Judgment:
Swatanter Kumar, C.J.
1. Section 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter called as the 'Act') empowers the Central Government to issue a notification in relation to maximum gross weight of a vehicle, its registration with reference to the size, number, nature and size of tyres attached to the wheels of the vehicles and to issue registration certificate with regard to a transport vehicles other than a motor cab. Section 59 of the Act further empowers Central Government having regard to the public safety, convenience and objects of the Act, by notification in the Official Gazette to specify life of motor vehicle reckoned from the date of its manufacture, after expiry of which the motor vehicle shall not be deemed to comply with the requirements of the Act. The Central Government is further empowered to issue different ages for different classes of vehicles. Sub-section (3) of Section 59 of the Act opens with a nonobstante clause and makes it mandatory that no prescribed authority or authorised testing station shall grant a certificate of fitness to a motor vehicle in contravention of the provisions of any notification issued under Sub-section (1). This power vested in the Central Government is intended to effectively achieve an object which again is in the larger public interest. The main thrust of submission of the Petitioner in the above petition is that in face of provisions of Section 59 of the Act, the State Government has no power to fix the age limit of the vehicles and to that extent the Government Resolution No. 29 dated 4th August, 2008 is without jurisdiction and serves no public interest. This argument of the Petitioner is based on misconception of law inasmuch as the power contemplated under Section 59 of the Act is distinct and different than the power vested in the State Government/appropriate authority under Sections 66 and 74 of the Act. Under Section 66 of the Act no owner of a motor vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle as a transport vehicle in any public place whether or not such vehicle is actually carrying any passenger or goods save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority. The proviso to Section 66(1) of the Act are of some significance. They read as under:
Provided that a stage carriage permit shall, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle as a contract carriage;
Provided further that a stage carriage permit may, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle as a goods carriage either when carrying passengers or not;
Provided also that a goods carriage permit shall, subject to any conditions that may be specified in the permit, authorise the holder to use the vehicle for the carriage of goods for or in connection with a trade or business carried on by him.
2. Similarly, Section 74 deals with grant of contract carriage permit. Sub-section (2) of Section 74 provides that the Regional Transport Authority, if it decides to grant a contract carriage permit, may, subject to any rules that may be made in the said Act, attach to the permit any one or more of the following conditions, namely:
(i) that the vehicles shall be used only in a specified area or on a specified route or routes;
(ii) that except in accordance with specified conditions, no contract of hiring other than an extension or modification of a subsisting contract, may be entered into outside the specified area;
(iii) the maximum number of passengers and the maximum weight of luggage that may be carried on the vehicles, either generally or on specified occasions or at specified times and seasons;
(iv) the conditions subject to which goods may be carried in any contract carriage in addition to, or to the exclusion of, passengers;
(v) that, in the case of motorcabs, specified fares or rates of fares shall be charged and a copy of the fare table shall be exhibited on the vehicle;
(vi) that, in the case of vehicles other than motorcabs, specified rates of hiring not exceeding specified maximum shall be charged;
(vii) that in the case of motorcabs, a specified weight of passengers' luggage shall be carried free of charge, and that the charge, if any, for any luggage in excess thereof shall be at a specified rate;
(viii) that, in the case of motorcabs, a taximeter shall be fitted and maintained in proper working order, if prescribed;
(ix) that the Regional Transport Authority may, after giving notice of not less than one month, (a) vary the conditions of the permit; (b) attach to the permit further conditions;
(x) that the conditions of permit shall not be departed from save with the approval of the Regional Transport Authority;
(xi) that specified standards of comfort and cleanliness shall be maintained in the vehicles;
(xii) any other conditions which may be prescribed.
3. The powers under Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 74 of the Act are of a very large magnitude and empower the concerned Authority having regard to the number of vehicles, road conditions and other relevant matters to impose any condition to limit the number of contract carriages generally or of any specified type, and further empower the Regional Transport Authority, after giving notice, to vary the conditions stated in the permit or attach to the permit further conditions in terms of Section 74(2)(ix). Section 74(2)(xiii) proivdes that the Competent Authority can impose any other conditions which may be prescribed. These powers under which the State Government, Central Government or Regional Transport Authority operate are distinct. There can be a complete prohibition under Section 59 of the Act which renders a vehicle inoperatable, while under Sections 66 and 74 of the Act, it is limited to grant of a permit for a vehicle used as public transport or a contract carriage. Vide the impugned Resolution, though reference was made to 15 to 20 years old taxis running on CNG/LPG, on examining and knowing their condition they being unable to ply and ferry the passengers, it was specifically noticed that the age is to be fixed by the Central Government which has a right to fix the age of the vehicle but keeping in view the directions of the Supreme Court in various cases, including order dated 22nd September, 1998 in the case of S.C. Mehta v. Government and Ors. in Writ Petition No. (Civil) 13029 of 1985 and in the larger public interest and to prevent pollution, decision was taken to remove such vehicles from being used and plied on road in absolute terms. It only admitted and infact has spelt out the terms and conditions for grant of extention of permit to any transport public and/or contract carriage vehicles. It is a power which has been exercised by the State, as is clear from its affidavit, in terms of Sections 66 and 74 of the Act and is not relatable to Section 59 of the Act. Thus, the argument raised on behalf of the Petitioners is without any merit.
