Judgment:
1. The defendants by this chamber summons pray that the execution of the decree dated 16-04-1996 passed by this Court against any of assets of defendants in particular that of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 be stayed.
2. In the affidavit in support of the chamber summons, it is averred that defendant No. 1 has filed reference with the Board for Industrial and Finance Reconstruction (for short B.I.F.R.) on 09-03-1997 and since the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 are guarantors they are also entitled to protection under Section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (for short SICA, 1985) and decree cannot be executed against their estate without obtaining permission of B.I.F.R.
3. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel appearing for defendants informed the Court that the reference has been registered on 10-04-1997 bearing Case No. 47 of 1997.
4. The decree holder Central Bank of India has filed affidavit in reply contesting the Chamber Summons taken out by the defendants. According to the plaintiff decree-holder bank, the defendants have abused the process of the Court and are guilty of suppression of facts and, therefore, are not entitled to any relief in the present chamber summons. It is stated in the affidavit in reply that the proceedings under Section 22 of the SICA, 1985 against the guarantors cannot be said to have been suspended and Section 22 of the Act is not all applicable.
5. Mr. Doctor, the learned senior counsel appearing for the defendants, strenuously urged that upon reference being made by the defendants under Section 15 of SICA 1985 and the same having been registered now, the proceedings for execution cannot continue further and shall have to be suspended in view of Section 22 of SICA 1985. According to Mr. Doctor, the learned senior counsel, the legislature has provided that no suit for recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security of any guarantee in respect of any loan or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further except with the consent of the Board or as the case may be, the appellate authority and the expression 'suit' covers execution of the decreed against the guarantors for the enforcement of the guarantee and the security in respect of the loan advance to the industrial company and, therefore, the chamber summons deserves to be made absolute. The learned senior counsel would contend that the expression suit in common parlance is an expression of wider connotation and it includes appeals, applications, revisions, review as well as execution. In support of his contention, the learned senor counsel relied on Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon 2nd Edition. Vol. III pages 2336 to 2338, Law Lexicon by Justice T.P. Mukherjee. Fourth revised and enlarged edition. Vol. II at pages 736 to 739. Whatron's Law Lexicon. Fourteenth Edition, page 387. Dokku Bhushyya v. Katragadda Ramakrishnaya, : [1963]2SCR499 ; M/s. Prakash Playing Cards . v. Neelima Steels Ltd., (1990) 68 Comp Cas 201.
6. On the other hand Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, the learned counsel appearing for decree-holder Bank submitted that by mere registration of the reference, it cannot be assumed that enquiry under Section 16 of the SICA 1985 is pending and, therefore, condition precendent for attraction of Section 22(1) was existing. In support of his contention Dr. Chandrachud relied upon the decision of the Gram Panchayat v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd., : [1990]1SCR966 : Judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Bengal Lamps Limited v. Furmanite Nicco Limited, 91991) 72 Com Cas 146: Dr. Chandrachud also referred to the order passed by A.P.Shah,J. on 23.03.1997 in suit No. 25 of 1996. Oman International Bank S.A.O.G. v. Messrs Madalsa International Ltd. The learned counsel appearing for the decree-holder Bank also argued that the expression 'suit' does not include execution of the decree under section 22 of the SICA 1985 and, therefore, contentions of the learned counsel for the defendants are wholly misconceived.
7. If the contention raised by the learned counsel for the decree-holder is upheld that mere filing of the reference under Section 15 or registration of reference under Regulation 15 cannot be constructed to mean that enquiry under Section 16 has commenced or is pending, obviously the other contention raised by the learned senior counsel for the defendants that the expression suit occurring in Section 22 includes execution may not be required to be gone into. The first answerable question, therefore, is whether on filing of the reference by the defendant industrial company under section 15 of SICA 1985 and its registration on 10-04-1997, can it be said that enquiry under Section 16 has commenced or pending?
8. Section 15, Section 16 and Section 22(1) of the SICA 1985 read thus: -
'15. Reference to Board - (1) Where an industrial company has become a sick industrial company, the Board of Directors of the Company, shall, within sixty days from the date of finalisation of the duly audited accounts of the company for the financial year as at the end of which shall be adopted with respect to the company;
Provided that of the Board of Directors had sufficient reasons even before such finalisation to form the opinion that the company, the Board of Directors shall, within sixty days after it has formed such opinion, make a reference to the Board for the determination of the measures which shall be adopted with respect to the company.
