A.P. Subba, J.
1. In this writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has sought for issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus and/or certiorari for quashing Notification No. PW/Admn-32/2000/47 (B) issued under Memo No. PW/Admn-32/2000/47 (AA) dated 12.07.2007, whereby he has been transferred from his present place of posting to another station before completion of his tenure in violation of the professed policy of transfer and posting.
2. Having regard to the urgency involved in the matter and as agreed to by the learned Counsel for the parties, this writ petition is being disposed of at the admission stage. Accordingly, Mr. M. Chanda, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. E.C. Suja, the learned Counsel for the State respondents and Mr. T.T. Diengdoh, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 4 were heard at length.
3. The case of the petitioner, in a nutshell, is that he was promoted and posted as Executive Engineer, PWD (Roads) NH Shillong Bye Pass Division, Shillong, in May 2005 from the post of Sub-Divisional Officer PWD (Roads) which he was then holding. Having joined the post of Executive Engineer to which he was promoted he had barely completed 2 (two) years tenure when he was transferred and posted as Assistant Chief Engineer, Office of the Assistant Chief Engineer, PWD (Roads) Western Zone, Tura purportedly in public interest. However shortly thereafter the petitioner was again transferred to Central Roads Branch, PWD (Roads) Shillong in suppression of the earlier order. Being aggrieved by this second order of transfer the petitioner has come up with the present writ petition seeking quashing of the order in question.
4. The main grounds which the petitioner has taken in the writ petition are that even though there are no statutory rules governing the transfer and posting of employees, under the term of various notifications and instructions issued by the Govt. from time to time, a fixed term of three years has been prescribed before completion of which no Govt. employee would be transferred in normal course. This practice has over the years been a professed policy of the Govt. in the matter of transfer of a Govt. employee. In view of such professed policy the petitioner would be entitled to continue in his present place of posting i.e. as Executive Engineer PWD (Roads), NH Shillong Bye Pass Division, Shillong at least till May, 2008.
5. Since the posting order in question has been issued in total disregard and in violation of the above professed policy of transfer being followed by the Govt. the further case of the petitioner is that the impugned order is not based on any consideration of public interest or any administrative exigency. The order, according to the petitioner, is based on extraneous considerations the main purpose being to accommodate the respondent No. 4 who is the blue eyed boy of the respondents in place of the petitioner. Therefore, the order being mala fide and arbitrary was liable to be quashed.
6. While the respondent No. 2 did not contest the petition a joint affidavit-in-opposition on behalf of respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 was filed denying the contention of the petitioners. Even though it was not disputed that under the different administrative instructions issued by the Govt. the policy evolved was that an employee should not be transferred before completing a period of three years in one place of posting, it was contended that such policy was not inflexible. It was within the power of the Govt. to deviate from such policy in cases of exigency of service. It was further contended that the notifications issued in this regard were mere administrative instructions which had no statutory force and as such deviation, even if any, does not give any cause of action to file a writ. In other words, the contention was that the guidelines/instructions in question lack any statutory force and cannot be enforced by filing a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was contended that since petitioner who was transferred and posted as Assistant Chief Engineer, PWD (Roads) Western Zone, Tura, vide order dated 3.7.2007, was reluctant to comply with the order and to hand over charge and as the posting of an officer against the vacant post in Tura, was very urgent, the department had to modify the order of transfer dated 3.7.2007 vide Notification dated 12.7.2007 posting one Shri Khylluid Nongrum at Tura and posting the petitioner in the Office of Chief Engineer, PWD (Roads) Central Roads Branch, Shillong, Meghalaya. Such action according to the respondents, was necessary in the interest of public service without any mala fide interest.