4. In the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors. : (1999)6SCC14 , the Supreme Court clearly stated that restrictions with regard to registration of diesel as well as petroldriven vehicles could be issued unless the vehicles conform to Euro II norms. The Bench of Allahabad High Court in Mohammad Saleem v. The Regional Transport Authority, Dehradun 1986 ALL LJ 1316 following the decision in the case of Subhash Chandra and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. : [1980]2SCR1024 , had passed similar directions and had held that the powers of the State to issue notification were valid, where the Supreme Court in the case of Subhash Chandra (supra) held as under :
4. Section 51(2)(x) authorises the impost of any condition, of course, having a nexus with the statutory purpose. It is undeniable that human safety is one such purpose. The State's neglect in this area of polcing public transport is deplorable but when it does act by prescribing a condition the court cannot be persuaded into little legalism and harmful negativism. The short question is whether the prescription that the bus shall be at least a sevenyear old model one is relevant to the condition of the vehicle and its passenger's comparative safety and comfort on our chaotic highways. Obviously it is. The older the model, the less the chances of the latest safety measures being built into the vehicle. Every new model incorporates new devices to reduce danger and promote confort. Every new model assures its age to be young, fresh and strong, less likely to suffer sudden failures and breakages, less susceptible to wear and tear and mental fatigue leading to unexpected collapse. When we buy a car or any other machine why do we look for the latest model Vintage vehicles are good for centenarian display of curios and cannot but be mobile menaces on our notoriously neglected highways. We have no hesitation to hold, from the point of view of the human rights of road users, that the condition regarding the model of the permitted bus is within jurisdiction, and not to prescribe such safety clauses is abdication of statutory duty.
5. Two decisions - Masi Ullah v. State Tribunal Appellate : AIR1967All128 and In re Ramesh Chandra Tewari Civil Misc. Writ No. 7317 of 1975 of Allahabad High Court (unreported) were cited as striking a contrary note. The first deals with Section 48(3) of the Act and prescription of the model or year of the make was held ultra vires because, lexically read, it was held that the expression `specified description' in Section 48(3) did not cover, according to dictionaries, the year of manufacture of the vehicle. We extract Black's Law Dictionary on `discription' to show how the model of a vehicle is obviously a facet of its description. `Description' means : Black's Law Dictionary, p. 532.
A delineation or account of a particular subject by the recital of its characteristic accidents and qualities.
So, dictionary v. dictionary leaves the matter at large, apart from the plain function of the court to gather the meaning, not under the dictatorship of dictionaries but guided by the statutory purpose without being deflected by logomachic exercises, the muschief to be countered and the public interest to be advanced. We are clear that a later model is a better safeguard and, more relevantly to the point, the year of the make and the particulars of the model are part of the description.
6. The unreported ruling in Civil Writ No. 7317 of 1975 interprets Section 38 of the Act and the nonissuance of the fitness certificate because the model was not recent enough. Maybe, the vehicle, regardless of the year of its make, may be fit and the refusal to certify fitness merely because it is old may not always be right. But we see no conflict between a vehicle being fit to ride and the condition, as an additional requirement and safety factor, in the shape of the year of the model. This is an extra measure, a further insurance against machine failure and cannot contradict the `fitness' provision.
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Deepak Theatre, Dhuri v. State of Punjab : AIR1992SC1519 clearly stated the principles that condition of licence is a regulatory measure to fix rates of admission and classification of seats in interest of general public and such restrictions or regulatory measures do not impinge upon the fundamental right to trade, avocation or business of the licensee. It would squarely fall within the concept of reasonable restriction.
6. Coming to the other aspect, at the very outset, we may notice that the Petitioners have not been taken by surprise and this has been in process for number of years now. Different Benches of this Court from time to time had passed directions with regard to the replacement of vehicles, vehicles to be fitted with CNG kit and span during which they were permitted to operate and thereafter phasing out of the taxis which were causing environmental problem, pollution and inconvenience to the general public. We may recaptulate the orders passed by the Court as under:
Order dated 17 th October, 2001 in Writ Petition No. 1762 of 1999.
