Judgment:
1. This writ, petition takes exceptionto the judgment and order passed by theMaharashtraRevenue Tribunal, Pune, dated October 18, 1999, inRevision No. MTR-P-I-14/98 (B-20/94) Pune.
2. Briefly stated, the Respondents 1 to3 were the original owners of two lands admeasuring3-H 59-R out of Survey No. 42 and 0-H 99-R out ofSurvey No. 40/2, situate at village Wadavali,Taluka: Mavalk, Dist: Pune. Respondents 1 to 3became owners of the said lands after havingpurchased the same under the provisions of Section32-G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural LandsAct, 1948 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity, inshort referred to as 'the Act',). In other words,the said Respondents 1 to 3 were tenants in thesaid lands and became deemed purchasers byoperation of law. Some time on 18th January 1992,the said Respondents 1 to 3 made application UnderSection 43 of the Act to permit them to transferthe said two lands to the Petitioner herein. Thatapplication was decided by the S.D.O. on January24, 1992, granting permission to the saidRespondents 1 to 3, as prayed for on certainconditions. One of the condition relevant fordeciding the present case is tht the saidtransaction between the said Respondents 1 to 3 andPetitioner was to be completed within three monthsfrom the date of granting permission and uponpayment of Najrana amount to the Government,failing which the permission would stand cancelledand action for resumption of land under Section 84Cof the Act was to be taken. There are othercondition in the said order, however, it is notnecessary to advert to those conditions herein. Asper the said order teh Petitioner as well asRespondents 1 to 3 were under obligation toconclude the said transaction within three monthsfrom the date of order, i.e. on or before 24thApril 1992. However, admittedly, that transactionwas not concluded between them. Whereas, some timeon March 1, 1992 Respondents 1 to 3 madeapplication to the S.D.O. that they have noobjection for granting extension of time forpayment and for execution of the sale deed as theyintend to dispose of the property to the Petitionerherein. Soon thereafter on March 5, 1992, theRespondents 1 to 3 made another application to theS.D.O. for permission under Section 43 of the Actto transfer the land bearing Survey No. 42 onlyadmeasuring 3-H 59-R in favour of the Respondents 4& 5 herein. Undoubtedly, this application wasfiled while the application for extension of tiemwas pending with the S.D.O.-filed on March 1, 1992;coupled with the fact that the time provided for inthe order dated January 24, 1992 was stillsubsisting till April 24, 1992. Be that as it may,the fact remains that the said transaction inrespect the aforestated two lands was not completedbetween Respondents 1 to 3 and Petitioner herein,before April 24, 1992. The order passed by theS.D.O. dated January 24, 1992 makes it very clearthat on non compliance of any of the conditions,which includes non completion of the saidtransaction result into cancellation of the saidorder. The other relevant dates that need to betaken note of is that the Second applicationpreferred by Respondents 1 to 3 dated March 5,1992, purported to be under Section 43 of the Act,seeking permission to transfer the land bearingSurvey No. 42 only in favour of the Respondents 4 &5, came to be allowed by the S.D.O. on April 30,1992 on similar conditions which are noted in theearlier order dated 24th January 1992. Pursuant tothis order, Respondents 4 & 5 paid the Najranaamount to the State Exchequer and on May 13, 1992executed sale-deed with Respondents 1 to 3 inrespect of land bearing Survey No. 42, admeasuring3-H 59-R and also obtained possession of the saidland with effect from the said date. The sale deedbetween the Respondents inter-se came to beregistered at Registration No. 3029 with theSub-Registrar of Assurances, Haveli, Pune.However, much thereafter on July 8, 1992Respondents 1 to 3 are stated to have executedanother sale deed in favour of the Petitionerherein in respect of the same land bearing SurveyNo. 