F.I. Rebello, J.
1. Petitioner was duly elected as a Memberof the Socorro Village Panchayat in the electionsheld on 12-1-1997 and, thereafter, on 14-2-1997 waselected as Sarpanch. Earlier also, the Petitionerhad held the post of Sarpanch. On 7-9-1998,Respondent No.1 served on the Petitioner a ShowCause Notice under Section 50(4) and 50(5) of theGoa Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred toas the Panchayat Raj Act). On 16-12-1998, thePetitioner filed his reply to the Show Cause Noticecontesting the charges and allegations made therein.The matter proceeded before the 1st Respondent. On16-2-1999, after hearing parties the 1st Respondentdirected the Petitioner and thecomplainant/Respondent No.3 herein to file WrittenArguments on 3-3-1999. On 3-3-1999, thecomplainant/Respondent No.3 filed Written Arguments.On that date, on behalf of the Petitioner anapplication was filed seeking time to file WrittenArguments. Time was granted and the matter wasadjourned to 7-4-1999 for judgment and order.After the matter was reserved for judgment, thePetitioner filed three applications. The firstapplication was dated 15-3-1999. By the saidapplication, the Petitioner sought an opportunity tocross-examine the Respondent No. 3 through hislawyer and also to permit the Petitioner to leadevidence through witnesses. The second applicationby the Petitioner contained a prayer that theRespondent No.1 should recluse himself from thematter as the Petitioner apprehended reasonablelikelihood or possibility of bias. The thirdapplication dated 17-3-1999 was that the mattershould be adjourned till such time as the two aforementioned applications were heard and disposed of.By Order dated 4th May 1999, the 1st Respondentdisposed of all the applications and rejected thereliefs prayed for. While considering the case ofthe Petitioner for cross-examination of theRespondent, the 1st Respondent held that the Ordersunder Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 50 wouldbe passed, based on the documentary evidence andafter considering the reply and written submissionsand in these circumstances there was no need forcross-examination of the Respondent No.3. Insofaras the application that the Respondent No.1 shouldrecluse himself, the 1st Respondent held that thePetitioner had not disclosed any material which mustnecessitate the Respondent No.1 reclusing himself.The 1st Respondent noted the various steps in theproceedings and the fact that it was only after timewas fixed for filing written arguments that theapplication was moved. In these circumstances, thesaid application was also rejected.
2. The 1st Respondent thereafter proceededwith the proceedings and by Order dated 14th June,1999 directed the removal of the Petitioner from theOffice of Sarpanch as well as the Membership of theVillage Panchayat of Socorro from the date ofreceipt of the Order with the directions that thePetitioner would not be eligible for re-election asSarpanch or as a Member of the Panchayat for aperiod of five years from the date of issue of theOrder. Aggrieved by the said Order, the Petitionerhas preferred the present Petition.On 29th October, 1999, this Court was pleasedto issue Rule. On January 14, 2000 the Courtheld that the Petitioner should be allowed tocontinue as a Member of the Village Panchayattill the final decision in the Petition.However, considering the various allegationsagainst the Petitioner which are referred to inthe impugned Order and the proceedings therein,his rights as a Member of the Panchayat wererestricted to the extent that the Petitionerduring the pendency of the Petition was notallowed to represent the Panchayat in anyproceedings or to issue any letter or certificateon behalf of the Panchayat or to vote at any ofthe meetings of the Panchayat till furtherorders. The impugned Order of Respondent No.1 tothat extent was stayed. An appeal came to bepreferred against the said Order. The same cameto be dismissed by Order of this Court dated 13thJune, 2000.
3. At the outset it may not be necessary togo into the contents of the Show Cause Notice, thereply thereto and the findings recorded by the 1stRespondent. This is because the challenge to theaction of the 1st Respondent is mainly based onviolation of the provisions of sub-section (4) andsub-section (5) of Section 50 of the Panchayat RajAct and the principles of natural justice. Theprincipal grounds of challenge as raised by thePetitioner are that the Show Cause Notice clearlydisclosed that the Director of Panchayat hadforeclosed his mind even before hearing thePetitioner. Thought opportunity to show cause hasbeen given, the 1st Respondent has pre-decided theissue by holding in the show cause notice itselfthat the alleged acts of irregularities/illegalitieshad been proved and, as such, the purportedopportunity given was sham and, consequently, theOrder dated 14th June,1999 was illegal, null andvoid. The next submission is that a perusal of theShow Cause Notice would indicate that theopportunity given to the Petitioner was only to showcause why he should not be removed from the Officeof the Sarpanch as well as from the membership ofthe Village Panchayat. No opportunity at all,reasonable or otherwise, was given to the Petitionerto show the acts of irregularities/illegalities asalleged against him, should not be held as proved.The next submission is that the Show Cause Noticepurported to give opportunity to the Petitioner toshow cause why he should not be removed from theOffice of Sarpanch as well as from membership of theVillage Panchayat. It is submitted that noopportunity was given to the Petitioner particularlyor at any stage as to why he is to be debarredand/or made ineligible for election as Sarpanch oras a Member of the Village Panchayat of Socorro fora period of five years. It is also submitted thatthe impugned Order proceeds on the basis that thecharges against the Petitioner are based on theinformation furnished by the Petitioner during theinspection carried out by the Director of VillagePanchayat at random of the records of the VillagePanchayat. Neither the inspection report, if any,nor statements of the inspection have been disclosedto the Petitioner at any stage nor referred to inthe Show Cause Notice, although they appear to berelied upon in passing of the impugned Order inbreach of the principles of natural justice and assuch the impugned Order is illegal, null and void.