7. It is the further case of the respondents that consequent upon the transfer order, the petitioner vide letter dated 16.7.07 was directed to hand over charge of his office to the next officer transferred and posted in his place but the petitioner vide his reply dated 18.7.07 declined to comply with the order taking a plea that he had not been able to complete the accounts till that date. Such reluctance on the part of the petitioner cast a doubt on his integrity and efficiency in so far as under the Meghalaya Financial Rules, an Engineer in charge of a Division was required to finalize and submit the monthly accounts within 10th day of the succeeding month. Such conduct on the part of an officer who was holding charge of large Divisional Office dealing with huge financial transaction showed lack of sincerity and integrity on the part of the petitioner for which the Department had to take serious note of it. Such conduct and lapses on the part of the petitioner according to the respondents showed his keenness to stay on and stick to his place of posting for reason best known to him.
8. The respondent No. 4 by filing a separate affidavit-in-opposition supported the case of the other State respondents contending, inter alia, his transfer and posting in place of the petitioner was in public interest and not mala fide.
9. Mr. Chanda, in his submissions assailed the impugned order mainly on the ground of mala fide. It was his contention that the impugned order of transfer was mala fide as it was not supported by any valid reasons which would show that the order was made in public interest or for exigencies of public service. It was also his contention that Shri P.K. Bhaiya, the Secretary to the Govt. of Meghalaya, Public Works (R& B) Department, Shillong, who was impleaded as respondent No. 2 in his personal capacity, chose to remain absent despite service and since no affidavit-in-opposition was filed by him the averments relating to mala fide were uncontroverted and in view of this the allegation of mala fide stands established. Per contra, the contention of Mr. E.C. Suja, was that the Department had to issue the impugned order keeping in view public interest and exigency of service and as such the order cannot be termed as colourable exercise of power. Sailing in the same boat and supporting the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the State respondents, Mr. T.T. Diengdoh, submitted that no mala fide can be taken to have been established on the basis of the two grounds taken by the learned Counsel for the petition. It was also his submission that the impugned order which was issued in public interest was not violative of any statutory provisions. The deviation, if any, being only in respect of Administrative instructions the writ petition filed by the petitioner was mala fide and liable to be rejected at the threshold.
10. It is well established that the burden of establishing mala fide is on the person making the allegations and such burden is very heavy. Mere allegation without prima facie establishing how the order is biased or actuated by something other than public interest would not be enough. Laying down as to what type of evidence would be required to establish mala fide the Apex Court in Kedar Nath Bahi v. State of Punjab : [1979]1SCR1089 has held that direct and circumstantial evidence and respondents' admission and the attendant circumstance of the case are admissible to establish the lack of bona fide or bad faith alleged. In a later decision rendered in Rajindra Ray v. Union of India : AIR1993SC1236 , the Apex Court has held that establishing malice in fact in a straight cut manner may not always be possible. Hence it has further been held that in an appropriate case, reasonable inference can be drawn about mala fide action from the pleadings and antecedents, facts and circumstances.
11. As already narrated above, the material facts pleaded by the petitioner in support of the plea of mala fide are that the petitioner has been transferred out of the place of his posting before completion of fixed tenure of three years against the professed policy of transfer. He was first transferred vide Notification No. PW/Admn-32/2000/40(L) dated 3rd July 2007 as Assistant Chief Engineer to Tura. Within a short period thereafter he has been again transferred to the office of the Chief Engineer PWD (Roads) Meghalaya, Shillong and in his place the respondent No. 4 has been transferred allegedly for undisclosed reasons without any administrative exigency or public interest.
12. The question is whether the facts as pleaded above are sufficient for drawing an inference of mala fide. As already noted above the contention of the petitioner is that the manner in which one order was replaced by the other in quick succession was indicative of absence of bona fide the object being to accommodate respondent No. 4 in his place for undisclosed reasons.
