Judgment:
Metha, J.
1. This criminal writ petition has been field by one Smt. Shashikala Krishnarao Rane in respect of the detenu Krishnarao Appaji Rane who was detained under as Order of detention dt. 9th June, 1986 issued by the Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu, Dr. Gopal Sing as also under a declaration dt. 11th June, 1986 issued by the Additional Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, respondent 2 herein. The petitioner prays for issue of an appropriate writ for quashing the impugned Order of detention dated 9th June, 1986 as also the declaration dt. 11th July, 1986 and further that the detenu be released from detention forthwith and be set at liberty.
2. Respondents 3, the Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu issued an order of detention against the detenu Krishnarao Appaji Rane dated 9th June, 1986 under S. 3(1)(ii) and (iii), Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 'the COFEPOSA Act'). The said Order of detention mentioned that with a view to prevent the detenu from abetting the smuggling goods and also with a view to preventing him from keeping and concealing smuggled goods it was necessary to detain the detenu in the Central Jail at Aguada on the grounds of detention served on him. This Order of detention was served on the detenu on 14th June, 1986. On the same day the detenu was also served with the grounds in support of the said Order of detention. Along with the grounds of detention was served a Marathi translation of the grounds of detention dated 9th June, 1986, as also a list of documents relied on by the detaining Authority.
3. The Additional Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, respondent 2 issued a declaration under S. 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act dt. 11th July, 1986. This declaration was served on the detenu on 18th July, 1986 in Jail. Along with the declaration the detenu was furnished with a Marathi translation of the said declaration.
4. Mr. Karmali, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the detenu has impugned the Order of detention dt. 9th June, 1986, on three grounds. Firstly that the Order of detention did not convey to the detenu the purpose of his detention under S. 3(1)(iii) of the COFEPOSA Act in that the order of detention stated that the detenu was detained with a view to preventing him from keeping and concealing smuggled goods. According to Mr. Karmali, the Order thus conveyed that the detenu had indulged in a stray act or acts of keeping or concealing smuggled goods. Whereas under S. 3(1)(iii) of the said Act a person could be detained provided he engaged himself in keeping or concealing smuggled goods. According to Mr. Karmali, the difference pointed out by him was of substantial import, in that the omission of the word 'engaging' in the Order of detention conveyed a different meaning to the one which was meant to be conveyed under the provisions of S. 3(1)(iii) of the said Act. According to Mr. Karmali the omission was of such significance as would entirely distort the purpose for which the detenu was detained and did not accurately convey to him the purpose of his detention.
5. Mr. Karmali assailed the Order of detention secondly, on the ground that the translation in Marathi of the grounds of detention and in particular, in Para 36 of the said grounds were not the proper translation and did not convey the correct meaning of the grounds furnished in English. Mr. Karmali laid particular stress on the following two sentences firstly : 'I have come to the conclusion that you have committed the wrongful act of evading duty and you have done the illegal act of storing and concealing the duty evaded goods worth several lakhs of rupees' and secondly, 'In order to prevent you from abetting the wrongful act of evading duty and also to prevent you from storing, concealing duty evaded goods' and submitted that these have not been faithfully translated and the manning thereof has been distorted to an extent where the detenu could not make an effective representation under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution.
6. Thirdly, Mr. Karmali contended that the Marathi translation of the declaration made under S. 9(1) of the said Act which was furnished to the detenu was not a faithful translation of the original declaration. Mr. Karmali pointed out that there were three sentences appearing in the said declaration which did not convey to the detenu the correct meaning of the original declaration. These sentences were : (i) 'with a view to preventing him from abetting the smuggling of goods and concealing and keeping smuggled goods'; (ii) 'likely to abet the smuggling of goods into and through the coast of Goa'; and (iii) 'is likely to engage in concealing and keeping smuggled goods in Honda, Sattari Taluka, Goa'. According to Mr. Karmali, the Marathi translations supplied to the detenu, both of Para 36 of the grounds as also of the declaration under S. 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act were so diametrically different that they did not convey to the detenu the correct purport of the original grounds and the declaration. Mr. Karmali argued that failure to give a faithful translation of the grounds and the declaration prevented the detenu from making an effective representation against the Order of detention and on that ground also the Order of detention ought to be quashed.
7. We shall now consider each of the three grounds submitted by Mr. Karmali. Mr. Karmali has drawn our attention to the Order of detention dt. 9th June, 1986. It will be relevant to recite the first para of the said Order of detention for the purpose of appreciating Mr. Karmali's argument. Para 1 of the Order of detention is in the following words :-
'Whereas, I, Gopal Singh, Administrator of Goa, Daman am satisfied with respect to the person known as Krishnarao Appaji Rane son of Appaji Rane residing at Saleli, Honda, Sattari-Goa, that with a view to preventing him from abetting there smuggling of goods and also with a view to preventing him from keeping and concealing smuggled goods it is necessary to make the following order.'
