiction of the Civil Court with respect to the civilsuits instituted before extension of the said RentControl Act to the area in which suit house falls. Thelearned Counsel for the appellants relied upon theJudgment of the Apex Court in the case of Karam SinghSobti and another v. Shri Pratap Chand and another : [1964]4SCR647 in support of his submissions.He also placed reliance on another Judgment of theSupreme Court in the case of Sankaranarayanan Potti(dead) by L.Rs. v. K. Sreedevi and ors. AIR 1998 SCW 1598 . He, on the above premises, prayed that the appealshould be allowed and the case be remanded to the firstappellate Court for determination of the rest of theissues, in accordance with law.
RESPONDENTS SUBMISSIONS
15. Per contra, at the out set, Mrs. Agni,learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, contendedthat the suit filed by the plaintiff could not be said tobe a suit filed under the provisions of Decree No. 43525in view of specific reference to the termination oftenancy by notice as contemplated under Section 111 ofthe Transfer of Property Act (T.P. Act for short).The suit, therefore, could not be said to be under theprovisions of Decree No.43525. It has to be treated ashaving been filed under the provisions of T.P. Act.Learned Counsel relying upon para 7 of the plaint, triedto contend that the cause of action for suit being basedon termination of tenancy and consequent failure tovacate suit house by the defendants/ respondents asrequired by notice dated 10.1.80, the suit cannot be saidto be under Portuguese Rent Control Act. The pleadingsas also evidence on record, were also put in service insupport of her submission to demonstrate that the causeof action for filing the suit was termination of tenancyunder T.P. Act.
16. The learned Counsel for the respondents,alternatively, submitted that even if it is held to be asuit under Decree No.43525; even then, as held by theApex Court in the case of Laxmi Narayan Guin v/s NiranjanModak, : [1985]2SCR202 , the Lower Appellate Courtwas bound to take note of change in law and to decideappeal accordingly. She further submitted that the rentcontrol legislation being beneficial piece of legislationbeneficial to the class of tenants the provisions thereofare to be made applicable even in a case where the suithas been decreed under the provisions of Transfer ofProperty Act. Relying upon the decision in the case ofMani Subrat Jain v. Raja Ram Vohra : [1980]2SCR141 she further urged that it was held by the Apex Courtthat the rent control legislation in a country ofterrible accommodation shortage is a beneficial measurewhose construction must be liberal enough to fulfil thestatutory purpose and not to frustrate it. So construedthe benefit of interpretative doubt belongs to thepotential evictee unless the language is plain andprovides for eviction. That intendment must byinterpretation, be effectuated.
17. The learned Counsel urged that whileinterpreting Section 13 of East Punjab Rent RestrictionAct, (Punjab Rent Act for short), the Apex Court heldthat Section 13 convincingly includes ex-tenants againstwhom decrees for eviction might have been passed, whetheron compromise or otherwise. The Apex Court held that thetenant enjoyed immunity under Section 13 of the PunjabRent Act. In her submission, Section 13 of the PunjabRent Act is in pari materia with Section 21 of the GoaRent Control Act, as such, the respondents/defendants(tenants) enjoyed the same immunity from eviction underthe Rent Control Act applicable to the State of Goa.
18. Turning to the next authority of the ApexCourt in the case of H. Shiva Rao and another v.Cecilia Pereira and others, : AIR1987SC248 , thelearned Counsel further argued that it is well recognisedlegal principle that Rent Control Legislations beingbeneficial to the tenant have to be given a liberalinterpretation. While ordinarily substantive rightsshould not be held to be taken away except by expressprovision or clear implication; in the case of RentControl Act. It being a beneficial legislation theprovision which confers immunity to the tenant againsteviction by the landlord though prospective in formoperates to take away the rights vested in the landlordby a decree of a court; which has become final, unlessthere is express provision or clear implication to thecontrary.
19. Learned Counsel further contended that anorder or decree for eviction of tenant passed prior tothe date when the Goa Rent Control Act was madeapplicable to the area in question cannot be executedagainst the tenant after the said Rent Control Act wasmade applicable to the area in question. If theprovisions of the said Rent Control Act are construed tothe contrary the same will not further the purpose of thelegislation, on the other hand, it will do violence tothe language or would be contrary to the literal meaningthereof.