13. As per law laid down by the Apex Court in Indian Nut Products and Ors. v. Union of India : [1994]3SCR1023 , the existence of the conditions for the exercise of the power must be made out on the basis of relevant material on record. As further held by the Court, if the existence of the conditions for the exercise of such power is challenged as in the present case, the courts are entitled to examine whether the conditions existed when the order was made. The relevant observation which occurs in para 10 of the judgment is as follows:
10. It is well-settled that if a statute requires an authority to exercise power, when such authority is satisfied that conditions exist for exercise of that power, the satisfaction has to be based on the existence of grounds mentioned in the statute. The grounds must be made out on the basis of the relevant material. If the existence of the conditions required for the exercise of the power is challenged, the courts are entitled to examine whether those conditions existed when the order was made. A person aggrieved by such action can question the satisfaction by showing that it was wholly based on irrelevant grounds and hence amounted to no satisfaction at all. In other words, the existence of the circumstances in question is open to judicial review.
14. The learned State counsel in support of his submission that the requisite conditions existed when the impugned order was issued in public interest and exigency of service produced the Departmental file bearing No. PW/Admn-32/2002 on the subject of promotion of Asstt. Engineer (Civil) PWD to the rank of Executive Engineer, PWD, Meghalaya, for perusal of this Court.
15. A perusal of the file goes to show that a proposal for promotion of four Asstt. Engineers to the post of Executive Engineer was initiated and approval was obtained vide notings at NSP 110-112. The notings go to show that since three of the officers proposed to be promoted and posted had not completed three years of service in their present places of posting, the proposal was submitted to the Chief Minister for his approval as required under the different instructions issued by the Govt. in this regard. The further notings after the approval was accorded go to show that necessary notification under Memo No. PW/Admn-32/2000/40 (AA) dated 3rd July 2007 was duly issued. The relevant part concerning the petitioner reads as follows:
No. PW/Admn-32/2000/40(L): On reliefs, Shri Andrew Banrilang Umdor, BE (Civil) Executive Engineer, PWD (Roads), N.H. Shillong Bye Pass Division, Shillong is in the interest of public service, transferred and posted until further orders as Assistant Chief Engineer, Office of the Additional Chief Engineer, PWD (Roads), Western Zone, Tura with effect from the date of taking over charge of the post vice Smt. Odelia K. Marak, transferred.
16. The relevant part of the other Notification issued under Memo No. PW/Admn.-32/2000/47 (AA) dated the 12th July 2007 reads as follows:
No. PW/Admn-32/2000/47 (A): On relief Shri Hubert Kharlukhi, BE (Civil), Under Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya, Public Works Department (R&B;), Special Works Branch is, in the interest of public service, transferred and posted until further orders as Executive Engineer, PWD (Roads), NH Shillong Bye Pass Division, Shillong with effect from the date of taking over charge of the post vice Shri Andrew Banrilang Umdor, transferred.
No. PW/Admn.-32/2000/47 (B): On relief, Shri Andrew Banrilang Umdor, BE (Civil), Executive Engineer, PWD (Roads) NH Shillong Bye Pass Division, Shillong is, in the interest of public service, transferred and posted until further orders as Assistant Chief Engineer, Central Roads Branch, Office of the Chief Engineer, PWD (Roads), Meghalaya, Shillong, with effect from the date of taking over charge of the post of Shri Winston Churchill Paswet, transferred.
No. PW/Admn-32/2000/47 (F) The order on transfer of Shri Andrew Banrilang Umdor, B.E. (Civil) from the post of Executive Engineer, PWD (Roads), NH Shillong Bye Pass Division, Shillong posting him as Assistant Chief Engineer, Office of the Additional Chief Engineer, PWD (Roads), Western Zone, Tura issued vide this Department's Notification No. PW/Admn-32/2000/40 (L) dated 3.7.2007 is hereby cancelled.
17. The above matter was apparently processed and approval was obtained vide notings appearing at NSP 114 and 115 of the concerned file. Curiously enough, these notings go to show that what was put up for approval was a draft Notification for transfer and posting of officers as per order at NSP 43 '46'. Since earlier notification was approved by the CM further approval of the CM was obtained and the impugned notification was issued. A perusal of the orders on page 43 '46' referred to in the above note go to show that the proposal is in respect of officers other than the petitioner. While the noting at NSP 43 relates to the proposal for posting of one Shri K.K. Mawa, the notings at NSP 46 relates to the posting of Shri K. Nongrum, SDO South, Shillong Sub-Division and Shri Bedi Thongni, NN Sub-Division No. III and posting of Shri M Tariang (ACF Bldgs) and Shri I. Kharmawlong Principal SATC. The name of the petitioner finds no mention in these proposals. It is only in the impugned notification issued after approval of the Chief Minister at NSP 114 that the name of the petitioner figures showing his new place of posting as Asstt. Chief Engineer, Central Roads Branch, Office of the Chief Engineer, PWD (Roads) Meghalaya, Shillong, in supercession of the earlier notification.