42. This transaction was effected inspite ofthe Registered sale-deed already executed in favourof Respondents 4 & 5 on 13th May 1992; besides,there was no subsisting permission in favour ofRespondents 1 to 3 to transfer the said land infavour of the Petitioner herein. In as much as,the permission which was granted on January 24,1992 had already lapsed on completion of threemonths therefrom. In one sense, the Sale-deedexecuted between Respondents 1 to 3 and Petitioneris not in confirmity with the requirements ofSection 43 of the Act. It is relevant to note thatan enquiry was held in which statements of owners-Respondents 1 to 3 came to be recorded wherein itis stated that they have no objection for grantingextension of time to complete the transaction withthe Petitioner only in respect of land Survey No.40/2 admeasuring Q-H 99-R but pressed thatpermission under section 43 of the Act be grantedto transfer the land bearing Survey No. 42,admeasuring 3-H 59-R in favour of Respondents 4 &5. It is not necessary to burden this judgmentwith all other events and various proceedingsbetween the parties before different forums, whichdetails are set out in extenso in theReply-affidavit filed by Respondents 4 & 5 beforethis court. Suffice it to mention that thePetitioner after execution of the sale-deed on July8, 1992 kept on making application to S.D.O. forextension of time. Besides, pursuant tot hegrievance made by the Petitioner by writtenapplication to the S.D.O., the S.D.O. passed orderon August 11, 1993 recalling the permission grantedin respect of the transaction to be completedbetween Respondents 1 to 3 and Respondents 4 & 5inter-se in terms of order dated April 30, 1992.This decision of the S.D.O. records that secondpermission application was erroneously entertainedby his office. Against the said decision,Respondents 4 & 5 filed above numbered Revisionbefore the M.R.T. Pune. The Tribunal, on the otherhand, was pleased to set aside the order passed bythe S.D.O. dated August 11, 1993. Though varioscontentions have been considered by, the Tribunal,in substance, the Tribunal has held that the secondapplication filed by the owners for permissionUnder Section 43 to transfer the land bearingSurvey No. 42 only admeasuring 3-H 59-R in favourRespondents 4 & 5 was properly filed. The Tribunalfurther held that when the permission was grantedon that application on April 30, 1992 at that pointof time there was no valid subsisting permission inrespect of the said land in favour of any otherperson. The Tribunal has further held that thereis no provision in the Act or the Rules which wouldauthorise the S.D.O. to set aside or cancel thepermission once granted. It is in this backdrop,the Tribunal was pleased to set aside the orderpassed by the S.D.O. dated 11th August, 1993. Itis this decision which is challenged by way of thisWrit Petition.
3. In all four contentions have beenraised by way of this Writ Petition and which havebeen canvassed across the bar at the time ofhearing. I shall make reference to thosecontentions a little later. It is relevant to notethat this Writ Petition was admitted by this Courton September 13, 2000 and this court granted orderof status-quo to continue till the disposal of thepetition. It appears that the Respondents 4 &5who were affected by the order of status quo moved an application before this court for vacating thatorder and alternatively for early hearing of thewrit petition. However, that Civil Applicationbearing No. 8087/2000 came to be rejected onNovember 22, 2000, essentially on the ground thatthere was no changed circumstances after the writ petition was admitted. It appears that thereafterRespondents 4 & 5 to apply for early hearing of thepetition on expiry of one year. Pursuant to thatliberty, fresh application has been filed beforethis court, being Civil Application No. 2120 of2002, pointing out that several incorrect andmisleading statements have been made in the WritPetition; that relevant materials have beendeliberately suppressed; and that it is on thatbasis the Writ Petition filed by the petitionercame to be entertained. Accordingly, Respondents 4& 5 have prayed by way of this application todismiss the Writ Petition with compensatory costs.It is further prayed that the hearing of the WritPetitioner be expedited and that the order of statusquo granted earlier be vacated. This applicationwas circulated on October 14, 2002 for order. Onconsidering the oral arguments advanced on thatday, I indicated to the Counsel appearing for theparties that the appropriate course will be to hearthe application along with the Writ Petitionfinally. Counsel appearing for both the partiesagreed to argue the Writ Petition for final hearingon the next date of hearing. Accordingly,arguments in this Writ Petition were heard finallyon October 16, 2002 and judgment was reserved. Theparties were given liberty to file writtensumissions. Pursuant to that liberty, writtensubmissions have been filed which are already taken on record.