4. For the purpose of appreciating thecontentions as raised on behalf of the Petitioner,it will be necessary to reproduce the provisions ofsub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 50 of thePanchayat Raj Act. They are as under:-
(4) Every Sarpanch or Deputy Sarpanchof a Panchayat shall after anopportunity is afforded for hearinghim, be removable from his office asSarpanch or Deputy Sarpanch by theDirector for being persistently remissin the discharge of his duties ormisconducting himself or misuses orabuses the powers or exercising thepowers not expressly vested in him byor under the Act or the rules framedthereunder and the Sarpanch or DeputySarpanch so removed who does not ceaseto be a member under sub-section (2)shall not be eligible for re-electionas Sarpanch or Deputy Sarpanch for suchperiod not exceeding five years as theDirector may specify in his order.
(5) A Sarpanch or Deputy Sarpanchremoved from his office undersub-section (4) may also be removed bythe Director from the membership of thePanchayat for such period not exceedingfive years as the Director may specifyin his Order.'
5. At the hearing of the Petition on behalfof the Petitioner though there was a challenge tothe validity of the Section that has not beenpressed and only the order is challenged. It iscontended that the impugned Order is liable to beset aside for the following reasons:
(A) In addition to removal as Sarpanch on thegrounds stipulated in Section 50(4) of the Act, aperson so removed is also liable to incurdisqualification of being ineligible to bere-elected as such for a period not exceeding fiveyears as ordered by the Director of Panchayat athis discretion. Further, such person is alsoliable to be removed as a Member of the Panchayatalso with a liability of being disqualified orbeing ineligible to be re-elected as a Member for aperiod not exceeding five years as ordered by theDirector in his discretion. Section 50(4) does noteither expressly or by necessary implicationexclude the application of principles of naturaljustice which have to be read as an integral partof the said Section.
(B) The expression 'opportunity' before beingremoved and made ineligible for re-election is notrestricted only to defend the allegation on merits,but also to show cause against the penaltiesproposed to be imposed;
(C) Opportunity must mean reasonable opportunityand this opportunity must be meaningful andeffective. The person likely to be adverselyaffected has to be informed not only of the groundon which the action is proposed to be takentogether with the material relied upon, but alsonecessarily be informed precisely and specificallyof the nature of penalty to be imposed. Thisreasonable opportunity would include theopportunity to defend the allegation by cross-examining the complainant, if any, and witnesses,if any, whose statements are relied upon in supportof the allegations as also to lead both documentaryand oral evidence by examining himself on materialand relevant witnesses to refute the allegations;
(D) At the stage of issue of Show Cause Notice, theAuthority has to form only a tentative or primafacie opinion based on the material that the personin respect of whom the show cause notice is issuedhas been persistently remiss in the discharge ofhis duties or misconducted himself or misused orabused the powers or exercised powers not expresslyvested in him by Rules framed thereunder. TheAuthority cannot foreclose its mind at that stagebefore considering the reply filed by thepetitioner. In the instant case, the Show CauseNotice would indicate that the Respondent No.1 hadalready come to the conclusion and, consequentlythe opportunity offered was sham;
(E) The Director of Panchayats exercising powersunder Section 50(4) and 50(5) and Section 210 ofthe Panchayat Raj Act, acts as a quasi-judicialauthority and that being the case, he ought not tobe a Judge in his own cause. In the instant case,the Respondent No.1 has relied on material gatheredat the inspection conducted by himself. This byitself indicates that Respondent No.1 was biased.Considering the definition of 'Director' in Section2 of the Act, the doctrine of necessity also is notattracted. Inasmuch as the Respondent NO.1 did notrecluse himself the Order is liable to be quashedand set aside.
(F) The Respondent No.1 when discharges functionsunder Section 50(4) and 50(5) and Section 210-A ofthe Act has to act as quasi-judicial authority andthe order passed must disclose reasons, more so inthe absence of any remedy of appeal or revision.Apart from disclosing the reasons in respect of thefirst part of sub-section (4) and (5) of Section 50as to whether the petitioner is guilty, reasonshave also to be given in support of the orderdisqualifying a party for a period upto five years;
(G) The Show Cause Notice which has to be read intosub-section (4) and (5) of Section 50, apart fromcalling on the person to whom the notice is issuedto show cause in the matter of removal, must alsocall on the party to show cause as to why themaximum period of disqualification or ineligibilityfor election should not be imposed. In the instantcase, this has not been done and, consequently, theorder is liable to be quashed and set aside;On the other hand, on behalf of the Respondentsit is contended that the Petitioner has been givensufficient opportunity. That it is not arequirement of this opportunity considering theSection that the Petitioner should be allowed tocross-examine the witnesses and/or to lead oralevidence. It is next contended that sub-sectionitself provided for an opportunity. The questiontherefore of reading the principles of naturaljustice need not be gone into. It is the case ofthe Respondent No.1 that sub-section (4) and (5)themselves contemplate the maximum period for whicha person can be disqualified or made ineligible forelection which period can even go beyond the periodof the term for which he was elected and that beingthe case, such a person knows the period for whichhe can be removed and, in these circumstances, itis not a requirement that a party must also begiven an opportunity of showing cause in the ShowCause Notice itself as to why he should not beremoved for a period of five years. It is furtherclear from the said Show Cause Notice itself thatit is not a decision and further does not forecloseor renders redundant the opportunity given to thePetitioner. The Show Cause Notice is based on thematerials on which the Respondent No.1 has come toprima facie conclusion and which have beendissolved to the petitioner. It is then contendedthat once reasons have been given for removal, noseparate reasons are required to be given in so faras the period of disqualification or re-election asSarpanch or a Member is concerned as it is purelyconsequential and at any rate reading of the orderwould disclose that there are reasons. The plea ofbias as contended is merely an afterthought andraised belatedly and, at any rate, unsupported bymaterial. It is further contended that thedoctrine of necessity will apply as the power isconferred on the petitioner by Statute and it isthe Director and the Director alone, who canexercise powers under sub-sections (4) and (5) ofSection 50 of the Act. For the aforesaid reasons,it is contended that the order is not liable to beinterfered with.