(2) Without prejudice to the provision of sub-section (1), the Central Government or the Reserve Bank or a State Government or a public financial institution or a State level institution or a scheduled bank may, if it has sufficient reasons to believe that any industrial company has become, for the purpose of this Act, a sick industrial company, make a reference in respect of such company to the Board for determination of the measures which may be adopted with respect to such company.
Provided that a reference shall not be made under his sub-section in respect of any industrial company by--
(a) the Government of any State unless all or any of the industrial undertaking belonging to such company are situated in such State:
(b) a public financial institution or a State level institution or a scheduled bank unless it has, by reason of any financial assistance or obligation rendered by it, or undertaken by it, with respect to such company, an interest in such company.'
'16. Inquiry into working of sick industrial companies - (1) The Board may make such inquiry as it may deem fit for determining whether any industrial company--
(a) upon receipt of a reference with respect to such company under Section 15; or
(b) upon information received with respect to such company or upon its own knowledge as to the financial condition of the company;
(2) The Board may, if it deems necessary or expedient so to do for the expeditious disposal of an inquiry under sub-section (1), require by order any operating agency to enquire into and make a report with respect to such matter as may be specified in the order.
(3) The Board or, as the case may be the operating agency shall complete its inquiry as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to complete the inquiry within sixty days from the commencement of the inquiry.
Explanation - For the purpose of this sub-section, an inquiry shall be deemed to have commenced upon the receipt by the Board of any reference or information or upon its own knowledge reduced to writing by the Board.
(4) Where the Board deems it fit to make an inquiry or to cause an inquiry to be made into an industrial company under sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, under sub-section (2) it may appoint one or more persons to be a special director or special directors of the company for safeguarding the financial and other interests of the company or in the public interest.
(4A) The Board may issue such directions to special director appointed under sub-section (4) as it may deem necessary or expedient for proper discharge of his duties.
(5) The appointment of a special director referred to in sub-section (4) shall be valid and effective notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Companies Act. 1956 (1 or 1956) or in any other law for the time being in force or in the memorandum and articles association or any other instrument relating to the industrial company, and any provisions regarding share qualification, age limit, number of directorship, removal from office of directors and such like condition contained in any such law or instrument aforesaid, shall not apply to any director appointed by the Board.
(6) Any special director appointed under sub-section (4) shall--
(a) hold office during the pleasure of the Board and may be removed or substituted by any person by order in writing by the Board:
(b) not incur any obligation or liability by reason only of his being a director or for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the discharge of his duties as a director or anything in relation thereto:
(c) not be liable to retirement by rotation and shall not be taken into account for computing the number of directors liable to such retirement;
(d) not be liable to be prosecuted under any law for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the discharge of his duties in relation to the sick industrial company.'
22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc.-- (1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an enquiry under Section 16 is pending or any scheme is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act. 1956 (1to 1956) or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding-up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans, or advance granted to the industrial shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or as the case may be, the Appellate Authority.'
9. Under the Act the regulations have been framed called Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction Regulation, 1987 and Chapter II of the regulations provide for reference under Section 15.
10. Regulation 19 reads thus:
'19. (1) every reference to the board under Sub-section (1) of section 15 shall be made--
(i) in Form A in respect of an industrial company other thana Government company;
(ii) in Form AA in respect of a Government company,
and shall be accompanied by five further copies thereof alongwith four copies each of all the enclosure thereto.
(2) Every reference to the Board under subsection 15 shall be made--
(i) in Form B in respect of an industrial company other than a Government company;
(ii) in Form BB in respect of a Government company.
(3) A reference may be filed, either by delivering it at the office of the Board or by sending it by registered post.
(4) On receipt of a reference, the secretary, or as the case may be, the Register shall cause to be endrosed on each reference, the date on which it is filed or received in the office of the board.
(5) If on scrutiny, the reference is found to be in order it shall be registered, assigned a serial number and submitted to the Chairman for assigning it to a Bench. Simultaneously, remaining information/documents required. If any, shall be called for from the informant.