Mr. Karmali contended that the Order of detention was purported to have been passed under Cls. (ii) and (iii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. However, the reasons for detention as set out in the Order of detention as set out in the Order of detention were not in consonance with Cls. (ii) and (iii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. Mr. Karamali pointed out that under Cl. (iii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 it was provided that a person could be detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing him from - '(iii) engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods'. However, the Order of detention omitted to mention the word 'engaging'. Mr. Karmali pointed out that the omission of an innocuous word from the text of the enactment may not be at times fatal to the Order of detention, however, when a word was crucial and significant, in that the word conveyed a certain intended meaning, then omission to mention such a word would entirely distort the intention of the enactment, and such an omission would vitiate the order of detention.
8. It will be pertinent to set forth the provisions of Cl. (iii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. It provides :-
'S. 3(1). The Central Government or the State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of state Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government may, if satisfied, with respect to any person (including a foreigner), that, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing him from -
(i) and (ii) ........
(iii) engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, or
(iv) and (v) ......
it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.'
9. According to Mr. Karmali the Order of detention was based on Cl. (ii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the said Act i.e., for abetting the smuggling of goods and also on Cl. (iii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the said Act for engaging in concealing or keeping smuggled goods. Mr. Karmali had no dispute with regard to Cl. (ii) which related to the abetting of smuggling of goods. However, with regard to Cl. (iii) Mr. Karmali submitted that the word 'engaging' had been omitted and the Order mentioned that the Order had been passed :- 'with a view to preventing him from keeping and concealing smuggled goods.'
10. We find considerable substance in the argument put forth by Mr. Karmali. Normally we would not be inclined to set aside an order of detention merely on the ground that the detention Order omitted to mention a word here or a word there of the provisions of the COFEPOSA Act. However, as in the instant case, where the word omitted is a word omitted is a word of crucial and significant import and the omission entirely alters the complexion of the intendment of the enactment, then one is compelled to take notice of such an omission. Now the word 'engaging' has been made use of in Cls. (iii) (iv) and (v) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act and to our mind the word has been introduced with particular intention. Clause (i) refers to a person smuggling goods. Clause (ii) refers to abetting the smuggling of goods and in these two clauses the word 'engaged' has advisedly not been introduced. But in Cls. (iii), (iv) and (v) this word has been introduced to convey a certain meaning. Clause (iii) relates to a person engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. Clause (iv) concerns a person dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods and Cl. (v) relates to harbouring persons engaged in smuggling or in abetting the smuggling of goods. Now in these three clauses the word 'engaged' has been introduced to mean a person habitually occupied or employed in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. The clause would not embrace within its purview a person who indulged in a stray case of transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, but only a person who consistently employed or occupied himself in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. It is only such a person who engaged himself in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods who would fall within the four corners of Cl. (iii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act.
10-A. The interpretation of the word 'engaged' given by us finds support in a judgment delivered by the Karnataka High Court in the case of R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka, reported in , wherein the learned judges of the Division Bench of the High Court were pleased to observe :-
'This takes us to the third contention urged for the petitioner that the order of detention was not in conformity with Cl. (iii) of sub-s. (1). The order just provides that 'with a view to preventing him from keeping smuggled goods'. It was urged that the Detaining Authority has not stated that the detention was necessary with a view to prevent the detenu from engaging in keeping smuggled goods. It seems to us that there is a good deal of substance in this contention. Clause (iii) could be invoked only to prevent a person from engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods. The Detaining Authority must be satisfied that it is necessary to prevent a person from engaging in such objectionable activities. The meaning of the word 'engage' as found in the Concise Oxford Dictionary is 'hold fast (attention), employ busily'. There is thus a lot of difference between the activities of just 'keeping' and the 'engage in keeping' and the Detaining Authority obviously has not applied its mind. In Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, : 1966CriLJ608 the Supreme Court observed that where a man can be deprived of has liberty under a rule by the simple process of the making of a detention order, he could only be so deprived of if the order is terms of the rules and strict compliance with the letter of the rule is the essence of the matter, and if there is any doubt regarding the observance of the rules, that doubt must be resolved in favour of the detenu ..............'