10. ...Having considered all aspects of the matter, we are of the view that with effect from March 1, 2002, all taxis over the age of 15 years shall be phased out, unless converted to run on CNG/LPG. All taxis of Premier 1370 model shall also be phased out by this date, unless converted to run on CNG/LPG.'
11. ...With regard to taxis more than 8 years old but less than 15 years old, the Committee recommended that the date of phase out should be 1st january, 2002. On the other hand, the stand of the Government is that the date of phase out should be 1st January, 2003. Counsel for the Petitioners suggested an earlier date for the phase out, but having regard to all relevant circumstances, including the availability of CNG/LPG, we direct that with effect from 1st January, 2003, all taxis over the age of 8 years shall be phased out, unless converted to run on CNG/LPG.
The Order dated 10 th April, 2002 passed in Notice of Motion No. 33 of 2002 along with other Motions in Writ Petition No. 1762 of 1999.
1. In all the above Notices of Motion except Notice of Motion No. 128 of 2002 and Writ Petition No. 838 of 2002, the basic challenge is to the order passed by this Court on 17th October, 2001 in Writ Petition No. 1762 of 1999 wherein there is a direction directing that w.e. f. 1st March, 2002 all taxis over the age of 15 years shall be phased out unless converted to run on CNG/ LPG by that date.
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16. As far as the first issue regarding phasing out of all taxis having petrol engines of more than 15 years of age unless the same are converted to CNG/LPG by 1st March, 2002 is concerned, it does not subsist and the earlier order dated 17th October, 2001 shall stand.'
The Order dated 31 st March, 2002 passed in Chamber Summons No. 62 of 2003 along with Notices of Motion in Writ Petition No. 1762 of 1999.
1. All the above Notices of Motion have been taken out by the Applicants for the reliefs prayed therein, inter alia, seeking extension of time granted by an order passed by a Division Bench on October 17, 2001 and again extended by a Division Bench by an order dated December 18, 2002.
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15. Considering the facts and circumstances in their entirety, we are of the view that the applicants do not deserve extension of time as prayed by them. It is clear from what has been stated earlier that the directions were issued by the Division Bench in October, 2001. The Court, after considering submissions on behalf of the petitioner as well as respondentauthorities and transport vehicle associations, who were before the Court, granted time upto December 31, 2002. With effect from 1st January, 2003 transport vehicles over fifteen years were to be phased out, unless converted to run on clean fuel.
16. As observed in order dated 18th December, 2002, virtually no steps were taken either by the authorities or by the association for implementation of the orders and carrying out directions issued by this Court and at the last moment the State authorities as well as Mahasangha approached this Court for extension of time. The Court noted that no serious attempts were made by the applicants for conversion of their vehicles to run on clean fuel. However, taking into account the fact that if extension would not be graned, public at large would suffer particularly when such transport vehicles were dealing in transportation of essential commodities also, extension was granted upto 31st March, 2003.
7. The above summary of the orders passed by the Court shows that these orders were in existence and in force for a long time and the Petitioners were fully aware that they were expected to phase out these vehicles in due course. The Court first directed the vehicles to be converted into CNG if they were to be plied on roads of city of Mumbai. Thereafter in cases of those vehicles whose permits had expired and completed their span, imposition of restriction on the permit cannot be termed as unreasonable and affecting fundamental rights of the Petitioner. The Government and the Court have to examine the rights of an individual visavis the larger public interest and once the public interest demands the equity of law, both will tilt in favour of notification rather than against it. The maxim 'Salus populi suprema lex' has been applied by the Courts in determining such controversy and has been repeatedly held in favour of larger public interest as held in the case of Hira Tikkoo v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and Ors. : AIR2004SC3648 and Barague Ramchandrappa v. State of Karnataka : 2007CriLJ2933 . Certain events occurred during the pendency of this Petition. The learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners had stated that the Government was not adopting a human and reasonable attitude for implementation of the Government Resolution even if the Petitioners were willing to carry out the same. Vide our order dated 15th December, 2008 while declining to stay operation of the Government Resolution and referring to the previous orders of the Court, we directed impleadment of various taxi unions who were also then served. In the same order, the Court passed the following directions:
(a) The Secretary Transport, State of maharashtra along with the Commissioner Office of the Transport Commissioner, one Senior Officer from the Finance Ministry of State of Maharashtra shall constitute a Committee. The Principal Secretary, Home Department (Transport) shall preside over the meeting.
(b) Bombay municipal Corporation shall nominate its snior officer to attend this meeting.
(c) Bombay Environmental Action Group will also be permitted to be represented before the Committee and put its point of view further.
(d) The Committee will hold its first meeting on 20th December, 2008 at 11 a.m. And would fix such other dates as may be convenient but the Committee will ensure that its report is submitted to the Court on the next date of hearing.