4. The first point raised on behalf ofthe petitioner is that the sale-deed executedbetween Respondents 4 & 5 and the onwersRespondents 1 to 3 on March 13, 1992, was muchbefore the S.D.O. had accorded permission in thierfavour vide order dated April 30, 1992. The WritPetition proceeds on the premise that, therefore,the sailed-deed executed in favour of Respondents 4 & 5is invalid. However, this contention has beencountered by the Respondents 4 & 5 by filingaffidavit and also placing on record all therelevant documents. The affidavit and thedocuments filed by Respondents 4 & 5 would clearlyreveal that the register sale-deed was executedbetween Respondents 1 to 3 and Respondents 4 & 5 inrespect of the land bearing Survey No.42 on May 13,1992, only after the S.D.O. had accordedpermission in that behalf. It is stated thatPetitioner has taken undue advantage of onetypographical error appearing in the impugnedorder. For, at one place in the said order it ismentioned that the said sale-deed was executed on13.3.1992, instead of 13.5.1992, which is thecorrect date. There is substance in this objectionin as much as in the earlier part of the samejudgment, before the reasons while adverting to therelevant facts, the Tribunal has noted the correctdate of the execution of the sale deed as13.5.1992. In the light of this position, whichhas now come on record by way of affidavit, Mr.Anturkar counsel for the Petitioner fairly concedesthat the said argument will not be available toPetitioner. He however, orally submits that thePetitioner committed genuine mistake in taking thatground. It is relevant to note that the Petitionerhas not filed any affidavit controverting the replyaffidavit filed by the Respondents 4 & 5 opposingthe Writ Petition and specifically making thisgrievance. However, it is only during the oralarguments Mr. Anturkar for the Petitioner hasattempted to offer justification as a genuinemistake on the part of the Petitioner, whichexplanation does not impress me at all. As is seenthat the Petitioner has filed affidavit-in-supportof the Writ Petition clearly stating that thecontents of the Writ Petitions are true to the bestof his personal knowledge and he has carefully gonethrough the memo of the Writ Petition.
5. Be that as it may, I shall nowadvert to the second contention raised on behalf ofthe Petitioner. It is argued that the order passedby the S.D.O. dated April 30, 1992 accordingpermission to transfer the land bearing Survey No.42 in favour of Respondents 4 & 5 was based on theapplication preferred by Respondents 1 to 3 on5.3.1992. It is submitted that the scheme ofSection 43 of the Act does not permit filling of twoapplications for the same relief in succession. Itis further contended that in any case while thepermission granted on the first application wasalready operating, the second application aspresented was not maintainable in law. In supportof this submission reliance has been placed on thedecision of the Gujarat High Court reported in 1994(1) GCD 26 (Guj) Harjivandas Anandji Kapadia &Ors. v. Apar Private Limited and Ors., whichdecision deals with similar provisions applicableto the State of Gujarat. It is next contended thatin the fact situation of the present case theS.D.O .0was obliged to extend the time forexecution of the sale-deed and for completion ofthe transaction to be entered on the basis of theorder passed on January 24, 1992. It is contendedthat the authorities below have committed palpablemistake in not extending the time in favour of th ePetitioner. It is next contended that the Revisional Court has completely exceeded itsauthority in going into the correctness of theorder dated January 24, 1992 which was not even thesubject matter of the challenge before it.
6. The above contentions raised onbehalf of the Petitioner are countered by thecounsel for Respondents 4 & 5. He submits thatthere is no substance in any of the arguments andthat Section 43 of the Act would not permit such anapproach, as has been suggested by the Petitioner.
7. Having considered the rivalsubmissions and after having gone through theentire reocrd, including the reply affidavit andthe accompanying documents as well as theaccompanying Civil Applications, I have nohesitation in taking the view that this WritPetition is devoid of merits and in fact deservesto be dismissed on account of the conduct of thePetitioner, which would be elaborated a littlelater. Reverting to the contention regarding thescheme of Section 43 of the Act that it does notpermit institution of second application orsuccessive applications for permission to transferthe same land to some other person; to considerthis submission, I think it apposite to reproduceSection 43 of the Act as applicable to the State ofMaharashtra, which reads thus:
'Section 43(1) No land purchased by atenant under Section 32, 32F or sold toany person under Section 32P or 64shall be transferred by sale, gift,exchange, mortgage, lease or assignementwithout the previous sanction of theCollector, such sanction shall be givenby the Collector in such circumstances,and subject to such conditions, as maybe prescribed by the State Government:
Provided that, no such sanction shallbe necessary where the land is to bemortgaged in favour of Government or asociety registered or deemed to beregistered under the BombayCo-operative Societies Act, 1925, forraising a loan for effecting anyimprovement of such land. (2) Any transfer of land incontravention of Sub-section (1) shallbe invalid.'
8. On the plain language of this provision, theargument advanced before this court on behalf of thePetitioner deserves to be rejected. The provision, perse, does not create any bar for filing successiveapplications for permission to transfer the land. Onthe other hand, it is only a provision for placingrestriction on transfer of land purchased or sold underthe Act. Even if this court was to give a restrictedmeaning to this provision, it would only be that in agiven case if a valid Sanction Order is in operation,then, ordinarily, the Collector would not grant anotherpermission in respect of the same land. In the enquiryfor examining the second request made by the land owner,the Collector, would obviously consider as to what arethe impelling circumstances requiring the land power tocontract with some other person in respect of the sameland in place of the earlier purchaser. It is alsopossible to take a view that the Collector may refuse togrant or entertain the second application for permissionin respect of the same land while the earlier permissionwas already subsisting or in operation. However, theorder of refusal should record the reasons therefor.The abovesaid requirement would be one of prudence andnot the rule. There is nothing in this provision tohold that even when the earlier permission has lapsed orstood automatically cancelled due to non compliance ofcertain condition, the Collector is incompetent to grantfresh permission in respect of the same land.