(6) If on scrutiny, the reference is not found to be in order, the Secretary or as the case may be, the Register may by order decline to register the reference and shall communicate the same to the informant.
(7) A reference declined to be registered shall be deemed no to have been made.
(8)(1) An appeal against the order of the Register declining to register a reference shall be made by the aggrieved person to the secretary within fifteen days of communication to him of such an order.
(2) An appeal against the order of the Secretary declining to register a reference shall be made by the aggrieved person to the Chairman within fifteen days of communication to him of such an order and the Chairman's decision thereon shall be final.'
11. Regulation 19 provides that on receipt of reference, the secretary, or as the case may be, the Register shall cause to be endorsed on each reference, the date on which it is filed or received in the office of the Board. Clause (5) of Regulation 19 provides that if the reference is found in order on scrutiny, it shall be registered, assigned a serial number and submitted to the Chairman for assigning it to a Bench. Simultaneously , if any remaining information or documents are required, the same shall be called for from the informant. Under the scheme of SCIA 1985, after the reference is made under section 15, the Board may make an inquiry as it may deem fit for determining whether an industrial company has became a sick industrial company. By making of the reference or by its registration of the reference or by its registration, it cannot be said that the inquiry under section 16 has connected or is pending. There is definitely hiatus between the registration of the reference and the order of enquiry under section 16. Once the reference is registered and, numbered it has to placed before the Bench assigned by the Chairman and the concerned bench has to apply its mind whether inquiry under section 16 needs to be made or not. For the purposes of Section 22(1), the inquiry under Section 16 can be said to be pending when the BFIR applies its mind to the question whether it would inquire into the matter and orders inquiry should not be made because then it can be said that BFIR after application of mind prima facie forms the opinion that unless cause is shown otherwise inquiry deserves to be made. What is really material is application of mind by BIFR on the question to make or not to make an inquiry after registration of reference. Reference to the Board under sub-section (4) of Section 15 when found in order in registered by Secretary or registrar of the BIFR under Regulation 19 (5). By registration of reference, a ministerial act done by secretary or registrar, the legislature never intend that provision of section 22(1) should be attracted, Can it be said that upon a frivolous reference made under Section 15(1) though in order by the industrial company actuated with ulterior motive to avoid payment to creditors and accordingly registered, the legislature intended that legal proceedings as contemplated under section 22(1) against the individual company should be suspended. Of course , that was set objective in enacting Section 22(1) and using the expression 'an inquiry under Section 16 is pending'. This expression seeks to ensure that it relates to the inquiry which the BIFR has decided to make after registration of inquiry and its commencement. Yet another aspect may be adverted to. Section 22(1) does not bar the legal proceedings mentioned therein altogether against the industrial company. With the consent of the BIFR or appellate authority as the case may be, the proceedings may be continued. That means BIFR grant consent unless it has commenced the inquiry.
12. As seen as the enquiry under section 16 is ordered by the board the various proceedings set out in section 22 would be deemed to have been suspended.
13. In the matter of Bengal Lamps Limited v. Furmanite Nicco Limited, (1991) 73 Comp Cas 146, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court was seized of the similar question and held thus:--
' We do not think that, after the registration of a reference under Section 15 of the Act, the Board has no option but to hold an enquiry. The word 'may' in Section 16(1) would indicate that the Board can refuse to hold an enquiry. This power must, in any event, be taken to be a necessary corollery to the power to hold an enquiry. It is possible that if the Board finds a reference to be frivolous, it may exercise its option of nor holding an enquiry at all. We are fortified in our finding by the three unreported decisions relied upon by Mr. Sarkar. Although this issue was not specifically raised before the Supreme Court in the Gram Panchayat's case. : [1990]1SCR966 , we cannot lose sight of the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 10 of the decision, Viz. (at page 173 of 72 Comp Cas : (at P. 1020 of AIR):
'As soon as the enquiry under Section 16 is ordered by the Board, the various proceedings set out under sub-section (1) of Section 22 would be deemed to have been suspended.
'However, in our view, it is immaterial whether the Board has an option to hold or not to hold an enquiry under Section 16 of the Act in view of our interpretation of Section 22(1).