6. From the above contentions of bothparties, the following propositions may be carvedout which will require to be determined fordisposal of the present petition:-
(a) What would be the meaning of theexpression 'opportunity', considering that theSection does not exclude the principles of audialteram partem?
(b) Does expression 'opportunity' read withthe principles of audi alteram partem include theright to cross examine and/or to examine defencewitnesses?
(c) Is it a requirement of sub-sections (4)and (5) of Section 50 that the person who is soughtto be removed from the post of Sarpanch/DeputySarpanch/Member must be given a show cause noticenot only against the removal from such post, butalso a show cause notice indicating the period forwhich such persons will be held to be ineligible tocontest the post of Sarpanch/DeputySarpanch/Member?
(d) Must the order of removal from the postof Sarpanch/Deputy Sarpanch/Member, before passingan order, disclose reasons both for removal and formaking ineligible a person to contest or hold thesaid post referred to above. On the facts andcircumstances in the present case does the orderdisclose the reasons?
(e) Does the material disclose therespondent No.1 was biased against the petitionerand consequently the order suffers from violationof the principles of natural justice and fair play?
7. At the threshold, it may be mentionedthat the Petitioner has not raised or argued thatthe order of the 1st Respondent is liable to be setaside on the ground that there was no materialand/or that the findings given are perverse and/orbased on materials which were not available to thePetitioner. The only limited submission made isthat the Show Cause Notice itself will disclosethat an inspection was carried out. Neither theinspection report nor the memo of inspection wasmade available to the petitioner. At the outset,it may be pointed out that the Show Cause Noticemerely proceeded on the footing that the inspectionwas conducted and in the course of the inspection,serious irregularities/illegalities were observed.
Those have been made known and given to thePetitioner. Therefore, it is clear that thematerial on which the Respondent No.1 sought torely upon was made available. There is noinspection report and neither has it been usedand/or relied upon. In the light of that, thecontention must be rejected.
The contentions set out in paragraph six willnow be dealt with not necessarily in the order theyare set out but also clubbing them wherever theycan be so clubbed.
8. With that, we come to the contentionbased on the plea of bias. Has there been aninfraction of the principle Nemo debet esse Judexin propria Causa -No man shall be Judge in hiscause-. Certain aspects must be borne in mindwhile considering the plea. On receipt of the ShowCause Notice, the Petitioner filed his reply. Inthe reply, no objection was raised that theRespondent No.1 was biased against the Petitionerand/or was otherwise disqualified on the ground ofbias in proceeding with the Show Cause Notice. Atleast such an objection was not raised in thereply. Thereafter the matter proceeded before the1st Respondent. For the first time, the objectioncame to be filed after the application foradjournment for further time was rejected and thematter was adjourned for orders with a direction tothe petitioner to file written arguments. Evenfrom the application considering the averments setout therein, it is impossible to arrive at aconclusion that based on the said pleadings it ispossible to accept the plea of bias. The plea ofbias basically is based on the ground thatmaterials gathered at the inspection were used toissue the show cause notice. The Section itselfconfers power on the Director of removal. Thispower can be exercised by the Director on complaintmade or exercising his statutory duties byexamining the records of the Panchayat that theSarpanch or Deputy Sarpanch is not persistentlyremiss in the discharge of duties, etc. TheDirector is the watchdog on these matters. It ishis duty to see that the Sarpanch/Deputy Sarpanchacts according to law. This would requireinspection to be conducted. If such power isexercised it cannot lead to the conclusion oflikelihood of bias. At any rate, that applicationwas rejected after hearing the petitioner. ThePetitioner chose not to challenge the said ordernor, for that matter, did the Petitioner chose toparticipate under protest. The contention soughtto be advanced is that there was hardly any timeand in these circumstances that should not be heldagainst the Petitioner. It is now a settledproposition of law that bias can be waived. SeeDr. A. Sarana Vs . Lucknow University, : (1977)ILLJ68SC In the instant case, the Petitionerdid not initially plead bias. In other words, itwas not a case of initial bias. The objection wasraised later on. In other words, it could only beon account of acts committed during the course ofthe proceedings. There is no material to show thatthe conduct of the Respondent No.1 was biased. Itoften happens that a party dissatisfied with ordersmerely with a view to prolong the proceedings raisea plea of bias to prevent a quasi judicial orjudicial authority from passing orders. TheAuthorities whether judicial, or quasi judicial,ordinarily should not succumb to such pressuretactics unless the the Authority was required todisclose some material which possibility could leadto a plea of likelihood of bias and for some reasonor lapse could not disclose it or has a personalinterest or proprietary interest or businessinterest or institutional interest in which eventit is a normal rule that the Authority, judicial orquasi-judicial, should recluse itself. In theinstant case, there is no material which warrantedthe Respondent No.1 from reclusing himself. Thereis no difficulty in holding that the plea of biascould be raised against the Respondent No.1 even ifhe is discharging official duties and a writ ofcertiorari would be issued if a case is made out ofreal likelihood of bias.