9. On the other hand, reliance is placed by theCounsel for the Petitioner on the decision of theGujarat High Court in the case of Harjivandas (supra).The observations in this case are in the context of thefact situation of that case. In that case, theCollector granted permission under Section 43 of theAct, however, the owner of the land being dissatisfiedwith the condition of requiring him to deposit Rs.17,600/- in the State Exchequer filed revisionapplication before the Tribunal. In other words, theorder of permission was not challenged as such, but whatwas challenged was only one of the condition in theorder that too at the instance of the land owner.Besides, the said order was subsisting when the secondpermission was granted in respect of the same land atthe instance of the land owner. In that context theGujarat High Court was called upon to consider as towhether the second permission was appropriate and theGujarat High Court has held that such an applicationcould not have been entertained. In other words, inthat case the second permission was granted during theperiod when the earlier permission was alreadysubsisting. However, in the present case, the factsituation is different. No doubt, the land owners filedsecond application on March 5, 1992 when the permissiongiven in respect of the same land was already to operatetill April 24, 1992; but, as is seen, the permission wasactually granted by the S.D.O. only on April 30, 1992after the first permission had already lapsed and stoodcancelled on account of the non-compliance of thecondition postulated in the order dated January 24,1992. In that sense, there was no subsisting permissionin respect of the same land when the order dated April30, 1992 came to be passed by the S.D.O.. Understoodthus, the order passed by the S.D.O. on April 30, 1992cannot be faulted or can be said to be inherentlywithout jurisdiction. If that is so, then the fact thatthe land owners had filed second application while thefirst permission was already in operation would be of noconsequence.
10. That takes me to the next contention thatthe competent authority ought to have granted extensionof time in favour of the Petitioner. There is nosubstance even in this grievance. It is seen that thepermission which was granted in favour of the Petitionerwas to expire on April 24, 1992 but before that date thePetitioner did not complete the transaction which he wasexpected to do by virtue of the order dated January 24,2002. Moroever, Petitioner made application forextension of time much after the expiry of that periodon July 24, 1992, that too when the land bearing SurveyNo. 42 already stood validly transferred in favour of theRespondents 4 & 5 by virtue of registered sale deeddated May 13, 1992. Accordingly, the applicationpreferred by the Petitioner for extension of time willhave no bearing on the present case. In any case, asobserved earlier, the application for extension of tiemwas filed by the Petitioner only after the right, titleand interest in respect of the land bearing Survey No.42 already stood vested in Respondents 4 & 5 by virtueof the registered sale-deed dated May 13, 1992. In thisview of the matter, there is no substance in thegrievance made by the petitioner that the authoritieshave misdirected themselves in not granting extension oftime to the Petitioner. The question of extension oftime would arise only if the land bearing Survey No.42was still available for transfer in the hands of theoriginal owner-Respondents 1 to 3. Assuming that thePetitioner would have contended that before expiry ofthe period provided in the order dated January 24, 1992the Respondents 1 to 3 had made application forextension of time and when that application was pendingthe Authority could not have entertained anotherapplication for permission in favour of some otherperson such as the Respondents 4 & 5 herein. However,even this grievance is devoid of merits. In the firstplace, the Respondent 1 to 3, the land owners have notsupported the case for extension of time in respect ofland bearing Survey No. 42 and instead urged that theymay be allowed to transfer the said land in favour ofthe Respondents 4 & 5. Besdies, the day on which theAuthority granted permission to transfer land bearingSurvey No. 42 in favour of Respondent 4 & 5, on that daythere was no subsisting permission in favour of anyother person with regard to that land and the landowners (Respondents 1 and 3) during the enquiry have notsupported the cause of the Petitioner. Moreover, theTribunal has rightly held that having regard to thelegislative scheme the S.D.O. had no power to set asidehis own order. For this singular reason the Tribunalwas justified in setting aside the order of the S.D.O.dated August 11, 1993-recalling his earlier order datedApril 30, 1992 which enured in favour of Respondents 4 & 5 and, in fact, was already acted upon-coupled with thefact that it is allowed to attain finality.