11. We must therefore be guided by the language of the Order and not by the intention of the Detaining Authority. We may also observe that if a Detention Order could be made to prevent a person from keeping smuggled goods then every person having one or the other foreign made goods without proof of its valid acquisition from an authorised source could be detained under Cl. (iii). We do not think that such was the intention of the Legislature. Learned counsel was therefore justified in this contention that the detention Order was not in accordance with Cl. (iii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act.
12. We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning of the learned Judges of the Karnataka High Court and we feel that the omission of a word which is of significant import and which conveys a certain intention of the draftsman and cannot be brushed aside lightly. When the Order of detention dated 9th June, 1986 mentions that the detenu was detained with a view to preventing him from keeping and concealing smuggled goods it conveys the meaning that the detenu had been involved only in a stray incident of keeping and concealing smuggled goods. Clause (iii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act provides for the detention of a person who is engaged or employed or is habituated in concealing or keeping smuggled goods. Therefore the meaning conveyed by the Order of detention is very different from the meaning conveyed by Cl. (iii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. We are therefore of the view that the Order of the detention insofar as it is not in consonance with the provisions of Cl. (iii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act is an order which is vitiated and must therefore he struck down.
13. Mr. Bhobe, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has submitted that in the instant case the order of detention has been based on two grounds. Firstly, for abetting smuggling of goods which would fall under Cl. (ii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act and secondly, with a view to preventing the detenu from keeping and concealing smuggled goods which would fall under Cl. (iii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. According to Mr. Bhobe even if the Court was of the view that the wording of the Order of detention with regard to 'keeping and concealing smuggled goods' was not in consonance with Cl. (iii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the said Act then the first reason, that is the abetting of smuggled goods, was in consonance with Cl. (ii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 33 of the COFEPOSA Act and since the two clauses were severable, the detention Order would hold good. Mr. Bhobe urged with some vehemence that if an Order of detention could be saved on the principle of severability then the Court should be inclined in favour of saying the Order of detention in respect of economic offenders Mr. Bhobe relied upon the provisions of S. 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act and contended that the provisions of S. 5-A would apply in the instant case. Section 5-A provided that were a person had been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention could be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly such order could not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds were (i) vague, (ii) non-existent (iii) not relevant, (iv) no connected or not proximately connected with such person, or (v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever. Now it is necessary to point out that S. 5-A related to the grounds furnished to a detenu in support of the Order of detention. It does not apply to an Order of detention. The grounds of detention are supplied to a detenu under sub-s. (3) of S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. Sub-sec. (3) of S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act is in the following terms :-
'(3) For the purpose of Cls. (5) of Art. 22 of the Constitution, the communication to a person detained in pursuance of a detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention.'
It is therefore apparent that S. 5-A relates to the grounds furnished to a detenu in support of the order of detention and it has no relevance to the Order of detention. We must therefore reject the submission made by Mr. Bhobe.
14. Mr. Bhobe contended that the commission of the word 'engaged' was through inadvertence and therefore the Court should not take a serious view of the lapse. An omission of a significant word by the Detaining Authority through inadvertence would tantamount to non-application of mind and we find it difficult to treat the omission lightly. In Khudiram Das v. State of West Bangal reported in : [1975]2SCR832 their Lordship were pleased to observe :-
'Where the liberty of the subject is involved, it is the bounden duty of the Court to satisfy itself that all the safeguards provided by the law have been scrupulously observed and the subject is not deprived of his personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with law.'
Again in the case Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., reported in : [1981]1SCR640 , their Lordship were pleased to lay down :-
'The burden of showing that the detention is in accordance with the procedure established by law has always been placed by this Court on the detaining authority because Art. 21 of the Constitution provides in clear and explicit terms that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law. This constitutional right of life and personal liberty is placed on such a high pedestal by this Court that the it has always insisted that the whenever there is any deprivation of life or personal liberty, the authority responsible for such deprivation must satisfy the Court that it has acted in accordance with the law. This is an area where the Court has been most strict and scrupulous in ensuring observance with the requirements of the law, and even where a requirement of the law is breached in the slightest measure, the Court has not hesitated to strike down the order of detention or to direct the release of the detenu even though the detention may have been valid till the breach occurred. The Court has always regarded personal liberty as the most precious possession of mankind and refused to tolerate illegal detention, regardless of the social cost involved in the release of a possible renegade.'
An order of detention requires the closest scrutiny of the material on which the decision is formed leaving no room for errors or at least avoidable errors. We therefore hold that the order of detention is not in consonance with Cl. (iii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act and is therefore vitiated.