More importantly, the decision-making processhas been conferred on Respondent No.1 as astatutory authority by the Panchayat Raj Act. Thelegislature has conferred the power on the Directorof Panchayats and not on any other person. Thatpower also cannot be delegated. In other words,the doctrine of necessity would apply and thematter has to be heard and Show Cause Notice can beissued by the Respondent No.1 and the RespondentNo.1 alone. The mere fact that the Director underthe Act has to be appointed by the Government canbe no answer. It is impossible to hold that merelybecause a plea of bias is taken the Governmentshould go on changing the Director under the Act.To my mind, considering all these facts, no casehas been made out insofar as the plea of bias isconcerned and consequently, that contention isliable to be rejected.
9. We may now deal with the propositions tothe next set of contentions, namely, as to thescope of the expression opportunity contemplatedby sub-sections (4) and (5) and whether that wouldinclude the right to cross examine complaint if anyand produce oral evidence on defence. Theexpression therein used is 'an opportunity'.Insofar as sub-section (5) is concerned, it ismerely consequential on the Respondent No.1 comingto the conclusion that the Sarpanch has beenpersistently remiss in the discharge of his dutiesor misconducted himself or has misused or abusedthe powers etc. Under sub-section (5) there is adiscretion in Respondent No.1, if he holds that aperson was unfit to hold the Office as Sarpanch toalso remove him as a Member. Therefore, theopportunity contemplated must be given,irrespective of whether the Respondent No.1 acts inan administrative capacity or quasi judicialcapacity. The opportunity must conform to theprinciples of natural justice. That an authoritywhose orders are liable to result in civilconsequences, whether acting in an administrativecapacity or quasi-judicial capacity, is bound tocomply with the principles of natural justice is nolonger res integra, having been settled once andfor all by the judgment of the Apex Court in thecase of Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India &another; : [1978]2SCR621 . The Apex Court notedthat the aim of both an administrative enquiry aswell as quasi-judicial enquiry is to arrive at justdecision and if rule of natural justice iscalculated to secure justice or put it negativelyto prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficultto see why it should be applicable toquasi-judicial enquiry and not to administrativeenquiry. It must logically apply to both. Posingto itself a question, the Court observed: 'Can itbe said that the requirement of fair play or actionis less in administrative enquiry than inquasi-judicial one Sometimes unjust decision inadministrative enquiry may have far more seriousconsequences than a decision in quasi-judicialenquiry and hence the rules of natural justice mustplay equally in an administrative enquiry whichentails civil consequences.'
It is, therefore, clear that the principles ofnatural justice should apply to both administrativeand quasi-judicial enquiries. However, whatparticular rule of natural justice should applywill depend on facts and circumstances of the caseand more importantly the framework of the law underwhich the enquiry has to be held and theconstraints of the Tribunal or Body of personsappointed for that purpose. See Saresh Koshy Jorgev. the University of Kerala : [1969]1SCR317 .The expression 'reasonable opportunity' has come upfor consideration before the Apex Court and theHigh Courts, both under Constitutional provisionsas also statutory enactments. In the case ofArticle 311 before the amendment to the Article, itwas held that reasonable opportunity would includean opportunity to deny guilt and establishinnocence which can only be done if the party isinformed of the charges levelled against and theallegations on which the charges are based; anopportunity to defend by cross-examining thewitnesses produced against and by examining himselfor any other witness in support of his defence;giving an opportunity to make representation as towhy the proposed punishment should not be inflictedwhich can only be done if the competent authority,after the enquiry is over and after applying itsmind to the gravity or otherwise of the chargesproved against the Government servant tentativelyproposes to inflict one of the punishments andcommunicates the same to the Government servant.See Khem Chand v. Union of India and another : (1959)ILLJ167SC . In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel : (1985)IILLJ206SC , the expression 'reasonableopportunity' was considered after the amendment ofArticle 311. The Apex Court referring to thejudgment in Khem Chands case (supra) hadreproduced the propositions as culled out earlier.The Apex Court then noted that after the amendment,second opportunity of showing cause against theproposed punishment would not arise. The Courthowever held that the cause herein need not conformto judicial process of Court of law becausejudicial adjudication of cause involves a number oftechnicalities, procedures and evidence which isunnecessary or not required for the purpose of fairhearing in a quasi-judicial or administrativeenquiry.
