Sawant J.
1. The question referred to us by the Division Bench is as follows :
'Whether a private road or a private place to which the public have a permissive access would be a 'public place' within the meaning of section 2(24) as well as used in section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 ?'
2. The facts which give rise to the question may briefly be stated for a correct appreciation of the question as well as the answer that we propose to give. The deceased, Pradeep alias Pradyumna Fulshankar Kapta, was working as a sales engineer in a company called W.G. Forge and Allied Industries Ltd. Thane. At the relevant time, he was on duty at Pune and was looking after the work entrusted to him by the company. As a part of his duty, he was required to visit various factories and on February 27, 1981, he visited the factory of the second appellant, namely, Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd., situate at Pimpri, Pune, hereinafter referred to as 'TELCO'. He had gone to the factory on his scooter. There, he met one Niloba Rane and after finishing their work, both of them left the factory building with the deceased driving the scooter and Rane on its pillion seat. They moved from Blocks Nos. 'B' and 'E' to reach the main gate of the factory compound. A truck belonging to appellant No. 2 and driven by appellant No. 1 and which was going ahead of the deceased's scooter took a sudden 'U' turn with the result that the deceased, who was riding the scooter on the right side of the truck was knocked down, and suffered injuries due to the impact. He was immediately removed to the dispensary of the factory which was also in the factory compound. However, before any medical help could be given, he succumbed to his injuries. The claimants, i.e., respondents Nos. 2 and 3, thereafter filed the present application for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The claim was resisted by the first respondent insurance company, among other things, on the ground that the place where the accident took place being within the compound of the insured, i.e., the second appellant, it was not a 'public place' within the meaning of section 95 of the Act and, therefore, the insurance company was not liable to pay the compensation. This contention was upheld by the Tribunal and the Tribunal dismissed the claim against the insurance company but granted compensation of Rs. 1 lakh together with interest at 9% per annum jointly only against appellants Nos. 1 and 2, i.e., the driver of the truck and the TELCO. Being aggrieved by the decision, the appellants preferred the present appeal.
3. When the appeal came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this court, the Division Bench, by its decision and order dated October 3, 1985, referred the matter to a Full Bench on the question indicated at the very outset. That is how the matter comes up before us for decision.
4. Before we answer the legal question, it is necessary to refer to the relevant evidence with regard to the place where the accident occurred. Admittedly, the second appellant company has a huge establishment at the place concerned, and in the compound of the establishment, in addition to various structures, there are open spaces and roads for the passage of traffic. Vehicles of all sorts are plied on the said roads. In addition to the large number of employees, there is a constant traffic of outsiders visiting the factory for various purposes. The testimony of Sharadkumar Moreshwar Wadekar, senior security officer of the second appellant company on this point reads as follows :
'The width of the road at the place of accident is about 45 metres with a road divider in the centre. There is a traffic island nearby the place of accident but no road leading to the left of the island. The building of the computer division is on the left side of the road. The exit of the 'D' block is not on the main road. Similarly the exit of the 'E' block is also not opening on the main road. Blocks 'C' and 'D' are huge buildings with workshops. After joining the main road from the 'D' block, one has to cover a distance of about 80 metres for reaching the traffic island, in question. The map produced as exhibit 59 is drawn to scale and it is correct.
Suppliers, contractors and visitors are required to reach the various blocks of the factory premises by the main road in connection with their business. For going to the various blocks from the main gate of the factory, one is required to travel a distance of about 1 1/2 to 2 kms. by the main road or other roads. Permission is required for going to the various blocks. Various modes of conveyance, mainly cars, auto-rikshaws, scooters, mopeds and other vehicles are used for reaching the various units. Daily, about 500 to 600 parties visit the factory. About 100 vehicles of transport contractors ply and other vehicles of our factory ply for arranging transport of the employees of the factory per shift. There are four shifts in our factory. Outside visitors generally visit the general shift that is from 8.30 a.m. to 5.00 p.m.'
5. The witness has further admitted that there are about 230 personnel belonging to the security department on duty at the main entrance gate. The establishment is enclosed by compound walls and only a casual visitor is given a gate pass at the entrance. The regular visitors have a regular pass for a fixed period endorsed by the security department. The security department can refuse entry at the main entrance in the absence of proper authority and the department is entitled to take action against a person who has unauthorisedly entered. Generally, a person entering the factory premises is supposed to possess permission or authority. The permission can be oral or in writing. The permission is verified at the time of the entry in the factory premises. The entire factory premises including the main road, belong to the second appellant company. The maintenance of the road is also done by the second appellant company.