20. She urged that the Rent Control Actapplicable to the State of Goa in fact provides that notenant shall be evicted except on the grounds as set outin the Act. Section 22 of the Goa Rent Control Actprovides for certain grounds such as arrears of rent,nuisance, sub-letting, etc. In terms of Section 21 ofthe said Rent Control Act, the tenant cannot be evictedwhether in execution of a decree or otherwise except inaccordance with the provisions of the said Rent ControlAct. Therefore, the appellate Court was justified inholding that the Judgment and decree of the trial Courtwas without jurisdiction.
21. She alternatively, further submitted thateven assuming for the sake of argument the suit was wellwithin the sweep of Section 59(2) of the Goa Rent ControlAct, and that the Civil Court had a jurisdiction toentertain and try the suit, even then, while trying thesuit and ordering eviction of the tenant, the trial Courtwas required to decide the matter considering theprovisions of the extended Goa Rent Control Act in viewof first proviso to Section 59(2). This has not beendone by the trial Court. The trial Court having failedto take into account the amended provisions of the GoaRent Control Act the impugned Judgment stood vitiated, ifthat be so the impugned Judgment of the Lower AppellateCourt can very well be justified on this count, as suchthis Court should not interfere with the impugnedJudgment and Decree and the appeal be dismissed withcosts.
THE ISSUE
22. On the above facts and submissions advanced,the issue that needs consideration could be summarisedthus :
Whether the Lower Appellate Court was justifiedin holding that the decree passed by the trial Courtstood vitiated on account of extension of the provisionsof the Goa Rent Control Act, 1968 during pendency ofappeal to the entire State of Goa, including the Villagewherein suit building is situate ?
THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
23. Before examining the arguments in support ofthe rival contentions, it is necessary to look at thescheme of the Rent Control Legislation applicable to theState of Goa.
24. It may be noted prior to the enactment ofthe Goa Rent Control Act of 1968, which came into forcein the year 1969, the provisions of Portuguese RentControl Act were in force which were contained in theform of Decree No.43525 and as per the said PortugueseRent Control Act, the suit in respect of the terminationof the tenancy, eviction of the tenant, recovery of therent, etc., was triable only by the Civil Courts and noother authority had jurisdiction to try such suits.
25. The Goa Rent Control Act, which came intoforce vide Notification dated 30.9.1969 was initially,made applicable to a few areas of the Union territory ofGoa, Daman and Diu. The relevant provisions of the saidAct relevant for the present appeal, are as under :
'56. Jurisdiction of the courts barred. -Save as provided in this Act, no court shallhave jurisdiction to settle, determine or dealwith any question which is by or under thisAct required to be settled, determined ordealt with by the Controller, the RentTribunal, the Appellate Board, theAdministrative Tribunal, or the Administratorand no order passed by any such authoritiesunder this Act shall be called in question inany court.
59. Repeals and savings.- (1) As from thedate on which this Act is brought into forcein any local area, the provisions of DecreeNo.43525, dated the 7th March, 1961, and theLegislative Diploma No.1409, dated the 14thFebruary, 1952 and the correspondingprovisions of any other law for the time beingin force shall stand repealed in that area.(2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the lawsby sub-section (1), all suits and otherproceedings under a repealed law pending atthe commencement of this Act before any courtor authority shall be continued and disposedof in accordance with the provisions of therepealed law as if that law had continued inforce and this Act had not been passed;Provided that in any such suit orproceeding for the fixation of fair rent orfor the eviction of a tenant from anybuilding, the court or other authority shallhave regard to the provisions of this Act;Provided further that the provisions forappeal under the repealed law shall continuein force in respect of suits and proceedingsdisposed of thereunder.'