In Managing Director, ECIL. Hyderabad & ors.v. B. Karunakar and others : (1994)ILLJ162SC theApex Court took the view that even after theamendment in the event the Disciplinary Authoritywas distinct from the Enquiry Officer, then whileconsidering the expression 'reasonable opportunity'there would be a duty to give to the delinquentemployee a copy of the report as part of theprinciples of natural justice. See also S.G.Jaisinghani v. Union of India and others : [1967]65ITR34(SC) . In State of Mysore & others v.Shivabasappa Shivappa Makapur : (1964)ILLJ24SC theApex Court noted that when domestic tribunalsexercise quasi-judicial functions, they are notCourts. That quasi judicial authorities can obtaininformation/material for the points under enquiryfrom all sources and through all channels withoutbeing fettered by rules or procedure which governproceedings in the Court. The only obligation castis that they should not act on any informationwhich they may receive unless they put it to theparty against whom it is to be used and give him afair opportunity to explain it. What is fairopportunity would depend on the facts andcircumstances of each case. In a case where oralevidence is led, then in that event, a party wouldbe entitled to cross-examine the witness or evenlead her own evidence.
In State of Kerala v. K.T.Shaduli GroceryDealer etc. : AIR1977SC1627 , the Apex Court wasconsidering a provision of best assessment underthe Kerala Sales Tax law. The Section contemplatedan enquiry assessing the dealer to the best of hisjudgment. The proviso provided that before takingaction, the dealer shall be given a reasonableopportunity of being heard and where Return hadbeen submitted to prove the correctness orcompleteness of such Return. The issue before theApex Court was whether that reasonable opportunityor opportunity of being heard would include theright to cross-examine witnesses based onstatements. The Sales Tax Officer had disbelievedthe account of the assessee. That question,however, was not decided as the Apex Court foundthat as the Return filed was being disbelieved, thepetitioner therein would be entitled tocross-examine to prove the correctness orcompleteness of the Return. The Court also notedthat the expression 'reasonable opportunity' wouldmean a fair hearing. Whether this hearing wouldextend to the right of demanding cross-examinationof witnesses or not would naturally depend on thenature of the materials relied upon, the manner inwhich the party could rebut those materials and thefacts and circumstances of each case.
On behalf of the Petitioner, reliance wasplaced on a judgment of the Single Judge of theMadhya Pradesh High Court in the case of KailashKumar Dangi v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others2000 A I H C 1033 . There what was underconsideration was the Section pertaining to removalof the Office bearers of the Panchayat. ThatSection contemplated enquiry by the StateGovernment with a proviso that no removal should bedone unless an opportunity was given to show cause.The learned Single Judge therein held that the saidSection would have to be considered in the similarmanner as the removal of a Government employeeunder Article 311. The learned Judge noted thatthe principles of natural justice being applicable,the party should be given an opportunity ofadducing relevant evidence on which he relies. Theevidence of the opponent should be taken in hispresence and should be given an opportunity tocross-examine the witnesses. To my mind, it wouldbe difficult to hold that as a matter-of-course inproceedings under Sub-sections (4) and (5) ofSection 50 of Panchayat Raj Act that oral evidencehas to be led. As repeatedly pointed out invarious judgments, the nature of the reasonableopportunity would depend on the facts of each case.The right to examine witnesses or cross-examine thecomplainant again would depend on facts andcircumstances and considering the nature of thedocuments relied upon by the authority seeking totake action for removal of the Sarpanch or theMember. A Division Bench of the Andhra PradeshHigh Court in D. Sathi Reddy v. Commissioner,Panchayat Raj, Hyderabad & others AIR 2000 AP 91was considering the provisions of Section 249 ofthe Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act. In thatcase, the Court noted that the failure to supply acopy of the report of enquiry officials would befatal. Similarly, if no proper opportunity wasgiven to give explanation. The Court noted thatbefore forming an opinion as to whether a party wasguilty, the authority was bound to comply with theprinciples of natural justice. The Division Benchnoted the observation of the Apex Court thereinthat the rules of natural justice are not emptyrules or mere formality. The extent of theirapplication depends upon the particular statutoryframework whereunder jurisdiction has beenconferred on the administrative authority. Withregard to the exercise of particular power by theadministrative authority including exercise ofjudicial or quasi-judicial functions, theLegislature while conferring the said power mayfeel that it would not be in the larger publicinterest that the reasons for the order passed bythe administrative authority be recorded in theorder and be communicated to the aggrieved partyand it may dispense with such a requirement. SeeS.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India : 1990CriLJ2148a . For, what is 'reasonable' also see RajendraSingh v. State of M.P. and others : AIR1996SC2736 and Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. T.C.Shrivastava and others - : (1984)IILLJ105SC .From the above discussion and considering thelanguage of sub-section (4) of Section 50 of thePanchayat Raj Act, it is clear that the expression'opportunity' therein would mean 'reasonableopportunity' in tune with the principles of naturaljustice and depending on the facts andcircumstances of the case and the nature of thematerial being considered by the authority in theShow Cause Notice. In the instant case, in theshow cause notice, all that was being consideredwas the documentary evidence on record and theprovisions of the Act, Rules, Instructions, etc.In these circumstances, the question of requiringthe complainant to be made available forcross-examination would not have arisen. TheAuthority only re-acted after the complaint, butthe Show Cause Notice was based on inspection ofthe documents of the Panchayat. All documents andinstances on which the Respondent No.1 sought torely upon or had considered while coming to theprima facie conclusion, were made known to thePetitioner. The Petitioner was then the Sarpanchof Respondent No.4. In these Circumstances, thequestion of permitting cross-examination of thecomplainant would not arise. Similarly, on thefacts of this present case, the issue of permittingoral evidence to be led by the Petitioner hereinalso did not arise. That is not to say thatleading oral evidence or cross-examining witnessesin defence is totally excluded. That would dependupon the facts of the case and the materialconsidered while forming prima facie opinion andrelied upon when the notice to show cause isissued. To our mind, therefore, the rejection bythe 1st Respondent of the Petitioners applicationfor cross-examination of the Respondent/complainantand for permission to lead oral evidence wasrightly rejected. Apart from that, the request wasmade at a belated stage after the matter was closedfor arguments and also placed for orders with thedirection to file written arguments. Thatcontention must, therefore, be rejected.