18. It must however be noted that the subsequent note recorded by P.K. Bhaiya, Secretary PWD (R & B) at NSP 116 does place on record the circumstances which preceded the issue of the impugned notification. The relevant part of the note reads as follows:
Chief Secretary
The department issued a notification transferring Shri Andrew Banrilang Umdor, EE, PWD (Roads), NH, Shillong Bye-pass Division to the Addl. CE, PWD (Roads) office at Tura vide No. PW/Admn-32/2000/40 (L) dt. 3.7.07 (SI. 41 c). Approval of Minister, PWD (Roads) and Chief Minister at Page 112 N.
The CM issued a note to Minister, PW (R) vide SI. 43C to stay the transfer order in respect of Shri Umdor in view of representation by 5 (five) MLAs. In a meeting held in the office chamber of CM., where Minister PWD (R) and Minister, Tourism were present on 12.7.07 it was decided that Shri A.B. Umdor, EE should be transferred but posted in Shillong itself and accordingly a modified order was issued with approval of the Minister PW (R) and the Chief Minister vide 81.47C.
It appears that some MLAs had met the Hon'ble Chief Minister on 19.7.07 and submitted a joint representation demanding that Shri A.B. Umdor, EE, NH Shillong Bye-pass should be transferred and Shri K.K. Mawa, Asstt. CE (Building) may be posted there. A copy of representation with the endorsement of CM is at Flag 'X'. The Minister, PWD (Roads) endorsement on Page 115 N may please be seen. As desired by them a modified order may be issued as per draft placed below, with approval of the Minister, PWD (Bldg.), Minister, PWD (Roads) and the Chief Minister.
Sd/- IllegibleSecretary PWD (R&B;)
19. Even though the above notings highlight the backdrop in which the impugned order came to be issued the notings do not show whether the complaint or the representations received were processed in normal course following set Office procedure for obtaining approval for modification/supercession of the earlier order for supervening reasons, if any. The relevant notings highlighted above thus do not throw any light on the conditions that existed if any and that makes it difficult to ascertain as to what weighed with authorities in taking the decision to modify or replace the earlier one before the impugned Notification was issued.
20. Conceding to the above position in all fairness the contention urged by Mr. E.C. Suja and Mr. T.T. Diengdoh is that the impugned order being in the nature of an administrative order, no supporting reasons were required. It is true that as far as administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly, as held by the Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. v. CEC New Delhi : [1978]2SCR272 . The relevant observation occurring in para 44 and 45 which is illuminating is as follows:
44. The dichotomy between administrative and quasi-judicial functions vis-a-vis the doctrine of natural justice is presumably obsolescent after Kraipak in India and Schmidt in England.
45. Kraipak marks the watershed, if we may say so, in the application of natural justice to administrative proceeding. Hegde, J., speaking for a Bench of five Judges observed, quoting for support Lord Parker in In re H. K. (an infant)
It is not necessary to examine these decisions as there is a great deal of fresh thinking on the subject. The horizon of natural justice is constantly expanding.
21. As pointed out by the Apex Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India : [1970]1SCR457 the distinction between a quasi judicial and administrative function has now become thin and what was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi judicial power. The following is the relevant observation occurring at para 13 of the judgment:
13. The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitab'e that the organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare State like ours it inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent: years the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power.
22. As further held by the Court, a duty to act fairly denotes obligation to follow procedural safeguards. Thus, even in administrative matters, it is the duty of the administrative authority to act fairly.