Section 22(1) is so far as it is material provides as follows :
22. (1) Where , in respect of an industrial company , an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or..... where an appeal under Section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then ..... no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company..... shall be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the board or as the case may be, the appellate authority'.
We are of view that the Phrase 'enquiry ending under section 16 does not include a reference under section 15. We are supported in our view by the scheme of the Act.
The scheme of the Act would show that a distinction is drawn between a reference, enquiry and scheme. Apart from the heading of chapter III of the Act, the regulation, would also show that a distinction is drawn between a reference and an enquiry. Regulation 19 deals with references under section 15 while regulation 20 deals with enquiries under section 16. An inquiry under section 16 is, therefore only a stage in the proceedings contemplated under the Act. If one were to adopt the analogy of a suit as submitted by Mr. Mitra, the inquiry could be equated with the actual trial. A trial cannot be said to be pending merely because a suit is filed. Similarly, an enquiry under section 16 cannot be said to be pending merely because a reference is filed.
In any event the words of the statue are explicit. Section 22 refers to an enquiry under Section 16. Had it been the intention of the Legislature to extend the provisions of Section 22 to a reference made under Section 15, the Legislature has not chosen to do .
The use of the words 'under section 16' limits the words 'enquiry pending' in Section 22(1). The provisions of Section 22(1) apply only to such enquiries and to no other. It is well established that, if the language is clear, the Court must give effect to it, for 'the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature'. In these circumstances, the case of In re Rippon, (1943) 1 All ER 676, as well as the two passages from Maxwell cited by Mr.Mitra can have no application.
In view of the express wording of the statute there is no question of the application of the principles of beneficial construction. In any event , Section 2 of the Act indicates that the Act has been enacted for giving effect to the directive principles as continued in Articles 39(b) and (c) of the Constitution of India. The principles contained in Articles 39(b) and (c) relate to subserving the common good as opposed to concentration of wealth.
It would appear from the statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act that one of the objects of the Act is to salvage the productive assets and realise the amount due to the banks and other financial institutions to the extent possible from the non-available industrial companies through liquidation of those companies.
It other words, the benefit if the legislation is not aimed merely at reviving a sick industry but also to put an end to a non- viable sick industry with a view to protecting investment of public funds.
At the time of the registration of a reference, the secretary is expected only to see whether the documentation is in order. The secretary is not required to come to any decision regarding the merit of the reference. There is necessarily some hiatus between the registration of the reference and the commencement of the enquiry. As stated above, one of the objects of the Act is to protect public investment made through financial institutions. If we accept the construction of section 22(1) put forward by Mr. Mitra, it would defeat the objectives sought to be achieved by the Act. For example, a company, with the mischievous intent of avoiding its creditors, could file a reference under Section 15 with truthful but correct documentation. It may be that the circumstances of the case may not warrant the filing of a reference in fact. According to Mr. Mitra the document being in order, the secretary would register the reference under regulation 19 and the enquiry under section 16 would be pending from that date. The result would be that recovery proceedings by a financial institution would be stalled for a crucial period allowing the dishonest company time to siphon off its assets. This cannot have been the intention of the Legislature'.
14. Mr. Doctor, the learned senior counsel appearing for the defendants sought to rely upon the judgement of Andhra Pradesh High Court in sponge Iron India Ltd . V. Neelima Steels Ltd. (1990) 68 Comp Cas 201 . The learned single Judge of the Andhra pradesh High court was also seized of similar question as posed before me and held thus:--
'Sri V. Rajagopala Reddy learned counsel appearing for one of the petitioners. Contended that the mere registration of a reference under section 16(1) will not make section 22 applicable or be aground for stopping the winding up proceedings in this court. According to him , the action of the secretary in registering a reference is a ministerial act and it does not indicate that there has been an inquiry or any inquiry is pending before the Board . It is contended that , unless an inquiry as contemplated by any of the sub-sections (2) to (4) has commenced . Section 22 doers not become applicable. He has fairly stated that there is only one reported decision in Industrial Finance corporation of India v. Maharashtra Steels Ltd., : AIR1988All170 , Which is prima facie, against him, but, according to him, has not directly dealt with this question.