10. We then come to the propositions (3) and(4) as framed, namely, whether the 1st Respondentwas duty bound to give notice to the Petitionerthat he would be removed as Sarpanch as also Memberand be barred from or made ineligible fromcontesting in the elections held for the post ofSarpanch or Member for a period of five years fromthe date on which the order was to be made and,secondly, whether the 1st Respondent was duty boundto give reasons whilst exercising the power to barthe Petitioner from holding office for a period offive years as also from holding office as a Memberfor five years. A plain reading of sub-section (4)of Section 50 shows that as a part of theopportunity, the Respondent No.1 was duty bound toissue a show cause notice before removing a personas a Sarpanch or Deputy Sarpanch, so also whileremoving a person as a member. The Section furtherstipulates that once removed, the Sarpanch orDeputy Sarpanch shall also not be eligible forre-election for such period not exceeding fiveyears as the Director may specify in his Order. Inother words, unlike the provisions in MadhyaPradesh Panchayat Raj Act, which were considered bythe learned Single Judge of that Court in the caseof Kailash Kumar (supra), the period ofdisqualification though statutorily fixed, there isdiscretion conferred on the 1st Respondent in thematter of the period. That discretion is whetherit should be for a month or more or for the maximumperiod of five years. Once there is a discretion,it is clear that the order must disclose reasonsmore so as the authority before whom the order ischallenged, must be able from the order to find outthat the 1st Respondent had taken intoconsideration relevant factors and not irrelevantfactors. That material on record had beenconsidered and which material had been madeavailable to the party. In other words, anobjective satisfaction based on material available.At least, therefore, the duty to give reasons isimplicit both in sub-sections (4) and (5) and aboutthat there can be no dispute considering theevolution of law on that count. The only questionis whether the show cause notice must indicate theperiod which the respondent may prefer to bar amember holding the office of Sarpanch or DeputySarpanch or as a member and the stage when thisnotice should be given Should the notice beafter coming to the conclusion, that the party isguilty or can it be simultaneous with the issuanceof the show cause notice On a plain reading ofsub-sections (4) and (5) and the nature of thehearing, to my mind, it is clear that it has to besimultaneous. It is also further clear that noticeshould be made known the period for which thenotice is sought to be removed, as the nature ofthe enquiry, and the time frame and considerationof material would depend on those facts. A Courtwhile considering the reasons and the fact ofreasonable opportunity in case the Authorityproposes a shorter ineligibility may consider theprinciples of natural justice differently thanwhere the maximum period is to be imposed asprinciples of natural justice cannot be put in astrait jacket. To my mind, therefore, thereasonable opportunity to be given must alsoinclude notice to the party to whom the show causenotice is issued that such party is to bedisqualified or made ineligible upto the period setout in the show cause notice. That is required tobe set out and contained in the show cause noticeitself. In the instant case, no such opportunitywas given. The Petitioner had filed his reply tothe Show Cause Notice, but however, did notcomplain that because of the failure of the 1stRespondent in not disclosing the term for which thepetitioner was to be disqualified, was hampered inhis defence. Therefore, even though there wasfailure on the part of the 1st Respondent to complywith the requirement of giving opportunity in thematter of ineligibility and the period on the factsof the present case, as no prejudice has beenoccasioned to the Petitioner, we do not propose tointerfere insofar as the failure on that count isconcerned.
11. We have however the second aspect,namely whether reasons are required or the ordermust disclose reasons for removing the Petitioneras Sarpanch for a period of five years and also asa Member for a period of five years. Beforeconsidering that, let us consider the need ornecessity for reasons. The recording of reasonsand the need to give reasons serves a twofoldpurpose. Firstly, a party aggrieved knows thebasis or the reasons on which the order has beenpassed and has an opportunity while challenging theorder, to demonstrate that the reasons whichpersuaded the authority to pass adverse order wereerroneous, irrational or irrelevant and, secondly,the disclosure of reasons and conveying them to aparty operates as a deterrent against possiblearbitrary action by the quasi-judicial or theexecutive authority invested with judicial powers.In Administrative Law, Seventh Edition, by H.W.R.Wade & C.F. Forsyth, the learned authors relyingon various judgments of the English Courts haveculled out various principles. The following maybe quoted:-
'Sir John Donaldson has said that in theabsence of reasons it is impossible todetermine whether or not there has beenan error of law. Failure to give reasonstherefore amounts to a denial of justiceand is itself an error of law. Lord LaneCJ. while not wishing to go so far, hasheld that a statement of reasons mustshow that the tribunal has considered thepoint at issue between the parties andmust indicate the evidence for itsconclusion. Where there is a conflict ofevidence, the tribunal ought to state itsfindings.'