In continuation of the earlier Notification dated30.9.1969, vide Notification being No.RD/BLDG.77/69-IIdated 23.12.1980, the provisions of the Goa Rent ControlAct, were extended to all the remaining areas of theUnion Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, the contents ofwhich are reproduced hereinbelow :
' In continuation of GovernmentNotification of even number dated 30.9.1969and in exercise of the powers conferred bysub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 1 of theGoa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent andEviction) Control Act, 1968 (Act 2 of 1969),the Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu herebyextends the provisions of the said Act to allthe remaining areas of Union Territory of Goa,Daman and Diu and further directs that theprovisions of the aforesaid Act shall beenforced in the said areas with immediatelyeffect. '
CONSIDERATION AND FINDINGS
26. Having heard the parties, it is not indispute that at the time of filing of the suit on4.2.1980, the suit building was governed by DecreeNo.43525. As aforesaid, the Goa Rent Control Act wasapplicable to only certain areas notified underNotification dated 30/9/1969 and the Village of Nerulwherein the suit building is situate, was outside thearea notified under the Goa Rent Control Act. It is alsonot in dispute that when the suit was pending, videNotification dated 23.12.1980, the provisions of the GoaRent Control Act were extended to all the remaining areasof the then Union Territory of Goa (now State of Goa),Daman and Diu with the result entire State of Goa wasbrought within the umbrella of the said Rent Control Act.The issue involved in this appeal centres around theinterpretation of repeal and savings clause engraftedunder Section 59 of the said Act. However, beforeconsidering the scope of Section 59 of the said Act, itis necessary to deal with the preliminary submission madeby the respondents that the suit is not referable to theprovisions of Decree No.43525. The cause of action forthe suit being termination of the tenancy by noticeissued under Section 111 of the T.P. Act, the suit wasunder the T.P. Act and not under Decree No.43525, assuch, the Lower Appellate Court was perfectly justifiedin holding that the suit would be governed by theprovisions of the Goa Rent Control Act. In this view ofthe submission, according to the respondents, theappellants are not entitled to claim advantage of Section59(2) of the Act and the impugned Judgment and Decree ofthe Lower Appellate Court is liable to be maintained.
27. In order to appreciate and decide thispreliminary contention, one has to turn to the pleadingsincorporated in the plaint and other surroundingcircumstances coupled with intrinsic evidence availableon record. Let me first turn to the Decree No.43525, soas to find out its requirement. Sub-Section II of theDecree No.43525 titled as 'Rescission' contained Sections45 to 49. Section 45 provided for rescission ofagreement of tenancy due to non-fulfilment of terms andconditions of Decree by the lessee. Section 46 providedgrounds for rescission of the agreement. The groundsavailable for eviction of tenant amongst others were;non-payment of rent-by lessee within the time limit atthe proper place or failure to make a deposit thereof;and/or user of the premises by a third party for thepurpose different from that of those for which it wasmeant. Therefore, reading of the said provisions wouldshow that the suit for eviction, amongst others, waspermitted on the ground of arrears of rent or for changeof user of the premises. In the light of provisions ofthe Decree No.43525, the contents of the plaint need tobe examined to determine the question raised by therespondents. If one turns to the plaint, it would beclear that the foundation of termination of the tenancyseems to be arrears of rent and change of user of thesuit premises. A specific pleading is to be found in theplaint claiming for arrears of rent in the sum ofRs.1975/- from 2.7.1972 to February, 1980. The plaintspecifically makes out a case that besides arrears ofrent, defendants are guilty of change of user as theywere using the suit house for their residence i.e. forthe purpose different from that of those for which it wasmeant.
28. Not only in the plaint above mentionedpleadings are to be found, but the evidence of theplaintiffs would specifically show that on these issues,the evidence was also led by the parties. The defendantscross examined plaintiffs on these vital aspects of thematter. Turning to the Judgment of the trial Court, itwould be clear that the trial Court also dealt with theissues based on the pleadings under Sections 45 and 46 ofthe Decree No.43525. Specific issue Nos.3 and 4 wereframed in this behalf and after appreciating theevidence, findings were also recorded by the trial Court.In this view of the matter, one has to reach to theconclusion that the suit was filed under the provisionsof Decree No.43525 and not under the T.P. Act. Thepreliminary contention sought to be raised by the learnedCounsel for the respondents, in this behalf is,therefore, devoid of any substance for the reasonsrecorded herein.