23. The Supreme Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India : [1981]2SCR533 has held as follows:
57...It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that whenever a statute confers a power on an administrative authority and makes the exercise of that power conditional on the formation of an opinion by that authority in regard to the existence of an immediacy, its opinion in regard to that preliminary fact is not open to judicial scrutiny at all. While it may be conceded that an element of subjectivity is always involved in the formation of such an opinion, but, as was pointed out by this Court in Barium Chemicals (ibid), the existence of the circumstances from which the inference constituting the opinion, as the sine qua non for action, are to be drawn, must be demonstrable, and the existence of such 'circumstances' if questioned, must be proved at least prima facie.
24. Similarly, the Apex Court in M.S. Nelly Bhosal Engineering Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar : (1990)IILLJ211SC has held that fairness is a fundamental principles of good administration. It is a rule to ensure that the vast
power in modern State is not abused but properly exercised. The Court has further clarified that the principle of fairness of procedure or fair play in action should be observed even where the principles of natural justice are not required to be followed. A similar observation made by the Apex Court in State Financial Corporation v. Jagadamba Oil Mills : [2002]1SCR621 makes it clear that the obligation to act fairly on the part of the administrative authorities has been evolved to ensure rule of law and to prevent failure of justice.
25. In Sherao Nagurao v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (1989) 2 SLR 328 a decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his case, it has been held by the Bombay High Court that a transfer is mala fide when it is made not for pro fessed purpose, such as in normal course or in public or administrative interest or in exigencies of service but for other purpose, that is to accommodate another person for undisclosed reasons. This view finds approval from the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu 1974 SC 555 wherein it has been held that a transfer made to accommodate someone for undisclosed reasons has to be termed as malafide.
26. In addition to the above we may also notice the following few of the other decisions referred to and relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the point.
In Dilip Kumar Saikia v. State of Assam and Ors. 2005 (4) GLT 371 a learned Bench of this Court observed as follows:
…If the exercise of power is based on ex traneous consideration for achieving an alien purpose or an oblique motive, it would amount to malafide and colourable exercise of power. Frequent transfer, without sufficient reason to justify such transfer cannot be held as bonafide. A transfer is malafide when it is made not for
professed purpose such as normal course or in public or administrative interest or in the exigencies of service but for other purpose, such as to accommodate another person for undisclosed reasons. It is the basic principle of rule
of law and good administration, that even administrative action should be just and fair. An order of transfer is to satisfy the test of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution, otherwise the same will be treated as arbitrary.
7. A transfer order issued as in the instant case only to accommodate another person and that too without affording any opportunity to the person whose interest is affected, cannot be said to an order issued in administrative exigencies.
Another learned Bench of this Court Viyishe Sema and Anr. v. State of Nagaland 2006 (Suppl.) GLT 379 observed as follows:
7. On close inspection of the records, it appears that the entire action of making impugned cross transfer has been taken up at the behest of the respective Minister and MLA reflecting arbitrariness and nepotism therein. It also goes to show that there was no public interest involved as such in renewing the initial cross transfer order dated 13.5.2004 on 25.1.2005 after almost a gap of one year.
In Jyoti Kumar Das v. Rubul Sarmah also a decision of this Court reported in 2004 (Suppl.) GLT 764 another learned Bench observed as follows:
4. Records further reveal that transfer was ordered primarily on consideration of certain complaints lodged by some political person and members of the public against the writ petitioner. If the writ petitioner has been indulging in any conduct not befitting the office of the CDPO contrary to the public interest, the respondent authority should have gone for any enquiry for imposing such penalty as may be permissible under the rules. Premature transfer at the behest of the members of the public without any enquiry is against public interest. It tends to destroy the morale of the government servant. Such a transfer cannot get the seal of approval from the Court. Hence, the application for vacating order of stay is rejected.