As explained earlier, the duty to state reasonsis normally held to be mandatory, so that adecision not supported by adequate reasons will bequashed or remitted to the deciding authority.We may now examine the judgments of the ApexCourt and High Courts on that particular aspect.In Shri Pragdas Umar Vaishya v. Union of India andothers 1967 Mah. L.J. 981 the Apex Court notedthat an administrative order of quasi-judicialauthority which has civil consequences, mustdisclose the reasons for its decision. If thereasons are not given, the order is liable to bequashed and it is not the duty of a higher Court togive reasons which the authority is bound to give.In M/s Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union ofIndia : 1978(2)ELT378(SC) , the Apex Court notedtherein that it would be impossible for the ApexCourt, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136,to decide the dispute without a speaking order ofthe authority setting out the nature of thedispute, the arguments in support thereof raised bythe aggrieved party and reasonably disclosing thatthe matter received due consideration by theauthority competent to decide the dispute.
In The Siemens Engineering & . v. The Union of India and another : AIR1976SC1785 , the Apex Court once againobserved that ' where an authority makes an orderin exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it mustrecord its reasons in support of the order itmakes. Every quasi-judicial order must besupported by reasons.' 'The rule requiring reasonsto be given in support of an order is, like theprinciple of audi alteram partem, a basic principleof natural justice which must inform everyquasi-judicial process and this rule must beobserved in its proper spirit and mere pretence ofcompliance with it would not satisfy therequirement of law.'
In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (supra)the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court noted thatexcept in those cases where the requirement to givereasons has been dispensed with expressly or bynecessary implication, an administrative authorityexercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, isrequired to record the reasons for its decision.The Court observed that in view of the expandinghorizon of the principles of natural justice, therequirement to record reasons can be regarded asone of the principles of natural justice whichgovern exercise of power by administrativeauthorities. The rules of natural justice are notembodied rules. The extent of application dependsupon the particular statutory framework whereunderjurisdiction has been conferred on theadministrative authority. The recording of reasonsby an administrative authority serves a salutarypurpose, namely, it excludes chances ofarbitrariness and assures a degree of fairness inthe process of decision-making. The said purposewould apply equally to all decisions and itsapplication cannot be confined to decisions whichare subject to appeal, revision or judicial review.The requirement, therefore to record reasons shouldgovern the decision of administrative authorityexercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective ofthe fact whether the decision is subject to appeal,revision or judicial review. The reasons need notbe elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law.The extent and nature of reasons would depend onparticular facts and circumstances. However, whatis necessary is that the reasons are clear andexplicit so as to indicate that the authority hasgiven due consideration to the points incontroversy. The need for recording of reasons isgreater in a case where the order is passed at theinitial stage.
In T.R. Thandur v. Union of India and others : AIR1996SC1643 , the Apex Court observed that inthe absence of express statutory provisions, therequirement of recording reasons in writing isimplicit as every State action must satisfy therule of non-arbitrariness.
A Full Bench of Gujarat High Court in TesteelsLtd. v. N.M. Desai Conciliation Officer andanother : AIR1970Guj1 examined the issue ofthe need of the principle to give reasons. TheFull Bench noted that there are two reasons whereevery quasi-judicial order must be a speaking orderas the necessity of giving reasons flows as anecessary corollary from the rule of law whichconstitutes one of the basic principles of theIndian Constitutional set-up. The administrativeauthorities having a duty to act judicially cannottherefore decide on considerations of policy orexpediency. They must decide the matter solely onthe facts of the particular case, solely on thematerial before them and apart from any extraneousconsiderations by applying pre-existing legal normsto factual situations. Now the necessity of givingreasons is an important safeguard to ensureobservance of the duty to act judicially. Itintroduces clarity, checks the introduction ofextraneous or irrelevant considerations andexcludes or, at any rate, minimises arbitrarinessin the decision-making process; the second reasonbeing the need, considering the power of judicialreview possessed by the High Court and the ApexCourt. This power of review can be effectivelyexercised only if the orders are speaking orders.In the absence of any reasons in support of theorder, the Courts cannot examine the correctness ofthe order under review. The superior Courts wouldbe powerless to interfere so as to keep theadministrative officer within the limits of thelaw. The result would be that the power ofjudicial review would be stultified and no redresswould be available to the citizens. There would beinsidious encouragement to arbitrariness andcaprice. If the requirement of giving reasons isinsisted upon, then they would be subject tojudicial scrutiny and correction.