15. We shall now deal with the second and third grounds of the submissions made by Mr. Karmali. Mr. Karmali has pointed out what he terms as distortions in the Marathi translations of the grounds and the declaration under S. 9(1) of the said Act, supplied to the detenu. Mr. Bhobe has pointed out that there was abundant material on the record to hold that the detenu knew English and knew it sufficiently well to the make an effective representation against the Order of detention and the grounds on which the said Order of detention was based. Mr. Bhobe pointed out that if the Court came to the conclusion that the detenu was well conversant with the English language then it was not necessary for the detaining authority to the supply the translations of the grounds on which the Order of the detention was based or to supply the translation of the declaration under S. 9(1) of the said Act. According to Mr. Bhobe, the translation of the grounds as also the declaration under S. 9(1) had been supplied to the detenu ex majority (abundanti ?) cautela or out of abundant caution. Mr. Bhobe pointed out that in the supplementary affidavit filed on the behalf of the detenu a School Transfer Certificate had been annexed which shows that the detenu had studied up to Std. IV in Marathi. According to Mr. Bhobe in the writ petition it was stated that the detenu had studied up to Std. VIII in Marathi. Mr. Bhobe contended that no reliance could be placed on this School Transfer Certificate for the reason that it only showed that the detenu had studied up to Std. IV in Marathi on the day on which this certificate was issued. This certificate does not rule out the possibility that the detenu might have studied further after the day of the certificate, a fact which was corroborated by the statement of the detenu under S. 108, Customs Act, and repeated in the writ petition. Mr. Bhobe drew our attention to the fact that the detenu in this statement before the Customs Officer under S. 108, Customs Act, had admitted that he was sufficiently conversant with the English language as to read, write and understand the same although he was not proficient at writing the same. It will be pertinent to set out the exact words of the detenu set out in the said statement under S. 108, Customs Act :-
'As regards may educational qualifications, I have to state that I have studied up to 8th standard in Marathi Medium. I know to read and write in Marathi. Besides I can also read and write Hindi. I can read, write and understand English language also but I am not proficient in writing it.'
Mr. Bhobe stated that it was true that this statement made by the detenu was later retracted by him. However, the retraction was at a later date and the Court ought to place reliance on the statement made by the detenu before the Customs Officers. Mr. Bhobe also pointed out that the detenu was a Sarpanch of the Honda Village Panchayat for a period of 15 years. He was also the Chairman of the Block Development Advisory Committee and he was a member of the Congress (I) party. All these facts find place in the petition itself. Mr. Bhobe also point out two document which were signed by the detenu in English. We are inclined to agree with Mr. Bhobe that the detenu is sufficiently conversant with the English language to the extent that he could have made an effective representation against the Order of the detention and the grounds supporting that Order.
16. Mr. Karmali, on the other hand, contended that the even if the detenu had a working knowledge of the English language, it could not be stated that it was sufficient to enable the detenu to make an effective representation against the Order of detention as envisaged under Art. 22(2) of the Constitution. We have considered the statement made by the detenu before the Customs Officer, where he has categorically stated that he could read, write and understand the English language although he was not proficient at writing the same. Such familiarity with the English language was sufficient to enable the detenu to make an effective representation against the Order of detention. We are therefore not inclined to accept the submission made by Mr. Karmali specially in view of the background of the detenu.
17. Mr. Karmali then contended that even if it be held for any reason that the detenu was familiar with the English language, since the detenu was supplied with Marathi translations of the grounds as also the declaration under S. 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act he was entitled to rely on the Marathi translations and to point out to the Court that the translations did not convey a faithful meaning of the original and this rendered him incapable of making an effective representation against the Order of detention. According to Mr. Karmali even if the translations were furnished out of the abundant precaution they could not be put to use Mr. Karmali's expression, 'in cold storage'. We are inclined to accept this submission made by Mr. Karmali. If the Detaining Authority thought it expedient to furnish the translations even though the detenu knew English, then the detenu was entitled to take advantage of the translations and to point out that the translations which he relied upon did not convey a faithful meaning of the original grounds of the Declaration under S. 9(1) of the Act and were such as to make it impossible for the detenu to communicate and on that the ground also the Order ought to be struck down.
18. Since we accept the submissions made By Mr. Karmali, we will now consider the translation of the grounds and the Declaration under S. 9(1) as furnished to the detenu to the find out whether the substantially the translations conveyed the meaning of the original grounds and the declaration under S. 9(1) or whether the translations conveyed a diametrically opposite meaning from their original.