In view of the various provisions noticed above, the inquiry contemplated by Section 16 will commence either on the receipt of a reference under Section 15(1) or (2) or, on the basis of any other information received by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. These two situations are reflected in section 16(1)(a) and 16(1)(b), In the case of reference, the secretary is empowered to hold a preliminary inquiry and register it and, therefore, the board will make such inquiry as it considers necessary in connection with the alternative measures to be adopted under sections 17 to 20.
Where there is no reference and the Board chooses to commence an inquiry, naturally there will be a contest by the company itself and in such cases the Board will conduct an inquiry keeping in view the provisions of the other sub-sections of Section 3(o) applies to the company in respect of which the inquiry is being held. It will then consider one of the alternative measures under sections 17 to 20 . According to the scheme of the Act, after an inquiry under section 16 has commenced and it is determined that it is a sick company within the meaning of section 3(o) the proceeding will terminate only after one of the alternative measures under sections 17 to 20 are taken. In several of the cases large amounts (the liability for which is not disputed by the respective companies) have not been paid by the companies and the respective petitioners are suffering hardship. Probably the petitioners or other creditors can intervene at the stage of inquiry before determination of the question of applicability of section 3(o) if they dispute it and have material to show that the industrial sickness is a device to defeat the claims and pray that some transactions of the company have to be invalidated . But this is a matter which can be examined and decided only by the Board. In view of the scheme of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Court under the Companies Act is excluded by is however, excluded by Section 26. Therefore, the registration of a reference by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (may be by the Secretary under the powers conferred on him) is, prima facie, proof that the enquiry before the Board is pending and the Board has to take further steps for taking one of the alternative measure under Sections 17 to 20. Once it is show that a reference is registered under Act. Section 22 becomes applicable and this is how I would answer point No.(a).'
15. The judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court of course helps the defendants but there is difference of opinion between the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Calcutta High Court. It would not be out of place to refer to the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Industrial Finance Corporation of India v. Maharashtra Steel Ltd., : AIR1988All170 wherein the Allahabad High Court held thus :--
'11. It is next urged that under S. 16 of Act No. 1 of 1986 the, language used is :--
'The Board may make such inquiry as it may deem fit.'
The argument is that the word 'may' used here itself indicates that it is directory in the nature and not mandatory. The argument to my mind is not sustainable. Looking to the scheme of the Act after a reference under S. 15 of the Act has been made and the same having been registered the Board cannot decline to enquire into the matter. It may on enquiry come to the conclusion that the application that for treating the company concerned as sick unit is not acceptable and thus reject the application but it cannot be said that Board has discretion not even to enquire specially after reference being registered and after nominating a Bench of the Board. The word may only qualifies the word make such inquiry is mandatory. In fact sub section (2) of S. 16 of the Act lays down that the enquiry may be made wither by Board or its agency or it may require any operating agency to enquiry into and make a report.
12. Even if in law if it could be argued that there is some gap between the actual holding of the enquiry and registration, it would not be proper for this Court on the facts and circumstances of this case to exercise its powers specifically keeping in view of the object for which the aforesaid Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act was been enacted. The main object is to salvage a viable Company by making available funds by other assistance or by making alterations etc. as contemplated under the said Act.'
16. There is no doubt that object of SICA is to salvage a viable company by making available funds for rehabilitating that company or by making available funds by other assistance or by making alterations as contemplated under the Act. In the absence of there being any order by the Board or by the concerned Bench for holding the inquiry or for issuance of notice for holding the inquiry, by mere filing the reference or by registration of such reference, it cannot be said that the inquiry under Section 16 has commenced or is pending. In my view, for the reasons already stated, by mere filing of the reference under Section 15 by registration of the reference, it cannot be said that enquiry under Section 16 is pending or has commenced. I find myself in agreement with the view of the Calcutta High Court in Bengal Lamps Limited 1991 (72) Comp Cas 146(supra) and with respect I am unable to subscribe to the view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sponge Iron India Ltd. 1990 (68) Comp Cas 201 (supra).