It is, therefore, clear that the duty to givereasons amongst others is to enable the superiorCourt or the reviewing Court to find out whetherthe authority exercising the powers has exercisedthem reasonably and considered the predicates whichhave to be applied while imposing the punishment orthe penalty or the like. Both, under Sub-section(4) and Sub-section (5) the duty to give reasons isimplicit as the power is discretionary. Whendiscretion is conferred in a system governed byrule of law that must be exercised within clearlydefined limits. The rule of law from this point ofview means that the decision should be made byapplication of known principles of law and rulesand in general such decision should be predictableand the citizen should know where he is. If adecision is taken without a principle or withoutany rule, it is unpredictable and such a decisionis antithesis of a decision taken in accordancewith the rule of law. See S.G. Jaisinghani v.Union of India and others- : [1967]65ITR34(SC) .It is no doubt true that on behalf of theRespondents reliance was placed on the judgment ofthe Apex Court in State of Orissa and another v.Alekh rehouse Jena 1988 (Sup) SCC 469 . That wasa case under the Orissa Gram Panchayat Act. Thereconsidering the language of the Section it was heldthat once the Collector in his report to the StateGovernment expresses satisfaction that theconditions prescribed in Sub-section (1) of theOrissa Grama Panchayat Act, 1964 existed, the StateGovernment in its Order under Sub-section (2) neednot reiterate that further continuation of theSarpanch in the office would be detrimental to theinterest of the Grama Panchayat or the inhabitantsof the Grama. A look at that Section indicatesthat it is the report wherein the opinion has beenformed. On that report, the State Government,after giving a reasonable opportunity of showingcause, could remove the Sarpanch and such removalwas for a period not exceeding four years as theState Government had specified. In that case, theApex Court held that accepting the report wouldmean that the State Government accepted thatcircumstances existed for exercise of power underSub-section (2). It is in that context that thesaid observations were made. It is no authorityfor the proposition that reasons for imposing thepunishment or ineligibility need not be given.
12. In the instant case, we do not proposeto interfere with the findings recorded by the 1stRespondent insofar as the Petitioners conduct asSarpanch is concerned. Insofar as holding the postof Sarpanch, a perusal of the order would indicatethat there are no reasons to show as to why thePetitioner was made ineligible for a period of fiveyears which is the maximum period. However,considering the nature of the charges, the findingby the 1st Respondent and that all these chargeswere in the course of functioning as Sarpanch, toour mind, would justify the order of the 1stRespondent, making ineligible to the petitionerhold the post of Sarpanch for a period of fiveyears. Ordinarily, the matter ought to have beensent on remand for reconsideration. We do notpropose to do that as, in our opinion, the findingsin the matter of misuse of power etc. wouldjustify the order prohibiting the Petitioner fromholding the post of Sarpanch for five years.
13. We then come to the issue insofar as theorder whereby the Petitioner is also madeineligible to hold the post of Member for a periodof five years from the date of the Order. Thevarious acts in respect of which the Petitioner wascharged and show cause notice was issued, were inrespect of acts committed as a Sarpanch. Theduties and powers of a Sarpanch under the Act aredistinct and different from that of a Member. Itis no doubt true that under Sub-section (5) if aSarpanch is removed from his Office underSub-section (4), he may also be removed frommembership. In other words, it is again adiscretionary order. Once it is discretionaryagain the same principles as aforestated mustapply. On behalf of Respondent No.1, their learnedCounsel tried to point out, that though the Ordermay not be happily worded, and considering that theRespondent No.1 is not a Judicial Officer,nonetheless on a reading of the order fromparagraph 105 onwards it would indicate the reasonsfor which the Petitioner was made ineligible to bea Member. On a perusal of those reasons, we findno discussion insofar as the period is concerned.The entire observations therein are in respect ofthe findings that the Petitioner was guilty ofabuse of power etc. Clearly, therefore, therewould be an infraction of principles of naturaljustice inasmuch as no reasons have been given.There are two requirements: (1) Removal as aMember. Considering the reasons given in the orderwe see no reason as to why that part of the Orderremoving the Petitioner as a Member should beinterfered with. The reasons given by theRespondent No.1 are that considering the chargesrelating to the tenure which were proved, theRespondent No.1 was satisfied that the continuationof the Petitioner was detrimental to the interestof the Panchayat. We have no reasons to differfrom that point of view as it can be said that thatcould be a reason for exercise of power underSub-section (5). That part of the Order,therefore, must be upheld.
Insofar as the second part is concerned,namely, the period of ineligibility again there areno reasons as to why the Respondent No.1 had chosento make he Petitioner ineligible to hold the postof Member for five years. Ordinarily again, thematter ought to have been remanded back toRespondent No.1. The Order itself was made on 14thJune 1999 and at the admission stage this Court,prima facie, on January 14, 2000 was pleased tostay the removal as Member with certain conditionspetition is pending for two years. Instead ofremanding the matter, we propose on the facts andcircumstances to reduce the period of ineligibilityfor contesting elections to the post of member upto14th December, 2001.
14. For the aforestated reasons, thefollowing Order:-
(1) We find no reason to interfere with thefindings recorded by the Respondent NO.1as to removal of the Petitioner fromboth the posts of Sarpanch and Member;
(2) Considering the material on record, wefind no reasons to interfere with theOrder passed by the Respondent No.1 inbarring the Petitioner from holding thepost of Sarpanch for a period of fiveyears from the date of the Order i.e.14th June, 1999;
(3) Insofar as the Order barring thePetitioner from being ineligible forre-election as a Member for a period offive years from the date of Order, wereduce it to a period upto 14thDecember, 2001;
Rule accordingly made partly absolute interms of paragraph 14(3). In thecircumstances of the case, there shallbe no order as to costs.
Personal Assistant to issue an ordinarycopy of this Order. All authorities to act on thesaid copy.