6. On the basis of this evidence, it was contended on behalf of the insurance company that the place where the accident took place, which is admittedly within the compound wall of the factory, is not a public place. The insurance policy was issued in favour of the appellant company only to cover liabilities from the accident by reason of the vehicle plying in a public place, and since the policy did not cover the risk at a private place, there was no liability of the insurance company and the liability was solely of the second appellant company. This contention, as we have pointed out earlier, found favour with the Tribunal and the claimants' claim against the insurance company was rejected. That is why the second appellant company has filed this appeal.
7. Before we discuss the various authorities cited before us on the meaning of the expression 'public place', it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the Act itself. The Act has been placed on the statute book to regulate the use of motor vehicles with a view, among other things, to ensure the safety of the persons and property exposed to use. It is for this purpose that the Act insists on a licence for driving a vehicle, on the suspension and cancellation of the licence in certain cases, on a licence for a conductor of a stage carriage, its revocation in certain cases, on the registration of all vehicles, on prohibition of its use for a purpose other than for which it is permitted to ply, on the limits of their weight and speed, on proper maintenance, on parking vehicles in a safe condition on road, on production of the licence when demanded and to stop it when requested, on giving necessary information in case of accident, on giving inspection of it, etc. However, some of the restrictions apply to vehicles even when they are not used in public places. For example, the restriction on the weight of the vehicle, on leaving the vehicle in dangerous condition on road, carrying any person or permitting any person to be carried on its running board or otherwise than within its body, allowing any person to stand or sit or anything to be placed in such manner or position as to hamper the driver in his control of the vehicle, carrying more than one pillion rider and the duty to stop the vehicle and remain stationary when required by the police officer or when the vehicle is involed in an accident, the duty to give information when the driver or the conductor of the vehicle is charged with any offence under the Act, the duty imposed on the driver of the vehicle or the person in charge of it to take all reasonable steps to secure medical attendance for the injured, etc., and to give information to the police, do not require that the vehicle on such occasions should have been plied at public places. These restrictions are attached to the vehicle itself whether it is used in a public place or not.
8. We also notice from Chapter VIIA that the no fault liability on account of the accident arises out of the use of the motor vehicle in any place and not necessarily in a public place. What is more, Chapter VIII which requires compulsory insurance of motor vehicles against third party risk and with which we are concerned in this petition, contains provisions in section 109A to section 109C with regard to hit-and-run accidents which do not require that the accident should have occurred in a public place to attract them. Section 110 contained in the said Chapter and which makes a provision for filing applications for claims arising out of the accidents does not stipulate that the accident should have occurred in a public place.
9. Chapter IX which deals with offences under the Act and penalties to be imposed for the same, etc., does not require that the offence of driving the vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drug should have occurred in a public place; so also, the offences referred to in sections 126 and 127 in that Chapter. The former section prohibits taking and driving away the vehicle without the consent of the owner or other lawful authority; whereas the latter refers to entering or mounting any stationary vehicle or tampering with the brake or any part of its mechanism. Such acts are offences even if they do not occur in a public place.
10. It is in the light of the object of the statute, its aforesaid relevant provisions and the scheme, that we have to appreciate the true import of the expression 'public place' for the purposes of Chapter VIII of the Act. It has further to be remembered that the expression 'public place' is a term of art, the same having been defined specifically by sub-clause (24) of section 2 of the Act. The definition reads as follows :
'24. 'public place' means a road, street, way or other place, whether a thoroughfare or not, to which the public have a right of access, and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage;'
11. The first thing to remember with regard to the definition is that it is an inclusive one. Secondly, it, in terms, makes it clear that any road, street, way or other place, whether a thoroughfare or not, is a public place for the purposes of the Act, the only condition being that the public should have a right of access to it. Thirdly, the expression used in the definition is 'a right of access' and not 'access as of right'. Lastly, when it states that any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage, is a public place, it shows that it is not so much concerned with the ownership of the place as with its user. Stage carriage is defined in sub-clause (29) of section 2 and it means a motor vehicle which is used to carry or adapted to carry more than six persons excluding the driver and which carries passengers for hire or reward at separate fares paid by or for individual passengers, either for the whole journey ar for stages of the journey. In short, it means a public passenger-carrier. In other words, by virtue of the last part of the definition, the expression would include any place, including a private one, where public passenger-carrier picks up or sets down passengers.