11. That takes me to the next contention arugedon behalf of the Petitioner that the Tribunal could not have gone into the validity of the order passed infavour of the Petitioner dated January 24, 1992. Thereis no substance even in this grievance. No doubt, thetribunal has gone into the correctness of the decisionof the S.D.O., however, to my mind, that is not the solebasis on which the Tribunal has passed the impugnedorder. In other words, the Tribunal has considered thataspect only incidentally and is not the basis forallowing the revision preferred by Respondents 4 & 5.On the other hand, the Tribunal in the operative orderhas only set aside the order passed by the S.D.O. datedAugust 11, 1993 and restored the order dated April 30,1992. Moreover, the question of setting aside the orderdated January 24, 1992 does not arise because it was aself-operative order. For, the same was to lastinitially only for a period of three months and wouldhave continued thereafter only if the Petitioner andRespondents 1 to 3 were to complete the sale transactionsin respect of the subject land within the prescribedtime. However, since that did not happen the said orderautomatically lapsed and stood cancelled. In this viewof the matter, there is no substance in the grievancemade by the Petitioner that the Tribunal has exceededits jurisdiction in going into the question of validityof the order dated January 24, 1992.
12. Before I conclude, it will be necessary topoint out that, in fact, I would have though itappropriate to dismiss this writ petition on account ofthe conduct of the Petitioner. Because the Petitionerhas not approached this court with clean hands. He hastaken false pleas and persuaded this court to admit thepetition on that premise. Counsel for the Petitionerhas already conceded before this court that the firstplea, which was the principal plea in the Writ Petitionwas not available and could not have been taken by thePetitioner. Besides, it is seen that hte writ petitionerwas filed-only accompanied by the order passed by theS.D.O. dated April 30, 1992 and of the Tribunal datedOctober 8, 1999 which is impugned in this Writ Petition.Obviously, the court was pursuaded to examine the matteronly on the basis of those two orders, for the purposeof admission. No other document was placed before thecourt. On the other hand, most of the relevant matterswere obviously deliberately suppressed from this court.In as much as, documents which have now come on recordby way of affidavit after the Writ Petition came to beadmitted, clearly reveal that the Petitioner ispersecuting the Respondents 4 & 5. As a matter of fact,the documents appended to the reply affidavit and theevents stated therein would clearly reveal that severalother disputes and claims are pending between theparties inter-se and, so far the Petitioner has notsucceeded in getting any relief either from the civilcourt or from any other court of competent jurisdiction.Moreover, the Petitioner did not disclose the crucialfact that the Petitioner has already executed sale-deedin respect of the subject lands dated July 8, 1992 whenthere was no subsisting permission in his favour. ThePetitioner has also filed a substantive suit againstRespondents 4 & 5 for declaration that the sale-deedexecuted in their favour in respect of land bearingSurvey No. 42 dated 13th May 1992 is invalid and notbinding on him, which fact is not disclosed. All thesematters were obviously suppressed from this court whichhave been unfolded only after a detailed reply came tobe filed. Moreover, the Petitioner has not counteredthe allegations made in the reply affidavit filed onbehalf of Respondents 4 & 5 as well as in theaccompanying Civil Application.
13. For all these reasons, I have no hesitationin observing that the present writ petition is an abuseof process of the court and the Petitioner has succeededin causing prejudice to Respondents 4 & 5 by persuadingthe court to pass an order of status-quo against themwithout disclosing the fact that the Petitioner wasalready suffering an order of injunction passed by thecourt of competent jurisdiction. As a matter of factthis would be a fit case to initiate proceedings againstthe Petitioner for filing false, incorrect andmisleading affidavit to support the averments in the writpetition. However, taking overall view of the matter, Ihave no hesitation in directing the Petitioner to paycompensatory costs to Respondents 4 & 5, which isquantified as Rs. 10,000/-. It is made clear that thecompensatory costs awarded in this order is withoutprejudice to the rights of Respondents 4 & 5 to pursueany other remedy against the Petitioner including forappropriate compensation in accordance with law.
14. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is dismissedwith compensatory costs quantified at Rs. 10,000/-. ThePetitioner shall directly pay the said amount of Rs.10,000/- to Respondents 4 & 5 within four weeks fromtoday. In view of this order, accompanying CivilApplication No. 2120 of 2002 also stands disposed of.
All concerned to act on an ordinary copy of thisorder duly authenticated by the Shirastedar of thiscourt.