19. Mr. Karmali has firstly taken exceptions to the Marathi translation of the Para 36 of the grounds furnished to the detenu. Exception has been taken on behalf of the detenu only to the contents of Para 36 of the grounds which is in the following words :- 'From the statements of S/Shri Sadguru Rama Parab, Sunil Natekar, Sukdo L. Naik, Nana Marathe, Venkatesh Atmaram Dessai alias Bandu Dessai, Balasaheb Atmaram Desai and your statements and the materials placed before me as described above, I have come to the conclusion that you have abetted the smuggling of goods and you have engaged in keeping and concealing smuggled goods worth several lakhs of rupees. Therefore, I am fully convinced that there is sufficient cause to pass detention order against you with a view to the preventing you from abetting the smuggling of goods and also with a view to preventing you from keeping and concealing smuggled goods'. Mr. Karmali has pointed out two distortions in Para 36 cited heretofore. Firstly, Mr. Karmali has pointed out that the words 'smuggled goods' has been translated as 'jakat chori cha mal'. According to Mr. Karmali this was an innovative translation of the words 'smuggled goods'. According to the Mr. Karmali the correct word for smuggled goods is 'taskari mal'. According to the learned Advocate 'jakat chori cha mal' would mean tax evaded goods and this could mean either evasion of excise, octroi, customs or any other levy and not necessarily smuggled goods. Therefore, according to learned counsel, the translation did not convey the correct meaning the words 'smuggled goods'. Secondly the word 'engaged' had not been translated at all in the Marathi translation. So also the word 'abetting', though the word 'abetting' had been added in English as an interpolation in the Marathi translation would not at all convey to the detenu the contents of the Para 36 of the grounds and would render it impossible for the detenu to communicate his objections to the Detaining Authority.
20. Now it may be pointed out that whilst dealing with the translations supplied by the Detaining Authority one cannot use the same inflexible criteria as one would use the same inflexible criteria as one would apply in the case of an Order of the detention. In dealing with the translations, one has to give some latitude to the ability of the translator for the reason that a translator is not supposed to apply his mind with the same amount of concentration and exactitude as the Detaining Authority. As long as a correct meaning is conveyed of the original by the translator, the translations must be held to be correct. It is only where a diametrically opposite meaning is conveyed by the translation or no meaning is conveyed by the translations or no meaning is conveyed at all, that the Court would hold that the detenu was not informed of the correct grounds or such as would make it possible for him to communicate his objections thereto. It is correct that in translating the words 'smuggled goods' in Para 36 the translator has used the terms 'jakat chori cha mal'. However, the expression is such as would convey to the detenu that what was referred to by the expression 'jakat chori cha mal' was smuggled goods. Further, what has been translated in Para 36 is that the detenu had done an illegal act of storing and concealing the duty evaded goods. The word 'engaged' mentioned in Para 36 in relation to concealing the duty evaded goods is again missing. This omission to our mind is vital inasmuch as we have held the same in the case of the Order of detention. To have omitted to translate this significant word would mean that the detenu was not furnished with a proper translation and this would render it impossible for the detenu to give a proper answer. It may also be pointed out that the word 'abetting' has also not been translated by the translator. Instead the word 'abetting' in English has been interpolated in the Marathi translation. This defect, too, to our mind, would not be a proper form of translation. For these reasons, we are of the view that even though the detenu was conversant with the English language, he was entitled to rely on the Marathi translations, since the Marathi translations were supplied to him by the Detaining Authority for whatever reason and the translations rendered by the Translator with regard to Para 36 of the grounds do not convey a faithful meaning of the original. Mr. Karmali, with his usual flair for research, has cited before us a number of reported and unreported judgments in support of his submission with regard to faulty translations. We do not think it necessary to cite those authorities for the reason that we are of the view that in the instant case the translation so far as Para 36 of the grounds is concerned is not a faithful or a near-faithful translation which would convey the meaning of the original and would enable the detenu to communicate his objections to the Detaining Authority.
21. With regard to the transaction of the declaration dated 11th July, 1986 under S. 9(1) of COFEPOSA Act Mr. Karmali has pointed out that here again the Translator had failed to translate the word 'engaged' in relation to 'concealing and keeping smuggled goods in Honda Sattari Taluka - Goa'. We agree with learned counsel that failure to translate this word 'engaged' which is of significant import would render the translation ineffective. On this ground also we are constrained to strike down the Order of detention.
22. It is regrettable that in this case we have had to set aside an order of detention in respect of an economic offender only because the Detaining Authority failed to mention the word 'engaged' whilst dealing with Cl. (iii) of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. The word, however, as we have pointed out bristles with meaning and its omission conveys a radically different meaning. We have therefore been constrained to come to the conclusion that the Detention Order must be struck down.
23. In the result, the rule is made absolute. A writ of Habeas Corpus will issue with a direction that the Order of detention dt. 9th June, 1986 is hereby quashed. The detenu will be set at liberty forthwith.
24. Petition allowed.