(e) This Committee shall consider the requests putforward by the above unions for implementing Scheme for phased replacement of the taxis in a phase manner. The possibility of granting financial assistance to them and/or any other exemption that may be permissible in accordance with law would be considered by this Committee and recommended to the Competent Authority forthwith.
(f) The Committee shall ensure that no prejudice any further is caused to public health, safety, traffic, evironment and implementation of the State policy in accordance with law.
(g) The Committee will also keep in mind the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in its Order dated 27.2.2002 passed in Writ Petition No. 1762 of 1999 (Smoke Affected Residents Forum v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Ors.)
(h) Besides assurances given by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties we will expect that taxi unions / members to fully cooperate in implementation of the Scheme.
(i) The Committee shall submit its report before the Court on or before the next date of hearing positively, i.e. 8.1.2009.
(j) We leave it open for this Committee/ Competent Authority in the Government to examine all other matters including these matters, if any, in their own discretion for implementation of the notification.
(k) The Court would not pass any injunctive order at this stage of the proceedings.
8. Thereafter, the Learned AGP on 9th January, 2009 informed the Court that the Government had offered the following concession to the Petitioners.
(a) The manufacturers viz. Maruti and TATA Motors have assured the supply of 2000 to 3000 vehicles within 2/3 months.
(b) The manufacturers have further stated that they will reduce the consideration as one time benefit to the purchaser by Rs. 20000 to 40000 depending on the facts of each case.
(c) They will also persuade the financial institutions and financial companies working in association with the manufacturers to advance loans to the petitioners at the rate of interest which will be lower by 2 to 3% depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. The loan would be extended for a period of five years and as a special benefit the existing CNG unis till be permitted to be used even in the new vehicles. In accordance with the rules, they will be permitted to transfer the CNG units in existing cars to new cars. The effect of the above reduction in price would be reduction in levy of statutory liabilities like Octroi and Salestax but the State Government in its present state of affairs is unable to waive the entire statutory dues. Let the petitioner consider this and make submission finally on the next date of hearing.
9. At that stage, the Petitioners had submitted that these concessions in fact were granted to them by their own efforts and there was hardly any contribution on behalf of the State in that behalf. While helping the Petitioners on the question of price of the vehicles and the above stated benefits, it was stated on behalf of the State that no concessions could be given in payment of Octroi and taxes etc. and a policy decision to that effect had been taken by the State. We again find no arbitrariness in the decision of the State declining to reduce Excise or Sales tax or Octroi payable on these vehicles and that by itself would not render the action of the State unreasonable. The doubt of the Petitioners as regards fitting of CNG kit in new vehicles and that too at a very short notice also do not stand as can be noticed in the interim order passed by this Court. In fact, most of the members of the Petitioners' Union accepted the Government Resolution and had accordingly acted in that direction. The statistics of the Regional Transport Authority of metered taxis which are of more than 25 years' old taxis and the taxi owners who had applied for replacement of their vehicles and continuation of permit are quite encouraging, The same reads as under:
Information of 25 years old yellow black meter taxis as on 9th March, 2009.
Office No. of Applied Vehicles Vehicles Not No. of No. of No. of
taxis for actually actually applied taxis Taxis Taxis
above replacement removed put on for checked completed detained
25 from permits as replacement for the 25
years permits replacer Age years
of age Limit
Regional
Transport
Ofrfice,
Mumbai (c) 3274 3245 2801 2451 29 1177 27 27
Regional
Transport
Office,
Mumbai (W) 1947 1773 1225 663 174 352 19 19
Regional
Transport
Office,
Mumbai (E) 1830 1567 1077 705 263 280 2 2
Total 7051 6585 5103 3819 466 1809 48 48
10. The Petitioners were fully aware that they had to take such steps and they have been granted more than sufficient time to do the needful. Even now they have time to comply with the directions of the Government Resolution as the notice was issued to them on 4th August, 2008, the four months' period expired on 4th December, 2008 and thereafter they have been granted first six months therefrom as time for replacement of vehicles without payment of any fee, while even a further period of six months is available to them merely on payment of Rs. 700/per month. Thus they could replace their vehicles till the end of the year 2009, subject to payment of fee.
11. For the reasons aforestated, we do not find any infirmity or illegality in the impugned Government Resolution and the same does not infringe any of the constitutional protection guaranteed to the Petitioners. Resultantly, both the Writ Petitions are dismissed.
12. In view of the disposal of the aforesaid Writ Petitions, the Notice of Motion No. 626 of 2008, Chamber Summons Nos. 12 of 2009 and 16 of 2009 do not survive and accordingly stand disposed of.
13. There shall be no order as to costs.