12. The definition of a 'public place' under the Act is, therefore, wide enough to include any place which members of public use and to which they have a right of access. The right of access may be permissive, limited, restricted or regulated by oral or written permission, by tickets, passes or badges or on payment of fee. The use may be restricted generally or to a particular purpose or purposes. What is necessary is that the place must be accessible to the members of the public and be available for their use, enjoyment, avocation or other purpose.
13. It is also necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the expression 'right of access' and 'access as of right'. The latter expression denotes a place where the members of public have a right of its use as members of public and as a matter of right, whether regulated, restricted or not. They cannot, however, be denied the said right except on legal ground. On the other hand, where there is only a right of access, the owner of the place, if he happens to be a private owner, may deny the access to any member of the public on any ground which he chooses. In other words, in the former case, the right of the members of the public to use the place is restricted compared to their right to use in the latter case. The definition under the Act uses the expression 'right of access' as pointed out earlier. What is, therefore, significant to note is that under the present definition, even a place, the right to the use of which is restricted, is a public place. Once this is borne in mind, much of the controversy raised before us around the correct meaning of the expression 'public place' loses its edge.
14. If we further bear in mind the overall object of the provisions of Chapter VIII which deals with compulsory insurance of vehicles to cover risks to third parties and their property, with claims to be filed for recovering compensation, no fault liabilities and liabilities arising out of hit-and-run accidents, etc., the intention of the Legislature is clear. It is to secure compensation to the persons and property which are exposed to the accidents caused by the vehicles. The very nature of the motor vehicle and its use mandate these provisions. The motor vehicle, in this respect, can be likened to a wild animal. Whoever keeps it does so at his risk. As pointed out earlier, some of the restrictions on the use of the vehicle contained in the Act are irrespective of the nature of the place where it is used and irrespective of whether it is plied or kept stationary. The Legislature was concerned not so much with the nature of the place where the vehicle causes the accident as where it was likely to do so. Hence, all places where the members of the public and/or their property are likely to come in contact with the vehicles can legitimately be said to be in its view when the Legislature made the relevant provisions for compulsory insurance. It will have, therefore, to be held that all places where the members of the public have an access, for whatever reasons, whether as of right or controlled in any manner whatsoever, would be covered by the definition of 'public place' in section 2(24) of the Act. To hold otherwise would frustrate the very object of the said Chapter and the Act.
15. Although the dictionary meaning of the expression is hardly of any use to us, it will be instructive to refer to it. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Fifth Edition, page 2094, 'public place' has been defined as follows :
'A public place is a place to which the public can and do have access; it doesn't matter whether they come at the invitation of the occupier or merely with his permission, or whether some payment or the performance of some formality is required before access can be had .....' This definition is taken from the decision in R v. Kane [1965] 1 All ER 705 (Stafford Assizes) and is a reproduction of only a part of it given there. The other part reads as follows (headnote) :'but a place, such as the club in the present case, would be a private place, if there was a real restriction of access to members and their guests and that any other member of the public who got in was in reality a trespasser.'
16. In this case, what fell for consideration was whether for the purposes of common law offence of affray in a public place, the Stage and Press Club where the offence took place was a public place. The other definitions of 'public place' given in the dictionary are with reference to the provisions of the Vagrancy Act of 1824. They are hardly of any relevance to us.
17. In Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, page 1107, 'public place' has been defined as follows :
'Public place :A place to which the general public has a right to resort; not necessarily a place devoted solely to the uses of the public, but a place which is in point of fact public rather than private, a place visited by many persons and usually accessible to the neighbouring public (e.g., a park or public beach). Also, a place in which the public has an interest as affecting the safety, health, morals, and welfare of the community. A place exposed to the public, and where the public gather together or pass to and fro.'
18. We may now refer to the decisions relied on by both sides which have interpreted the said definition of 'public place' under the Act as well as under other Acts. In LIC v. Karthyani, : AIR1976Ori21 , the learned Single Judge, interpreting the definition under the Act, has observed as under (headnote) :
'A place 'to which the public have a right of access' would mean the place where members of the public have admission as of right that is, where they can go without any hindrance or without being required to take any permission from anybody. If members of the public do not, as of right, have access to a particular place, that place cannot be said to be a public place as per the said definition.'