In Sarvesh Kumar Awasthi v. U.P. Jal Nigam and Ors. : (2003)11SCC740 , the Apex Court observed as follows:
3. In our view, transfer of officers is required to be effected on the basis of set norms or guidelines. The power of transferring an officer cannot be wielded arbitrarily, mala fide or any exercise against efficient ad independent officer or at the instance of politicians whose work is not done by the officer concerned. For better administration the officers concerned must have freedom from fear of being harassed by repeated transfers or transfers ordered at the instance of someone who has nothing to do with the business of administration.
27. The above decisions make it amply clear that an order of transfer of an employee cannot be made without valid reasons. In such view of the matter, I have no hesitation to answer the question raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents in the affirmative and to say that an order of transfer even though in the nature of administrative order must be supported by valid reasons.
28. The only question that now remains to be answered is whether the impugned order of transfer can be said to be duly supported by reasons in the present case. As already noted above, the concerned file produced by the Department neither reflects existence of the conditions for the exercise of the power under challenge nor does it indicate any reason so as to show that the power was exercised for professed purpose.
29. In the above circumstances, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order was passed to accommodate the respondent No. 4 for undisclosed reasons cannot be easily brushed aside.
30. Now coming to the other ground relating to absence of denial affidavit by the respondent No. 2 and its consequence it may be noted that, Mr. Chanda relying on Yadavindra Public School Association v. State of Punjab and Ors. : (1991)IILLJ76SC , contended that since the respondents No. 2 against whom the allegation of mala fide was directed did not independently file any affidavit in opposition denying the allegations, the averment of mala fide stand admitted. The observation relied on by the learned Counsel is as follows:
2. Considering that serious allegations of mala fides have been raised in the writ petition, it was not appropriate, in our opinion, for the High Court to have dismissed the writ petition by a detailed order in limine and without notice. When such allegations of mala fides are raised and the person against whom the allegations are made has been impleaded as a respondent, it would be appropriate to give an opportunity to the person concerned to file an affidavit and then to decide the case on merits. Without expressing any opinion on the merits of this case, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore CWP No. 16047 of 1997 to the file of the High Court for decision in accordance with law. Pending disposal of the writ petition, the appellant should not be dispossessed.
31. The position of law has been more clearly laid down by the Apex Court in State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma : 1991CriLJ1438 as follows:
It is well-settled law that the person against whom mala fide or bias was imputed should be impleaded to nominee as a party respondent to the proceedings and given an opportunity to meet those allegations. In his/her absence no enquiry into those allegations would be made. Otherwise it itself is violative of the principles of natural justice as it amounts to condemning a person without an opportunity.
32. As further held by the Apex Court in C.S. Rowjee v. State of A.P. : [1964]6SCR330 when:.In the absence of a denial affidavit by the person against whom such allegations are made, the court would be constrained to accept allegations so remaining unrebutted and unanswered on the test of probability.
33. However, the above does not appear to be law in each and every case. As per the law laid down by the Apex Court in a later decision rendered in
Hemlal v. State of Sikkim : 1987CriLJ718 , a decision relied on by Mr. Diengdoh, it is not necessary in each and every case where allegation of malafide have been made that a counter affidavit refuting these allegations is necessary. In this regard, it is relevant to note that even though the respondent No. 2 did not contest the petition in his personal capacity he was at the same time impleaded as respondent No. 1 in his official capacity and in the joint counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1,2 and 3, the allegations of malafide have been denied. Thus, having regard to this fact and bearing in mind the above principle, I find myself unable to agree with the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the allegation of malafide in the present case should be taken as admitted merely for non filing of counter by the respondent No. 2 in his personal capacity. Even though this ground fails it follows from the foregoing discussion on the first ground that the impugned order is unsupported by any reason to show that it was necessitated by exigency of service or public interest. Consequently the conclusion is irresistible that the impugned order cannot but be termed as malafide.
34. As a result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned orders of transfer bearing No. PW/Admn-32/2000/47 (B) and PW/Admn-32/2000/47(F) issued under Memo No. PW/Admn-32/2000/47(AA) dated 12th July 2007 stands quashed.
35. The department tile may be returned to the concerned Department forthwith.