29. Now coming to the crucial issue involved inthe present appeal, one has to consider the sweep ofSection 56 of the Act, which barred the jurisdiction ofthe Civil Court to settle, determine or deal with anyquestion which is by or under the new Act required to besettled, determined or dealt with by the Rent Controller,the Rent Tribunal, the Appellate Board, theAdministrative Tribunal or the Administrator and furtherprovided that no order passed by any such authoritiesunder the Act shall be called in question in any Court.
30. In order to find out whether thejurisdiction of Civil Court is barred or not, it is alsonecessary to consider the sweep of Section 59(1) of theAct which provides that as from the date on which thisAct is brought into force in any local area, theprovisions of decree No.43525 dated 7.3.1961 andLegislative Diploma No.1409 dated 14.2.1952 and the othercorresponding provisions of any other law for the timebeing in force, shall stand repealed in that area.Section 59(1) provides for complete repeal of theprovisions of Decree No.43525 and Legislative DiplomaNo.1409. However, sub-Section (2) of Section 59 providesthat notwithstanding the repeal of the laws bysub-section (1) all suits and other proceedings under arepealed law pending at the commencement of this Actbefore any Court or authority shall be continued anddisposed of in accordance with the provisions of therepealed law as if that law had continued to remain inforce and this Act had not been passed. The meaning ofthe opening part of the said sub-Section (2) isabsolutely clear that the repealed Act shall have noeffect so far as the suits and other proceedings underthe repealed law pending at the commencement of the RentControl Act before any Court or authority are concernedand the same are to be continued and disposed of inaccordance with the provisions of the repealed law.First proviso to sub-Clause (2) provides that in any suchsuits or proceedings for fixation of fair rent oreviction of a tenant from any building, the Court orother authority shall have regard to the provisions ofthe Goa Rent Control Act. The second proviso furtherprovides that the provisions for appeal under therepealed law shall continue to remain in force in respectof the suits and proceedings disposed of thereunder. TheApex Court in the case of Karam Singh Sobti and anotherv. Shri Pratap Chand and another had occasion to dealwith the similar provisions. The language used inSection 59 of the Goa Rent Control Act and more sosub-clauses (1) and (2) of Section 59 is identical withthat of Section 57 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent ControlAct, with which Supreme Court was concerned, thus readsas under :
'57. (1) The Delhi and Ajmer RentControl Act, 1952, in so far as it isapplicable to the Union territory of Delhi, ishereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, allsuits and other proceedings under the said Actpending, at the commencement of this Act,before any court or other authority shall becontinued and disposed of in accordance withthe provisions of the said Act, as if the saidAct had continued in force and this Act hadnot been passed:
Provided that in any such suit orproceeding for the fixation of standard rentor for the eviction of a tenant from anypremises to which section 54 does not apply,the court or other authority shall have regardto the provisions of this Act.
Provided further that the provisions forappeal under the said Act shall continue inforce in respect of suits and proceedingsdisposed of thereunder.'
31. In the aforesaid Supreme Court case therespondent Pratap Chand was the owner of Pratap Buildingsin Connaught Circus, New Delhi. He had let a room in itto the respondent, the Automobile Association of UpperIndia, formerly known as Automobile Association ofNorthern India referred to in that judgment as'Association'. The appellant was a sub-tenant of theroom under the Association. On 5.10.1959, the respondentissued notice to quit and on 25.12.1954 brought a suitagainst the Association and the appellant (in that case)for their eviction from the room. It is out of thissuit, the litigation arose and reached to the Apex Court.The question was, whether the appellant was liable to beevicted ?