19. In the above case, what fell for determination was whether the factory premises of the Hindustan Steel Limited, Rourkela, were a 'public place' within the meaning of the Act. The learned judge held that members of the public could not go as of right inside the factory premises. At times, some visitors were permitted to go inside the factory premises on obtaining special permits on prior applications for the purpose. It was also common knowledge that the members of the public could not, as of right, claim to have a permit to enter the plant area, on mere payment of an entry fee or making an application to that effect. The grant of permission to ener the factory premises was always a matter of discretion of the authorities. The plant and factory area were further cordoned off from the township by a high boundary wall constructed all round the said area. The gates in the compound wall at different places were heavily guarded and entry through those gates was strictly controlled by the men and officers of the company. Although there were roads inside the factory premises some of which were broader than the main rods in the town, those roads were menat only for the specific purposes of the factory and were certainly not public thoroughfares, and the members of the public as such did not have any right to use these roads for any purpose whatsoever. In view of these facts, the learned judge held that the facotry premises were not a public place.
20. In Rajammal v. Associated Transport Co. [1970] ACJ 44 a single judge of the Madras High Court was called upon to decide whether the compound called Huzur Garden in a portion of which the company - Shardlow India Ltd. was situated and where the accident took place was a 'public place' under the Act. According to the learned judge, the criterion laid down in the definition was whether the public have a right of access to the place and it will not be a 'public place' merely if, as a matter of fact, the public have access. The learned judge, therefore, held that the said compound was a private property since there were 8 or 9 companies belonging to Amalgamations Ltd. by whom the road in the compound was kept, there were watchmen at two gates of the road and lorries had to get permission before they could enter. Though nothing was said about the members of the public requiring permission, the learned judge held that it was a reasonable inference from the evidence that the members of the public also required permission before they could enter. The learned judge, therefore, held that on the evidence it was clear that the public had no right as such to enter the premises and, therefore, it was not a 'public place'.
21. In Mangalamma v. Express Newspapers Ltd., : AIR1982Mad223 , a Division Bench of the Madras High Court had to consider whether the compound of a place in Express newspapers estate, where the accident had occurred was a 'public place' under the Act. The evidence showed that the Express estate had a compound wall all around and a gate at the entrance of the premises. There was a watchman at the inner gate and a watchman at the outer gate and one required permission to go inside the compound. On these facts, the Bench held that the Indian Express estate was a private place and not a 'public place' into which public can enter as of right.
22. In Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rabari Gandu Punja, : AIR1981Guj200 , the learned single judge was called upon to decide whether the compound of the Western India Tiles Company where the accident had occurred was a 'public place' within the meaning of the Act. The learned judge held that before a place is held to be a public place, it must be proved that public have a right of access. Since members of the public can enter the premises like the factory premises only upon express or implied permission of the owners, the premises were not a 'public place'.
23. In Taxi Drivers' Union v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, : AIR1983Ker69 , the question arose before the learned single judge as under : the taxi drivers were parking their taxies in the parking area adjacent to Cochin Aerodrome Building and collecting passengers alighting from the various flights. The aerodrome building and the parking area are situate about one furlong away from the National Highway and both are connected by a link road. The Kerala State Road Transport Corporation decided to introduce two stage carriage services from Cochin Aerodrome to Guruvayoor. These stage carriages were to start from the parking area of the aerodrome. Since the bus services were cheap, it was bound to affect the taxi business and, therefore, the Taxi Drivers' Union filed a writ petition for restraining the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation from operating the services. The first contention of the union was that the parking area and the link road were 'public places' within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, a permit to operate stage carriage services was necessary under section 42 of the Act. The learned judge, therefore, had to decide whether the parking area and the link road were public places. Evidence on record showed that both parking area and the link road were the property of the Government. The learned judge held that the access to both was purely permissive, although the Civil Aviation Department or the Defence Department were obliged to grant permission to passengers to pass through the link road. The learned judge held that that will not mean that such passengers or members of the public have a right of access as such. On these facts, the learned judge held that it was not a 'public place' within the meaning of the definition, since the public had no right of access to the link road or the parking area in the aerodrome premises.