17. The learned senior counsel appearing for defendants submitted that an explanation has been added to sub-section (3) of Section 16 which provides that an inquiry shall be deemed to have been commenced upon the receipt by the Board of any reference or information or upon its own knowledge reduced to writing by the Board and in view of the explanation the inquiry under Section 16 shall be deemed to have been commenced on receipt of the reference by the Board. The explanation added to sub-section (3) of Section 15 has been considered by the A.P.Shah, J. in Oman International Bank S.A.O.G. v. Messrs Madalsa International Ltd. (supra) and he held thus:--
'6 Ms Iyer's argument is that the moment reference is filed in the office of the BIFR under S. 15(1) of the Act, it connotes the stage of commencement of inquiry within the meaning of S. 16 and the bar under S. 22 is squarely attracted. In that behalf Ms. Iyer relies upon the explanation of sub-sec. (3) of S. 16 which provides that an inquiry shall be deemed to have commenced upon the receipt by the Board of any reference or information or upon its own knowledge reduced to writing by the Board. I am afraid that the argument of Ms Iyer is completely misconceived. The scope of explanation of sub-sec. (3) is resticted only for the purposes of sub-sec. (3). It merely provides that period of 60 days mentioned in sub-sec. (3) shall be reckoned from the date of receipt of the reference by the Board. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the argument of Ms Iyere that the moment a refernce is lodged in the office of the BIFR and even if it is not registered, it must be presumed that the Board has commenced inquiry. We have already seen that under regulation 19 before a reference filed under S. 15(1) is registered, a scrutiny is made by the Secretary/Registrar. If on scrutiny, the reference is not found to be in order, the Secretary or, as the case may be, the Registrar has right to decline the reference and if reference is declined to be registered, it shall be deemed not to have been made. The order declining reference is made appealable. It is thus clear that a reference made under S. 15(1) is no reference in the eyes of law until it is registered after scrutiny by the Secretary/Registrar. Mere filing of a reference in the office of the BIFR would not amount to an inquiry within the meaning of S. 16 of the Act. Consequently, the question of application of S. 22 does not arise. In this connection reference may be made to the decision reported in Bengal Lamps Limited v. Furnanite Nicco Limited (1991) 72 Comp Cas 146). There it was held by the Calcutta High Court that where a company has only been registered by the Board on a reference under S. 15(1) has been made and the same is registered by the Board, it connotes that the stage of commencement of inquiry was pending before the Board. The Board would, once it registers a reference, make an inquiry which might take some time due to various reasons like heavy pendency of like cases. The view of the Himachal Pradesh High Court on registration of the reference the stage of commencement is reached and it would mean that an inquiry is pending before the Board.
18. According to me also the scope of explanation to sub-sec. (3) is restricted only for the purposes of sub-sec. (3). It merely provides that period of 60 days mentioned in sub-sec. (3) shall be reckoned from the date of receipt of the reference by the Board. The legislature has ensured that on receipt of reference, it does not remain unattended indefinitely. It does not mean that the reference if lodged in the office of the BIFR and when registered, it must be presumed that the Board has commenced inquiry. Of course the stage with which A.P.Shah J. was considereing, the reference was not registered and in that context the observations were made but so far as applicability of sub-sec. (3) of S. 16 is concerned, it does not make any difference. Explanation has been added to sub-sec. (3) for the purposes of sub-sec. (3) only and from the said explanation no inference can be drawn that upon registration of the reference the inquiry under S. 16 shall be deemed to have commenced or is pending for the purpose of S. 22(1).
19. In view of the aforesaid discussion I am unable to hold that inquiry under S. 16 is pending before th BIFR and therefore S. 22(1) of SICA 1985 cannot be said to be attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In view of this finding, I need not go into the question whether the expression 'suit' occurring in S. 22 which has been added by the amendment in the year 1993 includes execution proceedings or not.
20. The chamber summons accordingly has no merit and is dismissed.
21. Mr. Doctor, the learned senior counsel orally prays for stay of this order for a period of four weeks and for continuation of ad-interim orders dated 26-3-1997 and 27-3-1997 for a period of four weeks. Dr. Chandrachud appearing for the decree holder Bank has no objection if the ad interim orders passed by this Court on 26-3-1997 and 27-3-1997 are allowed to remain operative for a period of three weeks from today and the operation of the present order is stayed for a period of three weeks.
22. Accordingly, the operation of the order passed by me today shall remain stayed for a period of three weeks and the ad-interim orders passed on 26-3-1997 and 27-3-1997 shall remain operative for a period of three weeks.
23. Order accordingly.