32. The facts of that case revealed that Section13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Act, 1952, which had comeinto force on 9.6.1952 and governed the case, prohibitedthe Courts from directing eviction of a tenant in thesuit of a landlord excepting in the cases mentioned inthe proviso to it. Clause (c) of the said provisoprovided that a decree for recovery of possession mightbe made where the Court was satisfied that the tenantwithout obtaining the consent of the landlord has beforethe commencement of that Act, sublet, assigned orotherwise parted with the possession of, the whole or anypart of the premises. The respondent relied upon thisprovision of the said Act and contended that theAssociation had without his consent sub-let the shop-roomto the appellant and that he had come to know of thissub-letting at the end of May 1954. The Association didnot contest the suit seriously, but the appellant did.Both the Association and the appellant admitted that thelandlord had not consented to the sub-letting, but, theappellant contended that the respondent had fullknowledge of his occupation of the shop-room as asub-tenant and with such knowledge he had accepted rentfrom the Association and thereby acquiesced in thesub-letting and was, therefore, not entitled to evictionon the ground of sub-letting without the landlordsconsent. The learned trial Judge had directed ejectment ofthe Association and the appellant. The appellant thenpreferred appeal. The appeal was allowed. Decree forpossession was set aside. The suit was dismissed on11.6.1957. On August 26, 1957, the respondents moved theHigh Court of Punjab in revision under Section 35 of thesaid Act. While revision petition was pending in theHigh Court, the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 came intoforce. It repealed the Act of 1952, but made some of theprovisions of the repealed Act applicable to certainpending matters. One of the questions in that appeal waswhich of the provisions of the new Act would apply to thepending cases. While considering this question, theSupreme Court was pleased to hold as under :
'(10) Let us now consider S.57, of the ControlAct of 1958 against the background of thescheme of the two Control Acts, as statedabove, The first sub-section of S.57 repealsthe Control Act of 1952 in so far as it isapplicable to the Union Territory of Delhi.If the repeal stood by itself, the provisionsof the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) wouldhave applied with regard to the effect of therepeal and the repeal would not affect theprevious operation of any enactment repealedor anything duly done or suffered thereunderor affect any right, privilege, obligation orliability acquired, accrued or incurred underany enactment so repealed. The provisions ofthe General Clauses Act will not, however,apply where a different intention appears fromthe repealing enactment. Such an intention isclear from sub-sec. (2) of S.57 which containsthe saving clause. It states in express termsthat notwithstanding the repeal of the ControlAct of 1952; all suits and proceedings underthe Control Act of 1952 pending before anyCourt or other authority at the commencementof the Control Act of 1958, shall be continuedand disposed of in accordance with theprovisions of the Control Act of 1952, as ifthe Control Act of 1952 had continued in forceand the Control Act of 1958 had not beenpassed. Nothing can be more emphatic in thematter of a saving clause, than what iscontained in sub-s.(2) of S.57.'
33. The above Judgment of the Apex Court isfully applicable to the facts of the case on hand. Thefacts in the present case are identical with that of theabove case of Karam Sing Sobti and another (cited supra).The provision of Section 59(2) of the Goa Rent ControlAct is also identical with that of Section 57(2) of theDelhi Rent Control Act of 1958. The language used inSection 59(2) of the Goa Rent Control Act is plain andprovides for protection of benefits of the evictiondecree passed under repealed law. In this backdrop,there is no alternative, but to hold that the LowerAppellate Court was wrong in holding that the suit wouldbe governed by the Goa Rent Control Act and not by DecreeNo.43525. In this view of the matter, the impugnedJudgment and Decree of the lower appellate Court isliable to be quashed and set aside and the same is,accordingly, quashed and set aside. The proceedings areremitted back to the Lower Appellate Court for decisionon merits. So far as other issue raised by the learnedCounsel for the respondents; based on the first provisoto Section 59(2) is concerned, the issue needs noconsideration in the present appeal for want of anyfinding in this behalf by the Lower Appellate Court. Theparties are at liberty to raise this contention beforethe Lower Appellate Court who shall be free to decide iton its own merits. All other contentions on merits areleft open.
34. In the result, appeal is allowed, impugnedJudgment and Decree of the Lower Appellate Court is setaside, proceedings are remitted back to the LowerAppellate Court for decision on merits in accordance withlaw. The Lower Appellate Court is directed to decidethis appeal as expeditiously as possible, at any ratewithin 4 months from the receipt of writ from this Court.
Parties are left to bear their own costs.