24. In Abdul Hakim v. Emperor, AIR 1938 Lah 817, the learned single judge was called upon to decide whether the plot of land owned by a private individual but used by a motor bus was a 'public place' within the meaning of the Act. The learned judge held that the definition clearly showed that in order to describe a piece of land as a 'public place', there must be a grant of access to the public or the public must have a right to pass over it. Since, in that case, the public could not claim the right to pass over the plot, it was not a public place.
25. As against the aforesaid authorities, the following decisions have taken a different view. In Lanka Sarmma v. Rajendra Singh, : AIR1984AP32 , the learned single judge was called upon to decide whether a dam site which was the place of accident and which belonged to the Public Works Department and where the coolies were hired for loading and unloading stones was a public place under the Act. The learned judge held that as the workmen constituted the public, the place was a 'public place'. The learned judge further held that section 95 clearly shows that it would not be a correct interpretation of that section to hold that third party compulsory insurance need not cover an accident that occurred on a factory premises. While dissenting from LIC of India v. Karthyani, : AIR1976Ori21 , Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rabari Gandu Punja, : AIR1981Guj200 , and Rajammal v. Associated Transport Co. [1970] ACJ 44 , the learned judge held that the claims for compensation made against the insurance companies by the dependants of the workmen killed or injured within the premises of the factory could not be defeated by the insurance company on the ground that the general public have no right of access to such factory premises.
26. In Narsingh v. Balkishan [1987] 62 Comp Cas 519, the learned single judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court was considering whether the printing press, where the accident took place, could be said to be a 'public place' within the meaning of the Act. The learned judge held that the words 'other place' occurring in the definition are significant in their connotation and should be given a wide import and interpretation. He further held that 'public place' is a place where the public can and do have access. Even user of a private place and access of public to it can be interpreted as a 'public place' within the meaning of section 2(24). Evidence there showed that trucks had access to the campus of the compound of the printing press and the accident itself had occurred due to a dash by the truck. The mere fact that the compound or the campus of the press is owned by an individual would not, according to the learned judge, make it a 'private place'. The learned judge also observed that it was not necessary that the place must be a public property.
27. In Elkins v. Cartlidge [1947] 1 All ER 829, the case arose under the Road Traffic Act, 1930. The respondent there was charged for being in charge of a motor vehicle in a public place, while under the influence of drink. It was found that he had put his car in an enclosure at the rear of an inn at the side of which an open gateway gave access to the enclosure and cars had access to the enclosure and were actually parked there. The Court held that the enclosure was a place to which the public had access and, therefore, was a public place within the meaning of section 15(1) of that Act and the respondent was guilty of an offence under that section.
28. In State v. Dohana Jamnadas, : AIR1961Guj182 , a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court was called upon to decide whether the ladies second class waiting room in a Railway Station was a 'public place' within the meaning of section 12 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act. The Division Bench held that the test within the meaning of that section was whether it was open to the members of the public or not, even though there may be certain conditions attached to the entry or the use thereof. What is required is that such a place must be open for entry by an indeterminate number of members of the public and must not be open only to a definite or a determinate number. The Bench further held that railway platforms are places to which any member of the public has and is permitted to have access. The fact that a platform ticket is necessary for one to enter into such a platform makes no difference as the platforms are for the use and benefit of the public and the members of the public are, therefore, permitted to have access to such platforms.
29. We have already referred to the decision in R. v. Kane [1965] 1 All ER 705, which was a case of a common law offence of affray at the Stage and Press Club, where it was held that it was a public place. It is not necessary to repeat the discussion here.
30. A survey of the aforesaid decisions shows that courts are not unanimous in their views and that there is divergence of opinion with regard to the definition of 'public place' in section 2(24) of the Act. For the reasons which we have discussed earlier, we prefer the view taken by the latter authorities and hold that at least for the purposes of Chapter VIII of the Act, the expression 'public place' will cover all places including those of private ownership where members of public have an access whether free or controlled in any manner whatsoever.
31. In this view of the matter, it cannot be disputed that the place where the present accident occurred was a public place within the meaning of section 95. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the Tribunal and hold that the first respondent insurance company is equally liable to pay compensation to the respondent-claimants as ascertained by the Tribunal. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
32. At the request of Mr. Singh, learned advocate appearing for the first respondent insurance company, the execution and operation of this order as against the insurance company, is stayed for a period of eight weeks from today.
33. Mr. Singh applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The case involves an important question of law of general importance and since there is a difference of opinion on the question among different High Courts, it needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Hence, we grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under article 133(1) of the Constitution.